Your humble and obedient servant, William Caldwell.

G. Mark. Walsh
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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RÉÇUE
YOUR HUMBLE AND OBEDIENT SERVANT,

WILLIAM CALDWELL

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of Arts

by

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ABSTRACT

Colonel William Caldwell played an important role in the development of Essex County. After fighting for Lord Dunmore in Virginia, Caldwell joined Butler's Rangers as a captain, where he quickly showed great military ability. Stationed in Detroit from 1778, his services were in demand both on that front and the Niagara Frontier. Married in 1782 to Suzanne Baby, daughter of Duperon Baby, Caldwell was also the principal member of the "Indian Officers" who received a grant of land from the Huron Indians in 1784, on the site of present-day Amherstburg. He had a brief career in the fur trade, operating an unsuccessful business with Matthew Elliott from 1784-1787. From his Malden residence Caldwell became one of the principal inhabitants of the area, holding the offices of Justice of the Peace and Deputy Lieutenant of Essex County.

Already known for his defeat of Daniel Boone in 1782, he was the officer in command of the only British contingent at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794. Not a politician, he retired to the life of a gentleman farmer at Malden when passed over for command by the militia reorganization of 1798. From 1784 until 1810 he sought and finally succeeded in having the title to his lands under the Huron grant confirmed.

Caldwell played an important role in the War of 1812, initially
as Assistant Quarter Master General and later as Acting Deputy Superintendent General of the Upper Canadian Indian Department. Drawn into the conflict between the Department and the Military Establishment, he was dismissed in 1815. From that time until his death in 1822 Caldwell promoted the interests of Malden Township and Amherstburg, chairing town meetings and donating land for both Roman Catholic and Anglican churches.

Excepting the problems with the Indian Department in 1815, William Caldwell is remembered as an able soldier, respected by the Indians, a founder of Amherstburg, and principal inhabitant of early Essex County.
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List of Abbreviations

BHC  Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library
BM   British Museum
FMM  Fort Malden Museum
HBCA Hudson's Bay Company Archives
HWHM Hiram Walker Historical Museum
NMC  National Map Collection
OA   Ontario Archives
PAC  Public Archives of Canada
PAM  Provincial Archives of Manitoba
PRO  Public Record Office
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INTRODUCTION

The Georgian prose used so politely at the conclusion of letters of the day serves as a useful description of the life of William Caldwell. This was his contribution to Canada, Ontario, Essex County, and the American "Old Northwest" - that he was an obedient servant of the Crown and his community. It is a contribution which has never been appropriately treated. Caldwell has been portrayed variously as a British military figure of some ability, a stern and unloving father, a Loyalist, and a senile old man. Yet all of these descriptions fail to capture the man's life in its entirety.

William Caldwell's life shows the struggles and rewards of a man who chose to live under the British Crown at a time when many in North America did not. He was the quintessential Loyalist, forsaking family, wealth, and opportunity with no apparent inducement at the outbreak of the American Revolution. Rewarded by a grateful Crown, he took advantage of all opportunities offered to the "Royalists" in the decades following that struggle. Caldwell's activities as a Loyalist could have ended at that point, but he chose to take an active role in the struggle between Indian and American on the Detroit Frontier. This again was a sign of his fidelity. When British policy-makers abandoned their allies William Caldwell continued to stand with them.
When war again called upon the men of Upper Canada to declare their loyalties, Caldwell, once more became a soldier. He accepted any task given, even when it made him unpopular, indeed hated, by those under his charge. The last few public activities of his life showed him promoting the interests of his community. Not totally altruistic in all his endeavours, the man never ceased in his attempt to promote his own interests as well. In doing so he became a member of the landed gentry of Essex County and the holder of a number of appointed offices, both civilian and military.

The man from Castlecaldwell, County Fermanagh, in present-day Northern Ireland lived well and was respected in the pluralistic society of his day. Well known to the Indians, the Irishman married into a prominent French Canadian family and lived alongside the Germans, Scottish, English, and others who settled in the area. He was not as ambitious as some, but fared better than most.

Throughout William Caldwell's life there seemed to be only a secondary role for him to play. Upon deeper examination the story unfolds of his place in events and history at local, provincial, national, and even imperial levels. It is a story of faithfulness, of loyalty, of suffering and reward. It would be enough to consider Caldwell merely as a case study in Upper Canadian Loyalism, but there is more to his role in the defense of that loyalty which demands a study of his life.
Chapter I

"A Very Active Partisan" 1773-1783

The North America to which William Caldwell emigrated in 1773 was a place of great turbulence. The English held control of most of the continent. The conquest of the French opened up the land west of the Allegheny Mountains, causing the Ohio Basin Indians a great deal of consternation. Colony fought against colony in the race to extend borders and build empires. Natives retaliated in an effort to maintain traditional hunting preserves and territory.

Caldwell entered into the midst of one of the major conflicts along the western frontier. In January of 1774 Lord Dunmore, Governor of Virginia, made a pre-emptive strike against the Pennsylvanians at Fort Pitt. Taking the post easily, he claimed it for Virginia and refused to cooperate or negotiate with Governor Penn. Caldwell, who linked up with the Virginians either at this point or earlier in 1773, "joined Lord Dunmore as an officer on an Expedition against the Indians" which started with the events of June 1774. The Shawnee, Mingo, and Delaware tribes warred against the Virginian "land seekers" they found intruding into their territory. Caldwell was wounded in an ensuing battle on the
Monagahale River. By July Dunmore had received the support of the House of Burgesses to prosecute the campaign and pledged to lead the force personally. He organized two main forces to attack the Indians. Dunmore led a group from Fort Pitt, and Colonel Lewis of the Virginia militia led the second group down the Kanawha River. The two were to join forces against the Shawnee in the interior. Caldwell was with the latter, and on 10 October they were attacked by Cornstalk, chief of the Shawnee. Cornstalk hoped to defeat Lewis's force before it could join Dunmore, but in very stiff hand-to-hand combat it was the Virginians who were victorious. Caldwell was again wounded in what he called "Battle Kanaway", also known as the Battle of Point Pleasant. The defeated Shawnee sued for peace.

In the previous month the First Continental Congress was held in Philadelphia. In April of 1775 the American Revolution began with activities at Lexington and Concord. May marked the Second Continental Congress; it also became the month which divided Virginia into Rebel and Loyalist camps. When the Virginia Assembly attempted to support the notion of independence by legislation introduced on 26 May, Dunmore dissolved the Assembly and declared war against the Rebels in Virginia. By early June he was forced to flee to the safety of a small fleet of ships he had at Yorktown, from whence he conducted the Virginia Loyalist activities. He offered freedom to any slaves who would join his cause. Throughout October he and his forces raided suspected arsenals where they found weapons, but little powder. Finally, in January of 1776 Dunmore and his small force of Tories, negroes, and British regulars,
attempted to storm Norfolk, a Rebel stronghold. Although they left the
town in flames, they were forced to retreat. Even though Dunmore continued
to harass the Rebels until May of that year, his forces never recovered from
the defeat at Norfolk.\textsuperscript{11}

Wounded a third time at Norfolk, the battle which had "oblige[d] his
Lordship to embark his forces", Caldwell was rewarded for his bravery
and loyalty with a personal recommendation from Lord Dunmore to Colonel
John Caldwell, commanding officer of the 8th Regiment of Foot and com-
mandant at Fort Niagara.\textsuperscript{12} With the recommendation in hand Caldwell
retired to Philadelphia, likely to recover from his wounds, and stayed
with a well-to-do uncle.\textsuperscript{13} Here he was faced with the choice of remaining
loyal or joining the Rebels.

One of the prime features of Pennsylvania Loyalism
(and chief reason for its feebleness) is its equivocal, neutral, and, it must be argued, sometimes
subtle nature. A striking number of Pennsylvanians
did not know which way to turn.\textsuperscript{14}

His relatives tried to get William to take up the Rebel cause, but he
remained a Loyalist.\textsuperscript{15} His choice was very different from most Pennsyl-
vanians in that it was made so quickly and so definitely.

Once settled in Philadelphia, Caldwell must have come into contact
with Major John Butler, as it appears that he was one of the many agents
established by Butler in the principal towns of New York and Pennsylvania.
Butler's reason for recruiting these agents was to gather intelligence
on Rebel activities in general and Indian affairs in their areas in
particular. Caldwell had the reputation of being one of Butler's ablest
agents.\textsuperscript{16}

The Rebel population of Philadelphia had enough support to denounce
Tories. Caldwell was sentenced to death for his Loyalist activities, but escaped before the penalty could be administered. In doing so he also assisted a number of captured British officers to make their escape. The fact that the Philadelphia Caldwells were wealthy, and that William could have undoubtedly profitted had he chosen to stay with them, is indicative of his almost passionate attachment to the British cause.

Late in 1776 or early 1777 Caldwell reached Niagara. He did not make use of his recommendation from Lord Dunmore; he chose instead to continue his association with John Butler. The Major was busy forming the Loyalist corps which became known as Butler's Rangers. Caldwell had again demonstrated his courage and ability freeing several British officers and guiding them with him to Fort Niagara. He received the captaincy of the second company of Butler's Rangers.

The Rangers had been set up as a unit to fight beside the Indians. They would direct them, exhort them, and at times restrain them. Although carrying on a function important to the Indian department, the Rangers were not responsible to that department but rather to the commandant at Niagara, and many settled there after the war. As an irregular unit they were not subject to the same harsh discipline of the regular troops, rather "nothing of the kind is expected, the business of a Ranger being to march well, to be able to endure fatigue, and to be a marksman." The Americans for their part had not been idle in pursuing an Indian policy. While Dunmore had fought the Rebels in Virginia, others in New York concluded a treaty with the Six Nations at Albany in August of 1775 to secure their neutrality. Their efforts were renewed at
German Flats in New York in June of 1776, although only the Oneidas and Tuscaroras attended. The Americans were somewhat successful in keeping the Oneidas neutral and even secured their services as guides. It took Joseph Brant's intervention, along with the services of the Johnsons and Butlers as negotiators for the British, to get finally all of the Six Nations except the Oneidas to abrogate their treaty with the Americans and take up the British cause. This was formalized at Oswego in July of 1777. 21 The allegiance of the Six Nations was won only after the war had been ongoing for some time.

Caldwell may have been at those councils called by the British but there is, unfortunately, no record of this. One of the first official records mentioning William Caldwell as a Ranger was on 10 April 1778 when Butler wrote to Governor General Sir Frederick Haldimand, requesting that the commissions for the officers of the second company of Rangers be forwarded to him. Barrant Foy was named as first Lieutenant, Peter Hare as second, and Caldwell as Captain. 22 This was only a formality, as the company had been in existence from a short time after Caldwell's arrival at Niagara.

When Butler fell ill in the summer of 1777, Caldwell commanded the whole corps. He was the commander at the "Wyoming Massacre", where he coordinated manoeuvres with Joseph Brant. The Rangers and Indians reached the area by canoe down the Susquehanna River and marched into the upper end of the Wyoming Valley. The Americans there, under the command of General Zebulon Butler, were anxious for a battle, fearing that delay would place their families and property in jeopardy. In
leaving their fortification, the Americans invited disaster by virtue of their smaller number and the distance which they marched out, making retreat to the fort difficult. They fought fiercely for less than an hour before being outflanked by the combined Ranger-Indian force. Their lines broken, the Americans attempted to retreat. Those who fled the battle

...were pursued, tomahawked, speared, and butchered as they ran. Some took to the water..... They were shot while swimming, or brought to shore by promises of quarter and instantly killed. A prisoner was thrown on the burning logs of a fort and held down with pitchforks. Sixteen more..... were arranged around a stone, and Queen Ester, a squaw of political prominence, passed around the circle singing a war-song and bashing out their brains.

The civilian population fled the valley immediately.23

Butler had gone to the "Indian Country" in New York and found that the Indian Villages of Oquaga and Tuscarora were threatened by the Rebels. They appealed to him for assistance. Still in ill health, he gave the command to Caldwell. Staying at Oquaga, Caldwell had continual accounts of Rebel troops posted in Cherry Valley preparing to attack the villages. The Indians were, of course, very apprehensive. Unfortunately, two Rangers decided to desert while guarding cattle. They took or destroyed two stands of arms, which made the Indians suspicious of the Rangers' ability to support and defend them. Caldwell sent out a party to catch the men andexecute them on sight, which was done. As Butler later put it,

This had every effect which could be wished on Removing the bad impression on all the Indians and prevented any deserting from my Corps the
Complain of '78 79 and 80 - excepting two or three.....

Many of the Rangers were from western Pennsylvania, and were eager to avenge old injuries. This engagement and others like it allowed Butler to establish, by September of 1778, a chain of scouting parties of Rangers and Indians from German Flats along the Susquehanna and Ohio Rivers. Caldwell was given command of the entire force. They were to assist a large group of Senecas whenever required or requested. They were able to inflict considerable damage, mostly to property and livestock, as Caldwell's report Butler shows:

Onedella Sep 21st 1778

Sir,

We returned to this place yesterday evening after destroying all the buildings and Grain at the German Flats from Wm. Tygirt's to Fort Hirkimir on the South Side of the River, and from Adam Starings to Bicks beyond Canada Creek on the North Side excepting the Church and Fort Dayton and drove of a great Number of Cows and Oxen and a Great Many Horses & Mares, the Oxen were all large New England Cattle kept at the Flats for the use of the Garrison at Fort Stanwix, and we took them out to the Inclosure at Fort Dayton within pistol shot of the Fort. In our Way to the Flats we came up with a Scout at Major Edmontons three of which we killed but the others made their Escape notwithstanding we took every obvious Method to prevent them but prior to that we took five Oneida prisoners, but left them where they were with three other Indians to watch them, on their promising to stay at that place until we should return, which promise they broke and in our absence came to Onedella and robbed the people there of everything they had of any Value and Carried as many of the Men as they could find as prisoners amongst whom were two of our Sick Rangers. We would in all probability have killed most of the Inhabitants at German Flats had they not been apprizd of our Coming by one of
the Scouts getting in and warning them of our approach, and perhaps got their Forts—we were also very unhappy in the weather as it rained incessantly all the Night before we attack'd the place and the following Day we talked to none of the Inhabitants Mr. Shoemakers Family excepted who could not, or would not give any Acc. of the Armies at New York 
North River &c Mr Wall inqurd particularly about your Family but could learn nothing but that Mr Butler had been seen about three months ago at Skenecaday. Some people Created a false Report that we were surrounded and taked the better to excuse their own flying which I am afraid will reach you before this I refer to your particulars of this and everything else with us to L Fry I am Sir

Your Most Obedt
Humble Servt

(signed) Wm Caldwell

Caldwell accomplished this with the Rangers and about one hundred and sixty Senecas. As will be seen by the reference above to killing most of the inhabitants of German Flats, the business of a Ranger was to fight in the "Indian Mode" of warfare, seldom granting quarter. The theft of cattle would provide Butler with an inexpensive means of sustaining his Rangers and Indians at very little cost to the British. Captain Walter Butler, the Major's son and senior captain, set out gathering more Senecas "and hoped to be able to join Captain Caldwell & render the Blow more severe, as well as more extensive....." In the end, Caldwell was ordered to join with Captain Butler and attack Cherry Valley. The attack was repulsed because the Senecas refused to follow orders.

Caldwell and his Rangers spent the remainder of 1778 at Fort Niagara. They were put to work with the rest of the corps building barracks for themselves. When the costs of the project ran well over budget, the Butlers
blamed Caldwell for not dispelling a rumour that the men would receive double the usual per diem wages. Although Caldwell was in command during the Butlers' absence, he was not mentioned in the inquiry into the mismanagement of the project.  

Events on the Detroit Frontier took an ugly turn early in 1778 when Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton committed a near-fatal error. Although he had defeated George Rogers Clark on 7 October 1778, Clark had upon his return the following February recaptured Fort Vincennes, captured Hamilton, and was able to threaten the possession of the Old Northwest. Colonel Bolton, who had replaced Colonel John Caldwell in command at Niagara, ordered fifty hand-picked Rangers sent to Detroit to reinforce its garrison. Caldwell was chosen to lead the group. It was just as well that he was absent from Niagara for February and March, as Governor General Haldimand and Colonel Bolton were becoming concerned over Ranger expenses and the rate of consumption of goods by the Indians. Haldimand in particular questioned the amount of rum shown in the barracks accounts which had been given to the Rangers and workmen. He refused Butler's bill for expenses because of its many irregularities. Haldimand was also concerned that if Butler could not reduce the Indians' consumption of foodstuffs, then the scarcity of such supplies would continue at the Upper Posts. He wrote to Bolton, "I observe with great concern the difficulties Major Butler finds in subsisting his Rangers and Indians" and wanted Butler to find a means of feeding the Indians, preferably at no cost. Apparently the Rangers were not able to obtain livestock as Caldwell had at German Flats. Again it was fortunate for Caldwell to be away from Niagara, as
Haldimand feared that Butler and John Johnson would have a "misunderstanding"; Johnson apparently felt that the Rangers should fall under the Indian Department when in reality Butler had full command subject to the orders of Colonel Bolton. The distinction between military and Indian Department officers would continue to play a role throughout Caldwell's life.

The population at and around Caldwell's new posting was not totally Loyalist. Detroit was an obviously important post and settlement in the Old Northwest. Holding it meant virtual control of the Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois territories. It was the gateway to the Upper Great Lakes, and by the time of Caldwell's arrival already played an important role in the southwest and Michilimackinac fur trade. Ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of Paris, Detroit had not been an active theatre of war during the Seven Years War. Largely French, its loyalty had never been tested, but Detroit was close enough to Louisiana to be effected by rumours of renewed French activities in North America. The English-speaking population was not completely trustworthy either - one of Caldwell's new Detroit recruits denounced his former employer, stating that the man was setting aside supplies for the anticipated arrival of the Virginia militia.

Military strategy on the Detroit Frontier demanded the cooperation of the Indians. Those of the area - Shawnee, Wyandotte, Ottawa, Pottawatomi, Delaware, Miami, and others - required careful attention. Their proper motivation and management fell upon, luckily for the British, a very able group of Indian officers, British regulars, and Rangers, most
of whom fought along with them. These were the men who supplied the Indians' needs, providing aid by way of provisions, arms and ammunition, and military assistance. The failure to assist the Indians in battle and with supplies could end their support of the British. It is no surprise then that the garrison at Detroit would have to be maintained. Being chosen for this duty was evidence of William Caldwell's ability as a soldier and his influence with the Indians. It was a choice which would change his life.

While events at Detroit in the summer of 1779 were less than momentous, General Sullivan and the Continental Army spent August and September decimating the Iroquois villages of New York and Pennsylvania. Caldwell was ordered in September to proceed to Tioga and engage Sullivan. Although seeming less endangered, effective military operations in the Detroit area were made more difficult by the absence of Caldwell and his company. In October Simon Girty and Matthew Elliott led a group of Shawnees against Colonel Rogers on the Ohio. The following month the Shawnees asked for more soldiers to reinforce their towns on the Miami River. Major De Peyster, the new commandant at Detroit who had just replaced Captain Lernoult, was unable to comply with their wishes. He informed Alexander McKee, the chief Indian officer, that "was Capt. Caldwell's Rangers here It should be done!".

When Caldwell reached Tioga he found it abandoned and burned. He led a force of Rangers which had combined with approximately 1,000 Indians, regular troops, and artillery. They would not be so easily put to flight as Butler and Brant had been at Newtown on 29 August.
made—the mistake of thinking he had by that action broken the Tory-Iroquois menace to the American Frontier. The Americans had left in a hurry, and left 800 head of cattle behind which were immediately earmarked to feed the Six Nations Indians. Caldwell pursued Sullivan's trail for sixteen miles, but could not continue as the party of Indians with him refused to go on as he wished. He then returned to Niagara, where he would winter.

The defeat at Newtown gave the Rangers occasion to pause and examine their position. Caldwell, Walter Butler, John McDonnel, and Caldwell's former lieutenant, Peter Hare took the time to outline some problems in a letter to Major Butler. The basic issue was that the six-and-a-half companies of Rangers had only five captains, and the four signing felt that the other, Captain Fenbrook, was an inadequate officer. More commissions had to be granted. The obvious effect of more commissioned officers would be less confusion in the field. Caldwell and his fellow officers would see the elevation of the corps through the promotion of their commanding officer to colonel in February of 1780.

Events in the Indian countries of the two regions in the spring of 1780 differed significantly. On the Niagara Frontier, the recently dispossessed Iroquois took up residence on the Grand River, more determined than ever to defeat the Americans. On or about 17 March, the daughter of the Mohawk chief Rising Sun bore Caldwell a son, Billy. Reports from Detroit sounded a more ominous ring. Guy Johnson warned Alexander McKee that

In the course of the Winter, there has been an
extraordinary message sent to the Delawares of Ohio, from the Wyandots, Chipawas, Pontawatamies, and I believe the Hurons are also concerned in it, advising them to a neutrality, and to remove and settle among them &c. 45

The effect which the removal of Caldwell's company of Rangers from Detroit may have had on local Indians is not directly stated. It is safe to assume, however, that the additional Rangers' presence and military skills could only have had a beneficial effect on Indian loyalty to the British. By advising the Delawares to remain neutral, the tribes referred to above were indicating their belief that the Americans would win, and it would therefore be advantageous not to antagonize them. 46 The tribes had not yet broken faith with the British, but it would take careful diplomacy combined with military success to keep the alliance alive.

As for the state of Indian Affairs facing McKee, it would evidently be up to his Shawnee warriors to hold back the Americans. The Ohio Territory would be their battleground. Until reinforcements arrived at Detroit, it would be up to Matthew Elliott, the Girty brothers, and himself to direct the Shawnee with only very limited assistance. In the summer of 1780 Haldimand wrote Bolton that another company or two of Rangers would have a "good effect...against the Encroachments on the Ohio....", but until reinforcements arrived every available man was needed at Oswego. 47 The policy of maintaining forces in the Lake Ontario region at the expense of the Detroit area would be repeated some thirty-three years later in the next conflict between Loyalist and Rebel.

In January of 1781, Caldwell and his fellow officers got their wish; Major Matthews, secretary to the Governor General, provided Brigadier
General Powell with blank commissions for the Rangers. That same month a company of Rangers arrived at the Miami River, commanded by Captain A. Thompson. The group also made it to Sandusky in May. De Peyster still found that he needed reinforcements and asked for more Rangers. Caldwell was not mentioned in the official dispatches dealing with the Rangers in the Ohio Territory, but probably remained at Niagara, as was shown by his being chosen by Powell in the following letter in July to the Governor General:

Colonel Johnson and Colonel Butler having represented to me that about one hundred Indians and fifty Rangers might be employed to great advantage in Distressing the Rebels at Currys' Bush near Schenectady, I permitted them to go under the command of Captain Caldwell of the Rangers, a very active Partisan. They went off a few days ago and we expected to return in about six weeks. As I thought it was possible from accounts we have received of Colonel Allen's proceedings, that your Excellency might send some Troops over Lake Champlain, I gave Captain Caldwell instructions that in case he received certain accounts that Troops from Canada were at Ford Edward, or upon any Communication he was to send to the Officer commanding them and to offer his services to co-operate with him in any manner The King's Service might require; and I have no doubt but he will be of signal use if called upon.

Several important facts come to light from this communication. First and foremost, it is obvious that Caldwell was regarded as a man of some ability, at least by Powell. Haldimand also knew of his ability, and had written to Powell shortly after Caldwell's departure that he was pleased to hear that the Indians were anxious to be employed "and I approve of your having indulged their Inclinations in the Parties under Capt. Caldwell and Schenoss....." About the time of Caldwell's return the Commander-in-Chief again wrote General Powell, reiterating his approval.
of sending a party under Caldwell, and noting that a rebel newspaper contained an account of a Colonel Willmont defeating Brant. Haldimand thought that the reference was actually to Caldwell and hoped it to be without foundation. He hoped that Caldwell had returned successful.53

Second, the Rangers were frequently out on manoeuvres for extended periods, in this case six weeks. It was neither an easy nor inexpensive life, as "the Rangers, when they are out upon Scouts are frequently obliged to sell their necessaries to supply themselves with provisions, which is seldom reimbursed...."54

Caldwell apparently knew of the movements of another detachment of Rangers, and on 3 August he met with them. A smaller group of about thirty-seven Rangers under Lieutenant John Hare had about one hundred Indians with them, giving Caldwell the command of a combined force of approximately eighty-seven Rangers and two hundred and fifty Indians. The Indians were somewhat difficult to deal with, and decided on their own initiative to attack Rochester. Four days later the enemy was tracking the group, although a reconnoitering party of Rangers attacked their scouting party, taking two prisoners. After foraging around the Rochester area for about eight days, the Indians declined to go further. The local militia had been called out, and Caldwell decided that the best course of action was to return to Niagara. His retreat was slow, apparently because he hoped to lure the rebel militiamen into the woods in pursuit where his men and the Indians could easily pick them off. The militia, for their part, had learned from experience and did not take the bait. Caldwell had again taken a substantial number of cattle and horses, and was upset by the Indians' slaughter of the cattle which would have left the Rangers
to starve had they not had the horses. 55

Caldwell had no way of knowing that events on the Ohio frontier had already necessitated his return there. On 22 July Powell wrote to Haldimand stating that Caldwell and his company were to be sent to Sandusky. Returning to Niagara about the end of August he was forced to report that some of his men were 'missing'; they had likely either split away from the main party on the return trek or had returned home for the harvest. By the middle of September all except one had reported in and were to return to Niagara. On 20 October, nearly three months after his decision to send Caldwell to the Ohio Territory, Powell wrote Haldimand Colonel Butler having represented to me that the Company of his Corps now at Detroit having been promised to be relieved during the course of the summer, he was afraid, they would be much dissatisfied if it did not take place. In consideration of which, and the constant hard duty they have been upon, I have permitted him to send Captain Caldwell with twenty five men which were all they had fit for that service. To relieve part, or all of that Detachment, if they could be spared, and I shall take some other opportunity to compleat Captain Caldwell's Company, 56

While at Detroit in the fall of 1781 Caldwell appears to have done little by way of engaging the enemy. It is apparent that Haldimand was in direct contact with him, as the Governor General wrote General Powell on 1 November acknowledging letters which were "Covering a Copy of a letter from Captain Caldwell of the Rangers aledging the Receipt of my letters by Capt: Grant. . . . 57 It is doubtful though that Caldwell and his men were inactive. It may have been as well that during this period William Caldwell came to know his future wife, Suzanne Baby. As daughter of the
well established merchant and Indian Department interpreter Jacques Duperon Baby, Suzanne offered Caldwell the possibility of immediate entry into Detroit society. Something about the area must have appealed to him, for he could have easily settled elsewhere. It is also entirely possible that during the winter of 1781-1782 Caldwell became better acquainted with the Hurons on the south bank of the Detroit River, a group of Indians who would shortly reward him and other "Indian Officers" for fighting along side them.

Although Caldwell had been sent to relieve the corps of Rangers at Detroit under Captain Thompson, they did not leave that winter. In the spring of 1782, on 21 April, De Peyster wrote to Powell

...........Lieut Butler goes down with nineteen recruits for Col. Butler's Corps, I hope soon to see an officer replace him as the Rangers will soon move for the Indian Country; when the Sick and Lame are off, the Rangers are so few, that Cap' Caldwell hopes and I am sure I have reason to hope, It will not be insisted upon that he sends the remainder of Capt Thompson's Detachment, and, that the remainder of Cap' Caldwell's Company will join him by the first opportunity....58

De Peyster had good reason to be hopeful; intelligence gathered from a prisoner and sent by Simon Girty nine days earlier indicated that the Americans had been "to Council" at Fort Pitt for the purpose of raising an army which would march on Sandusky. It was to be a smaller campaign than Sullivan's led by General Irvin, with 500 infantry and 300 cavalry troops.59 A full month earlier De Peyster had written to Haldimand with news from the Indian Country that it was rumoured that 2,000 French troops were on their way up the Ohio River; he felt Detroit needed two or three more companies of Rangers to meet adequately the threat posed
by the Americans' ally. Three more companies of Rangers would likely have meant less than two hundred men, but De Peyster believed that the presence of additional Rangers would demonstrate the good intentions of the British to their Indian allies, and as the Rangers were to fight along side them, draw a larger number of warriors into the field to match the reported 2,000 French troops.

By the middle of May it was evident that at least the intelligence on American activities was true. An Indian scouting party from Sandusky fell in with the enemy "on this side of the Ohio opposite to the Wheeling" and did not fare well. The Indians withdrew with some difficulty and requested assistance from De Peyster, who felt he could not refuse them without losing their confidence. It was his decision to

.....send off Captain Caldwell with the Rangers, some Canadian Volunteers, and the Lake Indians, with a proportion of Ammunition, which I hope will give spirits to the Wiandots, till something more can be done for them.....

By the 16th De Peyster was expressing concern over the possibility of Colonel George Rogers Clark attacking the Shawnee Towns on the Miami. He then had two problems. First there was the imminent American attack on the Sandusky Wyandottes, and second the likely attack on the Miami Shawnee. There was a common solution to both: William Caldwell and the Rangers. With the schooner Faith ready to sail for Sandusky with the Rangers on board, De Peyster laid out his plan as follows:

___ I see by the Intelligence.....that it confirms the attack intended upon Sandusky ___ should it however not be the case, I shall manage matters so, that the Rangers shall not waste their time there, least Mr Clarke should intend a Visit up the
Wabash, in which case Captain Caldwell shall cross the Country with the Lake Indians to assist the Miami in opposing him....

Clark did indeed "intend a visit" and had in mind the eventual capture of Detroit itself. Washington had agreed to his plan, and ordered the commandant at Fort Pitt to give Clark a company of artillery and as many regular infantry as could be spared from that place. The officers of the Indian Department had been aware of his plans, and Matthew Elliott had taken a scouting party into Kentucky in March, burning a magazine of provisions. He noted a great deal of activity around Bryant's Station.

The Faith had sailed on the 16th May for the short trip to Sandusky. The Indian settlement there actually consisted of two towns, known as Upper and Lower Sandusky. Caldwell chose the lower town for his camp. He had his Rangers, Canadian Volunteers, and about forty Lake Indians in addition to the population of Sandusky. Twenty-four more Rangers under Lieutenant Turney joined him from Niagara shortly after his arrival. Matthew Elliott and Simon Girty represented the Indian Department. News soon reached Sandusky that a force of between 500 and 600 mounted riflemen under Colonel Crawford was marching against them.

Included in the intelligence was a mention that the force was the same one which earlier in the year had massacred nearly one hundred Christian Delawares at Muskegan by brutally beating them to death and then burning the bodies. This group of Delawares had in fact been neutral, but the Americans suspected them of harbouring other hostile Indians. Two-thirds of the population killed were women and children. The force was reputed
to intend to give quarter to no one. 65

At noon on June 4th the enemy appeared two miles away from the
British forces. Caldwell advanced his Rangers, Canadians, and Indians
at the junction of the two paths leading to upper and lower towns.
Crawford and his men retreated into a wooded area which was surrounded by
open fields on all sides, having only a slight projection in which the
Rangers gained a foothold. The Rangers, acting as an advance party,
managed to push the Americans back until Caldwell had most of the
Canadians and Indians under cover. The two forces then exchanged heavy
fire, although with few casualties. Unfortunately Caldwell was one of
those wounded early in the action, with a musket ball passing through
both his thighs. The field of command then went to Lieutenant Turney
with Matthew Elliott directing the activities of the Indian force. The
combined British force pushed the Americans out of the woods, and though
the fighting went on all day neither side was winning. The exchange
ceased at nightfall. At daybreak on the 5th the Rangers commenced firing.
Turney observed that the enemy seemed reluctant to engage them. The
Americans made two attempts to "sally" or charge, but were repulsed each
time. The balance was tipped heavily in favour of the British at noon
when Alexander McKee arrived from the Miami River with 140 Shawnee
warriors. 66 Turney used them to surround the enemy and thought he had
cut off their retreat. Unfortunately, the Americans found the weakest
part of the Shawnee line, charged at dusk, and broke through. The
Indians pursued them, seeking revenge for the Delaware massacre. The
chase continued for several days, and it appears that the last man to be
captured and killed by the Indians had made it as far as the Ohio River. Caldwell and McKee estimated that half of Crawford's force perished in the woods or was killed in the pursuit.67

Turney immediately made his report to De Peyster, as probably McKee did also. Turney particularly commended Captain Elliott for his part in the action.68 Some days later Caldwell felt well enough to submit his report as the commanding officer to De Peyster. The menace of Clark descending on the Shawnee Towns was clearly on his mind, as he wrote on June 11th:

Sir,

No doubt but you must ere this, have received Lieut Turney's letter from Upper Sandusky at the time it was wrote we were not able to ascertain properly the Enemy's loss, as the pursuers were not all returned. I now have the pleasure of transmitting to you as true an account as possible, which is killed and wounded 250 amongst the Prisoners Colonel Crawford and some of his Officers amongst the killed is Major McClelland. Their Officers I believe suffered much. Our loss is inconsiderable, one Ranger killed, myself and two wounded. Levellier killed. 4 Indians killed and Eight wounded. The White men that are wounded are in a good way, and I hope will be fit for service in a fortnight. The Delawares are still in pursuit, and I hope will account for most of the six hundred. The Lake Indians are very tardy, we had but forty-four of them in the Action. I should be very glad if they would hasten as I expect we will have occasion for them. I hope something will be done this Summer. Clark I believe will soon be on his way for the Shawanise Country; if so, we will have occasion for as many as possibly can be gathered. The Indian demands are great and I have not a single thing to suffice them with. Provision is mostly their cry, which I hope you'll send us a fresh supply of Ammunition, Tobacco, and such other things as are necessary for Warriors, are requisite if you please to send them. The Chief with one Eye and Dewantate with their Bands are going to Detroit, as it is their custom after striking a blow to return
and see their families; but whatever you may tell
them, they will do with pleasure. They behaved
very well while with me.....

Caldwell continued,

......If I had not been so unlucky, I am induced
to think from the influence I have with the
Indians, the Enemy would not have left the
place we surrounded them in......

He closed the report advising De Peyster that McKee was to set out that
day for the Shawnee Towns, and signed it "W. Caldwell Capt Command" at
Sandusky'.

Caldwell's report demonstrated several important points. First,
the command of a large operation went to Caldwell, even though both
McKee and Elliott had military experience. Further, when Caldwell was
removed from the scene of action, the command devolved upon Lieutenant
Turney. The fact that both McKee and Elliott were Indian Department
"captains" did not seem to give them equivalent military rank. A second
point is Caldwell's apparent confidence in his own abilities. Perhaps
Caldwell thought he might have done better than Turney owing to his then
six years' experience as a Ranger and the insight into the best methods
available for directing the Indians in battle. Finally, the fact that
the Indian families were at Detroit reinforced De Peyster's problems;
the women and children would obviously have to be fed. The return of
the warriors to their families would only exacerbate the problem. The
stationing of their families indicated both Indians' fear of American
attack and their growing dependency.

De Peyster, on hearing of the victory wrote on 11 June to McKee
that "the pleasure I rec'd from the defeat of the Enemy would have been
greatly heightened had Captain Caldwell not been wounded.70

For both De Peyster and Caldwell the "pleasure" of victory was
replaced by the horror of Indian atrocities committed June 12th. Simon
Girty arrived at Lower Sandusky that evening from the upper villages
where the Delawares were camped, and apparently where the prisoners were
also. The Delawares, in obvious revenge for the Muskegan massacre, took
Colonel Crawford and several officers and tortured them to death. A
most cruel death was given to Crawford: they scalped him alive, poured
hot ashes on his head, and then roasted him over a fire, eventually
burning him to death. Two captains were also horribly burned. In all,
fourteen American officers were killed.71 De Peyster, as sympathetic
as he may have been to the motive, could not allow such an atrocity to
be repeated. He warned McKee that if the Indians persisted in such
acts of cruelty, he would be forced to recall the Rangers, leaving the
Indians north of the Ohio to face the Americans alone.72

The Indians at Sandusky continued to be easily agitated. On June
17th William Arundel of the Detroit firm of Arundel & Dawson attempted
to collect a debt at Sandusky owed by interpreter LeVellier, one of the
men killed in the Battle of Sandusky, but found

....Their is here a Cow and three Hoses belonging
to the late LaVellier which I cannot get from the
Woman he kept, Capt' Caldwell seems to decline
having any thing to do in regard of Getting them
from her for reason as he does not Chuse to affront
any of them, the present times will not admit
of it. 73

The following day Arundel signed an agreement with Caldwell for supplying
his detachment, a clear sign that supplies were low. On the 26th
Caldwell bought all of Arundel and Dawson's cows at Sandusky. The Indians were anxious to strike at the Americans. De Peyster had been in communication with Colonel Butler to secure more warriors, but Butler replied on the 12th of June that the chiefs of the Six Nations had decided "if they were to collect a sufficient number of warriors and march to Wheeling, would be of more service to their Western Brethren, then to immediately join them" at Sandusky. The problem of coordination continued to plague Caldwell. He wrote to McKee that he had 'waited with a great deal of patience for the Shawaneflies herfes' but would have to set off without them 'as the time appointed by the Indians for our move is nigh expired'. The Indians at Sandusky were not feeling extremely cooperative either. When Matthew Elliott delivered wampum to Sandusky from the Shawnee, Caldwell held a council and acquainted the Wyandottes and Lake Indians with a request from the Shawnees, Mingoess, and Delawaries that the Sandusky Indians remain stationary a few days so as to be nearby for assistance in the event of attack. They refused, saying that if they needed assistance, they could go to the Shawnee Towns or the Miami. The tension between the Shawnee and Sandusky tribes demonstrated the problems of, even in a relatively small geographical area, prosecuting a two front campaign. While the Sandusky Indians actively sought aggression, the Shawnee needed to be certain that the requirements of defending an attack up the Wabash could be met.

The LeVellier affair, the Sandusky Wyandottes desire to move against the Americans, and their frustration at remaining stationary point to the chance of the cruel murder of Crawford being avoided as only remote.
Caldwell, who felt that he could manage the Indians under his command, was incapacitated in the period immediately following the Battle of Sandusky. He was probably just at the point of becoming mobile again when Girty reported the atrocity. De Peyster for his part had shifted his plans because of Caldwell's wounds, which meant delay in the Rangers' arrival at the Shawnee Towns. On 13 June he wrote to McKee "I am glad to hear that Captain Caldwell is so well and hope he will soon be able to stand, but he cannot flatter himself to be able to enter upon a speedy Campaign."

78 The threat of an American attack on the Shawnee was not abated though, and General Powell proposed sending more Rangers to join Caldwell at Sandusky; if Caldwell had no need of them, then they were to be sent on to Detroit.

79 Rumours abounded that an attack on the Miami River towns was imminent. When Shawnee chiefs made representations to De Peyster, relying on intelligence from Caldwell, wrote Powell that as "Captain Caldwell makes no mention of an Enemy coming from Fort Pitt, it convinces me that the Shawanese Chief's report must have been false." Powell conveyed this information to Haldimand, also stating that the Six Nations Indians recently arrived in the Ohio territory would "probably co-operate" with Caldwell and his party "as they were acquainted with each other's intentions". He also remarked that as the company of Rangers sent out from Niagara would be too late to join Caldwell at Sandusky, they were to report to De Peyster to be employed on the works of the fort at Detroit. 81 His letter was dated July 10th and indicated that he knew at that time that Caldwell would soon be leaving Sandusky.
McKee renewed concerns about the Shawnee Towns in his communication to De Peyster of the 22nd, informing him of his activities over the past ten days. On the 12th he had joined Caldwell at Upper Sandusky. After consultations with the Indians there, he set off with Caldwell and the Rangers, the Wyandottes, Delawares, and Lake Indians for the nearest settlement at Wheeling. This was also the target, it will be remembered, of the party of Six Nations Indians sent from Niagara in mid-June. While advancing they were overtaken by some Shawnee scouts who reported that the enemy force was within a few days of Shawnee Towns. McKee went ahead with the scouts. He wrote to De Peyster that he feared that the force referred to by the scouts was the largest American army yet to come into the Indian Territory. By the time of his writing Caldwell had advanced as far as the Wetstone branch of the Scioto River. McKee expected to meet him the following day.82

Five days later De Peyster replied, giving what information he could. Two Canadians had been brought in, and from them it was learned that there was no report of American activity on the Wabash. A group of Ottawas and a company of Rangers under Captain Andrew Bradt were being sent from Detroit to join Caldwell; it was hoped they would join him before he found himself "under the necessity of attacking the Enemy". De Peyster promised to write again to him and also to Caldwell as soon as General Powell arrived at Detroit, his visit being in the very near future. He asked McKee to show the letter to Caldwell and for both of them to write at the earliest convenience.83

Powell did indeed arrive at Detroit, and outlined
his observation to Haldimand on 7 August. The newly appointed and not yet arrived Lieutenant Governor of Detroit, Jehu Hay, among other things, only held the army rank of lieutenant, and it was expected that he and Major De Peyster would not get along. De Peyster would be granted leave to go to Canada if he so desired, but he could not stay at Detroit once Hay arrived. Writing again to Haldimand the same day, Powell stated that "Captain Caldwell is now supposed to have two thousand Indians with him". This force, in addition to the two armed vessels stationed at the mouth of the Miami, would block American progress in that area. If Detroit could receive the ordnance it required in the form of howitzers, shells, shot, wheels and gun carriages, then the area would be more secure.

De Peyster, growing uneasy at the lack of communication from McKee and Caldwell, wrote to the former on 6 August instructing them both to write him upon receipt of the letter. Powell, who had written several more letters to Haldimand, informed him on the 17th that Captain La Mothe was serving under Caldwell, who was by that time encamped on the banks of the Ohio River where he would stay to gather information on the enemy, although they had no recent word from him.

What neither De Peyster nor Powell appear to have known at the time was that Caldwell had received reports of Clark being near the Shawnee town of Piqua, meaning to seek revenge for Sandusky. Although the information was subsequently proven false, Caldwell changed his easterly advance to Wheeling and headed westward to face Clark. McKee and Matthew Elliott set about to gather as many Indians as they could possibly find.
They succeeded in gathering about 1,100 Indians for Piqua's defense, but this number dwindled rapidly as it became obvious that the intelligence had been false.

At this point, Caldwell and the Rangers with McKee, Elliott, and about 300 Indians decided to make a foray into Kentucky. Beginning in early August, they followed the same route taken by Captain Henry Bird two years earlier. McKee and Elliott had been with him, and were no doubt advising Caldwell from their experiences. Crossing the Ohio, the force attacked Bryant's Station, located five miles northeast of Lexington. They surrounded the station on the night of August 15th and began the attack at dawn on the 16th. Their siege continued until the following morning when it was broken off. Approximately 100 Indians departed, leaving Caldwell with a force of about 30 Rangers and 200 Indians.

The sequel to Bryant's Station started a day later. Caldwell positioned his forces at Blue Licks, near the ford of the Licking River. The attack on the station had been unsuccessful, with only crops and property outside the fortification destroyed. That was all changed by a decision made by the Kentuckymilitia to pursue Caldwell's force. On the morning of the 18th Caldwell's scouts brought him news of 200 mounted Kentuckians approaching. They were commanded by Colonels Todd, Trigg, and Daniel Boone. Caldwell had used the same strategy as in New York a year earlier; he would feign retreat, draw the enemy in, and attack from favourable positions. The Kentuckians indeed thought they were pursuing a retreating force. When they reached the ford of the Licking River, they dismounted to cross on foot. The British opened fire.
The Americans returned a volley, which Caldwell instantly countered with a charge. The Kentuckians broke immediately. After five minutes the Battle of Blue Licks was over. Nearly 70 Americans were killed, including Colonel Todd, and approximately 75 were captured. The British casualties were six Indians killed, 10 wounded, and an interpreter also killed. 90

Ordinarily full advantage should have been taken of the situation; ordnance could have been sent from Detroit to make a successful siege on Bryant's Station, or the British might have built a fortification themselves in Kentucky. Three reasons stood in opposition to consolidating gains in lower Ohio and Kentucky. First, it was not the purpose of the Rangers to hold territory, but rather to fight along side the Indians, using their transient mode of warfare. Second, it was still feared in Detroit that an American army would strike in Ohio, although the target was thought to be Sandusky. Third and most important, the British were no longer concerned with making progress into American territory. Peace was undoubtedly soon to be sought, and De Peyster wrote Powell on the 27th August that he had sent orders to "Captain Caldwell and Bradt, and one to Mr Alexr McKee, ordering them not to make any incursions into the Enemy's country, but to act on the defensive only." He hoped that the courier would catch Bradt and his Indians before he attacked the settlement and Wheeling. It did not, and he and his group of Rangers and Indians "devastated the settlement there". 91 De Peyster further stated that he feared that Caldwell had already crossed the Ohio, and that "in which case he will strike before he returns". 92
Learning of Caldwell's success by September, De Peyster informed Powell on the 3rd and Haldimand on the 4th.\textsuperscript{93}

Caldwell was instructed in De Peyster's late August express to return to Sandusky where he would meet Bradt. This he did, and De Peyster forced a group of Kickapoos, Piankeshaws, and other Wabash Indians who were at Detroit to "show their attachment" to the British by sending 30 warriors to join Caldwell. Caldwell and Bradt with their detachments moved to the Shawnee Towns on the Miami River, apparently figuring that place to be the Americans' target. McKee thought by the third week in September that the "Huron Villages" really were going to be cut off. Although Caldwell and the Rangers were in no shape to return to Sandusky, they did and Caldwell wrote De Peyster explaining that he and 38 of his men were ill, and therefore Sandusky would require further reinforcements. He and the other sick Rangers set off for Detroit, arriving on the 30th.

Notice of Caldwell's movements at high levels is shown in Dundas's remarks in a letter to Haldimand: "I am sorry to find that Cap\textsuperscript{n} Caldwell had been brought back to Detroit the 30th Sep\textsuperscript{t}, very ill with intermittent fever." De Peyster, seeing the Rangers upon their arrival at Detroit, described them as "walking spectres".\textsuperscript{94} They were, even though seeming more dead than alive, the heroes of the western frontier's 1782 campaigns.

Caldwell remained "indisposed" throughout the fall of 1782. De Peyster allowed the detachment under Captain Bradt and the able Lieutenant Turney to remain in the Indian Country, although not many warriors stayed with them. By October it was plain that something would have to happen if the enemy's advances in the Ohio and Illinois territories were to be
halted. The detachment under Caldwell at Detroit was still unable to muster a sufficient number to be effective. Colonel John Butler himself had to lead the Six Nations at the Wyoming. In late October or early November McKee sent intelligence back to De Peyster that a large American force was preparing to strike at the Indians. The news he received in De Peyster's communication of 21 November was less than encouraging. De Peyster had not had sufficient intelligence to convince him, believing the Americans had given up the idea of an attack that fall. It was not in his power to send such assistance anyway, as he had finally complied with orders from General McLean to send Captain Bradt's detachment of Rangers to Niagara. Caldwell's company was yet cut in half by the illness contracted at Sandusky. He (De Peyster) advised the Indians to avoid the Americans if they were found in large numbers, and that if the Americans were to "fortify themselves with an intention of remaining in the Indian country", De Peyster would "take such steps as will enable the Indians to dislodge them early in the spring." If however, the enemy retreated, he expected that no other American force would be seen that winter. McLean's orders to act only defensively were still in effect.  

On the same day De Peyster also wrote to McLean, acknowledging his and Haldimand's request for intelligence from Detroit. He informed McLean that there was in fact an American army, largely Virginians, which was determined "to destroy the Indians who have the promise of support" from the British. He complained that "to manage this matter without a strong reinforcement of Troops, and supply of Indian Goods, is beyond my comprehension." He reiterated, as he had with McKee, that Caldwell's
detachment was only at half strength with Caldwell himself still ill. He stated that the King's Regiment, though "the most excellent soldiers, are not altogether calculated, nor properly equipped for a Winter's campaign in the Indian Country," so that what was needed was "light troops." The implication was that the Rangers, had they been at full strength, could have conducted themselves well in a winter campaign. 96

As much as the lack of reinforcements hampered De Peyster's prosecution of a successful campaign in the Indian Country, so did problems with Indian presents. It was crucial to keep the Indians' wants satisfied if they were to continue to act in a defensive manner only. The other side of the issue was that care had to be exercised in the choice of gifts to keep the Indians from attacking the Americans. If powder and shot were given out that late in the year, they most assuredly would not be used for hunting. One group of Indians, a band of Senecas living in Shawnee territory, asked for a council to be held at Detroit to hear their grievances. Their chief, Ayouwiansh, presented their case to the British. The military and Indian Department were represented by Major De Peyster, Captain Potts (King's Regiment), Captain Caldwell, Lieutenant Saumarez (King's Regiment), and Messrs Duperon Baby and W. Tucker (Interpreters, Indian Department). Ayouwiansh began the proceedings by reminding De Peyster of the promise made to provision their warriors and their families "at the time you first engaged us to espouse the King's cause", referring to the council at Oswego in 1777. He cautioned the British, that although De Peyster had delivered a message from Haldimand that summer forbidding the Indians from treating their prisoners cruelly, their
warriors had injuries to avenge and were determined not to spare the enemy in battle. The British therefore should "be not surprised at seeing in the future more scalps than prisoners." Moving on to specific complaints, Ayouwiansh bemoaned the fact that when their people returned from Detroit their wants were left "unprovided", owing to the general want of provisions there. He admonished De Peyster,

"...I, and my people expect that you will give us necessaries in abundance, as also, such ornaments which is acceptable and pleasing to young men, if otherwise we shall imagine, you do not speak from the Heart,

The justification for this provisioning was that the band had constantly been engaged in action with the enemy, or on watch at their villages.

There remained two specific complaints. The first concerned a prisoner who had been adopted by the band, but who had escaped to Detroit. Ayouwiansh stated that De Peyster had promised his return, a promise which he now wished fulfilled. Finally, he referred to two barrels of powder which were to be allocated to the Senecas at Sandusky, of which (he claimed) they had received but a small portion.

De Peyster rose to make his reply. He referred to their "engagement" to the British cause, and reminded the Senecas that without his aid given them from Detroit they would have been overpowered by the Americans. He explained some of the problems associated with getting the Indian supplies down from Quebec and Niagara, and asked for their patience in awaiting the shipment. The question of the two barrels of powder was dismissed, since "the time which that Powder should have been expended is past" and also because he had repeatedly sent them powder
in sufficient quantity to ensure they got their share. He complimented
their abilities, and apologized for the lack of supplies, saying

...if you find yourselves disappointed in not
receiving your necessaries immediately depend upon
it I am more so, particularly so, from the recom-
mandation Captain Caldwell has given me of your
conduct in the last Campaigne

Regarding the humane treatment of prisoners, De Peyster repeated
that it was in the Indians' interest for them to do so, as the intelli-
gence he had received indicated that the enemy attacks that fall had been
made as revenge for the cruel torture of Colonel Crawford.

De Peyster also delivered a message to the band from Governor
General Haldimand, instructing them that they should "not push the
War into the Enemies Country but defend" their own, for which purpose
Haldimand was prepared to given them "every assistance in his power." 97

De Peyster showed himself an able man to deal with the Indians.
Caldwell's presence was not surprising, as he had extensive experience
with the Senecas in New York and Pennsylvania. He would likely have
know this group well enough as well, due to his extended stays in Shawnee
territory. He had obviously recovered from his illness, which would mark
its duration at about ten weeks. It is interesting to note that his
future father-in-law, Duperon Baby, was also in attendance. Ranked as
an interpreter, Baby was probably the best person to leave in charge of
the Indian stores at Detroit in McKee and Elliott's absence. He had
traded with the local Indians during the last days of the French Regime,
and resided at Detroit during Pontiac's Conspiracy.
The close of 1782 brought an end to the battle action which Caldwell would see in the American War of Independence. Certainly he continued to be actively employed, and in 1783 was sent with Captain Powell of the Indian Department and Joseph Brant along the Delaware River "as well as to annoy the enemy, as to gain intelligence". He had at this point been soldiering for 10 years— all of his first decade in North America. Acting as commanding officer, he had led the whole Ranger corps in Butler's absence. After his posting at Detroit he had become part of the military establishment there. Probably considered second-in-command to De Peyster while the Rangers performed garrison duty, he was clearly the recognized commander of joint expeditions involving the Rangers and Indian Department.

Captain Caldwell had, in his relatively few years at Detroit, established himself as a capable military man of some reputation. His exploits seem to have been closely watched at the local, regional, and national levels by officials at Detroit, Niagara, and Quebec. He had shown his abilities as a strategist, drawing enemy forces into traps, gaining ground when at a disadvantage, and inflicting heavy property damage on his enemy. An active partisan, Caldwell led his company by example. The times at which he received his wounds would indicate that he must have been in the front line leading a charge. He endured the same hardships as his men, out in the Indian Country for months at a time, returning to Detroit only when overcome by an illness so severe that his recuperation took two months.

By late 1782 Caldwell had decided to settle in the Detroit area. He had obviously been a good, brave and talented soldier, and was so
respected by the Hurons that he, along with other "Indian Officers",
was given sizable grants of land from them. The challenge which lay
ahead of him was to build on this foundation, find a peacetime career,
pursue family life, take advantage for himself and his company of Rangers
of opportunities presented to Loyalists by a grateful Crown, and finally
to be as effective a leader of men in civilian life as he had been in war.
Chapter II

"A Disbanded Ranger, Left to the Wide World, 1783-1793

1783 and the close of the American Revolution brought with it the decisions for Caldwell which would keep him on the Detroit Frontier. The Americans had retreated across the Ohio River. What military activity remained was taking place in the east, where Butler's Rangers were again harassing Wyoming, rather than in the Old Northwest. With Colonel Butler not participating in the active manoeuvres and with his son Walter's death, Caldwell was the obvious choice as the senior ranking officer to take charge of the Corps at Niagara. As usual, however, Caldwell's services were required in several places at once.

Although the victories of 1782 and enemy retreat made the Detroit Frontier seem less vulnerable, De Peyster had little reason to relax. The problem was not that Detroit needed defending, but rather that the British Indian allies needed to be restrained. De Peyster had orders to "lessen" the Indian Department at a time when the Wyandottes wanted to go to war. He did not relish Caldwell's recall, as it was the Ranger captain who led this same tribe in the successful campaigns of the previous year, and could likely exercise the most control over them. The Detroit commandant
to mention to Lieut Colonel Butler that it would be of great detriment to the service should Cap'n Caldwell be relieved or called away upon any occasion from this Post - he is au fait of the Indian Country, and the Indians are fond of him.

The Indian Department at Detroit was ordered to exercise economy, with presents only given out semi-annually. Expense accounts for department officers and men would be honored only if attested to by McKee himself. These orders were given while at the same time Butler was able to secure extensive supplies and gifts for Indians attached to the Niagara establishment. It was not a good time to have a military figure popular with the Western Indians absent from Detroit.

In spite of Ranger activity in the east in May and being ordered to Niagara in July, Caldwell's heart remained on the Detroit Frontier. Returning to the area in late summer, he could look forward to enjoying his land, with the official end of the war only weeks away. Soon to be a civilian, opportunities must have seemed greater for Caldwell in the Detroit area. His wife's family was there, and he was known for his recent military activities. Detroit, in comparison to Niagara, must have seemed a more civilized area. He had already settled the grant given him by the Hurons by the spring of 1783. Captains Bird, McKee and Elliott also received grants. Bird chose the area opposite the upper end of Bois Blanc Island, Caldwell and McKee opposite the middle, and Elliott opposite the lower end of the island. The new Lieutenant Governor of Detroit, Jehu Hay, while on the way to his new charge remarked in his diary for June 29th "......Set Sail 2 O Clock Past Isle Bois Blanc in
Company with the Rebecca Captain.Caldwell house opposite this island.  
Caldwell may not have resided at his own property, but he certainly had 
begun improving it, likely as a home for the recently married officer 
and his wife Suzanne Baby. It is apparent that from the beginning the 
"Indian Officers" looked to the development and settlement of the area 
around the mouth of the Detroit River.

Autumn of 1783 brought near disaster to the Indian Officers' hopes 
for a new settlement. Jacob Schiefflin, an Indian Department employee, 
attempted to usurp their claim. Captain Bird outlined the problem and 
the events leading to it in his letter to Halidmand's secretary, Major 
Matthews. Written from his new home, it was dated "Rivers Mouth 
October 15th 1783" and read:

Cap. Caldwell (Lt Cleach?) Capt. McKee and many 
others including myself having an intention of 
procuring a quantity of Land on the South Side 
of the River a little above Isle Bois Blanc, 
extending to the Rivers Mouth _ with an inten-
tion of beginning a little settlement on which 
many Rangers & others, meant to sit down _ 
as soon as any land granted us by the Indians in 
a general Council of those, who claim it _ and 
that Grant confirmed by the Commander in Chief 
& Council at Quebec should intitle us to do so __ 
Col De Peyster was informed of our intentions 
and we spoke to Some Huron Chiefs to Asemble 
their Chiefs Warriors _ even Women _ to council 
with them, about our request, that their Grant 
might be as full and clear as possible _ I 
happened to mention this affair to M' Schiefelain 
mentioning him the spot and told him I thought if 
we could get sufficient settlers it might in some 
future time be valuable

A few days ago he privately asemble a few 
Chiefs who really have not the power to grant the 
Land _ gives them liquor and obtains from them a 
territory including the little spot the Hurons 
were councilling about for the Loyalists & others
This Grant he sends down to Governor Hamilton by this Vefsal to get it by his means conferred We discovered it by accident some body seeing the grant which was requested yesterday by Mr Schieffelin (with Justice Williams) after the vefsal sailed

Capt. Caldwell was informing several of us yesterday that he had actually heard Mr Schieffelin got such a grant in the manner before mentioned I took Mr Schieffelin's part he himself came in just at the time I ask'd him before them all if he had done so and he immediately denied it tho (as we are since informed) he came that minute from obtaining it

If such a thing should be proposed for Mr Schieffelin I flatter myself Sir you will mention the Above circumstances Cap McKee had wrote to Sir John to beg that he will mention the matter to the Gen. if you think proper this may be shewn to Governor Hamilton

Bird added the postscript that "Mr Schieffelin might have been a proprietor with us had he mentioned any such inclination." The Schieffelin affair demonstrated clearly the need for regulating Loyalist land dealings with the Indians. The occasion provided a good example of what could be accomplished by an unscrupulous white with the aid of alcohol. Haldimand would have liked to have the government at Quebec decide land matters, but a grant made to certain Loyalists by an important ally who had fought faithfully for the British presented him with a virtual fait accompli.

The treaty ending hostilities with the American colonies was on September 2nd. The government at Quebec then began the process of dealing with those British subjects, whether military or civilian who had remained loyal to the Crown, and the need to redress their losses sustained because of this loyalty. One of the measures was in effect a
census of the various Loyalist corps, such as Butler's Rangers. Under the "Return of Persons under the Description of Loyalists Specifying the Number, Age & Sex of each family in Captain William Caldwell's Company in the Corps of Rangers Niagara 30th Nov' 1783" Caldwell was enumerated with the rest of his company. His wife Suzanne was listed, but no children were recorded. It appears that Billy was still living with his mother at the Mohawk refugee settlement at Niagara. 14

The end of the war also meant the end of Butler's Rangers. The corps had been instituted to serve a purpose which was no longer required. That Caldwell was reduced on half pay indicates the new purpose given the Rangers. Like the fledgling settlement at Niagara, the Indian Officers' grant at the mouth of the Detroit River would become a Loyalist settlement. As Bird mentioned, the Officers had intended to get Rangers and other Loyalists as settlers. It is apparent that the settlement of the Rangers was a deliberate policy, with those in the Detroit region to fulfill the same expectation as Butler had for those at Niagara, namely to be "useful" to the military post. Caldwell would then be in command of one of the first groups of "pensioners" - disbanded military outfits given grants of land at or near an important frontier who were to be a resident force of auxiliaries, or as in later policy, the major force for the defense of the area. He continued to be in command of his company in that he was responsible for securing their land and the tools and equipment required for clearing and improving it. Owing to the fact that the Indian Officers and others had taken up all of the original grant, Caldwell used his influence with the Hurons to secure a further grant
on the north shore of Lake Erie known as the "New Settlement". 15

News of the Schiefflin Grant reached Governor General Haldimand, and he laid out a very definite policy in a letter to Governor Hay. In the opening paragraph he made the first reference to the offender, stating "the Claims of Individuals, without distinction, upon Indian Lands at Detroit, or any other part of the Province are invalid...."

His instructions on the subject called for discontinuing acquisition of Indian lands by deed of gift. No "private Person, Society Corporation, or Colony" was to acquire Indian lands unless they were the proprietors of a grant from the Crown which included Indian land. In such a case the proprietors of the grant were to purchase or receive the land in question through a general council with the principal chiefs. Thereafter the land was to be surveyed by a qualified surveyor, accompanied by a person designated by the Indians. The surveyor was then to make an "accurate map" of the purchase or grant, which would then be "entered upon the Record with Deed of Conveyance from the Indians." With the policy laid out Haldimand turned to the specifics of the Schiefflin Grant and the Officers' claim:

These instructions lay totally aside the Claim of a Mr Schefflin (which you will hear of at Detroit) to an Indian Grant of Land, even had He obtained it by a lefs unworthy Means that He did.

Some application to, or offer from, the Indians at Detroit for Lands has been made in favour of the Officers and Interpreters who served during the War with them should it be renewed on Your arrival there, You will please to communicate the Circumstances to me, describing particularly the Tract of Land, the Persons applying for it &c., and such of the Transaction as may concern the Indians must, at the same time, be reported to Sir John Johnson thro' Mr McKee, His Deputy at Detroit.....16
Schiefflin was so disgraced that he had no alternative but to leave Detroit. Bird in a telling letter to William Edgar revealed

Mrs Scheiffelin whose figure & Genius you and I have so often admired, left this place the latter end of May, I was deprived of the happinefs of her Society some months before her departure, some illeberal transactions of her very unworthy Partner banish'd him from every Gentleman's company.....

A few days later Bird, as Acting Engineer at Detroit, completed an inventory of the engineers' stores there. In addition to the stores he had a category for stores "lent" to certain people. These included Captains Caldwell with one spade and twenty pounds of iron, McKee with a handmill, whip saw, cross cut saw, and 400 pickets "too small for the garrison", La Mothe with 7 planes, 5 chisels, 2 augers, a broad ax, a square saw, and a hand saw, and himself with a cross cut saw, a timber carriage, a handmill, and probably 463 pickets. The Indian Officers were obviously busy with improvements.

The Officers were also intent on ending any controversy regarding their claim to the Indian grant. In order to impress the Governor General with the validity of their claim, Caldwell left for Quebec to deliver personally the evidence. He and McKee had been the two officers best known to Haldimand, and McKee might have appeared to be involved in a conflict of interest had he attempted to represent both the Indians and Indian Officers. Stopping at Niagara, Caldwell called on his old friend, Colonel De Peyster, and requested a letter of introduction to Haldimand. The letter extolled his virtues and the advantages of acknowledging the Officers' claim. Dated 29 July, De Peyster wrote:
Sir

The bearer, Captain Caldwell, only known to Your Excellency through his Services in the Field had requested a personal introduction, which I cannot refuse to his merit as an Officer, and an honest man. He is now a Disbanded Ranger, left to the wide world, but, wishes to settle where his future services may be one day of use to his Country. This the earnest solicitations from the Hurons will facilitate without any expense to the Government. Should Captain Caldwell's solicitations in favour of himself and associated friends...... Capts. Bird McKee La Mothe and M' Elliott who have distinguished themselves in the Indian Country, meet with your Excellency's Countenance to pursue in settlement, forced upon them by the Indians they have served measure for a set of deserving men, but carries the appearance of future use to Government. 19

Caldwell appears to have been successful in his mission. On 18 August Sir John Johnson, writing from Montreal, instructed Alexander McKee to obtain a deed to the granted area from the Hurons in Council, which would then be transmitted to Sir John for confirmation by Haldimand. This action was ordered by Haldimand as a direct result of Caldwell's representations. A policy of surrender and regrant was to be used in determining title to Indian grants. In this manner the Crown would protect the native population from unscrupulous land speculators. Johnson also told McKee that he had "been directed to furnish Captain Caldwell with Tools and Improvements for building and Clearing land," which he had done, "as far as the afsortment sent out for that purpose would admit of." The number of tools must have been less than the needs of the settlers required, for Johnson also promised that if he were allowed to purchase more implements they would be forwarded to McKee for the settlers. Sir John also requested that if there were any good lots left, one might be
set aside for his use. 20

In keeping with the instructions sent by Haldimand via Sir John,
Philip Fry, Deputy Surveyor for the Upper District of the Province
of Quebec, conducted a survey of the Indian Officers claim in March of
1785. The proprietors' lands lined up showed 12 lots held and two vacant.
Commencing at Bois Blanc Island, Fry showed the following order:

William Caldwell
Alexander McKee
Matthew Elliott
1. Jonaire Chabere
2. Thomas McKee
3. Simon Girty
4. Anthony St. Martin
5. Duperon Baby
6. William Lamothe
7. Chevalier Chabert
8. Isadore Chene
9. Charles Reame

The numbered lots were each four acres-in-front, while Caldwell, Alexander
McKee, and Elliott received six. The two vacant lots, also four acres,
were reserved for Sir John Johnson and David W. Smith. The latter would
serve in the Upper Canadian Legislative Assembly in addition to being
Surveyor General. Captain Bird had not been left out. Fry had been
instructed to start at the lower side of Caldwell's fenced fields and
measure six acres upriver, making a note of any land lying between that
boundary and Captain Bird's first house. 21 This note was undoubtedly made
with the future site of a fort in mind. Detroit had been ceded under
the treaty and would one day have to be given to the Americans. Caldwell
had obtained the deed to the Indian Officers' land as required by Haldi-
mund's instructions. 22 It appeared that the question of title was settled.
This was not the case, especially for Caldwell and Bird, as later
developments would demonstrate.

Land was only one of William Caldwell's concerns after the war. In 1784 he had formed a partnership with his neighbour Matthew Elliott. Having worked closely in the 1782 Ohio campaigns, they also held their land claims in common. Their partnership continued in peacetime as it had in war; Detroit served as a base with operations extending throughout the Ohio Territory where they traded furs and operated a small trading post near the mouth of the Cuyahoga River (Cleveland). At Detroit they dealt in commodities, mostly flour, bacon, and cattle. Operating under the name Caldwell Elliott & Co., the partnership initially appeared successful. Elliott spent most of his time in the fur trade while Caldwell looked after commodities. The problems of being outfitted from Montreal or even Niagara were overcome by dealing primarily with two American firms at Pittsburg, Duncan & Wilson and Wilson & Wallace. The fledgling Detroit traders purchased large amounts of commodities on credit from their American suppliers, selling them at Detroit when they were not required for the Indian trade. The fact that the war was over, that their major suppliers were American, and that their trading post was technically in American territory did not lessen the partisan activities of Caldwell and Elliott. American commissioners sent out to make treaties with the Indians thought that McKee and Elliott were responsible for keeping the natives in the Ohio region in a state of constant agitation. A Shawnee warrior known as "the Buffalo" told General Butler, one of the Commissioners, that the Indians had been informed by British traders that the Americans "were
determined to collect and put them to death." After spending the last few days of October 1785 with the Buffalo, Butler observed

I find this mans conversation and remarks, that the great cause of the disturbance of our contry by the Indians, is owing to a petty set of men kept in employ by the British Agent and some traders, who wish to monopolize the peltry trade. These people have a great advantage over us, they being among the Indian nations....

Butler knew that Elliott had been meeting with the Shawnee and Wyandotte tribes. The American commissioners, nevertheless, appeared to make some progress. The Delawares, Shawnees, and Wyandottes sent word in early December that they were willing to meet at Cayahoga. These were the tribes with whom Caldwell and Elliott were trading, and were also likely receiving gifts at least semi-annually from the British. They took advantage of an opportunity offered, and told the Americans that they had nothing to eat. The commissioners immediately sent for beef and flour. Provisioning had already become an important aspect of British and American Indian policy.

Later in 1785 a road was cut from the Caldwell-Elliott cabins on the Cayahoga to Lake Erie, making direct transportation of goods across the lake easier. Between August of that year and March of 1786 the firm purchased nearly thirty tons of flour, all shipped to the Cayahoga except five hundred and fifty-four kegs for Fort McIntosh. Their suppliers in this "flour adventure" were Wilson & Wallace, who in exchange for giving the flour on credit expected half the profits from any sale. They continued to purchase commodities in bulk, this time from Duncan & Wilson. In the period from April to June, Caldwell and Elliott purchased
on credit 8,919\frac{1}{2} pounds of bacon to be shipped directly to Detroit, 3,824 pounds for the Cayahoga warehouse, with an additional 2,829 3/4 pounds shipped from Washington to Pittsburg for future use. In addition to the large quantity of bacon, Caldwell Elliott & Co., and Duncan & Wilson began a "cattle adventure" with the first drove numbering close to 300 head. These were not all beef cattle, as accounts show at least eight cows and one bull were bought along with the steers. They continued to purchase goods on credit through Duncan & Wilson throughout the summer of 1786, including more flour and bacon, a second drove of 160 cattle, a "negro boy" and equipment for pack horses. 27

Caldwell and Elliott also used other trade goods to secure Indian furs. On 10 July Duncan & Wilson sent the following to the Cayahoga:

91 lbs. of coffee
115 rolls tobacco
23\frac{1}{2} lbs gunpowder
4 kegs whiskey
45 bars of lead

These were the goods that would keep the Indians hunting on the one hand, and be used for leisure on the other. Caldwell Elliott & Company's returns for 1 July consisting of 87 beaver, 853 raccoon, 1 fox and 13 deer-skins were pitiful. 28

By early 1786 the partnership was in difficulty. Duncan & Wilson were pressing for payment on their accounts. They communicated with leading merchants in Detroit, David and William Robertson and John Askin, requesting information on market conditions and the activities of Caldwell and Elliott. Whether they entered into direct competition with their Detroit associates or not is not known, but in April of 1786 Askin offered
some advice to Duncan, writing

......you may do a great deal of Business in the Provision way here, the Settlement is quite out of Cattle & Wm. Caldwell pays very dear for... Indifferent Ones & no more is to be got... 29

Caldwell continued to move the commodities end of the partnership, going in September to one of the points on their cattle trail, Sandusky. It took him approximately one month to move the cattle from there to the Cayahoga establishment. 30

In addition to facing stiff competition from other Detroit merchants in the commodities trade, Caldwell Elliott & Co. had chosen an older well-trapped area in which to conduct their fur trade. While they may have been the first establishment to winter on the Cayahoga, they were obviously not among the first Europeans in the region. 31

In November of 1786 Alexander Henry wrote to William Edgar complaining that the Detroit and Michilimackinac trade was very poor. 32 Northwest, southwest, or due west of the Cayahoga would have meant a much better return on the trade. Their establishment was on the Connecticut Western Reserve, a tract of land granted to that former colony in 1662 by Charles II and deeded to the United States in 1786. 34

A crushing blow was delivered to the firm in the form of the non-renewal of their contract to deliver flour for the garrisons of Detroit and Michilimackinac. The Commissary General acknowledged Brigadier General Hope's order for the discontinuation on 3 September. The Commissary General commented that the contract favoured "a communication with the American States and was indeed a consumption of foreign produce in preference to that of the Colony...". 35 Their largest flour contract
cancelled, the land on which their establishment was built no longer
British. Caldwell and Elliott faced ruin. On the 22nd of November their
fellow Indian Officer and neighbour Anthony St. Martin, now a Detroit
merchant, succeeded in having a summons issued for the appearance of
Caldwell and Elliott at the Court of Common Pleas regarding an out-
standing balance of £369 New York currency on rum delivered to them.
In his declaration of indebtedness, St. Martin stated that "the Defen-
dants (tho often therunto requested) have hitherto refused and still
docth refuse to pay." In addition to the rum debt, he sued for court
costs and interest which amounted to £230.12.6. The writ of summons
was issued but not delivered until March 3rd 1787, a fact which indi-
cated that Caldwell and Elliott may have spent the 1786-1787 winter
trading on the Cayahoga. They were to appear before the Court on 2
June, 1787. 36 The coup de grâce came on May 21st, when Duncan & Wilson
entered a protest against the sale by Caldwell and Elliott of 80 head
of cattle to Duperon Baby. The sale had taken place on the 3rd of March
for £1,000, and amounted to a little less than half of the partnership's
income for the period of June 1786 - May 1787. In that time they had
also sold an additional 14 head, and slaughtered 31 cows and oxen,
selling 9,018.5 pounds of beef to the Detroit garrison and individuals.
Their total income for the period was £2313.15.0½ Halifax. In an account
current dated 13 May Duncan & Wilson also attempted to charge Caldwell
Elliott & Co. one-half of the costs of Major Findlay's bad debt. They
refused, stating that as Duncan & Wilson had accepted a draft from
Findlay in payment of their balance owing for flour, it was not Caldwell
Elliott & Company's business to assist them in the collection of a debt. They then sent Duncan & Wilson a corrected account current.

John Askin, the man who about a year earlier had advised Duncan to get into the provision trade at Detroit, gave evidence on 23 May that he had offered to freight flour for Caldwell the previous summer at 5 shillings per keg, which had been refused. Askin's statement gave the appearance of a disinterested merchant attempting to do business with an unreasonable man. The merchant's motives become better known, though, in a June 28th letter from William Wilson to William Robertson. Wilson had sought legal advice, and was given an opinion stating:

.....that the sale of the eighty head of cattle said to be made to Mr. Baby is by no means legal there being no retail delivery nor a removal of premises, he is also of the opinion that Mr. Askins is intitles to fifty head from Mr. Duncan, out of these cattle in preference to any other person it will be necessary to through every obstruction in the way that possibly can be done in order to prevent as much as possible the distribution of the cattle & by Caldwell & Elliott. My lawyer tells me that the protest entered by us against Caldwell & Elliott's future sales will enable us to come at any of the property they may dispose of in future.....

Askin would be rewarded for his services as Duncan's Detroit agent. Duncan & Wilson had not only stopped the sale of cattle to Duperon Baby, but had effectively ended Caldwell Elliot & Company's ability to engage in commerce. Less than a month later another summons was issued.

By this point Caldwell and Elliott had become very frustrated. Duncan & Wilson may have stopped them from making a profit at their expense, or they may have acted prematurely in prohibiting their Detroit associations from any future sales. The fact that there
had been no change in premises in the sale of the cattle to Duperon Baby was an error on the partnership's part. To be fair to Duncan & Wilson, they had been waiting in some cases for almost a year for payments on outstanding accounts. Whether out of frustration or partisan dislike for their American creditors, in August they sent several Indians down to Pittsburg to steal some horses Duncan had been holding, pending payment for their upkeep. Nothing seems to have been done in Detroit over the incident, and Duncan, apart from writing to Wilson of "their Villany" and stating "they mean nothing but Rogueyery with us", pursued it no further. Unable to conduct business, they quickly called a meeting of creditors after receiving the second summons and assigned all of their remaining property to Robert Ellice and Company, A. and W. Macomb, and Duperon Baby. Once in receivership, they had nothing more to do with Duncan & Wilson; that was now the business of the Trustees of Caldwell Elliott & Company. Caldwell when requested refused to assign his half pay. William Robertson wrote Wilson on 25 October, outlining the developments and stating "They have not obtained a release from their creditors nor do I believe they ever will." He had to inform Wilson that the only chance he had of recovering any debt was having the protest stand with the cattle sale declared illegal. 41

Caldwell’s first foray into the world of commerce had failed. There is no record to indicate that he and Elliott profited from the final bankruptcy of their company. The two seemed to have gone too far into debt to recover. It is possible that they were simply not good businessmen, accustomed to giving generously to the Indians during the
war when the cost was absorbed by government. It is unlikely that they were conniving and dishonest, as their public lives would not have continued much beyond 1787 if that were the case. No litigation apart from the protest seems to have caused them any harm. The collapse of their business did, however, seem to drive a wedge between the two, for although they would serve together again both in public life and wartime, there would never again be close association.

Throughout this time Caldwell and the other Indian Officers had continued to develop their lands. Major Robert Matthews, the recently appointed commandant at Detroit and former secretary to Governor General Haldimand, described the area in June of 1787:

....The Scene here most delightful the Point upon the main is the lower part of the Tract of land given up by the Indians to M. McKee for the Indian and other Officers who served with them during the war the Ground is beautifully irregular, richly clothed with fine timber and a little underwood a natural slope for fine beech up to the River opposite to it is the Isle au bois blanc, about a q. of mile, which forms the channel for the ships this Island is thickly wooded and in no part cleared about a mile up the River are the Houses and Settlements of Capt. Bird, Caldwell and Elliot they have cleared some land, but have been much retarded in their progress, owing to delay in the late L. Gov. Hay of settling that Tract as was intended by the Indians & directed by the Cmd. in Chief in 1783.....

1787 was also the year in which the Indian Wars in the Northwest Territory began. Mindful of encroachments along their eastern "border" with former colonies, the Ohio Indians fought fiercely to protect their lands. Raids on frontier settlements were common as the Americans attempted to move west in search of more land. The fact that the
territory had been ceded by Great Britain to the United States did not
make any difference to the Indians nor the British living in places like
Detroit. The Northwest Territory was a scene of much activity which could
easily have led to another war. In particular, as mentioned above, the
Americans remained convinced that British Indian agents were agitating
the Indians, urging them on in their attacks on Americans, and supplying
them with not only trade goods and foodstuffs, but arms and ammunition
as well. From the end of hostilities the Americans had been seeking the
withdrawal of the British presence from Oswego to Michilimackinac and
beyond. On the 5th of February 1785 John Jay, American Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, instructed John Adams, the Minister Plenipotentiary
of the United States at the Court of London, that he was to

in a firm, but respectful manner, insist that the
United States be put, without delay, into Possess-
sions of all the Posts and Territories within
their limits, which are now held against them
by British Garrisons.44

Brushing aside British statements of goodwill and honourable intentions,
the American statesmen warned:

.....the Detention of the Posts, the strength-
ening their garrisons in our neighbourhood —
the encouragement said to be given in those
Posts and various other Circumstances speak
a language very different from that of kindness
and Goodwill.45

American sentiment certainly was not mitigated by Indian warfare
along the Ohio. In order to prepare for all eventualities, on the 9th
of September 1787 a Militia Circular was sent to Detroit from Quebec,
ordering the militia of the District of Hesse to be organized into a
regiment.46 Military preparedness would be a constant theme both in
administrative policy for Detroit and in the area itself. While hostilities with the Americans had officially ceased, tension continued on the Detroit Frontier.

Finished for the time being as a businessman, Caldwell returned to the work on the settlement for his disbanded Rangers and other Loyalists. In 1787 he had given the deed for the New Settlement over to Major Matthews in keeping with the policy of surrender and regrant of Indian lands, and he continued to be influential among the settlers there.

The 111 settlers and persons granted land at the New Settlement shown on Major Matthew's list of 1 October 1787 fell into the following groups: Butler's Rangers, 44; British regulars, 22; Loyalists, 21; Loyalists Corps, largely Detroit Volunteers, 16; Indian Department, 7; and 1 "sham settler". The settlement was composed largely of disbanded Rangers and regulars, with only about twenty percent of the population not directly involved in the war or military service. Caldwell continued to be a reference for the Loyalist claims of his Rangers. The settlers and Indian Officers were pleased with the decision of the Upper Canada Executive Council to waive fees of office for land grants to former members of Butler's Rangers, the King's Royal Regiment of New York, and the Indian Department.

The settlements on the south side of the Detroit River, the New Settlement, Malden, Petite Cote, and L'Assumption continued to grow. The British had gradually been introducing their own institutions into the area but still lacked an Anglican church. In June of 1788 Caldwell was listed under "English Inhabitants who have never been applied to or have not
subscribed to the maintenance of a Minister." 51 Which was the case with him was not specified, although it was likely the former. 52 His path crossed Elliott's again on 4 July, 1788, when both were appointed Justices of the Peace. This appointment meant that they would have to work together as magistrates of the Court of Quarter Sessions. 53 Wilson was still watching them from a distance, writing to Robertson in July that he was sorry to hear that his firm's "Chance is likely to be so bad" with Caldwell and Elliott. 54

Caldwell had begun his family, which would eventually consist of five sons and three daughters by Suzanne Baby, and in 1789 he brought Billy into his household. 55 In keeping with opportunities offered to Loyalists and their children, Caldwell applied for the grant of a marsh at the entrance of the Detroit River considered wasteland for his eldest sons, William and James. His petition was read and reported on by the Land Committee at Quebec, who forwarded it to Lord Dorchester. The marsh was described as "only fit for grazing cattle" and lying between the Indian Officer's lands and the New Settlement. The Committee also pointed out that the New Settlement was a grant from the Hurons "which Captain Caldwell procured at considerable expense to himself and which he gave up to Government for the purpose of extending the settlement occupied by Disbanded Rangers and meritorious Loyalists" and advised Dorchester that if the land was granted, "the improvements of the marsh would be of public benefit." 56 William and James were confirmed in this grant on December 29th. 57

Caldwell's petition for the marsh was not the only business in
Quebec that month which mentioned him. On October 24th William Robertson presented "The Memorial of and Representation of the Merchants Traders and Inhabitants of Detroit" to a committee appointed by Lord Dorchester. The official title of the body was "the council relative to the administration of Justice in the District of Hesse." The "whole Council" consisted of Chief Justice William Smith, and Messrs Findlay, Harrison, Collins, Caldwell, De Lery, Grant, Baby, Davidson, DeLanaudiere and Col. Dupre. A smaller group, which did not include Caldwell, addressed the merchant's request. The memorial had as its basis the premise that there was no person in the District of Hesse sufficiently qualified in jurisprudence to be a judge or justice. Citing also the possible conflict of interest with justices involved in commercial activities as one problem, the merchants also alluded to "some persons who are entirely illiterate, which must diminish the respect due the Laws"....They suggested that if a "professional judge" paid by the state and dependent upon no other means for his subsistence could not be found, then the next best thing was to set up a "Court of Arbitration" composed of a number of Justices of the Peace with merchants and inhabitants also sitting with them in rotation. In the question period that followed, many issues beyond professional competence came to light. First and foremost, the names of the illiterate Commissioners of the Peace were requested of Robertson by Hugh Findlay, a member of the Committee. Robertson replied that A. Maisonville and Matthew Elliott could not read nor write, and signed their names "mechanically"; William Caldwell had not a good education; Captain La Mothe was not popular; and Mr. Adhemar
resided "at St. Vincents in the American States". Without being asked, Robertson added that if more Commissioners of the Peace were required, Mr. Askin, Mr. Leith, Mr. Shepherd, Mr. Sharpe, Mr. Park, and Mr. Abbot would have education and community respect required for the position. Duperon Baby, also a member of the Committee asked Robertson if any of the "old inhabitants" of Detroit had been consulted in the formation of the memorial. When Robertson replied "that those of the town and the surroundings" had been informed, Baby asked why they had not signed or in some way supported the memorial. Robertson had difficulty answering most of Baby's seven questions which related to the relationship of the English traders to the French inhabitants. The third and final set of questions was put to Robertson by Alexander Grant. The sixteen questions he asked dealt with the security and trade of the area, covering many aspects such as the defense of the lakes and the amount of British manufactures used in the Detroit trade. The possible result of the loss of the Upper Posts on trade was also considered. In many respects the questions and answers between Grant and Robertson seemed designed to promote the cause of the British merchants at Detroit. There were two main points implicit throughout the meeting, namely the tension between French law and fur trade interests and the replacement of the military order with a civilian one. Dorchester's five districts below the Ottawa River was a start in accomplishing both ends. As for Robertson and the other merchants' concern over the ability of the Commissioners of the Peace for the District of Hesse; it was specified that two or more justices for the Court of Quarter sessions had to sit to hear any case.
Giving this report on 13 January 1789, Dorchester's committee agreed with Robertson on the issue of the lack of "persons competent for the administration of Justice in Civil Causes" but made a resolution nevertheless for finding a person fit for the position and having the principal inhabitants join with the said chief magistrate to assist him. They agreed also with Robertson's notion of having this chief magistrate paid a salary of £500. The committee would not, however, endorse Robertson's Court of Arbitration.

After the judiciary, one of the first district bodies to be set up was the District of Hesse Land Board. It would be a major vehicle in the plan to replace the French method of land tenure and statues regulating the same. Two immediate problems faced the Hesse Land Board. They had to deal with French claims which pre-dated the conquest, and with claims to Indian lands. Regulating sales, mortgages, and leases was a difficult enough task, but the Board would have to clear away old claims first.

Any anxiety felt by the Indian Officers over the establishment of the Land Board must have been alleviated when Alexander McKee was nominated to serve on the Board by Major Farnham Close, the commandant at Detroit, on 15 June 1789. The Board began sitting almost immediately, and consisted of the commandant, William Dummer Powell, William Robertson, Alexander Grant and McKee. They heard the first thirteen petitions on 7 August, by which time Major Close and the 65th Regiment had been replaced by Major Patrick Murray and the 60th Regiment of Foot. The Board adjourned until the 14th, at which time they would "hear the Petitioners and judge the propriety of their claims." It was agreed
that the Board would meet weekly in the commandant's quarters. The first petition listed was that of William Caldwell.

Once again the task of protecting the Indian Officers' claim fell to Caldwell. Granted by the Hurons on 7 June 1784, having withstood the Schiefflin affair, acknowledged by Haldimand in his instructions to Hay to encourage the Officers of 14 August, surveyed on 25 March 1785 and deeded, a deed of cession drawn up on 15 May 1786, surveyed again in 1788 by Matthews, the grant was now challenged again. Dorchester, during an inspection tour of the Upper Posts, must have looked over the Officers' claim. He sent word to the Hesse-Land Board through his secretary, Henry Motz, that he wished a settlement named "Georgetown" to be commenced on the site of their grant. Meeting on 14 August, the Board briefly considered the request, with McKee outlining the problems involved. The Board agreed that there seemed to be some mistake, and ordered a copy of the minutes to be sent to Motz for Dorchester's "further command".

It took nearly a year, but the Indian Officers' claim was approved by the Board on 30 July 1790. The fact that one of their number, Sir John Johnson had come down to Detroit to chair some of the meetings did not hurt them. Caldwell's own fortunes ran at seventy-five percent successful. He and the other officers were confirmed in their grant, although Dorchester still wanted a "country town" in the area. The grant of the marsh to William junior and James stood. Caldwell was confirmed in holding lot 23 in the New Settlement. The only loss he sustained was the refusal on 31 May 1791 of a further grant to him of other marshland in the New Settlement.
The Board had also to deal with the claims of disbanded Rangers and Loyalists. They were required to produce proof that they had occupied and improved the land claimed. The major source of such proof for the disbanded Rangers was a certificate from Captain Caldwell. Those producing such proof were confirmed, the Board continuing to avoid dispossessing Loyalists.66

Sir John Johnson had not come to Detroit for the sole purpose of protecting his lot in the Officers' claim, but had been instructed by Dorchester to visit all four districts and preside over Land Board Meetings while present in each district. On 11 August 1790 he instructed Deputy Surveyor Patrick McNiff to lay out a survey of the lands on the east side of the Detroit River, out of which four townships were to be created.67 While involved with his disbanded Rangers in what would soon be known as the Two Connected Townships, Colchester, and Gosfield, Caldwell's greatest involvement would be in the area called Malden Township. It would take some time to turn "Fredericksburg"68 as the Indian Officers called their settlement, into a township, but it would be accomplished.

Now that further surveys were about to be conducted, the disbanded military and Indian Department officers were confronted with a bureaucracy which looked to conformity in land holding, based on the English freehold rather than French seigneurial system. Caldwell, Elliott, and La Mothe knew that as retired officers they were entitled to 3,000 acres and refused to count the Indian grant as part of this quota. This information was relayed by Patrick McNiff to the Surveyor General, the
Honourable John Collins. Collins was quite familiar with the land affairs of the District of Hesse. The previous June he had updated Major Matthews' 1787 list of landholders in the New Settlement. By McNiff's figures the three officers had received 800, 800, and 320 acres respectively.

Caldwell continued in his certification of disbanded Rangers throughout the fall of 1791 and spring of 1792. He also continued in his duties as one of the twelve justices for the District. The Court of Quarter Sessions discharged a wide variety of duties and was one of the most important bodies in local government. In his capacity as Justice of the Peace Caldwell had to deal with mundane matters such as taking depositions. One such document, dated 27 December 1791, concerned the theft of a pig, and was sworn before him at Malden. In 1792 Caldwell, Isadore Chene, and Simon Girty quickly moved to assist their old friend, Alexander McKee, when sued by Charles McCormick. All three gave testimony on his behalf. He and Elliott watched as their trustees attempted to collect on debts now five years old.

The idea of a town and fort in the vicinity of the Officers' land was still a controversial subject. Lieutenant Governor Simcoe doubted the advisability of constructing a post there. If Detroit was to be given over to the Americans, then the building of a fortification on the east side of the River might make the Americans think that the British were preparing for war. If it was an expensive proposition Simcoe favoured a site directly across the river from Detroit. He was aware of the Land Board's desire to locate a town opposite Bois Blanc Island. The Board had a difficult time dealing with the Indian grant, as Loyalists
were beginning to petition for land within that area. On the 25th of May the Board sent twenty-nine petitions six of which concerned the Officers' land, to York for further instructions. Two weeks later the Board rejected Caldwell's petition to have a lot transferred to him. 75

If land dealings were not going well, Caldwell saw action on a number of fronts. Following the Constitutional Act of 1791 came the need for a Legislative Assembly for the newly created Province of Upper Canada. In the election of 1792 David W. Smith, Deputy Surveyor and Secretary of the District of Hesse Land Board, was running as a candidate for the recently designed counties of Essex and Suffolk. The unusual circumstance of his campaign was that he was absent at Niagara when he should have been campaigning in the two counties. Smith had been promised McKee's interest, had the support of "the Commodore", 76 Matthew Elliott and others, but was worried about the New Settlement. He feared that if Francis Baby also ran for the same seat, Caldwell would influence the settlers in favour of his brother-in-law. Smith finally wrote Askin on 14 August to say that he had been assured of the settlers' vote "on Lake Erie & River latranche," but that there was a "powerful influence" against him. 77 It is unlikely that Caldwell was using his influence against Smith. Baby tied his political fortunes to Kent County and Smith's fears were not realized. The assurance of the settlers' votes could only have been delivered by Caldwell for the first area and McKee for the second. Furthermore, it would have served no purpose for any of the Indian Officers to antagonize the Secretary of the Land Board, particularly since Caldwell had again been examined by the Board on 27 July relative to the 1784 grant. 78 While no direct patronage link shows up, it is interesting
to note that when the first Legislative Assembly and its Lieutenant Governor created the offices of county lieutenants and deputy lieutenants, they were filled in Essex by McKee and Caldwell respectively. These offices automatically made them colonels in the militia, with McKee having command of the North Battalion and Caldwell the South.

The record shows Caldwell as a serious-minded public figure. Called on September 3rd to serve as a grand juror in the Court of Oyer and Terminer, he did not default in his appearance as did three Canadian gentlemen and four of his fellow justices. He was counted as well as one of two Justices of the Peace appearing, the other ten having defaulted. 1793 brought with it the official establishment of the Township of Malden. At a Land Board meeting on 8 January McKee, Elliott, and Caldwell were appointed patentees for the township, the marsh was recognized as being "granted to the Sons of Captain Caldwell" and it was resolved that the "Indian Officers have it at their option, to complete the Quota of land in the said Township." While it would seem from the wording of the last issue that Caldwell, Elliott, and La Mothe had not succeeded in having the 1784 grant excluded from the quotas, the rest of the decisions were certainly in Caldwell's favour.

In what must have seemed yet another attempt to settle the Indian Officers' claims once and for all, William Caldwell again was chosen to represent them. This time his audience would be Simcoe and the Executive Council, and again he appeared successful in having the legitimacy of their claim recognized. Simcoe and McKee availed themselves of the opportunity of Caldwell's trip to communicate with the Indians on activities in the
Ohio region. Simcoe commended McKee for his direction of affairs. Dated 30 January, McKee noted that the Americans were seeking peace in an effort to end the war. He informed the Lieutenant Governor that although the Ohio Senecas had done some killing they were not responsible for all the deaths attributed to them.

The year had not been completely without personal problems for William Caldwell. His former partner, Matthew Elliott had accused him of "tampering" with the foreman on his plantation and ordered him to desist. The young mixed-blood that he had fathered in the war, and who had lived in his home for the past four years was becoming increasingly difficult to control. In the spring of 1783 Prideaux Selby notified McKee that

An Indian who has much infested the mouth of the River &c &c by his thefts and depredations, was brought here the day before yesterday by some men from Grofs Isle whom he had robbed of their Clothing &c by getting down the Chimney; he is confined to the little fort until your pleasure shall be known; it is not Caldwell's Son but one of his Gang....

All things considered, Caldwell had established himself well in the first decade after the war. He represented a small group of Loyalist officers, succeeded in having their Indian grant recognized and successfully defended them from encroachment by individuals and the Crown. He appeared quite selfless in turning over a further grant to the Crown for rank and file disbanded Rangers, Regulars and other Loyalists. His business partnership with Elliott did not succeed because they failed to comprehend the politics of trade and depended too heavily on credit. He had made provisions for the future of his two eldest sons. William Caldwell,
if not successful in his first post-war career, had continued to be an effective leader of men. He accomplished this as a Justice of the Peace, the Deputy Lieutenant of Essex County, a patentee of Malden Township, a leading landowner and a political force to be reckoned with. With all this accomplished, William Caldwell would demonstrate his courage and abilities further in the upcoming conflict with the Americans.
Property Showing Caldwell's Post at Amherstburg
Detail from Sketch of the

Fig. 3
Chapter III

"A Respectable State of Defense" 1798-1811

The decade of apparent peace following the Treaty of Paris in 1783 was in reality a period of constant military alert along the Detroit Frontier. The British remained in control of the frontier posts in American territory, and continued to support the land claims and military activities of their Indian allies. British traders continued their commercial endeavours from the south shore of Lake Erie through to Michilimackinac, and through their relations with the natives cemented the alliance with the British.

For a time, the organizational requirements of the new government at Philadelphia severely restricted the Americans' ability to intervene actively in the Old Northwest. By 1789 developments such as the new constitution, Washington's leadership and military reorganization allowed the fledgling nation to turn its attention to the west.

The Americans remained anxious for the turning over of the posts along the Great Lakes. By holding Michilimackinac and Detroit the British sealed off the Upper Lakes. Niagara and Oswego closed Lake Ontario, Oswegatchie the St. Lawrence, and Point au Fer and Dutchman's Point hampered American activities on Lake Champlain. The British were able to, and according to American complaints did, exclude the United States from commercial activities on the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence
waterway. This of course violated the "middle line of the Rivers and Lakes, established, as the boundary between the two Nations." The holding of the posts by the British, and the Upper Posts in particular, resulted in the Americans' almost complete exclusion from the fur trade. Jefferson noted in 1791 that

By the proceedings we have been intercepted entirely from the commerce of furs with the Indian Nations to the Northward: a commerce which had ever been of great importance to the United States, not only for its intrinsic value, but as it was a means of cherishing peace with those Indians, and of superceding the necessity of that expensive warfare, we have been obliged to carry on with them, during the time that these posts have been in other hands.....

A year later Washington concluded "I do not believe these tribes will ever be brought to a quiescent state so long as they are under an influence which is hostile to the rising greatness of these states." 2

With diplomatic attempts to gain the posts failing and costly military defeats under General St. Clair and Harmer, the Americans fired off a sharp message to British Minister Hammond: "The interest we have in the western Posts, the blood and treasure which their detention daily costs us cannot but produce a corresponding anxiety on our part." 3

And as long as the "northwestern" Indians demanded acceptance of the Ohio River as the western boundary of the United States as the sine qua non of any meeting with the American Commissioners, negotiations remained deadlocked. Jefferson dismissed this condition as impossible owing to the settlement of American citizens west of the Ohio. He noted "consequently the war goes on, and we may expect very shortly to hear of General Wayne's advance" towards the Indians. November 1793 saw the official policy formed.
Our negotiations with the north-western Indians have completely failed, so that war must settle our difference. We expected nothing else, and had gone into the negotiations only to prove to all our citizens that peace was unattainable on terms which any one of them would admit.

By the end of 1793, the American course was set. It would be war with the western Indians, a war that carried with it potential catastrophic consequences for American relations with Great Britain. The key to prosecuting the war successfully was to challenge the Indians boldly in American territory, where the British could not claim injury. Equally important was preparation for the possibility that the British might support their Indian allies with more than arms and provisions. This was the unknown factor - the British response.

McKee and Simcoe had devised the concept of an Indian buffer state between the United States and Upper Canada in 1792. It was accepted by the Wyandotte, Delaware, Shawnee and Miami Tribes over the objections of the Six Nations who favoured a more moderate line leading quickly to peace. Just how far Simcoe was prepared to go in support of it was later questioned, but by spring of 1794 it was clear the Americans would challenge it. They were determined to make a major effort to break the Indian resistance to their westward expansion. The Canadian militia would have to be prepared for this possibility.

Lieutenant Governor Simcoe himself had been to Detroit and met with the Miami Indians. Spending the first seventeen days of April in the Michigan and Ohio territories gave him a first hand appreciation of the situation. The Indians were confident after defeating St. Clair and Harmer. Wayne's army would also fall, they thought, but requested
the reassurance of British aid. Even though Simcoe took the posture of
an active ally, the real decisions would be made at a higher level.

The United States protested that while the British ministry was
giving reassurances of good will, Lord Dorchester was fostering hostility
among the Indians towards the United States. The Governor General was
quoted as saying "I should not be surprised, if we were at war with the
United States in the course of the present year; and if we are a line
must be drawn by the Warriors". John Jay, American plenipotentiary to
Great Britain, was kept informed of events by Secretary of State Edmund
Randolf. By far the most serious provocation was the re-constitution
of Fort Miami by Simcoe, a development unacceptable to the Americans.
To the British argument that they were building the fort to protect
British subjects from American attack the Americans replied that they
had no intention of threatening the British in their advance on the
Indians. British arguments that the area around Fort Miami was dependent
upon Detroit, and thus part of the British possessions under the status
quo, were also ruled specious.

Simcoe's reconnaissance of the Detroit Frontier proved to him that
constant vigilance was required. The military and militia were to be
ready when and if the time came to fight. With McKee in the Indian
Country, responsibility for the Essex County Militia fell to Deputy
Lieutenant Caldwell. By the first week in May Caldwell had completed
the muster rolls. Several problems with the militia began to emerge,
such as the refusal of some men in the New Settlement to serve under a
Lieutenant Stockwell. In addition, he noted in mid-July, militia arms
"on inspection.....are all deficient, they being some of these common
Indian Guns which I think are not to be depended upon for service."10 Caldwell was to be given additional responsibility, as he was recommended along with Matthew Elliott and Francis Baby as the "proper persons" to raise a "Canadian Corps of two battalions." The corps was to be raised in both Upper and Lower Canada, but Simcoe did not know how many companies would be allotted to his province.11 Whether this body was meant to replace the militia or to provide the French population of the two provinces with the opportunity to serve as volunteers was unclear.

Regardless of the troops to be used, by August it was becoming increasingly obvious that local British leaders were preparing for a possible encounter with the Americans. In an effort to provision what seemed to be an imminent conflict, flour, pork, peas, rice and butter were sent to Detroit and Michilimackinac. Information from an American deserter set Wayne's force at 1,100 regular troops and 400 militia.12 This kind of intelligence led McKee, Caldwell and Colonel England to expect an army capable not only of crushing Indian resistance, but of advancing on Detroit and perhaps beyond. Conversely, the Americans were very suspicious of local British activities, as Jay was informed

"...The reports of determination in the British to abet the Indians grow daily more and more serious; and there is reason to apprehend, that British troops will be found mixed with the Savages, who are prepared to meet General Wayne...."13

Colonel England kept in close communication with Simcoe, informing him of Wayne's advance and Indian matters including a Wyandotte Council held at Detroit on August 6th. Using symbolic metaphor, the chiefs returned a hatchet given to them by Lieutenant Governor Hamilton
during the previous war with the Americans. They spoke of laying down
the hatchet at the Council at Sandusky at the close of the Revolution.
The time had come to use it again. The principal chiefs said

Father Listen. Here is the Hatchet you gave us
which was buried under the leaves, and which
we now return to you to sharpen for us, that we
may be the better enabled to strike the big
knives. Be expeditious in rubbing off the rust
as no time is to be lost. If you delay in
doing this we shall be undone.

Colonel England told the chiefs that he would inform Simcoe, but reported
the Indians "very peremptory" in their demands for assistance in the
field.15

The British were in a precarious position. If they aided the
Indians in the field without proper authorization from the Colonial and
War Offices there might be a war which the government in Great Britain
did not appear to want.16 If, on the other hand nothing was done to aid
the Indians, there was a very real fear that they would turn on their
former allies for their lack of support. The British had only to look
at the war between the Americans and the Western Indians over the past
decade to see the effects of an Indian war. New Fort Miami seemed to be
the answer. It was likely seen as not provocative enough to force a
war with the United States, and yet if fully garrisoned could provide
at least the appearance of support for Britain's Indian allies. To this
end one hundred Canadian volunteers were raised to work on the fort and
another fifty from the New Settlement under Caldwell were sent to rein-
force the garrison there, or

.....to be employed as Major Campbell may direct,
who had orders to be particularly attentive to
them, and not to permit they to commit anything hostile against the Army of the United States except he find it absolutely necessary; and knowing from his discretion and prudence that he will not be the aggressor, .....no difficulty in entrusting those men to his care.

By combining the work of the volunteers with the presence of the garrison Colonel England hoped to put Fort Miami, and by it the British claim in Ohio, in a "respectable state of defense". 17

Leaving Caldwell at Fort Miami Baby returned to Detroit in mid-August and reported to Simcoe. As Lieutenant for Kent County, Baby was concerned about the possibility of the American force advancing on Detroit, for it was administered as part of his jurisdiction. But to call out the Kent militia to garrison the fort or even send regulars from Detroit seemed provocative and dangerous. He viewed the sending of the Canadian "artificers" and Caldwell's volunteers as the "medium" course. In the event of an attack on Fort Miami they could defend it until the militia, if required, was called out. Colonel England anticipated Simcoe's intentions when Baby was ordered to have the Kent militia ready to march on very short notice on the 16th. On the same day England ordered the militia from River Aux Raisins to proceed to Fort Miami. That Simcoe was not only kept informed by England, but also approved of these actions was shown in an order he gave the following day, that England meet with the Lieutenants or Deputy Lieutenants of Essex and Kent Counties and, if it were deemed necessary, call out the militia. Simcoe also wrote McKee, stating "It is obvious that if Wayne attacks the Miami Post that a war commences between Great Britain and the United States....." The same day McKee informed England that Wayne had been reinforced by 1500
Kentucky militia with artillery. England had already written to Simcoe that morning, reporting that 1,000 reinforcements were expected to join Wayne, that 1,300 Indians gathered at Fort Miami with more on the way, and that both the garrison and McKee had been fully provisioned. He gave Simcoe a status report on the militia:

I have ordered the Militia commanders to have their Regiments ready to move on the shortest notice; whether in whole or by detachment as may be considered expedient. Lieu. Col. Caldwell, is at Fort Miami, with sixty or seventy fighting men with arms... 19

With preparation being made for war, Caldwell was back in the thick of action. His detachment of men from the New Settlement was likely made up of disbanded Rangers, British regulars, and other veterans of the recent war whom Caldwell had helped settle in 1787. 20 He rejoined McKee in a military situation very familiar to them both - one commanding the Indians, the other commanding whites trained to fight in "the Indian mode". Their absence from Detroit meant that Essex County was represented by neither its Lieutenant nor Deputy Lieutenant in decisions regarding the militia. England had no way of knowing when he reported to Simcoe on the 18th that the Battle of Fallen Timbers was but two days away. 21

On the 18th of August the American forces were approximately seven miles from the British and Indian camp outside Fort Miami. Tired and ill-prepared for battle, the troops were allowed to make an encampment. Wayne seemed uncommunicative to his senior officers. From reconnaissance he knew that the British and Indians had been drilling earlier that morning. His scouts were convinced that the Indians would fight a few
miles down the Miami River from the American camp, where the lines had been formed during drill. Wayne also received intelligence that the Indians would fight "stationary" instead of their usual style.

The Americans began their advance at dawn on the 20th. After a brief skirmish with an advance partly of Indians, they came upon the main force. Wayne was not at the head of the American troops, and it was General Wilkinson who actually gave the order to charge the Indians. After an hour of heavy fighting the Indian resistance began to weaken. A frontal charge broke the Indian line, causing them to retreat. 22 The Americans advanced, but captured or killed few Indians thanks to "a stubborn rearguard action" fought by the Wyandottes and the militia under Caldwell. 23

Throughout the battle Wayne had not been at the scene of the fighting or given an order apart from that of marching. Indian Department agents McKee, Elliott, and Simon Girty watched the battle but did not take part for fear of giving substance to the American suspicion that the British were behind the Indian hostilities. The Indians would later say that McKee made them fight, and that they had been reluctant to do so. 24

The British at Detroit had no notion of the day's events, and the militia was ordered to assemble the next day on the King's Common. In the absence of Caldwell and McKee, Francis Baby was appointed to look after the Essex as well as his own Kent militia. News of the defeat reached Detroit on the 22nd, and England immediately informed Simcoe. The Lieutenant Governor had already had second thoughts and had prepared his own letter for England on the same day, admonishing him for building up Fort Miami beyond original intentions. Simcoe stated that he would
soon be at Detroit. He wanted to diminish Fort Miami's garrison and increase the "moving force". He added "I think Caldwell and his volunteers also must be regarded as their spirit and loyalty deserve. I am surprised I have not received a Commission for that gentleman." 25

The 22nd was also the day on which events at Fort Miami would determine whether Britain went to war again against the United States. After burning all the-Indian huts in the area, Wayne approached the fort. Campbell issued an ultimatum to Wayne, warning that if the Americans did not halt their approach to the fort by the time they were in pistol range, there would be war. Wayne replied that the act of aggression lay with the British in their occupation of a fort well within American territory, and that if Campbell and his garrison withdrew there would be no war. The British major suggested a prudent compromise— to leave territory discussions to their nation's ambassadors; however, if Wayne was to come within cannon range, he could expect the consequences. 26 Wayne, with no orders for attacking the British from Secretary of War Knox, decided not to press the issue. 27

Reporting Caldwell's role to Simcoe, England stated

.....That very odd but gallant fellow Lieutenant Colonel Caldwell, who early went out to Fort Miami with nearly sixty men from the new Settlement, was in the action I believe with all his people, and as I am informed very gallantly with the Wyandottes only covered the Indians when retreating and bore the heaviest part of the action against the Light cavalry without moving for a long time, and my information states that Lieutenant Colonel Caldwell lost five of his people besides his Captain McKillop..... 28

Caldwell and his men were undoubtedly fighting alongside the Wyandottes in the heavy exchange at the time of the frontal assault.
He appears to have entered the field on his own, without further authority. His action was contrary to the general British response to the Indians' situation.

Simcoe seemed equivocal in his treatment of Caldwell's involvement. While on the one hand Simcoe complained to Colonel England "I am sorry that Lieutenant Colonel Caldwell was in the action, more so that he took so many men", he continued on the other with a proposal to reinforce Caldwell. Official recognition seemed to be given in Simcoe's order to Major Campbell that

all the Militia, British and Canadians who either volunteered or were called out by due authority and bonafide served, upon such abstract as (Lt.) Colonel England shall think proper to be transmitted to me shall be paid in the respective rank.....

The paylist showed that Caldwell had commanded a force including one captain, one sergeant major, two sergeants, and 48 privates, 53 men in all in the field. Simcoe seemed to offer a reward for Caldwell's service in his personal nomination of the Deputy Lieutenant to command a new detachment of militia for garrison duty at Fort Miami. In the end one soldier could not help but admire the courage and bold command of another.

With or without Simcoe's approbation Caldwell remains the only British officer who had supported the Indians. They were fortunate in his presence - if the garrison at Fort Miami had not needed reinforcements, he would not have been in the area. He had remained loyal to not only Britain's allies, but also to his friends and old comrades-in-arms from the earlier conflict with the Americans. At a time when other
men trusted by the Indians stood by and watched, when British regulars 
remained within the walls of the fort, Caldwell and his volunteers alone 
held to the promise of support made so many times to the Indians. 29

The British Indian bluff had been called, and their lack of 
support revealed. Now they were face to face with the Americans, with 
the dream of an Indian buffer state gone. The possibility of conflict 
on the Detroit Frontier loomed large. It even caught the attention of 
the partners of the North West Company in Montreal, and on 30 August 
Joseph Frobisher wrote Simon McTavish

I am very sorry to inform you that by Letters from Niagara of the 24 Ins: that General Wayne 
instead of being Beaton had advanced to the 
Glaice about Thirty Miles from our Fort at the 
Miamis, this had alarmed the Garrison of 
Detroit, & all the Artillery & the 24th Regt: 
are gone to the Fort at Miami. Two thirds of 
the Garrison of Niagara & all of the artillery 
with Ten Pieces of Ordinance are now on their 
way to Detroit & the Rangers31 had received 
Orders to March immediately....32

Wayne knew that some chiefs were meeting with McKee, Simcoe, and Joseph 
Brant at Detroit in contemplation of further action. He recommended 
to Knox that the wagon road which his force had cut be abandoned in 
favour of water transportation by the Au Glaize River, which would 
"facilitate an effective Operation toward Detroit & Sandusky, shou'd 
that measure eventually be found necessary." Wayne knew that he needed 
regular troops to garrison the posts in the conquered area, supplies, 
ordnance, and proper organization before moving on Detroit. 33

Three American treaties were facilitated immeasurably by their 
victory at Fallen Timers. The most obvious was the Treaty of Greenville
with the tribes concerned.\textsuperscript{34} Jay's hand was strengthened considerably in his negotiations in London. News of the victory also affected Pinckney's Treaty with Spain.\textsuperscript{35} The first two treaties in particular had an adverse effect on the fur trade. McTavish Frobisher & Co., as the major partnership in the North West Company, had been watching the Detroit area merchants for at least three years prior to Fallen Timbers. They were afraid that firms such as Forsyth Richardson & Co. and individual merchants such as Alexander Henry would turn from their pursuits in the Detroit-Mississippi trade and Michilimakinac to the "petit nord" at Lake Nipigon and beyond into the northwest.\textsuperscript{36} After Fallen Timbers and Jay's Treaty many of the British merchants were cut off from the southwest trade and forced into competition with the North West Company. Shut out of the Montreal concern, the merchants formed the "New North West Company" known more popularly as the XY Company, and became the fiercest competitors the older concern had met.

Fallen Timbers tested Simcoe's Indian policy and quickly demonstrated its shortcomings. McKee, Caldwell, and Francis Baby were probably the only office holders who carried out more than a ceremonial function as County Lieutenant and Deputy Lieutenant. Caldwell in particular was the only one to perform the intended militia duties and lead a contingent into action.

Fallen Timbers served to cement further Caldwell's relationship with the Wyandottes, - the same tribe he had fought alongside to victory at Sandusky in 1782, and the same tribe that was responsible for his original land grant. This relationship would serve him well in
the next conflict with the Americans. In the years between Fallen Timbers and the War of 1812, Caldwell returned to his more sedate life as a civic leader, land owner, and farmer.

Late in 1795 David Smith reiterated to Simcoe that Malden Township had been reserved for the Indian Officers. On the 16th of March of 1796 Caldwell sold a portion of his lot 3 to his wife Suzanne. This may have been as insurance in the event of his death. He continued with his efforts to secure the marsh for his sons William and James, and they were confirmed in the grant by Order-in-Council on 21 February 1797. That year was important for the development of Malden. When Detroit was surrendered to the Americans in 1796, it became necessary to make provision for the administration of the Western District and its defense. The two functions split, with Sandwich performing the first and Malden the second. Caldwell appears to have been the first person to have suggested to Lord Dorchester that a fort be built at the mouth of the Detroit River. To this end Henry Bird's property was seized for a fort and settlement. Bird, who had been obliged to return to England to look after financial matters, had already built two houses on the property. This action would later throw doubt on Caldwell's claim to Lot 3 as Lots 1, 2, and 3 were set aside by Dorchester as the reserve for a military establishment and town.

Caldwell continued to look after his land matters, with a survey of the marsh completed on July 22nd, and the sale of another portion of Lot 3 on August 12th. On the 14th of that month Caldwell was recommended for the grant of lot number 6 on Third Street in Sandwich, a location which would have placed him closer to his duties as a justice. The order for the grant however, was stayed.
The question of why Caldwell did not appear to have sought land grants for his other children was given a possible answer in David Smith's letter to President of the Executive Council, Peter Russell, on Christmas Day 1797. Smith recommended that the first twenty applications for grants to Loyalists' children should get 1200 acres of Crown Wasteland, or sixty acres each, and the next twenty to split whatever land was left over. No choice of location would be given except by individual petition. There likely were already over forty petitions. It was about 1797 that a further survey of Malden was undertaken. The area of the Indian Officers' claim had "strong and rich" black soil. The major woods of the township were black and white walnut, bass, elm and ash. The survey oddly enough showed Lot 1, 2, and 3 as Caldwell's with 1 and 2 to be part of the military reservation. The waterfront rights were Caldwell's for Lot 3 only. In addition the survey showed him holding Malden Lots 22, 23, 26, 27, 41, 42, 45 and 46 all at 200 acres each. A similar survey for Harwich Township showed Caldwell owning Lots 18 and 19 in the second concession there. William junior and James were shown with not only the marsh at 3052 acres, but also Lots 60 and 61 in Malden for an additional 547 acres.

Caldwell's life at this time was not without financial difficulty. Angus MacIntosh, acting for himself and Alexander Macomb in the attempted collection on a bond owed by Caldwell, sought either cash or land in payment in the summer of 1799. The amount of land mentioned was 1,000 acres. He apparently owed an additional £300, to the Estate of Sharp & Wallace in the fall of that year, which he again promised MacIntosh to pay either in cash or land. By 1801 the debt was reduced to £60., which MacIntosh
doggedly pursued. He threatened Caldwell with legal proceedings to get his money. William Park also attempted to collect a balance of £55.2 from him. The two may not have been on extremely amicable terms, as Park concluded his letter of 15 May 1800 with "I expected that you would come to see me (as you saw me in the street)....". a slight which he would not let pass.

Continuing his role as a Justice of the Peace, Caldwell attended the Court of Quarter Sessions regularly at the turn of the Century. Cases heard in 1801 included: Windel Wiley and Dony Malt for 'seducing' minor children, dismissed; Jean Marie Bouche for assault and battery, guilty - fined £25.; Joseph Meilleur for the same, not guilty; and John Donohoo for petty larceny, guilty - sentenced to a public whipping and imprisoned from 14 January to 1 May. Caldwell himself brought one of his tenants up on charges of petty larceny for stealing corn. The charge was dropped due to conflicting evidence. It did, however, mention that Caldwell intended to sell the corn to Forsyth Richardson & Co., indicating that the fur trade was one market for his commodities.

The cases referred to above and others heard by Caldwell and others at the Court of Quarter Sessions in the first decade of the nineteenth century reflected a concern for property and public duty. Frequently fines were handed out to petty and grand jurors, constables, and witnesses for nonattendance of the sessions. Common crimes involved assault, trespass, and charges related to the sale of liquor. One unfortunate man was fined two pounds in 1804 for 'blaspheming and rioting.'

The close of the decade brought William Caldwell his long sought patent of Lot 3 in Maiden. Lieutenant Governor Francis Gore had
written to Governor General James Craig, in not very positive terms, regarding Caldwell's claim to the lot. Referring Craig to "a Voluminous Report of the Surveyor General", Gore noted that the military reserve had been made as a result of Caldwell's suggestion for the position of a fort. He cautioned that the situation had become "delicate", owing to the growth of the town between the fort and Caldwell's claim. On the 13th of April 1810 the lot was officially granted to him. He was not given, however, the exemption from fees granted to members of Butler's Rangers. On August 18th of that year Caldwell paid £5.11. as a "full fee grant of land". The business was finalized on August 20th when he received a grant of the waterfront on Lot 3.

In 1811 Caldwell had been in North America for a little less than forty years. In the third and fourth decade of that time he had made a few accomplishments. In one crucial hour he and his white auxiliaries had allowed the Indians to make a safe retreat at Fallen Timbers. He remained committed to allies at a time when official British policy betrayed them. Caldwell continued with Matthew Elliott and Alexander McKee as patentees, watching their settlement at Malden grow. Upon his suggestion the area at the mouth of the Detroit River was seen as a strategic location for a military establishment after the surrender of Detroit to the Americans. He continued to raise his family. While perhaps no more successful as a businessman than he had been in partnership with Matthew Elliott, he was nonetheless part of the landed gentry, complete with tenant farmers. He continued in his civic leadership as a Justice of the Peace, and until the militia reorganization of 1798, as Deputy Lieutenant of Essex County.
Finally, Caldwell had clear title to his lands.

Having mentioned all these positive events and qualities, it should be noted that the years of 1794-1811 were not completely successful for Caldwell. His rewards for Fallen Timbers were few. In the militia reorganization of 1798 he was passed over for colonelcy, in spite of the fact that his commission predated many others.56 His old friend and mentor, Alexander McKee, died in 1799.57 The position of Deputy Superintendent for the Western Indians passed first to McKee's drunken son Thomas, and then after his incompetency was proven to Elliott. Caldwell does not appear to have been considered for the position at that time. His half-breed son Billy had left Malden to seek his fortune in the fur trade. Caldwell remained unable to establish completely a sound relationship with him.58 Finally, the separation of the military from the administrative functions of the Western District left Caldwell with those he seemed to feel most at home. It would leave him behind though, as the merchant class joined other privileged segments of society in the Family Compact.
Detail from Smith's 1813 map showing Essex County

FIG. 5
Frontier
The head of Lake Ontario and Niagara
Detail from Smith's 1813 map showing
Fig. 6
Chapter IV

Acting Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs - 1812-1815

The coming of the nineteenth century put Fallen Timbers behind the Detroit Frontier. The death of Alexander McKee and succession first of his drunken son, Thomas and then Matthew Elliott to the superintendent in combination with the calming influence of a few years' peace meant that the Indian Department's role was diminished in the opening years of that century. The relations between Great Britain and the United States quickly deteriorated - and the Indian Department's role increased proportionately.

By 1806 it was evident that Great Britain, struggling against the Continental System, would no longer allow the "broken voyages" of enemy goods to American ports from whence they were re-exported as "Americanized" products. The Berlin Decree of 1806, the British Orders-in-Council, and the Milan Decree of 1807 all hurt American commerce. The Chesapeake incident, also of 1807, induced the Anglophobic Jefferson to sign the Embargo Act into law in December of that year. By 1810 the American's pride was soothed with the victory of the President over HMS Little Belt. Unable to effectively compromise over matters concerning American commercial activities in a time of military crisis for Great Britain, the two
nations drifted towards war. ¹

The state of preparedness for conflict on the Detroit Frontier was shown by the speed with which the militia was called out for war. Congress made its declaration on Thursday, June 18th, 1812; the Essex Militia was called out the following Monday. On the 24th Sir George Prevost received notification that a state of war existed between the United States and Great Britain not from military or diplomatic sources, but in a letter from Forsyth Richardson & Co. ²

The Americans had been advancing from the Ohio Territory towards Detroit for three weeks before war was declared. General William Hull commanded a force of four regiments, only one-quarter of which, the 4th United States Infantry Regiment which had fought at Tippecanoe the previous year, had any military experience. ³ Unaware that hostilities had broken out, Hull sent the sick, army wives, and bandleaders ahead on the schooner Cayuga, along with a packet box containing his correspondence, official instructions, and muster rolls. The British at Amherstburg had intelligence on Hull’s movements. The Cayuga was easily intercepted, its colours struck and the Union Jack raised, and the American bandleaders were made to play God Save the King. ⁴ The ease of the interception showed the benefit of locating the fort at the mouth of the Detroit River: the water route to Detroit and the Upper Lakes was cut off. Caldwell’s suggestion was a good one.

The undoubted enjoyment of the musical interlude was short-lived. The alarm was sounded at Sandwich on July 4th as Hull’s troops were seen approaching Detroit. Inhabitants along the Canadian shore of the river either moved to Fort Malden or hid in the surrounding woods. ⁵ When Hull
invaded, he found Sandwich deserted. Setting up his headquarters upriver in the home of Francis Baby, Caldwell's brother-in-law and fellow militia colonel during Fallen Timbers, Hull issued his famous proclamation to the local inhabitants. In it he promised to protect the "persons, property, and rights" of those who in friendship would be "emancipated from Tyranny and oppression and restored to the dignified station of freemen." For those actively continuing in their loyalty to the British, he warned "you will be considered and treated as enemies, and the horrors and calamities of war will stalk before you." 6

The invasion again demonstrated the strategic location of Fort Malden. Holding an empty village, Hull had to content himself with attempts to harness the British. On one such occasion Lewis Cass met a small British detachment at the bridge over River Canard. Attacking immediately, he forced the British back, but Hull failed to capitalize on the outcome of the skirmish. Indecision was the watchword of the invaders' commander. 7

The number of inhabitants taking refuge at Fort Malden was swelled by the arrival of a large force of Indians on July 17th. They arrived with their faces blackened, ready for war. It is difficult to say exactly how William Caldwell viewed the growing conflict. Unlike his former partner, Matthew Elliott, who after a period of disgrace, had returned to Indian Affairs as the Superintendent of the Western Indians, Caldwell stayed in a more passive role with the Quarter Master General's Department. He was an older man, now in his sixties. Passed over in the 1798 militia reorganization he, again unlike the even older Elliott, did not command a militia regiment. He undoubtedly would have had problems serving under Elliott or any other local commander. When he had fought
with the Indians against the Americans, it was not as an agent to supply them or urge them on, but as a true ally side by side with them in the thick of battle. He had three sons in the militia. William, the oldest, captained the 1st Flank Company of the 1st Essex Regiment. Thomas was a lieutenant and Francis a private recently promoted to ensign, both in their brother's company. The elder Caldwell succeeded in seconding Thomas as his assistant in the Quarter Master's stores. Perhaps he looked forward in fighting the war vicariously through his sons.

Whatever the reason, William Caldwell senior entered the War of 1812 as a non-combatant. His influence continued to be present, if not acknowledged, in three facts. First, his foresight in recommending a site for a fort effectively ended the possibility of amphibious operations for the Americans. Supplies had to be brought in overland to Hull at Detroit. The supply line marks the second point. Caldwell's relationship with the Wyandottes was an important reason for their continued support of the British cause. Those living along the south and east shores of Lake Erie interrupted Hull's communications, making his overland supply line as unreliable as that by water. Third, Caldwell's sons, now including Billy as Captain in the Indian Department, would be involved in military operations throughout the war. Caldwell himself was not totally inactive in the opening year of the war. He travelled, as he had done in the days of the Revolution, between Detroit and the Niagara frontier carrying dispatches and transporting supplies. Certainly his sons were at the taking of Detroit, where Hull surrendered without a shot being fired when threatened with the possibility of Indian atrocities being
committed on his civilian and military population. He led an Indian expedition shortly after the surrender of Detroit against Fort Wayne which resulted in its capture. He was appointed by Brock to serve as a member of the Court of Enquiry into the actions of the officers of the Essex and Kent militia regiments during Hull's invasion. Their loyalty and efficiency being questioned gave Caldwell the opportunity to resurrect his abilities as a Ranger and enter the conflict in a recognized military capacity.

In January of 1813 Brigadier General Henry Proctor, commandant of Fort Malden since Brock's departure, received a request for the formation of a ranger unit from the surrounding Indians. He reported

The Indians in Council have formally requested the Aid of such a Corps (Butler's) as were attached to, and acted with them, during (as it is called) the Revolutionary War, and that Captain Caldwell whom they well know and think highly of, may be employed. A Corps of that Description, would be, I am convinced, of the highest utility - both in restraining, and directing the hostility of the Indians to the proper objects of it....

In order to gratify such a request Proctor needed the permission of the Administrator of Upper Canada, Major General Sheaffe. When Sheaffe was slow to reply, Caldwell seized the initiative, went to Montreal and took up the plan with Governor General Prevost. When Sheaffe finally answered, nearly two months later, he agreed with Proctor that Caldwell should command the corps. However, he had very different ideas on its formation. The Ranger Corps for Sheaffe was "a proposition to be reported on", rather than "an Order to be acted on." Sheaffe stipulated that men were to be mustered from the Western District only. Each
man was to be outfitted at a sum to be set by Proctor. The men were to be paid and have the same privileges as "soldiers of the line" or regular troops, which included having rations issued to their wives and children. In direct contrast to Proctor's idea, Sheaffe also wanted, it was understood that the corps was to act only in concert with the Indians or in military action in the Western District, "unless on some pressing emergency, it should be requisite to employ them in some other part of the Province, or otherwise, as is required of the Militia generally." Proctor was to send Sheaffe the names of the officers he wished to nominate as well as any further nominations which Caldwell might make. The corps was to be engaged for the duration of the war with the Americans. Proctor was to report back to the cost-conscious Sheaffe as soon as possible, paying particular attention to the question of whether or not the corps could be formed with "ordinary pay." In a postscript, Sheaffe suggested the uniform of the corps: the same dress as the regulars in Upper Canada minus the scarlet cuff and collar, "with green, brown, or black substituted." 

Proctor answered as quickly as time would allow. He found it regrettable that Sheaffe insisted on limiting the corps to the Western District. It had been his intention to tap the resources of the whole province, thinking that a large ranger corps "would supercede the necessity of ever having recourse to the Militia, but in the event of an absolute invasion...." Proctor found the idea of having women and children with the Corps out of the question, given the nature of their purpose. He expected them to feed themselves at the enemy's expense as often as possible. As they would fight in the Indian manner, they were to be
armed similarly. Here Proctor looked to the North West and South West Companies for assistance. The corps was, as Butler's Rangers had done earlier, to direct the energy of the Indians in the manner desired by the military authorities. Proctor looked for raising between four and eight companies from the Western District. Each company was to have sixty men, two subalterns, and a captain. The Brigadier General wanted to reserve the nomination of two captains, "the One Senior of the Corps, being from the line, and the Paymastership." Proctor continued

Colonel Caldwell to who it is hoped the situation of Lt Colonel may be given, purposes his four sons - two as Captains - indeed it is conceived that the nomination or recommendation should, as much as possible, be left to him. - it is a peculiar kind of Service, & requires Officers suited to it - No individual can be admissible but of determined courage and hearty constitution.

Concerning pay, the Malden commandant favoured using Butler's Rangers as the standard rather than regular troops, owing to the fact that Caldwell's Rangers would experience "an extraordinary wear and Tear of Necessaries", occasional loss of materials which would mean that they would be "precluded from the practice of economy." Proctor could not even agree with Sheaffe concerning uniforms. The Brigadier preferred "A dark green plain jacket; Grey Pantaloons, and a low Bucket Cap, quite plain," calling it "the fittest dress." 18

Major General Sheaffe did not decide immediately, but conferred with the Governor General. Out of the consultation came an answer which flew directly in the face of Proctor's intention. The Commander-in-Chief's military secretary, Major Freer, felt that the terms suggested by Proctor were far more extensive than ought to be contemplated. One
or two companies could be formed as an experiment; further companies would depend on the success of this modest beginning. Although Caldwell held the command of the corps, only one company would be formed, captained by the younger William Caldwell, William Elliott, and James Askin, with Thomas and Francis Caldwell and Claude Gouin as lieutenants. At no time did the total number of officers, non-commissioned officers and privates in the Western or Caldwell's Rangers exceed thirty men. Even though this must have been a blow to Caldwell personally, it had an even greater effect on Proctor. An extensive Ranger operation was required to eliminate the necessity of dealing directly with the militia and Indians. Now Proctor would have to go through existing channels - in both cases Matthew Elliott. Caldwell's former partner was colonel commanding the 1st Essex Militia and Superintendent of the Western Indians. Like Caldwell he was much older than he had been in his last active service. Now seventy, it was doubtful that he was completely capable of managing Indian affairs in the Western District. The Indians were a problem for Proctor, as they were

...at best unsatisfactory soldiers. They were devoid of discipline. They lacked tenacity and were easily discouraged by failure. They were restless, dissatisfied during periods of enforced inactivity, yet inclined to fight for only brief periods at a time.21

The Indians were in such a state by mid-1813 that Caldwell removed his family from Amherstburg, fearing that less satisfied warriors would turn on their British allies.22 Great difficulty was experienced in feeding the ravenous hordes of warriors and their families. Their discontent was a contributing factor in Captain Barclay's decision to meet Commodore
Perry and his fleet at Put-in-Bay, and re-establish water supply routes. 23

The defeat of the British fleet on September 9th finished a summer
of apparent British control of the mouth of the Detroit River. Now
facing a situation similar to Hull at the outbreak of hostilities, Proctor
favoured a removal from Fort Malden. With no fleet to move supplies
quickly across the breadth of Lake Erie, he could not provision the
Indians at the rate to which they had become accustomed. He made every
effort to convince the Indians of the wisdom of withdrawal, including
sending Caldwell to speak to them. The aged Ranger later reported

the Indians seemed to be very uneasy and many
of my acquaintance of the Indian Chiefs came and
told me that the Indians would be very lazy to move
down with their families to such remote Country
as Canada, 24 and that was not agreeable to the
speeches that came from their father to them,
which were that they should be supported......
we told them that it was owing to the loss of
our fleet and the great scarcity of provisions
They said to me this is like the peace of 1783,
and again alluded to 1785 25 and said this the
second time we have been deceived by our father 26

The reluctant consent of Tecumseh to withdraw was held by Proctor as
a sufficient degree of Indian agreement but it is evident that they felt
betrayed. Forgotten in the treaty of 1783 and deceived in events of
1794, the Indians once again were forced to accept their ally's wishes.

Caldwell retreated with Proctor's forces and the Indians. Later
the Americans crossed the Detroit River and proceeded to the ruins of
Fort Malden destroyed by the retreating British. Caldwell's property
close to the fort was stripped and his buildings burned in retribution
for his past actions against the Americans. 27 Caldwell travelled with
the Indians, likely his old friends, the Wyandottes. When the British regulars and Indians positioned themselves across the road and into the swamp at Moraviantown on October 5th, Caldwell was with the Indians in the swamp. After pursuing the routed British, the Americans turned their attention to the swamp. "The fight was stiff but decisive: Tecumseh and his nucleus of particularly warlike braves died; the rest of the Indians melted away into the woods...." When the battle was finished, the British had suffered a miserable defeat and Indian resistance against the Americans on Lake Erie and the Detroit River was over. They would winter far away from their homes, going to "the head of the Lake" - Burlington Heights, on Lake Ontario. The retreat had been a costly maneuver. It landed a devastating blow on the Western Indians' confidence in their British allies. Matthew Elliott, without Proctor's knowledge, had promised Tecumseh that the Forks of the Thames would be fortified. Upon their arrival there they found themselves misled - there were no fortifications. The Brownstown Wyandottes and a few Delaware families left camp and accepted American protection. American agents had, prior to the Battle of Lake Erie, endeavoured to "corrupt the minds" of the Chippewa, Potawatomi, Ottawa, and Miami Tribes. A greater effect was achieved by the results at Put-in-Bay. Of the 3,500 warriors estimated to be in the Detroit area in the fall of 1813, only 1,200 accompanied the retreating troops. When they found no fortification, between six and seven hundred left to protect their families. The credibility of even Matthew Elliott had been stretched to the limit. Some of the Indians expressed regret for not having made peace with the Americans,
and holding Elliott and Thomas McKee responsible for their situation, threatened to kill them both. After Moraviantown Elliott's life was threatened again, this time because of the killing of Indian women and children by the Americans.  

Caldwell went on to Quebec, staying there from late in the fall of 1813 throughout the spring of 1814. He had likely removed his family to the security of the fortified city, away from the action of war. His eldest son, William, remained behind in command of Caldwell's Rangers. It was he who led the Ranger detachment which fell in with the Americans at Long Woods on the evening of the 3rd of March, 1814. Caldwell also had business to look after. Since the time of his appointment to the command of the Western Rangers he had received neither the salary for his position in the Quarter Master General's Department, nor the half-pay due him as a reduced Ranger captain. As he had been with his land grant, Caldwell was prepared to spend the time required to right the situation. The fact that his claim was supported by his brother-in-law, the Honourable James Baby, helped his cause considerably.

Whether with Caldwell's foreknowledge or not, Prevost and Drummond chose him as Matthew Elliott's successor to the superintendency of the Western Indians upon hearing of the latter's illness in May of 1814. When news reached Montreal on May 18th of Elliott's death the appointment was made, although Caldwell did not submit his memorial requesting the appointment until the day after. He picked up his commission and started out for Kingston on the 23rd. This was clearly a military decision; William Claus, Deputy Superintendent General of the Indian Department
and technically Caldwell's immediate supervisor, was not informed of the appointment until the 28th. 35

Caldwell was again joined by two of his sons. William junior had been appointed to the Indian Department as a captain on the 25th of April. Thomas received his commission as lieutenant in the Department exactly one month later. Each continued to hold their commission in Caldwell's Rangers, the command of which had devolved upon Captain James Askin. 36 In addition, there was of course Billy, who had been serving in the Department since the outbreak of hostilities.

Immediate and pressing problems which had beset the Department before Caldwell's appointment were coming to a head. The greatest of these in 1814 was the rivalry between the Western and Six Nations superintendencies. John Norton, who had six months earlier been elevated by Sheaffe from interpreter to captain, had been a thorn in Claus's side, and would be more so for Caldwell. Claus had been taken away from his duties with the Indian Department by military events in the Niagara Peninsula where he commanded the Lincoln Militia and in some instances regular troops. 37 Norton, a man of Scottish origin, had successfully been accepted as a Cherokee serving the British. In the course of his masquerade he had received the favour of not only Sheaffe, but Joseph Brant as well. The Claus-Norton feud was longstanding, beginning as early as 1800 with Claus's appointment as Deputy Superintendent General. Claus and others in the Indian Department feared

That Norton might abuse his role as Brant's successor by encouraging the Six Nations to make extravagant financial and territorial demands on the authorities, thereby adding to York's embarrassment at a-
critical stage in the colony's affairs...  

Caldwell was no stranger to Claus. They had known each other since the previous war with the Americans. It is not surprising that Caldwell would be sympathetic to Claus's disposition towards Norton. Both of them complained bitterly in late June when Norton received half of the provisions at Burlington. Prevost as well seemed impressed with Norton. He gave the imposter charge of the Delaware, Moravian, and Munsee Indians, all tribes formerly under the direction of Western Superintendancy. This meant of course that Norton sent in an additional requisition for supplies, even though these tribes preferred to remain with Captain Elliott, the son of Matthew Elliott. Claus felt that Norton sought "to increase the number of his Adherents" by interfering with the Western Indians. One method was his "liberality in supplying with provisions and liquor" which was "far beyond what they experienced from Colonel Caldwell..." The Western Indians, homeless and still feeling the sting of Próctor's retreat, felt no compunction to stay with any given officer. Perhaps remembering pre-war generosity from Elliott, they sought as much as they could get. Norton's interference resulted in unnecessary public Expense as most of the Indians after receiving their stipulated allowance of Provision from their own Officers! crofs the Bay to Burlington where they receive additional supply from Captain Norton.  

He was particularly successful with the Shawnees whose leader, the Prophet, opposed Caldwell. Lured by Norton's generosity, the Prophet attached himself to Norton's camp. The Shawnee then used promises of plentiful provisions to attract most of the refugee Shawnees,
Kickapoos, and Wyandots to the Grand River.

The Shawnee Nation did not know Caldwell as intimately as they had known Matthew Elliott, and before him Alexander McKee. Caldwell's greatest success had been with the Wyandottes, a large part of which tribe had accepted American protection.

Caldwell, though angered at Norton's "wish to gain over the Western Indians at any rate, & make the Government pay any price his ambition will impose!", could not let the Indians see the problem facing the Department. He informed Claus

I am careful not to shew to our Indians any anxiety, or uneasiness on the subject of their joining Captain Norton because such conduct would make them suppose that a Party Spirit, and not true Patriotism prevailed amongst us, and that we could not act with unanimity among ourselves. Such opinion if entertained by them I well know would be attended with consequences, and they would place no confidence in a Government split into Parties.

Caldwell was at this point Acting Deputy Superintendent General of the Indian Department in Upper Canada during Claus's absence from the head of Lake Ontario. He had three areas under his supervision: the Grand River, Burlington, and the active combat zone of the Niagara Frontier. Burlington was the base from which the Indians went into the latter. He was in theory, if not in fact, Norton's superior. That Claus, however, was still in command of the Department in Upper Canada is evidenced by his general order of 20 July:

The Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs having observed the great inattention of the Lieutenants and Interpreters of the Indian Department, who are generally absent when their Services are required. He directs that those Officers will immediately incamp themselves
at or near the Indian Camp on the Point opposite to Burlington Heights, and that they do not in future absent themselves from their duty without the permission of the Acting D' Sup. Genl or Senior Officer on the Spot.  

The general order points out several problems facing Caldwell. First and foremost, the question arises as to the necessity for the issuance of such an order. Caldwell, only two months in his new position may not have been familiar with Department policy in respect to his subordinates' quartering in a wartime situation. This is unlikely, since throughout the American Revolution and later hostilities with the Americans he had fought alongside the Indians. What is more likely is that the Indians under his command were becoming more restless as time wore on. Claus requested that Caldwell direct his officers "to be particularly attentive to the conduct of the Indians, and to endeavour as much as possible" to put an end to those disgraceful depredations of which the inhabitants, complain so loudly and Justly, their Cattle being frequently Killed and their fields of grain and Grass being ruined by the Indians feeding their horses in them.  

It is also interesting to note that Claus had specified the point opposite Burlington Heights. There would be no room for argument in this order; the officers were to go to Caldwell's camp on the Point and not Norton's at Burlington Heights.

It was small wonder that the situation in which Caldwell found himself was full of confusion. The Western Indians, uprooted and angry, now participated in the conflict along the Niagara Frontier. Two weeks prior to the order had seen fighting at Chippewa, and five days after Claus's instructions the hostilities were renewed at Lundy's Lane.
Their frustration would increase over the autumn of 1814. Moved from their Burlington camp to Ancaster, the Western Indians were held inactive and given fewer supplies. As was often the case with attempts to practice economy in Indian Department accounts, it caused much bitterness. As the action of the war slowed, so too did the military's response to requests for even the most basic supplies.

Lieutenant Colonel Reginald James, officer commanding the 37th Regiment and future commandant of Fort Malden, requested that Caldwell send a group of Indians to Delaware and on to the Detroit area late in the fall. Caldwell was forced to refuse a second request because the remaining Indians lacked shoes. As the year 1814 closed, Caldwell informed James of the state of the Western Indians:

I have now to address you on a subject of the very first importance, it is the manner in which the Indians and their families are provisioned, the quantity is so very scant that it will not enable them to more than exist. To keep them from starving they have sold for vegetables &c. nearly all their clothing and silver ornaments and as this resource is at an end, I am apprehensive unless some other means are taken to feed them, that we shall not long have them to feed, as they already begin to talk of going off, not from want of loyalty to us, but (as they say) from starvation. I have to request you will have the goodnfs to interfere in the business, and if you have it in your power the quantity to each may be increased.

Although James supported Caldwell, the Deputy Commissary General responded by ordering Caldwell to provision his Indians once a week instead of twice. The Acting Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs was further ordered to make "regular Provision Returns of the number of Men, Women & Children to receive Ration before any issue can be made."
Instructions to the Commissary General's Department at Burlington Heights stipulated that no vouchers were to be honoured unless signed by Caldwell for the Western Indians or Norton for the Grand River tribes. One of the objectives in tightening provisioning regulations was to prove "that Colonel Caldwell may not be justified in complaining of the Indians being without their Rations...." 47

Under some scrutiny from the military, Caldwell also had difficulties with his charges. The Shawnee, Munsee, Delaware, and Ottawa Indians were growing more discontented daily. They had little patience with the lack of provisions, and clamoured for guns and ammunition. They feared renewed American activities along the Niagara Frontier that winter, and could not even have defended themselves, being "completely destitute". The Prophet, Tecumseh's irascible brother and leader of the Shawnee, was particularly obstreperous. It is possible that, feeling betrayed by the events of Tippecanoe and later the retreat up the Thames River, with the death of his brother, the Prophet would not have trusted any British agent. He seemed particularly resentful of Caldwell. 48

The treaty of Ghent ended hostilities between Great Britain and the United States. Borders were returned to their pre-war status or referred to the future Boundary Commission for decision. The Americans by the ninth article agreed

to put an end immediately.....to hostilities with all the Tribes or Nations of Indians with whom they may be at war.....and forthwith to restore to such Tribes, or Nations respectively all the possessions, rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven previous to such hostilities.
The clause was subject to the proviso that
such Tribes or Nations shall agree to desist
from all hostilities against the United States of
America, their Citizens, and Subject upon the
Ratification of the present Treaty being notified
to such Tribes or Nations, and shall so desist
accordingly.

A similar set of clauses applied to tribes hostile to Great Britain. 49

The decision made and the war over meant that the Western District was
returned to the British. Those Indians who had lived on the Upper Canadian
side of the Great Lakes could return to their homes. Those who did not
would have to deal with the bureaucracy surrounding the cessation of
hostilities.

One of the military details left for Caldwell to complete was testi-
ying at General Henry Proctor's courtmartial. As early as July of 1814
Proctor requested evidence from Caldwell and his sons Billy and William.
When he was informed by the Adjutant General's Department that distance
might affect attendance at this courtmartial, Proctor protested that he
was anxious to get their evidence to clear his character. 50 Although the
courtmarital began on December 21 1814, it took nearly two months to com-
plete. The three Caldwells were in attendance for fifty-two days, absent
from their charges at a crucial time. In the initial testimony and cross-
examination they supported Proctor. In particular the Caldwells' testi-
mony was used to reinforce Proctor's contention that the Indians had been
very difficult to manage in the period immediately prior to and during
the retreat from Fort Malden. Billy's testimony as Proctor's Indian Aide
expounded on the difficulties faced in the Detroit area in keeping the
Indians loyal to the British. 51

1815 marked the end of the war, and as such the end of the British
need of Indian allies. This in turn meant the reduction of the Indian Department. The initial "Proposed Establishment for the Indian Department of Upper Canada...." retained Caldwell as Acting Deputy Superintendent General at £300. sterling per annum. He was to preside over the Department's affairs at Amherstburg with an establishment of 4 captains, 1 surgeon, 1 storekeeper, 1 clerk, 2 lieutenants and 6 interpreters. While plans varied, his superintendency continued to include Billy, Thomas, William and even Francis with the latter two described as militia officers "attached" to the Department. By May it was evident that the Shawnees needed particular attention, and Claus wrote to the Military Secretary asking that Matthew Elliott and Alexander McKee, Metis sons of the men of the same names, be kept on in the hope that they would prove influential with that tribe.

One of Caldwell's most difficult tasks was overseeing the return of the Western Indians to their pre-war homes. The job of moving hundreds of men, women and children was, he claimed, greatly complicated by interference from Colonel James. Claus had relayed instructions to Caldwell regarding the settlement of the Indians in new areas. Caldwell had his own ideas which he felt would lead the Indians to a state of great self-sufficiency. Unfortunately he misjudged his and the Department's independence from the Military Establishment and chose not to inform Colonel James.

In the rather disagreeable relations during and following the move, James appears to have followed protocol. Caldwell must have observed from the time of his immigration to North America that the Indian Department reported to the Military Establishment. He must have known that
McKee had kept De Peyster informed constantly, and must have observed Elliott and Proctor. Caldwell was not a dull man. Why then did he ignore James' authority? Several possibilities exist. The first and most popular is that he was senile. This theory too easily dismisses an older man and with him the problems of administering a large Department, its internal problems, and its relationship to other institutions. Caldwell's nomination for Elliott's position had come from the highest military officer in the land. The decision had been based on the best available information, which pointed to his being well thought of by the Western Indians. He was further made Acting Deputy Superintendent General and continued with that rank after the war. It is unlikely that he was overcome by senility in the thirteen months during which he held the position.

A personality clash is another possibility. It undoubtedly figured into the problem, but both men were capable of putting personal matters aside in the course of their duties. That they did not indicates the presence of a larger and more complex problem. The Western District was the only British area to be successfully invaded and held by the Americans during the War of 1812. Its loss and the reason for the retreat up the Thames River ending in the route at Moraviantown provided much room for discussion regarding the placing of blame. Was Proctor so terrible a soldier? Or were the Indians responsible for the defeat? The tension which had always existed between the Indian Department and the Military Establishment strained to the breaking point. Caldwell and James were the microcosmic representation of this tension.
James was going to a place of military disgrace. The Americans with whom he would have to deal in order to keep the peace had been the victors in the final struggle for control of the Old Northwest. His perception of the cause for the British humiliation may have included Proctor, but likely settled on the Indians and the Indian Department. His actions in regard to that Department demonstrated an intolerance to the slightest deviation from military practice, and show a man determined not to make the same mistakes as Proctor. If the Indian Department could not operate smoothly, he would take care of it himself.

Caldwell, for his part, was returning home. It was not, however, the place he left. His home, barn, and other buildings had been burned, his farming equipment destroyed, and his timberland and orchard ravished. While it was obvious from his support of Proctor that he felt that the Indians were primarily the cause for the retreat, he had no love of the Military Establishment with whom he had to deal as Acting Deputy Superintendent General of the Upper Canadian Indian Department. They were the ones who had placed Norton in a position of strength. It was their orders which called for reduced rations for the Western Indians and relegated his charges to the brink of starvation. He had been made the bearer of this bad news, and all the while dared not show any negative reaction lest the Indians perceive it as a sign of weakness. It was obvious to him James did not understand the nature of Indian Department operations, neither did he appear to respect the position of Acting Deputy Superintendent General. Caldwell therefore saw no reason to defer to this man.

There was one other perceptual problem which may have affected Caldwell’s ability to relate to James. From past experience he knew
that McKee and Elliott operated with a great deal of autonomy. They were subject to military authority, but not completely controlled by it. Both McKee and Elliott had been able to mete out some favours. Their sons had positions in the Department and even the drunken Thomas McKee became the Amherstburg Superintendent for a time. McKee and Elliott had decided when, where, and to whom the supplies would be distributed. They could reward a friend, punish an enemy, flatter an influential chief, or elevate an obscure brave by simply regulating the distribution of supplies and presents.

James understood none of this. When Caldwell did not inform him on Indian Affairs while still at Burlington, he became uneasy. Early in 1815 Caldwell stationed his son Thomas at the Grand River. Later in the spring James ordered the movement of the Western Indians from Burlington, from whence they were to continue on to Delaware. Eight days' rations were to be given to the Indians upon their arrival. When James arrived five days after the rations should have been given out and discovered that they had not, he began to make inquiries. He discovered that the officer of the Commissary Department had received no order to supply the Indians. Further, the officer told James that he knew of only one occasion in the previous two months when Thomas Caldwell had visited the Grand River. James immediately informed Sir George Murray, outlining a "shameful" situation which had come about "all owing to Colonel Caldwell's neglect...." James did not stop to consider, and Caldwell did not inform him, that there might have been a reason for the conditions at the Grand River.

A possible explanation is that Caldwell waited the extra five days
for stragglers. A more likely interpretation is that Caldwell sought to teach a lesson to the Grand River and Western Indians, largely Shawnees, who created problems for him by their behaviour and complaints. By only sending Thomas to see them once in two months, and by withholding their rations, Caldwell could impress upon them that they would have to listen to him. James's interference weakened the object lesson. If Caldwell had chosen to inform James of the reasons for his actions, the strategy might have worked and many problems would have been avoided.

Existing problems were amplified at Delaware. James had asked Caldwell to accompany him, to which he received no reply. Arriving first, James was slighted when Caldwell did not come to see him upon his arrival. What James did not realize was that by interfering in Department affairs he had weakened Caldwell's position. The fear of losing more prestige with the Indians by admitting James's superiority may have kept Caldwell away. He may have felt too angry to deal with the Colonel. The lack of communication again aggravated the situation. Caldwell hoped to establish the Indians on the Thames River and plant corn, as summer was fast approaching. James had specific orders from Murray to leave only Moravian, Delawares and Munsees at Moraviantown. James had plans to settle other Indians on the St. Clair River for the summer, where they could also have grown corn. The two were again working at cross purposes. Both were busy blaming each other when the Indians were brought to Sandwich in June. Each had favoured his own "planting ground" to keep a distance between the Americans and Indians. While James knew the aims of the postwar military establishment, Caldwell knew the country and the requirements of his charges.
Once back at Sandwich James took over the Indian Department function of provisioning, using the former Moravian town agent Laidly of the Commissary General’s Department. In doing so he did exactly what Caldwell feared; he removed Caldwell’s real power and reduced him to an administrative figurehead. This led, in addition to the constant diatribes between James and himself in June and July, to a further deterioration of Caldwell’s relationship with the Indians.

Again the bearer of bad news, he had to try and enforce the ban on crossing the Detroit River. A group of eight chiefs from the Sauk, Shawnee, Kickapoo, Ottawa, Chippawa, Potawatomi, and "Misquokie" tribes threatened Caldwell that they would “go to the American side, and never return to the English again.” Not only did they say this in front of James, but proceeded to Kingston where they repeated their charges and reiterated their dissatisfaction with Caldwell to General Robinson. He felt that the "dislike and heavy displeasure against Col. Caldwell" which they had expressed deserved a full report to Drummond. In it he wrote

> I very much fear it will be almost impossible to reconcile the Indians to Col. Caldwell. They hate and despise him to an inconceivable degree. It is the cause of their coming here and they plainly say that they cannot live any longer under him.60

In the speech of the Shawnee the charges were that he had not looked after them, leaving them "in want of Clothing, even Barefooted" and that they had constantly asked him to explain the terms of the Treaty of Ghent.61 Caldwell was apparently no longer au fait of the Indian country.
The latter charge was completely refuted in the testimony of Billy and his father at a Court of Inquiry presided over by James. It was held under instructions from both Drummond and Robinson to inquire into the actions of a group of Shawnees who had crossed the river and stolen American horses. Caldwell testified, supported by Billy, that the Indians had been informed of the terms of the Treaty at Burlington not once but twice. The deflection of his Shawnee charges did not take the heat off Caldwell. In August, William McGillivrary, a powerful partner of the North West Company, was busy in Montreal recommending that a successor to Caldwell be found. His assessment was that:

Colonel Caldwell's appointment to the Station of Superintendent was a measure of necessity. He was not considered equal to the task, but he was the best that could be found, and much dependence was placed on the aid & assistance which he would derive from his Sons.

If that was the opinion in Montreal at the time of Caldwell's appointment, it was a private one, and one later born out of a retrospective analysis.

It is indeed unfortunate that Caldwell had chosen to antagonize Lieutenant James. In his presence Caldwell would be quite deferential. Away from him he sought to assert his own position. Occasionally events conspired to bring the two men into conflict. Late in August an envoy of the American commission to arrange peace with the Indians crossed to Fort Malden with a letter regarding the Indians' attendance at a council of peace to be held on the 25th. James's second-in-command, Major Barrack, read it hastily and informed the envoy that Colonel Caldwell was the proper person to whom it should have been delivered. Caldwell sent a servant to conduct the envoy to his home. The envoy came part way,
decided that the letter was not intended for Caldwell, and returned to Detroit. The Commission approved of his decision and the letter was subsequently taken back to Major Barrack. 65

Some four days after the council, the Prophet and his group of Shawnees crossed the river to Spring Wells. It became clear to the Prophet that if he signed the treaty with the Americans he would lose his rank and become an "ordinary tribesman". Those Shawnee who had not fought against the United States were rewarded and appointed chiefs and spokesmen.

Offended, the Prophet returned to Amherstburg with a very small camp of followers September 8th. He might have faded away into obscurity there, and Caldwell and James might have effected a reconciliation had it not been for American intransigence in keeping peace with the Indians. 66

On the fourth of October two Indians were squirrel hunting on Grosse Isle when they were spotted by a group of American soldiers. Ordered to depart, they did so but as their canoe left the shore a soldier fired on them, mortally wounding one of the Indians. Robert Richardson, Indian Department Surgeon, examined the wounded man and reported the incident to Caldwell. Taking an interpreter with him, he was able to reconstruct the events.

From all the information I was able to collect there appears to have been an unprovoked and most wanton act of Violence and of such Nature as may be attended with the most serious consequences.

The Indian died that night.

A more serious incident occurred when the Kickapoos attempted to return to their homes in Illinois. The Indians were set upon by a group of American settlers, one Indian was killed and the rest fled
back across the border to Malden. A few days later nine horses were stolen from a herd kept by the Indians at Grosse Isle. These incidents revived the Prophet's power as the refugee Kickapoos now listened to his anti-American rhetoric. A council was held on October 20th. The Prophet through Caldwell demanded that James secure the return of the horses. James dealt directly with Governor Cass. Five days later on the 26th Cass acknowledged receipt of James's letter with Caldwell's as an enclosure, and although polite, he was firm in the contention that the event had occurred in the United States to Indians under its protection and would be looked after by American authorities.

The renewed tension between the Shawnee and Kickapoo refugees and the Americans quickly showed the weakness of the relations between Caldwell and James. The Commandant stayed at Sandwich to deal with Indian affairs there. He requested the services of Lieutenant Parin of the Indian Department. Caldwell, no doubt irritated by the renewed activities of the Prophet, was considerably less than diplomatic in his reply:

October 21st 1815

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter of yesterday's date, in which you request me to direct Lieut Parin to proceed forthwith and attend to the Duties of the Post of Sandwich his Services with the Numerous Indians about Malden/ I should suppose you might have long since on my application have dispersed with/ In answer to which I have to State that Lieut Parin being the only Interpreter for the Kickapoo and Shawnees I cannot spare him from this post as circumstances happen daily in which it is impossible for me to dispense with Lieut Parins' attendance at this post, but will send Thomas Guthrie Int/ who speak the Indian and the English
I have &
(signed) Willm Caldwell

Lieut. Col James A.D.S.G.70

Caldwell may have been right in keeping Parin with him. The Kickapoos
had lately returned, the Prophet was once again in need of restraint,
and Indian affairs were generally difficult at that time. James however
felt he had the makings of an international incident to deal with.
Immediately upon receipt of Caldwell's letter he took action which he
deemed necessary in the form of the following District Order:

Captain Billy Caldwell will take charge and
control over and in the management of the Indian
Department until the pleasure of His Excellency
Major General Sir Fredk. Robinson K.C.B. is made
known. 71

While Caldwell informed Claus of his reasons and continued to refuse
to send Parin, his refusal was to no avail. He was relieved of his
command and Billy replaced him.

Caldwell's reasons for so bitterly opposing Lieutenant Colonel
Reginald James remain unclear. His relationship with the Military
Establishment at the local, provincial and national levels were tra-
ditionally strong, friendly and mutually beneficial with his services,
always at his country's disposal, seldom going unrewarded. His other
strong suit was his relations with the Indians - his ability to restrain
or exhort them to action as the situation required. The War of 1812
had returned him to what should have been his best environment.
From all reports he did a good job as Assistant Quarter Master General
and commander of Caldwell's Rangers in the Militia. He was chosen on
the basis of these strengths which he exhibited over a period of four
decades. From all appearances he should have succeeded, old as he was, in the position of Acting Deputy Superintendent General.

Certain factors mitigated against him. First and foremost, his greatest Indian allies were the Wyandottes, who accepted American protection before Moraviantown. While he knew the Shawnee, and must have been known by them, he was not as familiar with them as he had been with the Wyandottes. Even though an able field officer, he was neither the charismatic Tecumseh, nor a religious leader like the Prophet. The Shawnee undoubtedly admired his abilities in the field, but that did little to satisfy them when they felt their needs were not being supplied. In 1782 it had been the Wyandottes of Sandusky who fought alongside him, and traded with him from 1784 to 1787. Even at that early period it was McKee and Elliott who dealt with the Shawnee. It was the Wyandotte branch known as the Hurons who had given Caldwell and the Indian Officers their initial land grant in 1783 and further granted Caldwell land for the disbanded Rangers in 1784. Caldwell convinced the Wyandottes of Brownstown to remain loyal to the British in 1812. After Moraviantown it was a different story. The Shawnee along with the other tribes with homes on the American side of the river stood the most to lose, and were the most agitated at the defeat. Tecumseh had been able to control them through his personal qualities; the Prophet lacked the necessary leadership abilities to direct the Shawnee. If they would not rally around him, they would rally around issues and around provisions. In managing the tribes thus the Prophet aided Norton and played Caldwell off against him. When back at Amherstburg he made Caldwell's leadership and ability
an issue, although his charges were clearly false. 72

Caldwell came into the position at a serious disadvantage. With the Wyandottes gone, he did not have a loyal core of supporters in the Western Indians. The Claus-Norton conflict was already well developed and simply changed to the Caldwell-Norton conflict. Overseeing a group of refugees in wartime, and coordinating their military activities was a very difficult task; directing the orderly return of defeated Indians was even worse. While Caldwell may not have been senile, he lacked the insights and the physical abilities that made him so successful as a soldier earlier. He did not have the ability or enough support in high places to overcome James.

James, for his part, did not cooperate with Caldwell, or the rest of the Indian Department. Shortly after Caldwell's dismissal Charles Askin wrote from Drummond Island to Claus,

On the arrival of the officers of the 3rd Regt. I learnt with sorry of the unwarrantable conduct of the Commanding Officer at Amherstburg towards poor old Caldwell even learned that the old man had been so harrass'd as to have confine to his Room from sickness It would be a happy circumstance of this Gentleman receive an order as the one of Amherstburg73 did, so that he would mind his own Business.74

On Christmas Eve 1815, long after Gore and Drummond had sanctioned Caldwell's dismissal, James wrote a very telling line to the Military Secretary:

The game that is going on by Governor Claus will have some light thrown on it; however He cares not a button what becomes of Old Caldwell provided He can get His A: Secretary75

From James's somewhat cynical note referring to Claus's attempt to
keep his Assistant Secretary on staff it is apparent that Caldwell did not receive support in that quarter either.

In the final analysis Caldwell's term as Acting Deputy Superintendent General ended on an unfortunate note. The fact that he did not respect James's authority or defer to his judgment, and that James appreciated neither the difficult task Caldwell had nor the services he had performed for his country, served as dividing factors in Western Indian affairs at a critical time. Caldwell resisted James as best he was able, but was overcome.

Almost as unfortunate was the scale on which Caldwell's Rangers were undertaken. It is entirely possible that the Western Indians would have fought more courageously and in greater number at Moraviantown had there been more evidence of British support. A large contingent of Rangers, trained to fight in the "Indian mode" and able to exhort their allies to stand and fight might have made the difference.

Caldwell was now identified with two losing causes: General Proctor and the Upper Canadian Indian Department. These losses combined with Suzanne's death must have made 1812 to 1815 bitter, difficult years. Even though the events of those years had been unkind, he still had his Malden property and Elizabeth, Theresa, Suzanne, and young John at home. Malden would become the focus for the old Ranger's activities in his declining years.
Fig. 7  Amherstburg Military Reserve and town in 1819  
(Courtesy National Map Collection)
Fig. 8 Amherstburg about the time of Caldwell's death
(Courtesy National Map Collection)
EPILOGUE

The Indian Department done with, Caldwell returned to the life he led before the war. It was not without activity though, for Caldwell had leased his barn as a barracks for the men of the 37th Regiment. It was given rent-free for a period of two years from the 24th of August 1815, an action which Caldwell likely hoped would placate James. It would also serve as a means to repair his barn free of charge for under the terms of the lease the repairs were "to be left with Col. Caldwell with the exception of the Births...." Upon completion the barn accommodated 230 men.

In 1816 Caldwell received yet another blow. In calculating his property losses caused by the Americans he came up with a figure of £2810.15.3 Halifax currency. The Military Board of Claims reduced it by nearly half to £1349.11. As was required, he brought several witnesses to attest to the value of his property. They were all French Canadians, and at least one had served with Caldwell in the Indian Department. The Board would not accept them as persons qualified to appraise such a claim, and appointed William Duff, Robert Inness, and George Hall to evaluate it. It was their decision which so heavily reduced the amount.

The aged Ranger had not been careful in entering his claim.
Witnesses more acceptable to the Board would have helped his cause. He should have been more specific, as Sarah Elliott, Matthew's widow had been. She had listed an itemized account right down to door knobs, while Caldwell had only listed buildings and agricultural materials. It was not 1784, and he had neither the same reputation nor was he dealing with the same people. While the British would again reward Loyalists, this time he was not an auspicious figure.

1816 also saw the second General Order to reduce the Indian Department on August 27th. Billy was not immune, and as he had entered the position of Amherstburg Superintendent politically, so he left it. He had held the station for almost exactly ten months - seven less than his supposedly incapable father. Although reduced, Billy was kept on the pay list until late October. The problems with the Indians for which the elder Caldwell had been held responsible refused to go away with the Colonel's dismissal.

Although forced out of the Indian Department, Caldwell was still respected in Amherstburg. When its citizens needed someone to promote their cause of making it the county seat for Essex, they turned not to the merchants, but to the last remaining patentee of Malden Township. On February 1st 1817 Caldwell chaired a meeting where a petition to the provincial "House of Commons" was drawn up. The community had been steadily growing, and had been in competition with Sandwich since the surrender of Detroit and separation of military and administrative functions in 1796. Although they did not succeed in becoming the seat of district government, it was evident that Caldwell's idea for a town
had borne fruit.

Caldwell was again called upon late in 1817 to chair another town meeting, this time to answer the questions of Mr. Robert Gourlay on Malden Township for his book on Upper Canada. Though thirty years junior to Sandwich, it had 108 "inhabited" houses to the latter's approximately 200, a population of 675 compared to about 1000, the same number of "medical practitioners", two more schools, one less store at twelve, three less taverns at five, six less windmills, but provided Sandwich with some bricks and was the local supply of limestone and lime. Malden had only a Roman Catholic chapel while Sandwich had the Catholic parish of Assumption and the English church, St. John's, which had been destroyed by the Americans in the war. The majority of these Malden statistics came from Amherstburg.

In January of 1818 the aged Colonel began to make preparations for his demise. He took care to divide his lands among his children. In his Malden lands he reaffirmed William and James's right to the marsh; divided Lot 22 between Francis and John and gave Lot 23 to Thomas, both lots being in the second concession; he gave Susan Lot 26 and divided Lot 27 between Theresa and Elizabeth, both lots in the third concession. He gave his one lot in Harwich Township to Billy. The lot for which he had struggled the longest was Lot 3 in Malden. It was the largest piece of prime land he possessed, and the growth of Amherstburg had made it a particularly important tract. It was Caldwell's wish that the lot be equally subdivided among all his children, excepting Billy. Leaving Billy out of the subdivision of Lot 3 may seem to indicate some prejudicial treatment. The fact, however, that he was left in the will at all after
taking what must have been to his father a very hurtful course of action at the time of the elder Caldwell's dismissal, indicates a possible reconciliation.

His children now provided for, Caldwell turned to the needs of the spiritual world. He had been involved with the Roman Catholic Mission at Amherstburg, initially allowing his home to be used for services, and later giving them land for a chapel. Although Anglican himself, his wife, children, and in-laws were Roman Catholic. That is not to say that he turned his back on the Church of England. In September of 1818 Caldwell conveyed a small portion of Lot 3 to five trustees of the future parish of Christ's Church for five shillings each. In the agreement conveying the land it was specified that he would have "a seat in the Church to be erected thereon for himself and his heirs forever." The social status of a family pew was of great value; his brother-in-law James had one at the Assumption parish church.

Caldwell had but one thing left to take care of; his financial affairs. Having first pleaded his case in 1814 for his pay as Assistant Quarter Master General of the Militia while colonel commanding Caldwell's Rangers, in 1820 he was forced to draw petition to receive his half pay as a reduced Ranger captain during his tenure as Assistant Quarter Master General. By November his petition reached Lord Palmerston, who approved the payment of the pension for the period of July 8, 1812 to January 18th, 1813.9

The end of Caldwell's life passed quietly. He died late in February, 1822, and was buried not in Christ Church, but in St. Jean Baptiste
graveyard, on the twentieth of that month. It appears that he had a deathbed conversion to Catholicism.

The unfortunate controversy with Colonel James clouded Caldwell's career; his contributions on the local, regional, and national levels have largely been overlooked. His military career showed a man of great ability, courage, and action. While lacking Daniel Boone's mythological stature, Caldwell actually defeated him in 1782. Under the militia arrangements of 1794, Caldwell was the only County Lieutenant or Deputy Lieutenant to command in a military situation and to fulfill the role as officially designed. When Great Britain and the United States teetered on the brink of war, he was in the thick of the action. That he held very senior positions in the War of 1812 such as Assistant Quarter Master General, colonel commanding the only ranger unit in Upper Canada, and Acting Deputy Superintendent General of the Indian Department, attests to his ability and reputation.

In civilian life he had tried his hand as a merchant, and found himself to be a more successful farmer. Among the first group of Justices of the Peace to be appointed in 1788, Caldwell in his prime answered the call of public service. He served with other notables in 1789 on "the council relative to the administration of Justice in the District of Hesse." He was recognized as an influential man, and his favour was sought by political candidates in the 1792 provincial election. He continued to sit and serve on the Court of Quarter Sessions until war interrupted. Later in life he was asked to chair meetings dealing with municipal affairs and the promotion of Amherstburg.
In his land dealings, Caldwell had been prescient regarding his location for a military establishment and town. From 1784 to 1810 work on his and the Indian Officers' land claims helped to establish the principle of surrender and regrant for Indian land transactions. The additional grant for disbanded Rangers and other Loyalists while he served was not only selfless, but also established the first English settlement in Essex County. That he did not attempt to extend his land holdings beyond Malden Township and the one lot in Harwich is indicative of the kind of life he chose to lead - not that of a land speculator, but rather a gentleman farmer. Comfortable and secure in his holdings, he correctly perceived the future value of Lot 3. The Caldwell family continued to subdivide and sell parcels of the original lot through to 1878. The marsh was partitioned in 1863.11

In spite of Colonel James, Caldwell's career with the Indians must be considered successful. He was obviously a better tactician than administrator. He commanded joint British and Indian forces at two battles in 1782 which resulted in magnificent victories. His dedication to the Indian cause left him as the only British commander in the field at Fallen Timbers. Owing to his service, he was known by Lieutenant Governors and Governors General of the day, from Haldimand to Simcoe and Drummond. That the Indians should ask for him to lead them during the War of 1812 was a testimony to their trust in him. He lead them at a very difficult time. It was unfortunate for his memory that he was drawn into the antipathy that existed between the Indian Department and Military Establishment.
In the final analysis, William Caldwell was a founder of Essex County. Unlike his contemporaries McKee and Askin, and even his in-laws the Babys, Caldwell sought neither the wider political or economic profits offered by Kent County. Although a public figure, he was not a politician. His were appointed positions.

Caldwell was a man who functioned well under fire. He was a soldier, and truly served his King and Country whenever called upon and in whatever capacity needed. His early exploits directly affected the design and implementation of military and civil policy for the Detroit Frontier, and very nearly fulfilled the dream of an Indian buffer state. Although less dazzling, his services in the nineteenth century were steady, well motivated if ill-executed, and no less worthy of respect.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. See for example the Michigan Pioneer Collections, Clifton's work on Billy Caldwell, and Edmund's *The Shawnee Prophet* for descriptions of Caldwell.

2. See Chapter II for Caldwell's land grants after the Revolution.

3. Chapter III describes Caldwell's activities at Fallen Timbers in 1794.

4. Reference here is to complaints against Caldwell during his tenure as Acting Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

5. Caldwell held the positions of Justice of the Peace, Deputy Lieutenant of Essex County (and with that the colonelcy of the South Battalion of Essex Militia), Assistant Quarter Master General, Colonel commanding the Western Rangers, and Acting Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Upper Canada. Most of these positions were given to Caldwell because of the reputation he established while senior captain in Butler's Rangers during the Revolution.

6. HWHM George Macdonald Papers.

CHAPTER 1


3. Ibid.

5. Caldwell's Memorial.


13. Possibly Andrew Caldwell, a well known Philadelphia politician. Although a conservative, this Caldwell took up the Rebel cause.


17. Ibid., p. 135.


20. BM Add Ms 21764, fo. 24, Haldimand Papers, PAC microfilm copy. Hereafter referred to as BM Add Ms with number.


22. BM Add Ms 21765, fo. 36.


25. BM Add Ms 21765, fo. 36.

26. Colonel Butler's wife and family had been captured by the Americans.

27. BM Add Ms 21765, fo. 42.

28. Ibid., fo. 38.


30. BM Add Ms 21765, fo. 129.


32. BM Add Ms21764, fos. 3, 5.

33. Ibid., fos. 24-25.

34. Ibid., fos. 37-38.


37. PAC Ms: 19 F1, Claus Papers, vol. 2, p. 140. Hereafter referred to as *Claus Papers*.


41. BM Add Ms 21765, fo. 142.

42. BM Add Ms 21764, fo. 90.


44. The Delawares referred to lived near Sandusky, Ohio, and would play an important role in the Battle of Sandusky two years later in 1782.

46. The Wyandottes in particular had to be impressed and believe that victory was possible. At the last moment they withdrew their support of the British at Moraviantown in 1813.

47. BM Add Ms 21764, fo. 114.


49. BM Add Ms 21761, fos. 20-21, 63, 85.

50. Ibid., fos. 2, 20-21, 57.

51. Ethan Allen.

52. BM Add 21761, fo. 120

53. Ibid., fo. 43; Add Ms 21764, fos. 210, 214.


55. BM Add Ms 21761, Fo. 124.

56. Ibid., fo. 199.

57. BM Add Ms 21764, fo. 242.

58. BM Add Ms 21762, fo. 26.

59. Ibid., fos. 13-14.

60. Ibid., fo. 15.

61. Ibid., fo. 42.

62. It is interesting to note the role of sea power in the perceived two-pronged attack on Detroit; the Rangers were taken by ship to the point farther from their base and would work their way back if necessary.

63. BM Add Ms 21762, fo. 42, reverse side.


65. Ibid., p. 106.

66. McKee's action infers that the danger of an attack by Clark up the Wabash and on to the Miami Towns was considerably lessened.


69. BM Add Ms 21762m fo. 62.


71. BM Add Ms 21762, fo. 80.


73. BHC Ms/Williams (Thomas).

74. Ibid.


76. Ibid., p. 126.

77. Ibid., p. 137.

78. Ibid., pp. 129-130.

79. BM Add Ms 21762, fo. 100.

80. Ibid., fo. 108.

81. Ibid., fo. 108.

82. Ibid., fos. 114-115.


84. Quebec or Niagara.

85. BM Add Ms 21762, fos. 118, 120-122.


87. BM Add Ms 21762, fos. 126, 129, 130.


90. Ibid., pp. 108-109; Horsman, Op. Cit., p. 41; MPC XI, p. 633; Bennett H. Young, History of the Battle of Blue Licks August 19, 1782, John P. Morton and Company, Louisville, 1897, pp. 3-4. The Battle of Blue Licks was well remembered by the Americans, who burned Caldwell's house in revenge in 1813.


92. MPC XI, p. 633.

93. BM Add Ms 21762, fo. 160; MPC XI, pp. 634-635.

94. BM Add Ms 21762, fos. 160, 176, 175, 179; Cruikshank, Op. Cit., p. 109; MPC XI, p. 646.


96. MPC XI, p. 321.

97. Ibid., pp. 326-329.

98. BM Add Ms 21765, fo. 409.

CHAPTER II

1. BM Add Ms 21763, fos. 3, 10-15.


3. BM Add Ms 21763, fo. 1.


5. BM Add Ms 21763, fo. 98.

6. Ibid., fo. 86


8. Also referred to as John Hay.


10. BM Add Ms 21763, fos. 175, 330.

11. Sir John Johnson
13. BM Add Ms 21765, fo. 344.
18. MPC XI, p. 423.
19. BM Add Ms 21765, Fo. 342.
21. MPC XXVI, pp. 146-147.
26. BHC Ms/Sibley (Solomon). Hereafter referred to as Sibley Papers.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. BHC Ms/Askin (John), Correspondence: 1786 file.


35. MPC XXIV, pp. 31-32.

36. Sibley Papers.

37. Ibid.


40. Ibid.


42. PAC MG 23 J9, Robert Matthews Papers, diary.


45. Ibid., p. 15

46. BHC Ms/Askin (John), correspondence: 1787 file.


49. OA Report 1904, p. 1040.

50. PAC MG 9 D1, vol. 6, Upper Canada Executive Council.

51. BHC Ms/Askin (John), correspondence: 1788 file.

52. Based on his gifts of land in 1819 to both the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches in Amherstburg, it is unlikely that Caldwell would have refused such a request.
53. HWWM George Macdonald Papers; PAC RG 5 B5, vol. 1, Upper Canada State Papers.

54. Sibley Papers.


56. MPC XI, pp. 626-627.

57. OA Report 1905, p. 32

58. MPC XI, pp. 627-643.

59. PAC RG 5 B5, vol. 1.

60. MPC XII, pp. 2-3

61. Claus Papers, vol. 4, p. 179.


63. See Ibid., pp. 12-14, 22-23, 28-32.

64. Ibid., pp. 16-20, 85.

65. Ibid., p. 128; PAC RG 1 L3, vol. 126, Executive Council: Upper Canada Land Petitions "Miscellaneous C."


67. Ibid., pp. 21-23.

68. Most likely in honour of Frederick Haldimand.


71. Claus Papers, vol. 4, p. 349.

72. OA Report 1917, p. 74.

73. OA Report 1905, pp. 177, 182.

75. OA Report 1905, pp. 186, 189.
76. Alexander Grant.
77. BHC Ms/Askin (John), correspondence: 1792 file.
78. OA Report 1905, p. 194. The Board made no ruling but referred the matter to Dorchester for further instructions.
79. BHC Ms/Askin (John), militia file.
81. OA Report 1905, p. 223; George Macdonald Papers.
84. MPC XXIV, pp. 528-529.
86. Claus Papers, vol. 5, p. 113.

CHAPTER 111

1. Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 47.
2. Ibid., pp. 53-54
3. Ibid., p. 58.
4. Ibid., pp. 58, 60.
7. Diplomatic Correspondence, pp. 67-68.
8. Ibid., p. 71.


13. Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 77.

14. Referring to the Council at Sandusky.


16. The French Revolution had, by 1793, played a role in the formation of political parties in the United States. The Federalists "were all the more inclined toward friendship with Great Britain..." which may have in turn inclined the British ear to be more than a little deaf to its Indian allies. Daniel M. Smith, The American Diplomatic Experience, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1973, p. 33.


19. Ibid., p. 337.


22. BHC Ms/Covington (Leonard), Correspondence D5.


24. Ibid., p. 104; BHC Ms/Covington (Leonard), Correspondence D5.


29. Ibid., pp. 36, 59.

30. Ibid., pp. 45, 59.

31. Queen's Rangers.
32. HBCA, PAM, F.3/1 fos. 189d-190.


36. HBCA, PAM, F.3/1 fos. 6, 31-32, 38, 76.

37. Wolford Simcoe Papers, Series 2, book 1, p. 44.

38. OA Microfilm copy of Abstract Index to Deeds, Malden Township. Hereafter referred to as OA A1D.


40. PAC RG 8 "C Series", vol. 272, pp. 185-186.

41. PAC MG 23 18, Bird Papers.

42. OA RG 1 CB 1, Box 22.

43. OA A1D.

44. OA RG 1 A-1-7, Box 6: RG 1 C-1-2 Vol. 9.

45. PAC MG 9 D1, vol. 6.

46. OA RG 1 A VII, vol. 2.

47. OA RG 1 A IV, vol. 17, pp. 40, 142.


49. BHC Ms/Fraser (Alexander), ZL3.

50. PAC MG 9 D833, Western District Court of Quarter Sessions.

51. PAC RG 5 B5, vol. 1, Clerks of the Peace - Extracts of Fines.

52. PAC RG 8 "C Series" vol. 272, pp. 185-186.

53. OA A1D.

54. OA RG 1 B.111, vol. 4.

55. OA A1D.


58. Clifton, Op. Cit. References to their relationship will be found throughout the article.

CHAPTER IV


2. BHC Ms/Askin (John), 1786-1812 journal, ZM5 J8.


4. Ibid., p. 155.

5. BHC Ms/Askin (John), 1786-1812 journal, ZM5 J8.


7. Ibid., p. 158.


10. OA Ms 498, James Duperon Baby Papers.


15. It is possible that Sheaffe did not want to repeat the problems faced with the formation of Butler's Rangers, when even regular troops tried to leave their regiments in favour of the Rangers.

17. Perhaps Proctor thought that by using an officer of the line as senior captain he could have more control over the activities of the corps.


19. PAC RG 8 "C Series", vol. 1220, Freer to Sheaffe, 16 April 1813.


24. Probably Burlington or Kingston.

25. Fallen Timbers, 1794.


27. FMM Caldwell General File.

28. Legend has it that Caldwell was with Tecumseh when he died. No reliable documentation has been found to support this.


33. PAC MG 24 A9, Sir George Prevost's Memorial Book, January 1814.

34. PAC RG 8 "C Series", vol. 192, p. 5.


42. Ibid., vol. 688D, fo. 72.

43. Ibid., fo. 73.

44. Ibid., vol. 257, p. 377.

45. Ibid., p. 376.

46. Ibid., vol. 688D, fo. 145.

47. Ibid., fos. 147-148.

48. Ibid., fo. 159.


50. PAC RG 8 "C Series", vol. 166, Proctor to Colonel Edward Baynes, 7 July, 1814; Baynes to Proctor, 11 July, 1814; Proctor to Baynes, 17 July, 1814.


52. PAC RG 8 "C Series", vol. 257, p. 81.

53. Ibid., vol. 84, pp. 319-321.

54. Ibid., vol. 258, p. 78.


58. Ibid., p. 156-159.
59. James claimed that the Indians could come and go as they pleased, while it was apparent that "British and American officials agreed that the pro-British Indians should not enter the United States until they had met with American Indian Agents....", Edmunds, Op. Cit., p. 152.

60. PAC RG 8 "C Series", vol. 258, pp. 150-152.

61. Ibid., pp. 135-155.

62. Ibid., pp. 375-384.

63. Ibid., p. 180.

64. See for example Prevost and Freer's correspondence in Ibid., vol. 1222, pp. 118, 123, 127.


69. A reference no doubt to the Prophet and his followers, especially since Parin (Perin) spoke Shawnee.

70. Ibid., p. 476.

71. Ibid., p. 477.

72. Ibid., pp. 375-384.

73. Referring to Caldwell.

74. MPC XVI, p. 371.

75. PAC RG 8 "C. Series", vol. 258, p. 538.

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7. OA RG 22 G2, Probate Court, Western District (Essex) Estate No. 199, William Caldwell.


10. FMM St. Jean Baptise Parish Registers, 1822 Burials (Microfilm Copy).

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VITA AUCTORIS

Gregory Mark Walsh was born in Nokomis, Saskatchewan, second son of Fr. David and Beth (nee Travis) Walsh. After living in Guelph, Hamilton, and St. Catharines, the family moved to Windsor in 1969.

Receiving his Honours Secondary School Diploma in 1974 from J. L. Forster S.S., he enrolled in History at the University of Windsor in 1975 and received his Honours B.A. in 1979. Married to Virginia Denomme in 1979, he registered in the Master of Arts (History) Programme at the same university. In 1980 the position of Archivist, Microfilm Programme at the Hudson's Bay Company Archives in Winnipeg was accepted, from where studies were continued on a part-time basis. A daughter, Nicole, was born in 1982. Returning to Windsor as the Municipal Archivist, Windsor Public Library, he graduated in 1984.