The World Bank and biopolitical governance: The ARMM Social Fund Project

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THE WORLD BANK AND BIOPOLITICAL GOVERNANCE: THE ARMM SOCIAL FUND PROJECT

By Marie Fuki

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through Sociology, Anthropology, Criminology
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts at the
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The World Bank and Biopolitical Governance: The ARMM Social Fund Project

by

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December 8, 2011
Author’s Declaration of Originality

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes the policies and practices of development as a biopolitical technology for managing culturally perceived ‘risky’ populations in the southern Philippines. Since post-9/11 and its reinforcement by the war on terrorism, the interrelations of security and development underscore the proliferation of securitized discourses that operate within and beyond transnational aid organizations. Within this security-development nexus, I focus on the World Bank’s ARMM Social Fund Project. I analyze its techniques of generalized descriptions, quantifications, and responsibilization that aim to shape individuals occupying the ARMM ‘borderland’ as a governed entity. I reveal how these biopolitical techniques guide the actions of the poor, shape ideas of poverty and poverty reduction, and legitimize development interventions that aim to manage the lives of the poor. The thesis concludes by examining new possibilities for social transformations that link local struggles with transnational actions.
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I would like to thank Dr. Suzan Ilcan for her guidance and wisdom which has motivated me throughout my thesis research as well as my entire graduate career. I would like to acknowledge Dr. Lynne Phillips and Dr. Valerie Scatamburlo-D’Annibale for their helpful advice and support. Thank you Kelley Allard for your assistance and consolation.

Thank you mom, I miss you dearly and I will continue to try and make you proud. Dad, thank you for keeping me focused and your endless words of encouragement. And, Laura, I’m grateful for your friendship and support throughout this process.
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## Acronym List

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<tr>
<td>ASFP</td>
<td>ARMM Social Fund Project</td>
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<td>ARMM</td>
<td>Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao</td>
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<td>ASG</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Country Assistance Strategy</td>
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<td>CDD</td>
<td>Community Driven Development</td>
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<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>GRP</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of the Philippines</td>
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<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>MCFF</td>
<td>Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>United Nations Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
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<td>MNLF</td>
<td>Moro National Liberal Front</td>
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<td>MTF</td>
<td>Mindanao Trust Fund</td>
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<td>SZOPAD</td>
<td>Special Zone for Peace and Development</td>
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<td>UNDP HDI</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme Human Development Index</td>
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<td>UNWFP</td>
<td>United Nations World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WDR</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

“More than any other entity on Earth, the Bank shapes the worldview of proponents of big international development, and the Bank is its biggest funder”.

Bruce Rick in *Invested Interests: Capital, Culture and the World Bank* (2007)

In the recent assassination of Osama Bin Laden, there is an unsurprising refocused limelight on Muslim populations around the globe. One of the monitored populations targeted is the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in the Philippines. On May 5, 2011 BBC published an article entitled ‘Al Qaeda around the World’, ostensibly pinpointing al-Qaeda-affiliated groups and operations. Among others on the list, the author of “Al-Qaeda around the World” cites the Filipino Abu-Sayyaf group, pointing out that the organization “is said by the United States to have links with the al-Qaeda network”, and thereby classifying it as a potentially risky population and threat to global security and peace.

Development organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations have been increasingly involved in promoting global peace through aid projects geared to achieving security. In examining this increased emphasis on peace and security, I focus upon the World Bank’s ARMM Social Fund Project (ASFP) which engages the racialized minority Moro population (Muslim Filipinos) in programs that involve providing and improving sustained access to social and economic services, capacity building for indigenous women and out-of school youth for improving food security, and employment opportunities and household income. These activities suggest the presence
of what Foucault (2003) calls biopower which involves a central concern of the modern liberal state in fostering of life of the population (242). The mechanisms of biopower bring life into the realm of explicit calculations and make knowledge an agent of the transformation of human life. The ASFP serves to focus upon particular people in the ARMM by engaging them in activities that are deemed ‘best’ for human development. In light of these activities, I question how the World Bank’s ASFP utilizes ‘development’ as a form of biopolitical governance in the Philippines. In reference to the ARMM, I analyze the ways in which communities affected by poverty and conflict are calculated and managed.

In the past decade (post-9/11), transnational organizations have enforced an emphasized security discourse in their ‘solutions’ to achieving peace, development, and poverty reduction. It is vital to examine this discourse of emphasized security in analyzing development in the ARMM. This is not only because of the region’s infamously high levels of poverty, but also due to increased surveillance over the Moro population on account of allegations accusing the former of terrorist activities by Filipino and American military. I examine specifically the methods and frameworks provided by the World Bank that are (in) compatible with reducing poverty in the ARMM, in achieving ‘order’ and ‘peace’. It is important to note that I am reluctant to portray the World Bank, and its ideology and legacy, in a singular sense. Yet a brief genealogy of the World Bank Group illustrates that the institution has exerted persuasive power and “repeatedly refashioned itself over the past sixty years in response to specific historical pressures from events, individuals, and movements” (Benjamin 2007: xxviii). What is of utmost importance is that such a genealogy allows for historico-political discourse
analysis, providing one with the ability to critically examine the powerful roles organizations play within society (Foucault 2003: 197). Thus, an analysis of the current context of the World Bank will allow for greater understanding of power as well as the ways in which development aid is used to ‘maximize the fitness’ of the ARMM.

Development intervention is often legitimized through the implementation of political, economic, or social reforms, to create a population that is less ‘backward’ or less willing to follow ‘threatening’ terrorists. Duffield (2006) argues that the interdependence between development and security suggests a radicalization of the former. It invokes an urgent willingness to harness developmental resources to change the balance power between social groups, to include the excluded and rebuild crisis-ridden societies anew in the interest of global stability (Duffield 2006:73). Therefore, the ‘war on terrorism’ is a racist discourse which allows the legitimacy for development practitioners to manage the ARMM by targeting and managing particular ‘types’ of populations. In this case, the Moros are culturally and racially perceived as a particular risky ‘type’ of population that needs to be governed for the sake of global stability. They must be governed to better monitor international criminal networks, reduce unwanted migratory flows,¹ and defend the ‘health’ of a society.

¹ Khan (2009) illustrates the migratory flow of Filipino women to ‘developed’ countries. According to the National Alliance of Philippine Women in Canada (NAPWC) in 2005, Filipino women accounted for 95.6% of Canada’s live-in caregivers. However, permanent residency in Canada is feared as they are denied benefits and can only work for the duration that the contract permits (28).
In managing the Mindanao region, the World Bank and other aid organizations have attempted to enforce a strong international economic environment within the Philippines since decolonization. However, the promised annulment of poverty has proven elusive. As a matter of fact, according to the World Bank’s Country Assistance Report, poverty in the ARMM increased by almost 10 percentage points (up to 61.8 percent) between the years of 2003 and 2006. The rationale given in the Report for this outcome indicates that weak governance of the Philippines constrains growth and poverty reduction. Aid organizations besides the World Bank also aim to reduce conflict and poverty through aid.

The United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP) is also involved in the ARMM. Its role is “to complement the government’s efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Mindanao by addressing the food security needs of vulnerable people in conflict-affected areas”\(^2\). The UNWFP uses poverty indicators\(^3\) to show that the region “falls far below the national average with a poverty incidence of 47 percent…Other basic indicators such as the rate of primary school completion and stunting among children under five are significantly worse”\(^4\) than the national Philippine

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\(^2\) http://www.wfp.org/countries/Philippines/Overview

\(^3\) The share of people below the poverty line, a quantitative indicator based on consumption levels, is often used.

\(^4\) http://www.wfp.org/countries/Philippines/Overview
average. Thus, in similar ways to the World Bank, the UNWFP also utilizes development and ‘food security’ to bring life into the realm of explicit calculations. Furthermore, food aid allows the UNWFP to contribute by monitoring security conditions in the ARMM. A focus on poverty indicators such as the ones used by the UNWFP and the World Bank only signify the number of people below a calculated poverty line. However, such data excludes vital factors such as colonial history, racial, ethnic, and religious marginality that contribute to impoverishment in the ARMM. The ASFP also follows a similar notion that ‘development’ is crucial to those who are deemed ‘vulnerable’ according to World Bank ‘expertise’.

Although powerful organizations such as the World Bank are dominant in ‘development’ work around the world, I argue that social networking websites provide local resistance groups the opportunity to engage in new forms of agency. In revealing local struggles in Mindanao, I illustrate how some Moros have begun to utilize online social networking websites to reach out by asking for support. Internet websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and even Youtube have allowed possibilities to build regional and international solidarity for Muslim Mindanao locals, in pursuing a fully independent state.

**Methodology**

In this research, I examine the ways in which the World Bank’s ASFP uses the development discourse to govern the poor in the ARMM in light of the development and biopolitics literature. Various research reports, documents, and project plans which are
available on the Internet are examined to highlight the interests of the Filipino state, the ARMM, and resistance groups in governing the ARMM.\(^5\) I have used critical discourse analysis, an analytical strategy that allows the researcher to be highly sensitive to context and draw attention to power imbalances and social inequalities. Critical discourse analysis is strongly influenced by the work of Foucault and others (Huckin 1997, Foucault 2003, Fairclough 2003) in which the researcher pays close attention to the linguistic and discursive features and styles of texts, and understands that the notion of reality is constructed largely through the interaction with others. In particular, Fairclough (2003) argues that textual analysis is not only linguistic analysis, but it is also what he calls interdiscursive analysis which views texts in terms of the different discourses (ways of representing), genres (ways of acting) and styles (ways of being) they draw upon and articulate together (ibid: 3). Furthermore, he emphasizes that texts are elements of social events that have causal effects that bring about change. Texts have the ability to influence knowledge and beliefs, contributing to shaping people’s identities (ibid: 8). He explains: “The elements of orders of discourse are not like nouns and sentences (elements of linguistic structures), but discourses, genres, and styles. These elements select certain possibilities defined by languages and exclude others- they control linguistic variability for particular areas of social life (Fairclough 1992: 24). Thus, the text documents prepared by the World Bank are influential in the global community for establishing the parameters of what it means to ‘develop’ as well as the ‘solutions’ to global poverty; excluding possible alternative methods and knowledge.

\(^5\) This includes speeches, statements, and reports by key actors such as President Aquino, resistance leaders, as well as the U.S military.
The World Bank’s text documents are mediated via the Internet, virtually to anybody who has access to the Internet and thus link ideas about ‘development’ and ‘peace’ locally and globally. These texts simultaneously represent aspects of the world and enact social relations between participants in social events and the attitudes and values of participants (ibid: 27), oftentimes through the Internet (official websites, Youtube channels, and social networking sites). Text documents such as the World Bank’s World Development Reports, virtually circulated online, are problematic because the dominant ‘reality’ about underdevelopment is ultimately determined and distributed by so-called ‘experts’ (Smith 1990). The circulation of ‘expert’ knowledge is successful through the reliance on calculative practices (Rose and Miller 1992) that ranks populations according to level of development. By ranking populations (UNDP HDI ranks the Philippines as 97th out of 177 in 2010), it reinforces a dichotomous understanding of the world- “us” and “them”- as well as reproducing the discourses of “backwardness”. Furthermore, the World Bank’s ASFP relies on these calculated ‘realities’ which is powerful because of the assumed “objective” relationship between the reader and the events or information.

Huckin (1997) provides effective strategies such as identifying genre-orientation, framing, foregrounding, omission, and presupposition, for conducting critical

6 Identifying a genre is to recognize that the text belongs to a certain text type that manifests a characteristic set of formal features serving a characteristic purpose (http://eca.state.gov/education/engteaching/pubs/BR/functionalsec3_6.htm).

7 Framing refers to how the content of a text is presented and what sort of perspective (angle, slant) the writer is taking (http://eca.state.gov/education/engteaching/pubs/BR/functionalsec3_6.htm)
discourse analysis. In analyzing various official documents for this thesis, I have found that the categories of foregrounding, omission, and presupposition were particularly useful in highlighting power relations, as well as the authoritative role that the World Bank plays. Utilizing the strategy of foregrounding was crucial in highlighting particular ideas that were emphasized by the World Bank, as well as ideas that were deliberately muted. Huckin also argues that it is important to be sensitive to manipulation and omission of a genre. For example, the World Bank’s Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Loan for the ASFP has deliberately omitted vital cultural and historic information such as information on local voices that is relevant to peace in the ARMM.

Benjamin (2007) also follows a similar methodology to Huckin as his research approach involves analyzing “Bank documents with an eye toward examining not just what the Banks says and how it says it, but also more importantly, what is absent from the Bank’s own public record” (2007:5). In line with manipulation and omission, Huckin argues that it is necessary to highlight presuppositions, and language that appears to take certain ideas for granted as if there were no alternative. For example, organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund often presuppose that the ‘development’ of a country can only be achieved through policies of economic reform. I question the implications of the utilization of these discourses and forms of ‘knowledge’ they consequently produce. In reference to Mindanao, the World Bank argues that this region has a comparative advantage in agribusiness.

8 Foregrounding refers to the writer's emphasis on certain concepts, by giving them textual prominence, and de-emphasizing others (http://eca.state.gov/education/engteaching/pubs/BR/functionalsec3_6.htm).
Understanding how the Philippines could improve its competitiveness in agribusiness and agricultural commodities markets in which the country, particularly the island of Mindanao, enjoys strong comparative advantages is critical to fighting poverty and boosting rural incomes. A recent World Bank study of the performance of two key agricultural value chains in Mindanao—yellow corn and export bananas—reveals that both corn and banana value chains offer significant future growth potential; yet they are facing some critical issues in terms of their long-term viability and sustainability (World Bank Philippines Quarterly Update 2011: 33).

The above World Bank statements made about the Mindanao region illustrate how language is used to make the solution to “fighting poverty” parallel with the “comparative advantages” in competing in the world market. I also look at the ways in which the ASFP uses labeling of certain types of people that describe underdevelopment. Escobar (1988) argues labeling groups of people, such as “small farmers” and “pregnant and lactating women,” helps to create a discourse of “clients”; a population that needs to be treated and modernized (435). The process of labeling process of certain groups as ‘terrorists’ and the ‘poor’ is also seen as useful for the ASFP in managing communities in the ARMM.

In analyzing local voices, I acknowledge that a limitation to this research is not being able to conduct ethnographic fieldwork to fully address whether development projects are meeting local needs. However, I was able to access various Facebook and Youtube websites such as ‘We support Constitutional Amendment for Bangsamoro Substate’ and ‘Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society’ that articulate local voices
through new forms of media. These data sources add to the complexity of the multiple interests - the US and Filipino state, the ARMM government, the World Bank’s ASFP, resistance groups, and *datus* (chiefs) - in governing the ARMM.
Chapter 2: Governing Development: a Conceptual Framework

In this chapter, I outline the conceptual framework for studying development and focus on the literature on biopolitics and development. In light of this, I introduce the ASFP, the historical context of Mindanao, followed by the findings and analyses on the ASFP and biopolitical governance. The concept of ‘development’ that is used today is often taken for granted; it is a concept that is used to compare nations with other nations. The ways in which projects such as the ASFP use the concept ‘development’ did not emerge out of thin air. The strategic way in which the World Bank today utilizes ‘development’ as a form of governance in managing poverty-affected regions has been a process that has been reinvigorated by the United States, institutions, and policies after the Second World War. Escobar argues that the end of the war created a demand for powerful nations particularly the United States to seek overseas investment opportunities, through the established multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund founded in 1944 (1988:430).

Perceived as a process of human ‘progress’ and ‘modernization’, development allowed the legitimacy in targeting poor countries to programs and interventions in every social and economic life. Thus, ‘development’ as a mode of thinking was successful in the sense that it allowed endless control of powerful nations over others. Through such control, everything from “their population, processes of capital accumulation, natural resources, agriculture and trade, administration, cultural values became the object of explicit calculations by experts formed in new sciences for that purpose” (Escobar 1988:430).
Faith in repair and restoration calculated and guided by ‘experts’ who formulate the models of ‘development’ became significantly important. Colin Leys coined the term ‘positivist orthodoxy’ in the late 1940s and 1950s, a theory that implies expertise of technocrats in ‘answering’ the remedies of poverty through economic planning established by Bretton Woods (Harriss 2005: 19). Thus, scientific calculations of development allowed the ranking of populations which continuously reinforces a dichotomous understanding of the world as ‘us’ and them’ or ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’.

The World Bank’s ASFP relies on the powerful discourse of ‘development’ through the two major mechanisms of the professionalization and the institutionalization of development as integral processes. The professionalization of development is referred to as a set of disciplinary techniques through which knowledge is managed and controlled. Fields such as development economics, health, demography, and urban planning were increasingly professionalized, legitimizing the process of targeting specific populations to ‘develop’ and become more ‘modern’. In the case of development, the application of existing and new subdisciplines to ‘Third World problems’ validates these practices of disciplining techniques (Escobar 1988:430).

The second mechanism, institutionalization of development refers to a field in which discourses of development are produced and put into operation (ibid: 431). Transnational organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations “use certain forms of knowledge and producing specific forms of intervention in….constituting a network that organizes visibilities and makes the exercise of power possible” (ibid 431). Certain forms of knowledge such as development economics became the most important
discourse because of its assumption of unprejudiced and objective discipline.⁹

Development economists particularly utilized the ideas of Keynesianism and growth economics¹⁰ to ‘poor’ countries in raising their gross national product (GNP). Furthermore, the network of transnational organizations is responsible for the dissemination of such knowledge through conferences, expert meetings, consultancies.

Benjamin (2007) illustrates the ways in which the World Bank crafted a new institutional role, evolving from reconstruction to development in the wake of the Marshall Plan. In the beginning, the institution was conceived primarily as a lending vehicle for European reconstruction after World War II. Benjamin argues, “Early drafts contained no mention of the word development and no hint of a mission that might focus on poorer or underdeveloped nations” (2007:13), indicating no initial World Bank interest in ‘developing’ poor nations. However, this objective changed over time as the World Bank found that applying disciplinary techniques to ‘modernize’ the ‘third world’ would benefit powerful nations particularly, the United States. Thus, the Bank’s new institutional role in assisting the ‘underdeveloped world’ was not only to lend capital, but also to lend technical assistance. The Bank was successful in articulating a narrative that

⁹ Development economics, an extension of classical and neoclassical economics became the focus in the crisis in the world economy in World War I (ibid: 432).

¹⁰ According to this theory, in order to grow, economies must save and invest a certain proportion of their output. Given a specific level of savings and investment, the actual rate of growth would depend on how productive the new investment is. Investment creates new capacity to produce and increases in income and demand (Escobar 1988:432).
involved non-political lending which enabled them to gain legitimacy in offering ‘objective’ instruction to borrowing countries. Thus technical assistance for ‘development’ began to “serve as a mode of pedagogy that -following in a long line of infantilizing imperialistic rhetoric- functions to discipline its borrowing members” (ibid: 38). Former Bank president McCloy\(^{11}\) emphasizes the lack of underdevelopment countries in technical knowledge in a speech in 1948 at the National Foreign Trade Convention:

> Although our underdeveloped member countries are impelled by a tremendous desire to improve their situation, they generally lack the technical knowledge as to how to go about it. Few of them have any well-formulated concept of the over- all lines along which their development is most likely to make progress (Benjamin 2007:38).

The World Bank began to provide instructive strategies, a pedagogical program in which technical assistance becomes a teaching method upon the “underdeveloped” spaces and to prescribe the means and conditions of assistance through the ‘calculations’ of development. Using classic imperialist binaries of science and religion, as well as materiality and spirituality, the World Bank assessed “underdeveloped” nations in such relations with the ‘features’ of ‘developed nations’. For example, former Bank president Black argued that India’s metaphysical richness in culture sets back their process to development. Thus, the Bank assumes its role as a means to provide the knowledge of

\(^{11}\) McCloy also championed British imperialism as a model of wise international investment, emphasizing the benefits of international credit aimed at garnering support for the Bank (Benjamin 2007:48).
material wealth, which India’s “spirituality” lacked. Benjamin argues that, we can locate the early conceptions of development and underdevelopment through the terms of presence and lack, provision and want (ibid: 52). This process of shaping the worldview of the world has allowed the common conception to rank populations, reinforcing a dichotomous understanding of the world: “us” and “them” or “developed” and “underdeveloped”. Thus, these spaces of poverty, conflict, and disease carry a message that implies that ‘suffering’ must be repaired by the technical assistance of global development institutions to become economically developed.

In Mindanao for example, the common activity of fetching water requires one to travel and wait in line. Development agencies view this “backward process” of accessing water as something that needs to be ‘repaired’. Success stories of such reparation are covered in *Water addresses needs mundane and divine*, (http://www.emindanao.org/#!stories). The ASFP and their expert assistance are praised for introducing modern technology; “Gone were the days when they had to wait in long queues just to fetch water… people of Poblacion Muslim enjoy potable water right in their home”. It is clear here that economic and material ‘development’ is used by the ASFP in managing the ARMM. This form of development takes place at the expense of valuable local knowledge that may now be undermined.

**Governmental Technologies and ‘Wasted Humans’**

Expert governmental technologies have the ability to exert power by shaping and directing individuals in producing remedies to poverty. The ASFP relies on ‘experts’,

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12 This site is about assistance for and activities in conflict-affected areas in Mindanao.
those who use techniques of notation, computation, and calculation as tools to justify
intervention in the ARMM. Such quantitative calculations\textsuperscript{13} are used to portray the
extent to which a region is developed or underdeveloped. For example, it is argued that
the ARMM falls far below the national average with a poverty incidence of 55.3 percent
in 2006.\textsuperscript{14}

Such statistical calculations operate to produce contractual relations between the
citizen and society. An analogy is a person who exhibits ‘bizarre’ behaviour becomes
diagnosed under a medical mandate to be cured. Similarly in the case of development,
countries diagnosed with ‘poor’ economic statuses are placed under the mandate of
development ‘expertise’. For example, Benjamin argues that metaphors of health and
disease permeate early Bank documents; “lending in this metaphor is likened to
medicine: curative when properly prescribed and administered, ineffective or destructive
when misused” (2007:41). Thus, the World Bank shaped the worldview that expert
technical assistance and calculations must be followed in order to relieve the “disease” of
poverty. ‘Poverty’ becomes the object of analysis in which its features are seen as
tangible entities that can be defined, leading to solutions that ‘show’ less poverty or
‘development’.

\textsuperscript{13} Measurements that support such notion are evident; the gross national product (GNP),
the poverty index, as well as the Human Development Index (HDI) are examples of
calculative measurements of development.

\textsuperscript{14} http://www.armm.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=313&Item
id=180
Green (2006) argues that the World Bank is the principal agency in international development which has assumed leadership in its fight against poverty through establishing systematic ways of representing, analyzing, and theorizing ‘poverty’ (2006: 1109). Through the publications of World Development Reports and an extensive World Bank academic research, the contractual basis of the relationship between donor agencies and developing country governments are continuously strengthened. As expert calculations and the measurements of poverty have become institutionalized, ‘poverty’ is increasingly seen as tangible; its existence can be determined and known. Thus for development practitioners, if ‘poverty’ is a tangible entity then it is possible to describe and locate it. Green illustrates the ways in which the World Bank constructs poverty and homogenizes the experiences of the poor:

Marginal, excluded, vulnerable, unwell, illiterate and often indigenous and female, the poor predominantly live in remote rural areas and urban shanties, with few assets and weak social networks. Their relative powerlessness is emphasized, and by implication, the power of various groups over them, not only of local and national elites and governments, but the power of development institutions to recognize and define them, and to determine when poverty matters (Green 2006: 1111).

Similar to qualitative assessment, quantitative approaches also homogenize poverty. In describing what a ‘developing country’ is, the World Bank explains “five million of the world's 6 billion people live in developing countries where incomes are usually under $2 per day and a significant portion of the population lives on less than $1.25 a day”.15

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15 World Bank’s FAQ:
Such statistics and representations create the impression that ‘poverty’ is a homogenized experience, ignoring various national and regional histories with economic, political, or social marginalization of a particular group. Although each region may have different roots and causes of poverty, the preferred method in assessing and solving poverty is found upon the strategy of locating and containing ‘risky’ populations. ‘Risky’ populations are seen as necessary groups of people that need ‘order’ and civility in the process of ‘successful development’.

The discourse of terrorism serves as a means to target dangerous unruly populations that are often considered as ‘wasted humans’ or “marginalized populations such as prisoners, refugees, ghettoized immigrants and outsiders” (Ilcan 2006:853). The ASFP targets the ‘poor’ or particular types of humans that are considered to deter the process of development; transnational organizations use global order-building to target those who are perceived as “wasted humans” for the purpose of ‘global security’. Over the last decade, the media has facilitated the racist discourse of the necessity to capture these ‘risky’ populations under the global ‘war on terror’. The September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center has intensified the search to contain these so called “wasted humans” or terrorists for the sake of peace and security. The BBC newspaper article mentioned earlier is a clear example of this.

The problem with the discourse of ‘war on terror’ is that, it is a western notion of fighting the so-called evils of the world. It is often a one-sided narrative that portrays the enemy as ‘dangerous’, constraining ‘our’ road to global peace and development. Thus,
this internationalized problem makes the objective of global security urgent, requiring effective co-ordination of development agencies, and actions between ‘peaceful’ developed countries. Furthermore, the ‘enemies’ of peace are defined by powerful nations and development institutions.

Tujan, Gaughran and Mollett (2004) argue that the ‘war on terror’ has made the world hostage to a definition of ‘global security’ of the global powers. They provide an example of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines as being identified by the United States as a foreign terrorist organization. Jose Maria Sison, the leader of this ‘terrorist’ group is considered ‘dangerous’, thus crucial for captivity. However, the authors argue that, while this perception may be legitimized in the United States, it is not necessarily the case in the Philippines (Tujan et al. 2004: 54). Security considerations articulated by global powers provide justification for strengthening the control and surveillance of the ‘risky’ populations. The discourse of fighting terror and fighting for global security has been increasingly incorporated in development programs.

Tujan et al. illustrate that as the war on terror becomes the global political priority, development co-operation is increasingly being influenced by the global security agenda. The granting of development aid is now ‘securitized’ through “security considerations [that] are being promoted as key…either in the selection of programmes or partners or in the actual promotion of military or quasi-military assistance as development aid” (2004: 55). Furthermore, they argue that there has been a substantial increase in foreign aid to countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Pakistan to strengthen links between foreign security and development policies after September 11, 2001. Countries with large Muslim populations and insurgency movements have become almost automatic
priorities for assistance by foreign donors and most notably, US bilateral aid. Tujan et al., illustrate that during the Bush administration, US bilateral assistance in South and East Asia involve an increasing emphasis on military aid.

US official development assistance (ODA) to East Asia grew by 47 per cent between 2000 and 2003. In addition, the US economic support fund (ESF) grew by 104 per cent during the same period. However, these rises are dwarfed by huge increases in military-related aid. Expenditure through the US foreign military fund (FMF) in East Asia, for example grew by 1,614 per cent between 2000 and 2003.

(Tujan et al 2004: 56).

This development-security nexus is also taken up by transnational organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations. The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report (WDR) entitled Conflict, Security, and Development emphasizes the interconnections of security and the process of development; here insecurity is viewed as a development challenge.

The central message of the Report is that strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence. Restoring confidence and transforming security, justice, and economic institutions is possible within a generation, even in countries that have experienced severe conflict. But that requires determined national leadership and an international system “refitted” to address 21st-century risks: refocusing assistance on preventing criminal and political violence, reforming the
procedures of international agencies, responding at a regional level, and renewing cooperative efforts among lower-, middle-, and higher-income countries.

(World Bank WDR 2011:2)

It is important to note that while the World Bank seems to be concerned with ‘restoring’ security in conflict affected regions, the WDR reveals that the motivation for development projects is premised upon “restoring confidence” in the institution rather than security. As the WDR focuses on the relevance of ‘restoring’ security and justice in conflict-affected regions, it refers back to the origins of the IBRD, emphasizing the ‘R’ for restoration.16

According to the Report, countries such as Afghanistan and Haiti are problematized as countries unable to reach the MDGs.17 Furthermore, the ‘fragility’ of a state is described as a virus, “the problems of fragile states spread easily: They drag down neighbours with violence that overflows borders, because conflicts feed on narcotics, piracy, and gender violence, and leave refugees and broken infrastructure in their wake” (World Bank WDR 2011: iii). Regions with characteristics of ‘insecurity are perceived as ‘breeding grounds’ for violence and criminals, and portrayed as constraints to the road

16 Over 60 years later, the “R” in IBRD has a new meaning: reconstructing Afghanistan, Bosnia, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, and other lands of conflict or broken states (WDR 2011: iii). The IBRD is one of 5 institutions of the World Bank, as discussed later.

17 Not one low-income country coping with these problems has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal (WDR 2011: iii).
to development. The WDR goes on to mention success in the ASEAN landscape where military and exercises between the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand are paying off due to partnership with the United States (World Bank WDR 2011:38). The World Bank shows confidence in the Report that it has “learned to contain sporadic violence and tension in the [ASEAN] region and would not allow them to derail our community development efforts aiming at common security and sustainable prosperity for our people” (World Bank WDR 2011: 38). The “us” and “them” binary used in this report signifies backwardness of certain regions in the ASEAN, while it is necessary for transnational agencies to “contain” and manage “them”. Thus as development projects and policies are continuously securitized, a biopolitical analysis become particularly relevant for understanding the interdependence between development and security, on the one hand, and the urgency of rebuilding crisis-ridden societies in the interest of global stability, on the other.

**Biopolitics: Development, Race, and ‘New Wars’**

The fear of danger and the need to securitize particular regions involves the idea of protecting the welfare of the individual (Dillon and Reid 2001:51). Within this context, development is perceived to bring security, order, and ‘health’ of a region through activities that foster the quality of life. Thus, the ASFP is legitimized for the sake of protecting life by “supporting and promoting life through interventions that aims to maintain the equilibrium of a non-sustainable population by compensating for differences or ameliorating risk” (Duffield 2006:69). Development in this sense is
understood as the provision of basic needs which will in turn, allow for ‘self-reliance’ or little willingness to be influenced by nonconformists (Duffield 2006:76). Development intervention is established through contracts, which is an exchange between provisions of development and loyalty, a strategy that is geared towards maintaining a ‘peaceful and secure environment’ in quashing uprisings and trouble-free implementation of “Western” ways of life. However, according to development practitioners, as long as underdeveloped region and populations exist, there will always be a need for intervention and/or the promotion of development, and security, “because underdeveloped species life is not socially entrepreneurial and hence self-reliant enough. In other words, a life still has to be taught how to master its own sustainability; for the new administrators, everything exists to play for” (Duffield 2005:156). Thus, the issue of imperialism is quite prevalent within intervention and development literature, and it appears as if Duffield is referring to underlying imperialistic development strategies.

Mosse (2005) also follows through in this argument by stating that these development policies acts as regimes, through which specific goals and outcomes (Western concepts of democracy, capitalism, and neoliberal agendas) are implemented, and through which individuals come to understand themselves and their surroundings. It is hegemonic in the sense that it moulds the individual into a ‘governable subject’ (Mosse 2005:13). It is also imperialistic because it implements continuous pressure of Western standards of development. Dumenil and Levy (2004) argue that the crucial factor to imperialism is to inflict pressure towards “a government prone to the development of economic relations favourable to the interest of dominating countries…”
This can be achieved by all means: collaboration with local ruling classes, subversion, or war” (2004:660) as legitimate reasons of imposition.

Furthermore, intervention is legitimized through the belief that development equals security; security cannot be enforced, or maintained, without intervention from an outside party (Duffield 2007). However the act of intervening jeopardizes the sovereignty of a particular state, in this case the ARMM. Although the ARMM is by name recognized as an autonomous region, there is little self-governance due to the multiple economic and political interests of development projects such as the ASFP, as well as the Filipino and US government. Thus, multiple interests in governing this region further complicate the pre-existing tensions in the region.\textsuperscript{18}

In the ARMM, pre-existing tension and conflict stems from colonial ideas of the minority Moros who were seen as inferior in race and religion. The Moro population was a target of elimination during the process of creating a ‘purer’ Filipino society and during Spanish and American colonial rule.\textsuperscript{19} Within a nation-state, Foucault believes that race is one mechanism by which populations are “left to die”; this is done through racism’s two functions. First, racism produces division within the biological continuum addressed by biopower, and thus, fragments a population. Secondly, race allows space for establishing those who ‘deserve’ to live more on the basis of those who are less

\textsuperscript{18} Pre-existing racial and religious schemes are cross-cutting new ways of governing that differentially value populations, as seen in other regions (Ong 2000:58).

\textsuperscript{19} An extended discussion of the Moro population and their importance is illustrated later in the thesis.
worthy. Here, the idea is that the death of the ‘bad’ or ‘inferior’ race will produce a so-called healthier population (Foucault 2003:255).

Contemporary biopolitics is rooted in Darwinism and his classical evolutionary accounts in which evolutionary processes of natural selection play a role in reproduction of organisms. Human population and order are understood to have similar mechanisms of mutation and reproduction that adapt to ‘genetic changes’ which in turn improves the ‘fitness’ of a population (Dillon and Reid 2001:42-43). Dillon and Reid argue that ‘fitness’ involves the conception “that the propagation of genes from one generation to the next depends upon the survival of the organism until it reaches a stage, when it can reproduce a reasonable number of offspring” (2001: 43) which is then, capable of maintaining the next generation. The organism that is ‘unable’ to reach to the desired stage then dies because of its incapability to develop and evolve.

In conflict-affected regions of the world, transnational organizations often use the discourse of ‘new wars’, using sociocultural racism as a tool (much like Foucault’s understanding of it) to protect the “species-life”, which is under the threat of underdeveloped, or non-insured species life. Sociocultural racism by the state and transnational organizations is used in order to maintain intercultural harmony, which provides for popular support for intervention, and it allows for the development of fear, which also legitimizes intervention within areas that are socially and culturally different. Therefore racism, as well as the act of excluding certain species-life is legitimized “through biologizing and de-historicizing the discourse of race struggle, sovereignty reinvents itself as imperative to protect the race…[It] is a strategization of power” (Duffield 2006:70). Furthermore, the discourse of ‘new wars’ allows for sociocultural
racism to protect ‘species-life’ from those who are of ‘high risk’ population, or ‘non-insured’.

In the case of the Philippines, the ARMM is central to this idea of securing the ‘borderlands’ which is understood as anything that is not located within modern society. The ARMM ‘borderland’ is culturally perceived as: ‘backward’, ‘barbaric’, ‘irrational’. In contrast, homeland may be considered as, ‘civil’, ‘restrained’ and ‘rational’ (cf. Duffield 2005:17); a modern world which has the capacity to secure undisciplined and unregulated regions. Moreover, the culture of ‘good governance’ permeates the ASFP with its focus on the well-being of the individual, implying certain kinds of citizenship responsibilities in which poverty is now the problem of the individual. It raises the question of whether the ASFP and the current development model have the purpose to address the local needs and realities in the ARMM. We see this focus particularly clearly in the following discussions of the ASFP and Biopolitical Governance section.
Chapter 3: The ARMM Social Fund Project (ASFP)

As discussed in the previous chapter, the intervention of transnational organizations is legitimized through the belief that development equals security, and that security cannot be enforced without intervention from an external party (Duffield 2007). The World Bank is at the forefront in disseminating the knowledge for a heightened security policy. Furthermore, the ‘war on terrorism’ facilitates the rigorous racist discourse for development practitioners, legitimizing the implementation of political, economic, or social reforms, to create a population that is less ‘backward’. Through explicit calculations, the racialized Moro population is monitored for the ‘health’ of society through technical assistance. Thus, I focus upon the World Bank’s ASFP as a case of biopolitics of how the project engages the targeted Moro population in programs, for the sake of global peace.

The ASFP is a project to assist the communities of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in building peace and development. It is currently the only foreign assisted project in the region that covers all municipalities in all provinces. Its mission stated on their Facebook page is to:

Fund the construction of socio-economic infrastructures, livelihood opportunities and provides technical assistance in selected disadvantaged, conflict-affected communities in ARMM in a manner that is effective, efficient, transparent and participative. We are fully committed to bring about a meaningful and lasting change in ourselves, the selected communities we serve and help enhance governance in the ARMM.
The original loan of US $33.6 million for the ASFP under the World Bank was approved on December 5, 2002 and became effective on May 19, 2003. Its original loan closing date of June 30, 2008 was extended to May 31, 2010. This research focuses on the additional loan that was recently proposed for the period of May 31, 2010 to May 31, 2013. I discuss briefly the background of the ASFP, the changes made in the additional loan, and the World Bank’s stance on achieving ‘sustainable’ development.

The ASFP was a response to pursue a policy of building peace and development by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the government of the Philippines in 2002. The issuance of Executive Order (EO) No. 124 on September 12, 2002 resulted in creating the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Social Fund for Peace and Development (ASFPD). The ASFPD was created “to help improve the living conditions within the ARMM communities by encouraging the constituents to actively participate and effectively manage their community affairs” (Special Audits Office 2011:2). EO 124 was amended by EO 518 on March 21, 2006 renaming the ASFPD to the ASFP. Its original implementation covered five provinces and one city through a loan of US$33.6 million dollars from the World Bank and 2.47 billion Japanese Yen from Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). ASFP Funds are loans by the GOP from funding institutions, and then the Loan Proceeds are given as a grant to the ARMM. As required under the Loan Agreements, GOP also provides monetary counterparts (http://asfp.armm.gov.ph/).20

20 The IBRD contributes 77% of funding, while GOP provides 23% of total cost (estimated project cost) (World Bank Additional Loan 2010:10).
The original objectives of the ASFP were to:

1. Provide and/or improve sustained access to social and economic infrastructure and services by the poor and conflict-affected poor communities
2. Provide capacity building for women, youth and other community groups for improving food security, employment opportunities and household incomes
3. Strengthen social cohesion and partnerships between and within communities in the ASFP region
4. Improve local governance and institutional capacities for implementation in the ASFP Region.


The original loan was completed in April 2010 in assisting projects that deal with reconstructing and constructing infrastructure such as hospitals, education facilities, training centers to over 600 barangays which also implemented 1,700 subprojects (http://www.emindanao.org/#!armm-social-fund).

There are a few changes in the additional loan of US $30 million to the Government of the Philippines for the purpose of scaling up the current ASFP activities. The current themes in the ASFP emphasize more on conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, other rural development, and participation and civic engagement. Furthermore, the request for additional loans is associated with “modifying by limiting to targeted communities”\(^2\) as well as increasing assistance to more barangays (villages).

The original loan has assisted 655 barangays and with this additional loan, they wish to

\(^2\) A previous component for regional infrastructure will not be considered in the additional loan.
target 500 additional barangays in the ARMM to ‘improve basic services’\textsuperscript{22} - Moreover, only two of the three original components of Community Development Assistance and Institutional Strengthening and Governance will be maintained under additional financing\textsuperscript{23} - The component of Community Development Assistance (CDA) ultimately “aims to ensure efficient and transparent use of funds, to empower and benefit vulnerable target groups including men, women and out-of-school youth” (5). The idea of this component is to increase community participation and management accompanied by accountability mechanisms. For Institutional Strengthening and Governance (ISG), this component aims to include “regular workshops and media sessions on the good governance aspect of a community-driven development approach” (5). This component is seen to provide ASFP municipalities with technical assistance in multi-year planning, financial management and procurement.

The additional loan is also relevant in contributing to the achievement of the new Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) 2010-2012 goals under “Stability and Peace”. The impact and conflict-sensitivity of development programs is enhanced in communities affected by armed or violent conflict through Community-Driven Development (CDD). The CAS for the Republic of the Philippines 2010-2012 was prepared by the IBRD, International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in strategizing the process of development during this period. The

\textsuperscript{22} ARMM has 2,469 barangays in total. (World Bank Additional Loan 2010:6).

\textsuperscript{23} The third component, Strategic Regional Infrastructure will no longer be pursue since this is taken up by JICA and another World Bank project, Mindanao Rural Development Project 2, which supports farm-to-market (World Bank Additional Loan 2010: 11-12
current situation according to CAS is that,

In recent years, the Philippines’ economic growth has rebounded on the back of fiscal consolidation, macroeconomic stability and a strong international economic environment. Higher growth has, however, not translated into less poverty: the share of the population below the poverty line is the same as it was a decade ago and has increased between 2003 and 2006. Income inequality remains high, and the country risks missing MDGs on education and maternal health.


The CAS describes the Philippines as a low-middle income country in which poverty (measured using the international benchmark) shows that the percentage of people living in absolute poverty (income of less than US $1.25 a day) was reduced from 34.9 percent in 1985 to 22.6 percent in 2006. However, the absolute poverty rate increased from 26.2 million people in 1985 to 27.6 million in 2006. Absolute poverty rose mainly in the ARMM where poverty ‘swelled by almost 10 percent (61.8 percent). Even though absolute poverty\(^\text{24}\) is calculated to be rising, the CAS argues that the Philippines has ‘strong potential for development’ because of its rich and diverse in mineral, oil, gas and geothermal potential.

Yet according to the CAS, it is the factors of weak governance, the recent food and fuel crisis, an increasing population growth, and conflict that restrain development. In the Philippines, weak governance is seen to have been a “key constraint to sustained

\(^{24}\) An “absolute” poverty line is determined by the minimum value of consumption needed to be deemed “not poor” in the world’s poorest countries. This places the new absolute poverty line at almost...exactly $38 a month or $1.25 a day (WDR 2008).
growth and poverty reduction” (World Bank CAS 2009: 2). The CAS diagnoses a number of governance challenges including a lack of independence capacity and integrity, regulatory capture,25 built in-checks and balances which slow down policy-making and policy implementation (ibid: 2). Furthermore, the higher prices in oil and food in 2008 have been issued as a constraint to government. Rice prices, in particular were raised by almost 50 percent. Thus, the Government announced to ‘postpone’ spending on social protection and subsidies to the poor (ibid: 3). Poverty reduction efforts are also seen to be challenging due to ‘high population growth’ of 2.2 percent. High population growth is deemed problematic because of higher demand on education and health services as well as job creations. Finally, the conflict-affected people in Mindanao pose a challenge in “destroyed infrastructure, slowed development, below-average human development, and stagnating economic outcomes” (ibid: 10). For these reasons, development projects are seen to be imperative in the Philippines.

In ensuring the sustainable growth in the Philippines, the CAS suggests that there needs to be strengthened efforts in the investment climate and creating a more competitive financial sector. It describes some of the constraints to development and poverty reduction such as the impediment of the “private sector…by a constrictive policy and regulatory environment, particularly in areas such as rice trade where policies favor the public sector” (ibid: 9). Furthermore, in terms of achieving the Millennium Development Goals, the Philippines is seen to be on the way of meeting all the goals.

25 Regulatory capture happens when a regulatory agency, formed to act in the public's interest, eventually acts in ways that benefit the industry it is supposed to be regulating, rather than the public (http://www.investopedia.com)
However, net enrolment rate for elementary education has been falling and there has been an increase in maternal mortality and malnutrition.\textsuperscript{26} In response to these ‘development challenges’, the CAS has proposed strategic objectives to counter the challenges of economic growth.

According to the World Bank expertise, achieving a stable macro economy, improved investment climate, better public service delivery, reduced vulnerabilities, and a cross cutting theme of good governance is the formula to ‘develop’ the Philippines, and particularly the ARMM. In looking at the strategic objective of reduced vulnerabilities, the ASFP particularly pertains to the goals of stability and peace.\textsuperscript{27} Under Stability and Peace, CAS proposes the push to enhance conflict sensitivity by “generat[ing] systematic analysis of conflict typology, incidence and patterns; public expenditure to track development resources; impact evaluation to measure the effectiveness of development, and…detailed analyses of local conflict dynamics” (26). Furthermore, Community-Driven Development (CDD) will be accomplished through the ASFP in assisting the mainstreaming of good governance, which include improving transparency, accountability, and management of public resources.

The ASFP practices CDD initiatives for development intervention as the need for conflict-affect regions to quickly develop a sense of community to improve

\textsuperscript{26} Achieving the MDGs for primary education and maternal mortality remain major challenges and are increasingly unlikely to be met (CAS 2009: 9-10).

\textsuperscript{27} Other areas of Reduced Vulnerabilities includes social protection system such as 1) the National household poverty targeting system and 2) Disaster risk management and climate change (CAS 2009:24).
infrastructure;\textsuperscript{28} to enable livelihoods to improve capacity and to empower a community\textsuperscript{29} and to begin building more transparent governance. CDD is seen as an approach that will empower local communities through decentralization, giving direct control to the community over planning decisions and investment resources through participatory planning and accountability (ibid: 6). This is hypothesized to shift in power relations by transferring decision-making processes over to the community. Further hypotheses underlie the CDD paradigm, which include:

1) Poverty Alleviation: CDD can support poverty reduction by mobilizing communities, strengthening human capacity, and improving physical assets at the community level.

2) Prioritizing needs: CDD can improve service relevance, responsiveness, and delivery by matching provision to articulated demand.

3) Local governance. CDD promotes a more inclusive voice for the poor, builds linkages with local governments, and increases access of the poor to governance processes.

4) Targeting. CDD improves the alignment of services and investments with

\textsuperscript{28} Local services and infrastructure often collapse during conflict, especially when formal government structures have limited capacity for service delivery. In such instances, a government-supported CDD approach to service delivery is one way in which to address coverage and access problems (8).

\textsuperscript{29} CDD processes and local community councils, in particular, can serve as a safe forum in which to exchange views and therefore increase intracommunity communication on a wide range of issues (8)
community priorities and better targets the poor and other vulnerable groups. (World Bank Community-Driven Development 2006:6).

CDD emphasizes the importance of minimizing conflict within a region through the strategies of delivering resources at the local level and offering ‘cost-effective, demand-driven responses’ in reconstructing a community. It supports the notion of decentralization because it claims that there will be the strengthening of local capacity, transparency and accountability among local stakeholders and institutions. Assistance is also needed particularly in militarized states where there is a ‘need’ for political pragmatism. For example, CDD entered into discussions with the MILF and the government and decided that development projects should be administered by the state, and by neutral third party (World Bank) that was acceptable to all sides (ibid: 22).

CDD operations claim to be most beneficial to the poorest communities when there is clear and inclusive targeting. Thus, the ASFP selects the ‘most worthy’ beneficiaries to determine how to allocate project resources. Once those groups are identified, the

30 The report uses the case of Rwanda to show that “poor governance was the root cause of the genocide” (ibid: 9). The rationale is that if community members take part in the decision making process, they will be less susceptible to corruption and conflict. This is an effective strategy in promoting good governance because, it generates fear among aid receivers; aid receiving countries want to avoid genocide in their homeland.

31 In countries where decentralization policy is not yet in place or not fully implemented, technical assistance is required in local governments through the use of CDD principles; “a careful and timely roll-out of well monitored activities that mitigates the weak institutional capacities such as staff and legal mandates” (ibid: 17) is necessary.
CDD program usually opens a designated window through which funds are disbursed for small-scale projects to benefit the vulnerable group(s). So, how does one measure who deserves assistance the most? Those who are deemed ‘most worthy’ of aid is determined through a social assessment to identify vulnerable groups, which often include war widows, female heads of household, orphans, disabled children, demobilized fighters, displaced people, and youth (ibid: 27). The rationale for such intra-community targeting is that conflict affects groups differently, making some particularly vulnerable in the post-conflict period. However, there are methodological and contextual challenges in utilizing a system that ‘identifies’ poverty and vulnerable groups. In conflict-affected countries, the statistics and data needed to determine poverty levels often are very sparse. In the absence of data (in the context of a postwar humanitarian emergency), targets may be set on the basis of broad criteria of need such as shelter and food. Priority may be given to geographic areas with high levels of destruction or high rates of displacement and return.32

The CDD model applied in the ASFP “targets marginalized groups; strengthens participatory and empowerment mechanisms and processes; and supports a broad range of interventions to respond to immediate rehabilitative as well as long-term development needs” (ibid: 65). In this way, the application of the CDD model targets the Moros as marginalized, due to their association with poverty and conflict with “immediate rehabilitative and development needs”. In terms of monitoring the targeted ‘vulnerable’

32 CDD suggests that in time, however, an investment must be made in comprehensive data collection because only with good data can a reconstruction effort, respond to acute postwar needs (CDD 2006: 28).
population, the ASFP follows the CDD initiative of utilizing the governmental technology, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems. The M&E systems acknowledge that the information and monitoring schemes need to be both quantitative and qualitative. Such information allows project staff to ensure adherence to the principles of CDD, such as inclusion and empowerment (ibid: 30). It is argued that conflict often complicates monitoring and evaluation, however most operations develop their own monitoring and evaluations because “it takes time to train and build the capacity of staff….as well as risks to the physical safety of staff responsible for collecting data” (31).

In the ARMM, CDD reports that the World Bank: Social Assessment of Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao (2003) was conducted during the project preparation of ASFP. The assessment indicated that most community needs turned to issues such as peace and order, water supply, livelihood, health services and medicine, school buildings, power supply, roads, and housing for internally displaced persons due to the conflict in the region. Such an assessment of the ARMM facilitates an ARMM ‘borderland’ through the containment of the so-called ‘wasted’, non-insured species for discipline and regulation. As a result, colonial ideas of Moros as ‘wasted’ persist in the sense that “they” are incapable of ‘development’ creating them as necessary subjects to the ASFP.

Furthermore, the ‘conflict’ in this region allows for the sociocultural racism to protect society from those who are underdeveloped non-insured, producing the justification for the exclusion of a particular other (Duffield 2008:151). By providing social and economic infrastructure and services to these subjects (objective 1), development practitioners believe that this will in turn, allow for little willingness to be
influenced by other ‘backward’ and culturally perceived “wasted humans”. It is also a 
strategy that is geared towards maintaining a ‘peaceful and secure environment’ in 
eliminating resistance and easy implementation of “western” ways of life.

**Historical Context of the ARMM Social Fund Project**

As mentioned above, the ASFP is a project that aims to assist the communities of the 
ARMM in building peace and development. While many development agencies 
acknowledge ‘diversity’ and ‘equality’, they often fail to acknowledge the historical 
context of a region. This ignorance not only fails to exclude the voices of the 
marginalized, but also reinforces the pre-existing discourses of particular populations as 
‘backward’ and ‘dangerous’. It is important to investigate the ways in which old colonial 
divide-and-rule policies have continued in the state differentiation of citizens. A brief 
history of colonial Philippines will illustrate the ways in which Moro ‘rebel’ groups came 
to form in resistance to the colonial mechanism of ‘letting die’. It will also shed light on 
how the global ‘war on terror’ has reinforced the idea that certain Filipino populations 
are ‘dangerous’ and ‘backward’. Development agencies also utilize similar discourse in 
legitimizing intervention to convert particular populations from their ‘backward’ 
mentality so that they will be less likely to follow ‘terrorism’.

Biopower has generated a fear among individuals that “man” will be destroyed, or 
the “other” will negatively affect ‘man’s biological well-being’. Therefore, this fear of 
the “other” allows for systematic exclusion to ‘let specific populations die’, for 
maintaining societal well being. The act of making live and letting die (Foucault 2003)
is evident throughout human history as race was used as a tool of population management in colonialism, war, immigration policies, and homeland security. For example, the history of the apartheid in South Africa in which colonialists used race as a means to create hierarchy within the state allowed the ‘purer’ white race to prosper. In contrast, the ‘coloured’ population was legally disenfranchised and isolated in designated ‘group areas’ (Kellet, Mothwa, Napier 2002:35).

In the context of the Philippines, Mindanao was “originally inhabited by small tribal communities known collectively today as the lumad…[but]…the introduction of Islam in the 15th and 16 centuries by Muslim traders” (Milligan 2010: 31) had significant influence on local social structure. From that period on, Islam became the dominant religion among 13 ethnolinguistic groups in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. However, the expansion of Islam was not extended at the arrival of Spanish colonialists in mid-16th century. When the Spanish colonialists came into contact with Muslim Filipinos, they coined the term “Moros”33 who eventually became the target of elimination in the process of creating a ‘purer’ Philippine society.

Before Spanish colonization of the Philippines, “the largest Moro tribes had their own state formations, the Sulu Sultanate and the Maguindanao Sultanate… but ultimately failed to preserve the independence” (Tuminez 2008:122). Spain had colonized the Philippines in1521, and by the nineteenth century it was racially stratified, with differences marked in terms of blood mixture, territorial nativity, and religious ‘civilization’. In comparison to other colonized states, the Philippines as a whole was

33 ‘Moro’ was the name that Spaniards assigned to Muslim Filipinos; it is a name that is feared because of its term associated with fire, pillage and slavery (Gowing 1964:12).
marginalized from the 1830s, denied any political representation in the Cortes or the ‘Congress’ unlike Cuba and Puerto Rico. When this lack of political representation was challenged by Filipino *ilustrado* (educated) elites, the Spanish Empire rationalized this on racial grounds: “it was because the islands’ people were uniquely undeserving of it, its ostensibly Catholic natives mired in superstition, its savage Muslims untouched by the saving hand of the church” (Kramer 2006: 36-37).

Kramer (2006) illustrates that the friar order depended on the blood mixture; Spanish mestizos (the children of Spanish men and indigenous women) were few but became prosperous through landholdings and were regarded ‘superior’ to the larger Chinese mestizo group and the ‘Igorots’ (ibid:39). The term ‘Igorots’ was applied to describe the unconquered animists of Luzon and the ‘Moros’ of the south. Furthermore, racial distinctions (Spaniard and non-Spaniard) and religious hierarchy were justified by the church, state, and market. It served to minimize power of the Moro through racialized systems of taxation, forced labour and economic exclusion. The Spaniards and Spanish mestizos were exempted from these regulations, because they were unlike Filipino “savages”. Moros were especially regarded as members of a “backward people” who require protection to bring them into Christian and/or western civilization (Tuminez 2007:79).

In viewing the formation of the independent Philippine state, it is evident that biopolitical governance, in which certain groups are included and excluded to increase the fitness of a population, was its strategy. When the United States gained colonial rule (1898-1946), the ‘Moro’ population was further exacerbated in the process of striating the Philippine population where “certain categories of life…die both literally and
metaphorically in order to purify and strengthen society as a whole” (Duffield 2006:69). In this case, Muslim Filipinos became systematically excluded in order to strengthen the majority Christian society by encouraging Christian settlement in large parts of Mindanao. Tuminez (2007) illustrates that the Regalian doctrine made the Spanish state the sole owner of state ‘domain’ which includes lands, forests, bodies of water and natural resources. This doctrine contradicted the Philippine Muslim tradition of communal land ownership, abolishing the domain of the sultanates and the rights of other indigenous peoples. This was particularly devastating for the Moros who used to possess majority land ownership in Mindanao and Sulu in 1912.

The Regalian doctrine pushed the Muslim Filipinos further off their lands through the Land Registration Act of 1902. They became legally disenfranchised and furthermore removing the authority of traditional datus or chiefs to dispose of land through the 1903 Philippine Commission Act No. 718. Although the Philippines gained independence from the United States in 1946, the Regalian doctrine is still active today in continuing to displace Muslim Filipino ancestral lands by the Filipino state. In Mindanao, “Christian land-owning families with entrenched personal, political, and corporate interests…have a proven track record of blocking the implementation of peace

34 The Regalian doctrine is a principle in law which means that all natural wealth - agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral lands of the public domain and all other natural resources belong to the state. Thus, even if the private person owns the property where minerals are discovered, his ownership for such does not give him the right to extract or utilize said minerals without permission from the state to which such minerals belong. (http://philrealestatestore.com/realesate_acq.html)
agreements and…lobbied against accommodating Moro ancestral domain claims” (Tuminez 2007:84). These deliberate forms of marginalization did not cease to end after decolonization. In fact, after the Philippines was gained independence from the United States, the ruling elite Christian population was granted corporations and individual rights to Muslim ancestral lands (Tuminez 2008:122). These racist doctrines and acts were deliberate forms in pursuing to exclude and kill off the ‘Moro’ population.

As mentioned earlier, the term ‘Moros’ was originally used as a pejorative label by the Spanish and American colonialists to discriminate against the Muslims in the Philippines (Tuminez 2008; Tigno 2006). However, the label became a tool for Filipino Muslims “to further underscore their struggle against discrimination by Spanish, American, and later the Philippine government itself” (Tigno 2006:25). It is no surprise that organizations such as the MNLF (Moro National Liberal Front), MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), and Abu Sayyaf group (ASG) were formed not only in defense of their Moro culture, but in pursuing full autonomy and as an independent political entity. However, these resistance groups framed as enemies of peace, are seen as challenges to the governing technologies of the World Bank in the sense that they interfere with the implementation of “Western” policies and ways of life. Thus eliminating such “risky” groups is not only necessary for ‘security’ but also for the process of development work in the ARMM.

**Conflict in the ARMM**

For centuries, colonialists have negatively stigmatized the ‘Moro’ population as an
Islamic minority. This negative association still persists today as there is still widespread ignorance of Moro culture, history and religion in the Philippines. Thus, Tuminez (2008) argues that there is much resentment by the Moros in which the dominant national narrative fails to acknowledge Moro history; they are treated with “second class citizenship and negative stereotypes…as dishonest, violent, and lazy” (Tuminez 2008: 22). I imagine that the recent phenomenon on ‘war on terror’ has exacerbated the issue of anti-Moro discrimination.

Aside from discrimination, Tuminez (2008) argues that the conflict concerning territorial and deliberate marginalization of the Moros is the major issue. Furthermore, many Moros simply wish for self-government with little or no interference from the central government in Manila. Many self-identified Moros talk about the past as the glorious days when they “defined self-determination exclusively as independence or sovereignty” (cf. Tuminex 2008:122). This has been the struggle for the Moro population in their wish to create an autonomous Muslim region. Although the ARMM is seen legally as “autonomous”, in reality the central government strategically selects ARMM governors that will keep this region dependent on Manila for sustainability (Tuminez 2007: 84).

The ARMM is composed of the provinces, which include Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and the city of Marawi (Tigno 2006:26). Taken from the official ARMM website, the ARMM states their goals:

For the continuous quest for self-determination, envision a peaceful, progressive society through social justice, human equity, responsive governance with empowered people, distinct cultural heritage and identity, sustained-managed
patrimony and with established international amity and enjoying the freedom to chart our own destiny.

(http://www.armm.gov.ph)

The ARMM’s “continuous quest for self-determination” is due to the lack of fiscal independence. The ARMM government is almost completely dependent on grants and subsidies from the Philippine national government. Furthermore, these handouts are seen as unpredictable in amount and timing, which reinforces its dependence of Manila (Tuminez 2007:124). Thus, the ARMM’s failure to deliver political power, representation, and sustainable economy has fueled for increased conflict in the region.

There are also at large, three groups that are fighting for full autonomy among the Moro population in the Mindanao region.35 The Moro National Liberation Front and its splinter group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and the Abu Sayyaf Group36 are the

35 In addition to the MNLF, MILF, and ASG, there are also a number of other independent breakaway groups and factions operating independently of (but sometimes in coordination with) the major combatant groups. Moreover, the communist New People’s Army (NPA) has always been active in southern and central Philippines particularly the northern and western parts of Mindanao as well as eastern Visayas. Aside from the Moro-based groups, there are also Lumad-based as well as Christian-based groupings that received military equipment and training from the AFP. These are also known as “lost commands” (Tigno 2006:25).

36 The ASG is seen more as a criminal bandit group engaged mainly in kidnap-for-ransom activities and disguised as freedom fighters struggling to secure a distinct Moro identity and homeland (Tigno 2006:25).
focus in this thesis. I argue that while the three main Moro groups may differ in their ideas of governing Mindanao, their common goal is for the Moro people to practice their religious culture, having full economic access to their ancestral lands and, an independent state without the dependence on the central Philippine government. How did these three groups come into formation?

Tuminez (2007) illustrates the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the first and largest group produced in the wake of the 1968 Jabidah Massacre. The group was formed during the Marcos presidency, when the Philippine government soldiers (Armed Forces of the Philippines) slaughtered a few dozen Moro recruits under their supervision. The MNLF’s goal was to ultimately create an independent state of the Moro. However full scale war was triggered when President Ferdinand Marcos declared his suspension of democracy due to the Moro rebellion in 1972. Four years later, under the support of the Libyan government, the Marcos government, and the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement, which was a peace agreement that promised Moro autonomy in thirteen provinces and nine cities (ibid: 80). Unfortunately, this arrangement was never executed. When the Mindanao conflict was at its worst in the 1970s, the threat of an oil cut-off from the Middle East persuaded the Marcos government to negotiate. The result was the Tripoli Agreement, which would provide autonomy in thirteen provinces and nine cities in Mindanao, and the creation of such institutions as sharia courts, Moro schools, Moro-run financial and economic systems, a Special Regional Security force, and Moro regional legislative and executive bodies (Tuminez 2008:123).

After the Marcos government was overthrown in 1986, President Corazon Aquino negotiated with the MNLF to create the ARMM. However the Aquino government
“chose not to determine the limits of the autonomous area through another broad plebiscite” (Tuminez 2007:81). It is no surprise then that the majority of the provinces opted not to join the ARMM, bringing only four provinces to the ARMM, an entity much smaller than the promised Tripoli Agreement. Nevertheless, an organic act was ratified establishing the ARMM in August 1989. Republic Act 6734 or “An Act Providing for an Organic Act\(^{37}\) for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao” sought:

… to establish the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao [or ARMM], to provide its basic structure of government within the framework of the Constitution and national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines, and to ensure the peace and equality before the law of all people in the Autonomous Region (Article 1, Section 2).

However in the pursuit of creating a ‘Muslim Mindanao’, it is important to note that Moro organizations are not all collective. In 1977, Salamat Hashim led a new group, MILF, to branch out of the MNFL. The split marked two different approaches to the Moro’s future in which,

…the MNLF followed a secular track towards self-determination within existing Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity, as reflected in the 1996 GRP-MNLF peace agreement. The MILF, on the other hand, pursued a more uncompromising stance on Moro independence, rooting their struggle in the

\(^{37}\) Organic Act: an Act that establishes a territory of a state or an agency to manage certain federal lands.
distinctiveness of Moro identity, religion, and the political legacy of the sultanates…not support[ing] plebiscites or elections related to the ARMM. (Tuminez 2007:81).

During Fidel Ramos’ presidency [1992-1998], the MNLF was the focus of Government of the Philippines (GOP) peacemaking that was supported by the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Indonesia in particular, culminating the Final Peace Agreement between the MNLF and the GOP in 1996. This Final Peace Agreement looked promising; the former MNLF commander Nur Misuar was to oversee economic development in fourteen provinces and nine cities in Mindanao also referred as the Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD). Unfortunately, there was inadequate support from the central Philippine government and the majority Christian populations of SZOPAD opted not to join the ARMM. With the MNLF being unsuccessful in their agenda, Tuminez (2007) indicates that since 2001, Malaysia has facilitated the GRP-MILF negotiations in the context of security, rehabilitation, and ancestral domain. The unresolved issue of ancestral domain, territory that constitutes as Moro homeland, continues. It involves the Moros’ pursuit to gain “sufficient control over economic resources on that land; and a structure of governance consonant with Moro culture, involving minimal interference from Manila” (Tuminez 2007: 83). The MILF emphasize a need to avoid past failures, criticize the inadequacies of the ARMM and rejecting autonomy as a solution. To the MILF, ancestral domain is the key to a more just and hopeful Moro future.

As Tigno argues, it may have been the intention of the Philippine government to address some of the root causes of the conflict through the Organic Act. The aim of RA
6734 is to provide a venue for the expression of autonomy of the Muslim provinces within the framework of the Philippine constitution (2006: 26). However, it has clearly failed to address critical issues concerning land, governance and full autonomy over its future. For example the Philippine Congress exercised its power to amend the original Organic Act creating the ARMM, but did not consult adequately with Moro leaders or voters in passing Republic Act 9054 (“An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Regional in Muslim Mindanao”) in March 2001 (Tuminez 2007:82). Furthermore, the Government of the Philippines was and is still not prepared to grant such independence to the Moros. Despite granting the ARMM government limited powers of taxation and providing for revenue-sharing arrangements with Manila, in reality, the ARMM is almost completely dependent on block grants and subsidies from the central government. Instead of pursuing sustainable economic development in the ARMM economy, the government opted to keep the ARMM dependent. In fact, over 95 percent of ARMM revenues came from the central government in 2001. Furthermore, Tuminez argues that the developmental impact of the ARMM’s weak fiscal autonomy is clear, given that 70 percent or more of the ARMM’s budget must be used to pay for general administration, operations, and support in the 17 national line agencies devolved from the central government to the region (2007: 82).

Besides the problem concerned with the central government, there are also setbacks within the ARMM government; “the Moro leaders lack a unified vision, fight[ing] one another for the patronage spoils from Manila, and appear more interested in their own enrichment than the development of their people” (Tuminez 2007: 83). Leadership issues concerning governor Misuari who proved to be an incompetent administrator, was
also added to the complexity of the conflict in the ARMM. Furthermore, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo supported a rival to Misuari for the ARMM governorship
which stimulated a Misuari-led rebellion and landing the leader in jail. These events did
not look promising in the leadership and administering the ARMM. Another issue in the
mix is the Abu-Sayyaf group (ASG), which is seen as a major global threat to the United
States. Banaloi (2006) illustrates the ways in which the ASG was formed and how their
ideology differs from the other two groups.

The origins of the ASG can be traced to the MNLF who joined the International
Islamic Brigade that fought the Soviet forces in Afghanistan from 1980 to 1988. After
the Afghan war, the leader Janjalani and his followers formed to advance the idea of an
Iranian-inspired Islamic state in Southern Philippines. In 1989 Janjalani called this
group the Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF), which became the
forerunner of the ASG. With the formation of the MCFF, Janjalani officially broke away
from the MNLF in 1991. The MCFF was known in Mindanao as "Janjalani's group" and
the MCFF eventually became known as Abu Sayyaf's group.38 It is important to note
that there are some scholars and journalists that mistranslate ASG to mean "bearer of the
sword", but ASG really means in Arabic, ‘Father of the Swordsman’ (Banaloi 2006:
248). The ASG received more international attention than the MNLF or MILF due to its
provocative tactics such as the assassination of foreign or Christian missionaries. In
1991, the ASG was publicly announced for being responsible for the bombing of MIV
Doulos, a Christian missionary ship at the Zamboanga port in southern Philippines. This

38 This is because the nom de guerre of Janjalani during the Afghan war was "Abu
Sayyaf", in honour of Afghan resistance leader Professor Abdul Rasul Sayyaf
event received international media attention for the death of two foreign missionaries. Janjalani claimed after the assassination of Father Carzedda, a foreign Catholic missionary in Mindanao, that violence will persist to defend their Islamic goals in the region. There were numerous violent crimes since 1991; thus the United States had listed the ASG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

Although the ASG is listed as a ‘foreign terrorist organization’ by the United States, the ASG has similar goals to the MILF in that the ASG was formed “as an alternative group of Filipino Muslim radicals who were disappointed with the secular leaderships of the MNLF” (Banaloi 2006: 249). The MILF is more moderate in its Islamist position, but most of the original founders of the ASG are disgruntled members of the MNLF and the MILF. These three groups may stand on different ideas of governing Mindanao, however as Janlani expresses in ASG’s “Four Basic Truths” its ultimate goal is the establishment of a purely Islamic government”. Banaloit illustrates the empathy that the MILF has for ASG’s tactics because of their common understanding in oppressed history.

39 From 1991 to 2000, the ASG were engaged in 378 terrorist activities, which resulted in the death of 288 civilians. During the same period, the ASG ventured into 640 kidnapping activities involving a total of 2,076 victims. Because of its kidnappings the Philippine government preferred to describe the ASG as a mere bandit group (Banaloi 2006:249).

40 Presumably written between 1993 and 1994, Janjalani aptly stressed what he called the "Four Basic Truths" about the ASG, to wit: 1. It is not to create another faction in the Muslim struggle, which would be against the teaching of Islam, especially the Quran, but to serve as a bridge and balance between the MILF and MNLF (250).
as ‘Moros’ in their homeland. MILF founder Hashim Salamat contends that “the emergence of the ASG is caused by the oppression and the continuous usurpation of the powers…and as long as the region…[is] still under the control of the Philippine government, and oppression continues, we should expect more Abu Sayyaf style of groups to come to existence” (ibid: 250). Despite differences between the three groups, their commonality stands on their fight to create an independent Islamic state separate from the central Philippine government.

Unfortunately, Moro groups face two major problems: not only is the Mindanao region treated as an uninhabited political space by the central government and transnational organizations, but it is also framed as a threat to global security, owing to its poverty-stricken population. The attacks of September 11, 2001 have strengthened the discourse of homeland security and the ARMM has been subjected to increased surveillance. After the events of 9/11, the Filipino government quickly jumped on the bandwagon of partnering with President Bush, offering full support for this ‘war against terrorism’. In fact, President Arroyo was the first Asian leader to support the United States. For this reason, Arroyo was well rewarded with “promised military and economic assistance…in getting rid of the Abu Sayyaf” (Labrador 2002:148). The re-energized relationship between the United States and the Philippines in the ‘war on terror’ has allowed political justifications for U.S military agenda. Tujan, Gaughran and Mollett (2004) illustrate the ways in which the United States have gained access in pursuing their military agenda, providing political justification for intervention due to the presence of groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and the MILF. The US claims that the
ASG has ties with al-Qaeda, and as a result, the Philippines was deemed the ‘second front’ in the war on terror.

It is important however, to highlight the multiple factors in which the United States is interested in locating itself in the Philippines, particularly Mindanao. Tujan et al (2004) argue that the US requires refueling and logistics support for Arabian Gulf or western Pacific operations. Therefore, Mindanao is geographically an appropriate location for refueling as well as to monitor developments in neighbouring Muslim countries such as Indonesia. Furthermore, the United States is interested in having an increased military presence to “protect the economic interest of donor countries…There are at least twenty-six American-owned or affiliated corporations exploiting the war-torn region’s rich natural resources” (Tujuan et al 2004:60) in Mindanao. Thus it is clear that the United States finds the Philippines and particularly Mindanao a location ‘worth’ invading to defend its economic, political, and military interests.

The U.S. invasion of Mindanao has resulted in devastation for many local communities. Tujan et al (2004) illustrate the consequences of the ‘war on terror’ for Mindanao. They argue that conducting military exercises against the Moro liberation groups have displaced many local communities in Mindanao. In March 2002, soldiers have moved indigenous Subanens from their homes in Baragay, Limpapa, and Zamboanga to use these areas for jungle training exercises (ibid: 61). Furthermore, residents of Limpapa said they were never consulted about the intrusion into their territory. Large-scale evacuations have been ordered in Sulu and Basilan due to military operations. Many residents in Sulu, Basilan and Zamboanga suffer from these military offensives which have disrupted their economic activities and livelihoods.
Livestock and poultry have been taken; houses have been looted and burned, reportedly by soldiers, and farms and property destroyed by bombs… Fishing is one of the main livelihoods in the southern Philippines, especially in Sulu, Basilan and Zamboanga; fishing also augments the meager income of seasonal farmworkers. With the war on terror threatening their safety, some fisherfolk are forced to abandon fishing. The war on terror is leaving villages poorer than they already were.


As the ‘war on terror’ continues, not only have the activities to ‘heighten security’ actually created insecurity in the region but they have further impoverished the communities in Mindanao. Sulu, a province in the ARMM and a hub of insurgency, is consistently the poorest province in the country; the US military presence and increased militarization have done little to reduce impoverishment and social unrest in this region. In fact, aid militarization has intensified the conflict in this region, resulting in increased poverty as people are displaced and their livelihoods destroyed. It is reported that “the Philippine military, using US attack helicopters against MILF camps early in 2003…killed 200 people, mostly non-combatants, and displaced 40,000 civilians” (Tujan et al. 2004:62). Thus in the name of “security”, the Filipino government and the US military work hand in hand to ‘maximize the fitness’ of the Philippines by letting certain populations die, in this case the Moros. Similarly, Naber (2002) argues that the Bush Administration’s actions have coincided with corporate, state, and media discourses that lump groups like Abu Sayyaf of the Philippines with legitimate grassroots movements as
an excuse to kill all the movements altogether as evident in the BBC article mentioned earlier.

Atran (2006) argues that, “There is a preferred interpretation and lingering misconception among leading pundits and politicians that contemporary martyrs around the world are being directed and organized by a specific ‘Al Qaeda’ group” (134). Acharya and Acharya (2007) also argue against the problematic discourse of the United States’ global ‘War on Terrorism’ as a global war on Islam, Washington’s one-size-fits-all counterterrorism initiatives (76). Furthermore, they argue that Southeast Asia’s terrorist presence is far from monolithic and does not directly correlate to the Middle Eastern version. Acharya and Acharya illustrate the diverse agendas and groups even within Southeast Asia, such as some groups seek to punish rival ethnic groups in a situation of ethnic hatred and conflict. Groups such as the Laskar Jihad in Indonesia, for example adopt a militant Islamist ideology but usually target local groups such as Christians in the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi. Others, such as groups in the Philippines, southern Thailand, and Aceh and West Papua in Indonesia, are advocating separation from the central governments based on ethno-nationalist sentiments.

Moreover, some radical groups in Southeast Asia that have been accused of terrorism by the governments, including the Free Aceh Movement in Aceh, the MILF in the Philippines, and the Pattani United Liberation Organization in southern Thailand, but are inclined to settle their disputes and grievances through negotiation, in contrast to the zero-sum mindset of groups such as al-Qaeda (ibid: 79). However, the homogenized Islamic terrorist groups are often the most common perceptions, serving to kill off certain groups in the name of ‘security’. This problematic discourse produced by the
United States is problematic not only as Washington’s counterterrorism initiatives, but are reflected upon the World Bank’s interests. In the next section below, I will explain how World Bank initiatives coincide with the interests of the United States.

The World Bank and the Philippines

In the early years after the end of World War II, the process of decolonization occurred in many nation states that aimed to ‘remove’ the dependency of one state over another. Dillon and Reid (2001) illustrate an important shift from governance over ‘complicated worlds’ to governance over ‘complex worlds’ (46). Order was achieved through the process of reduction of certain populations during the time of colonial rule. However, Dillon and Reid argue that in the current context of ‘complex worlds’, the administration of life is maintained through orchestration rather than reduction. It is complex in the sense that there is convergence of powers as well as promotion of self-orchestration; a population governed without government (2001: 47). Biopolitical governance in this sense is more concerned with production, markets, and consumption, rather than the features of a nation. Biopolitical governance in this regard involves development agencies promoting free trade, emphasizing the value of an unregulated economy, and decreasing state sovereignty. In doing so, it governs, through aid practices and policies, “a complex population that one might call the global poor” (Dillon and Reid 2001:49).

However, I argue that the ‘features’ of a nation such as race and religion are still relevant in managing “complex worlds”. Targeting racialized so-called ‘wasted humans’
is still a mechanism in governing ‘underdevelopment’. Principal to biopolitics is the governance of populations through definition and analyses in all aspects, for the betterment of life. The circulation of this knowledge or information becomes central to knowing ‘how to’ manage the often racialized ‘global poor’. In this section, I discuss the ways in which the World Bank gained its international status as a development institution as well as its governance-through-development in the Philippines.

As Richard Peet argues in *Unholy Trinity: the IMF, the World Bank and WTO*, “two interventions- direct loans and the setting of policy conditions-make the World Bank the most important development institution in the world” (2009:127). Furthermore, not only is the World Bank powerful in handling economic policy conditions for ‘developing’ nations, Benjamin (2007) argues that the World Bank has been instrumental in shaping the very idea of culture as we understand it today. Using the work of Michael Denning, he contends that ‘culture’ has become mass-produced into a ‘global industry’ where the world was imagined to be divided into three in the mid-20th century. Denning’s work allows us to understand that the Bank engages in “cultural trafficking which enables it to move beyond a narrow economism, to construct an interventionist mission of development that is global in geographical scale and that claims infinite and eternal reach into the everyday processes of social life” (Benjamin 2007: xiii). The culture of “development” - in which nation-states are not only involved in explicit economic calculations but in everyday processes of the social- became worldwide. As the process of development was seen as the route to the capitalist ‘first world’, the World Bank’s

41 The capitalist first world, the communist second world, and the decolonizing third world
mission and purposes is for ‘developing’ and ‘underdeveloped’ nations to achieve ‘first world’ status. Stated in Article I of the Bretton Woods Articles of Agreement, the purposes of the World Bank are:

1. To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries.

2. To promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or participations in loans and other investments made by private investors; and when private capital is not available on reasonable terms, to supplement private investment by providing, on suitable conditions, finance for productive purposes out of its own capital, funds raised by it and its other resources.

3. To promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging international investment for the development of the productive resources of members, thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor in their territories.

4. To arrange the loans made or guaranteed by it in relation to international loans through other channels so that the more useful and urgent projects, large and small alike, will be dealt with first.

5. To conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of international investment on business conditions in the territories of members and, in the immediate
postwar years, to assist in bringing about a smooth transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy.

(World Bank 1989)\(^{42}\)

The World Bank articulates that the formula to development is to build “productive facilities” and “to promote private foreign investment” in which surplus will ultimately trickle-down to the poor. It is often the case that the World Bank is talked about as a singular bank when in fact it is a group that consists of five institutions. They include the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (Peet 2009:127-128). However, for the most part the ‘World Bank’, commonly only refers to the IBRD and the IDA.

These five agencies work simultaneously with the mission to “reduce global poverty” which is stated as their mission in the World Bank group website. In Article I of the Bretton Woods Article, it also mentions that the World Bank’s purpose is “to assist in the reconstruction and development of territories”. However, as previously noted, the World Bank did not actually begin with “development” or “poverty reduction”. Benjamin illustrates, that the support for the idea of an international bank at Bretton Woods came from reconstructing European countries with damaged economies due to the Second World War. A ‘bank’ was seen as a prospective source of relatively inexpensive lending. However, in order for the Bank to be legitimately accepted by the

U.S public and politicians, it was necessary for the agency to prove that it was for the best interests of the United States. Therefore, it is no surprise that since the early years of the formation of the World Bank, the USSR has chosen not to become a member “because of what it saw as disproportionate U.S influence….complain[ing] that the Bank was subordinated to the political purposes which made it the instrument of one great power” (Benjamin 2007: 12). This rightful complaint by the USSR was due to the undemocratic practices of the World Bank in which institutional voting power was tied to the size of a nation’s financial contribution. The undemocratic system continues to this day, making the United States an overwhelming authority in governing the World Bank. Thus, the World Bank also possesses and maintains hierarchal and hegemonic power in the decision-making development intervention.43

In its early years, the World Bank garnered Wall Street’s confidence by insisting on fiscal discipline and ‘sound banking practices’ (Benjamin 2007; Peet 2009) as well as restricting its practices to project lending for public utilities such as electric power and other economic infrastructure. Peet argues that “this restricted version of project lending was, however, also in line with what little economic theory at the time dealt with developmental issues” (2009:130). Nevertheless in gaining U.S confidence of the Bank and maintaining authority, the Bank portrayed itself as a knowledgeable doctor in curing economic diseases. This was a successful strategy in which a “cure” requires not only sound advice from “experts”, but subordination of the borrowing countries (patients) to

43 A similar case can be made with the United Nations, where it appears as if the Security Council maintains a hierarchical type of organization, whereby powerful state members occupy, and influence, the decision making process.
all the medical ‘advice’ given. It includes the rationale that if the patient does not follow these instructions, it is their problem and they may be left to ‘die’. In early development economics, capital investments that raise productivity were given as ‘prescriptions’ to cure economic diseases. Thus, social programs dealing with education and health were regarded as a waste. This way of thinking was altered in the 1950s when the World Bank began to show interest in global poverty.

The shift from mere reconstruction of European economies to focusing on the global mass of poor populations was motivated by the Cold War engagement between USSR and the USA. The “third world” became the ideological battleground where “a geopolitical strategy of containment…focused US military, diplomatic and economic interest on the ‘rim countries’ surrounding the communist USSR and China” (Peet 2009: 132). Including these “third world” spaces for aid was in large part an investment in gathering up American allies. But including more member states to the Bank meant that ideas of lending needed to be changed. Peet argues that the late 1950s was when ideas of ‘poverty alleviation’ were incorporated in the Bank and lending was widened from industrial infrastructure to the agricultural sector.

Toussaint (2008) illustrates this pattern of the United States gathering up allies, in the context of the Philippines. This political process is evident in the early years after decolonization, when the United States “allowed” the Filipino state to control capital flows and exchange rates for the first twelve years. There was an increased economic growth of the Philippine state during this period. However, this period of growth ended in 1962 when the control measures were abandoned under pressure from the United States, the IMF and the World Bank (74). The elimination of control led to external debt
that increased sevenfold between 1962 and 1969 (ibid: 74), a significant devaluation of
the Philippine currency as well as the drastic decrease in incomes of small producers.

The Bank’s focus on development and poverty issues were executed to an even
greater extent during McNamara’s presidency at the Bank, when the number of member
countries dramatically increased. It is evident that “by end of the 1960s, the World Bank
or the IBRD metamorphosed—the Bank’s membership skyrocketed during the era of
decolonization, swelling from 44 to 116 between 1947 and 1971” (Benjamin 2007:58).
It is no wonder that Benjamin describes this era as a time when the World Bank
successfully crafted its institutional identity as the world’s most influential development
agency. Peet argues that McNamara possessed a fierce determination to articulate the
Bank as a development agency that deals with poverty issues. He goes on to show that
the reasons “behind this seem to have combined genuine, compassionate generosity with
the realization, intensified by the Vietnam disaster, that US national security was

In the case of the Philippines, the first loans granted by the World Bank to them date
back to 1958. The loans remained low until the McNamara’s presidency in 1968.
However, increases in loans were necessary -- as McNamara argued -- because the
locations in which “American bases were of such strategic importance that it was
absolutely necessary to strengthen its ties to the World Bank… lending money was a
way to get greater leverage” (Toussaint 2008:75). Furthermore, McNamara encouraged
large rural development projects focusing on small farmers in the Philippines. Projects
were perceived to increase productivity and surpluses through the market. However, this
strategy to raise productivity was proven “to be easier to outline on paper in Washington
than to carry out in the field” (Peet 2009: 136). Dissatisfied with project lending coupled with an overall regime shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism in the late 1970s, forced the Bank to reconsider how it might adjust the patterns of ‘development’. In ‘adjusting’ the patterns, Peet shows that the Bank’s new lending program consisted of providing loans that were policy-based rather than project-based. The Bank reported a list of policy inadequacies in the areas of macroeconomics finding that state controls over trade were detrimental to development.

The list of inadequacies went something like this: trade and exchange rate policies overprotected industry, held back agriculture and absorbed administrative capacity; there were too many administrative constraints and the public was overextended, especially in the direction of hopelessly corrupt and inefficient parastatals; there was a bias against agriculture in price, tax and exchange rate policies.

(Peet 2009:137)

In the case of the Philippines, the debt crisis in the 1960s led to the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in 1972 with the support of the United States, the World Bank and the IMF. Marcos was concerned about “replac[ing] the import-substitution industrialization model with the export-oriented industrialization model that it championed…[thus]…the Bank decided to grant two huge structural adjustment loans in 1981 and 1983 aimed at export promotion” (Toussaint 2008: 76). It was clear that Marcos’ objective was to strengthen neoliberal policies through force. However, the World Bank and the IMF supported Marcos’ dictatorship as well as his repressive measures. Moreover, Toussaint argues that the World Bank was in fact, well aware that these granted loans were going to end up misused by Marcos and his generals. Misused loans were considered
“worthwhile to pay off” in exchange for an acceleration of the neoliberal counter-reform. However, popular discontent rose sharply during this period. Eventually, Marcos was removed and Corazon Aquino, leader of the opposition among middle class took over in 1986 (ibid: 77).

It is ironic that despite the Bank’s support of the Filipino state’s widespread corruption, it began to stress (and still stress) the practices of efficient, accountable administration, and ‘good governance’ during the 1980s (Peet 2009: 143). Today, ‘good governance’ practices are viewed as the solutions to problems of underdevelopment, dependency and corruption. These are however, western-oriented ideas that lack the incorporation of alternative perspectives. Parnini (2009) argues that ‘good governance’ has been defined in terms of emphasizing good service delivery to meet citizens’ needs. Unfortunately, “most of the donors’ ‘good governance’ agenda rarely matches local needs to improve governance systems in developing countries” (Parnini 2009:555).

In the case of the ARMM, the World Bank suggests that local voices are taken into account through good governance. However, in practice it enforces a rigid, unilateral solution of ‘good governance’–based on indicators that negates actual local needs. Focusing on curing the diseases of ‘corruption’ and ‘poverty’, measurements of good governance are used by the World Bank to calculate the status of governmental performance. Buduru and Pal (2010) provide a list of governance indicators measurements that were created by the World Bank Institute. Seven of the most widely cited governance indicators include, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception

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44 The World Bank, the IMF and the United States continued to “support” the Philippines when she made commitments to deepen neoliberal reforms.
Index (CPI)\(^{45}\), the Center for Public Integrity’s Global Integrity Indicator (GI)\(^{46}\), the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Index (CPIA), the World Bank and EBRD’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), the International Institute for Management Development’s World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY), Freedom House’s political and civil right index (FH) and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (KKZ) (Buduru and Pal 2010:517). Buduru and Pal argue that the indicators that are used to assess aid fraud or corruption are highly unreliable and lack comparability. In addition, these indicators are limited in precision, transparency, and comparability.\(^{47}\) However, these indicators are seen as reliable to the global community.

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\(^{45}\) CPI, a corruption indicator lacks sufficient transparency; however it is used to measure the performance of anti-corruption policies in 179 countries (ibid: 518). Thus, it can be argued that making decisions on aid allocation based on these unreliable indicators to rank a country’s governance is unreasonable, or they are in place for reasons other than those proposed.

\(^{46}\) Among these seven indicators, two of them (CPI and GI) focus on assessing corruption. The sources in which these indicators become published are through the opinions of ‘experts’ and business people. Furthermore, the methodologies and sources used to publish these indicators change from year to year (ibid: 518).

\(^{47}\) Buduru and Pal argue that users of governance indicators have a tendency to rely on perception-based, rather than fact-based. Fact-based, defined as indicators that are publicly available data for replication and transparency only constitute one-third of the World Bank’s indicators (ibid:523).
Thus, the current Philippine President Benigno Aquino III (2010- ) has also pledged to the international community in his fight to end large-scale corruption with the help of the World Bank. Aquino at the 2011 Annual Meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund spoke about the extent of corruption:

Take for example a region in my country, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, where 80 percent of funds allotted to the governor’s office in 2009 to 2010 cannot be accounted for. May I repeat that? Eighty percent cannot be accounted for. It is hard to believe that this kind of corruption has not contributed to the ARMM being among the poorest regions in the country. Had the funds gone to where they supposed to, perhaps the ARMM would be better off today. (Benigno S. Aquino III 2011)48

The President commits to “percolate socioeconomic development to a greater majority” by beginning with “cleaning up government: instituting a culture of transparency and accountability”. This commitment not only pleases development agencies such as the World Bank but also the United States.

It is in the interests of both the United States and the World Bank to make sure that the funds made to the Philippines are ‘properly’ used. As mentioned earlier, it is evident that the increased loans by the World Bank are made to regions where there is high U.S. political interest. The Philippines and particularly the ARMM is of particular interest to

48 At the 2011 Annual Meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund [Delivered at Washington, D.C., on September 21, 2011 (September 22, Manila time)]
http://www.gov.ph/
increase loans because it is a way to gain greater leverage for the United States in regulating ‘terrorist’ activities. Thus, the priority is to eliminate risky ‘terrorist groups’ of the region, not really addressing local needs and interests. Furthermore, the central Philippine government is mutually on board with World Bank and U.S initiatives because the culturally perceived “wasted” Moros are seen to be problematic, creating conflict and poverty in the country.

The World Bank Today

Viewing a brief history of the World Bank allows us to understand the foundations of the World Bank as well as the re-articulations of how development is achieved by various Bank presidents. In the six decades since the Bank has been established, the institution has continuously altered its articulations with ‘development’. Depending on the president of the time, the Bank has even changed in the extent to which its lending practices are diversified. However, the one thing that has never changed is the constant faith in capitalism and the power of the market. In fact, “the concept functions as common-sense logic and economic law, the coherent, foundational principle on which a flexible, responsive, contingent conception of development can be built and perpetually renovated” (Benjamin 2007:7). However, it is important to note that the Bank has not avoided scrutiny by many students and NGOs representing social and environmental movements. Global protests, most notably the 1999 WTO Seattle protest and the current Occupy Wall Street movement proved that many citizens of ‘developed’ nations oppose the undemocratic corporate drive in international trade where national safety standards,
laws and rules are often deemed as barriers to trade. Moreover, protestors have also criticized structural adjustment policies made by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that position ‘developing’ or ‘underdeveloped’ nations to be dependent upon these large institutions. For these reasons of public scrutiny, Benjamin contends the “World Bank turns to ever more mediated mores of public address…self-consciously traffics in culture, placing increasing emphasis on the local, the micro and the participatory” (2007:138). One wonders whether this is an attempt by the Bank to genuinely reinvent itself or merely a process of paradigm maintenance. Nevertheless, since 1999, the Bank began to focus its attention on issues such as health, gender, and the environment.

The effort to create the image of a more ‘holistic’ World Bank was intensified through the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Peet illustrates that the main agency charged with coordinating global and local efforts in outlining potential strategies for action is the UNDP. However because the UNDP had no funds to give out as loans or grants, it looked to the World Bank. In collaboration with the UNDP, the Bank set up a monitoring unit in which “the Global Monitoring Report reports on how the world is doing in implementing the policies and actions for achieving the MDGs and related development outcomes” (2009:171). The MDGs are idealistic in aspirations such as to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, and promote gender equality. However, Peet argues that these goals lack in the means of actual realization. They are to be realized by each government by using the funds given from the UNDP, the World Bank and other international agencies. The problem “is that it makes it look as though something serious is being done about
development, when in fact governments are just carrying on…organizing the economy so that it benefits the rich” (2009:173). Using the MDGs, the World Bank maintains its authority over global ‘development’. In addition to supporting the MDGs, the World Bank is successful in maintaining its institutional status through extensive research and education.

The World Bank brands itself through its website in devoting sections to educational materials. On its website, there is a section for students and teachers where material on “development” is available through “the KidsDev Newsletter and the Learning and Knowledge sections of the Bank site contain[ing] enormous amounts of World Bank information explained through highly accessible prose and graphs” (Benjamin 2007: 162). The World Bank’s feature of ‘commitment’ to education, research and internships allows for a saleable public image. Furthermore, the website contains literature of success stories of borrowing nations which may facilitate instructions for an audience looking to borrow funds. For example, the World Bank published, “Success Story in Kerala” in May 2008, which reported the river-based schemes in the region to provide portable water. The report includes pictures of water infrastructure built emphasizing that the “schemes are the first of their kind in Kerala to have been planned and implemented” (Water and Sanitation Program 2008: 2). This success story is significant because these kinds of reports serve as “a model for effective, decentralized planning and implementation” (Water and Sanitation Program 2008:2). Benjamin argues that these reports are valuable because function as ‘best practices’ or ‘how to manuals’” (2007:160) for not only borrowing states but also policymakers and practitioners in scaling up such approaches.
By publishing ‘best practices’ manuals and educational materials for children, the World Bank is successful in reinventing its image as more ‘holistic’. However, such strategies only feed into their biopolitical approach of legitimizing the activities of administering life of ‘underdeveloped’ regions. It is fostering the idea that only ‘western’ research and expert knowledge possess the capacity to maintain order and health of a region. Furthermore, these educational materials ‘teach’ the ways of how to mould an individual into a ‘governable’ subject of development.

The ASFP and Biopolitical Governance

In this section, I discuss the ways in which the ASFP focuses upon the Moro population by engaging them in specific activities that are deemed best for human development. Thus, how does the World Bank’s ASFP utilize ‘development’ as a form of biopolitical governance in the ARMM? I analyze the ways in which poverty-affected communities in the ARMM are subjected to calculation and management by the ASFP. In the Philippines and specifically the ARMM, the physical setting and policy spaces act as post-colonial spaces of containment. The ASFP distinguishes the poor spatially from the non-poor through development programmes, with the necessity to control the ‘order’ of this region. As Duffield describes ‘borderland’, poverty becomes a representation of ‘chaos’ that is necessary to contain and monitor. We have seen that the ARMM is targeted and ‘effectively’ contains the Philippine Muslims physically as part of the ‘borderland’. The ASFP justifies its obligation to assist in the development of this region by describing the ARMM as especially poor:
The poorest region in the Philippines, with its provinces continuing to be at the top of the country’s poorest areas. Its deeply-rooted poverty situation aggravated by decades of unresolved conflicts and weak governance requires continuous financial and technical assistance by national, regional and local government agencies, the private sector, and donor community.

(World Bank Proposed Additional Loan 2010:9).

By describing the ARMM as the poorest, the region is separated from the rest. Moreover, its inhabitants are distinguished as those who need special assistance and reform. It reinforces a dichotomous understanding of the world: “us” and “them”, reproducing the discourses of ‘backwardness’. Although the creation of the ARMM has been the result of the Moros pursuing an independent state, the creation of the ARMM itself has actually reproduced discourses of backwardness. Today, internal conflict continues to be racialized and understood as a characteristic of ‘backwardness’. It involved a discourse of the Moro ‘other’ as a threat to development programs. Conflict is understood “within policy discourse [as]…unrestrained barbarism of internal war destroy[ing] the very possibility of self-reproduction” (Duffield 2006: 75).

Although racism and religious discrimination are not accepted as part of ‘modernist views’, the events of 9/11 has produced a revival of this ideology through public discourse. The religious ‘backwardness’ of religious extremists is seen as the cause of global terrorism. As groups such as ASG and MILF are thrown into the mix of ‘global terrorist groups’, they are seen as a threat to global security. Thus, large transnational organizations such as the World Bank have implemented projects such as the ASFP to execute biopolitical power in containing these ‘risky’ populations.
The ASFP has proposed that the development projects will not only ensure human development but security and peace in the region. Thus, the additional loans proposed to achieve security and peace during the years of 2010 to 2013. As mentioned earlier, the original loan was completed in April 2010 in assisting projects that deal with reconstructing and constructing infrastructure such as hospitals, education facilities, training centers to over 600 barangays which also implemented 1,700 subprojects (http://www.emindanao.org/#!armm-social-fund). In various websites such as the ASP’s facebook page and the official website, photographs of schools (Appendix I), health and water facilities with large signs indicating affiliations with ARMM Social Fund Project is indicated as part of its ‘fight against poverty’. Besides the educational materials that the World Bank publishes, these signs are an effective way of branding the ‘World Bank’ and the ASFP. It signifies the World Bank’s feature of ‘commitment’ to education and health as a saleable public image. It is a marketing strategy in which borrowing nations are possible consumers to the services of development projects.

Before proposing such projects, the World Bank sends out ‘experts’ by conducting assessments to investigate the situations and needs of a region. This is done through calculative practices such as the Human Development Index (HDI) and graphs indicating poverty incidences. For example, in the Social Assessment of Conflict-Affected Mindanao, experts have illustrated tables indicating poverty incidences and annual per capita income. Under its analysis, Population, Poverty Incidence and Depth (1997, 2000), Mindanao provinces are compared to Metro Manila in their poverty incidences. In one of the ARMM provinces, Sulu, a table shows that poverty incidences have climbed from 87.5 percent in 1997 to 92 percent in 2000. Similarly, another ARMM
province (Tawi Tawi) illustrates increased poverty of 52.1 percent in 1997 to 75.3 percent in 2000 (World Bank Social Assessment 2003:9). By comparing the Mindanao region to Metro Manila, where poverty incidence is at only 5.6 percent in 2000 (3.5 percent in 1997), the document indicates an ‘us’ and ‘them’ even within the same country. It signifies that the central government has succeeded in ‘developing’ urban Manila; the ARMM is problematized for its non-urban (backward) setting in which, it is seen as necessary to build infrastructure for development.

Though it is difficult to gather the specific information on project implementation in a barangay, there were a few ‘stories from the field’ in the ARMM illustrating details of the ‘development’ process. In the Flood-Free Health Center Improves Access to Health Services in Liguasan Marsh, published by members of the Mindanao Trust Fund (MTF) Secretariat. It discusses the geographical limitation of Sitio Marges, Buliok, Pagalunan in the province of Maguindanao as an area that lacks development such as health facilities. The sitio [territorial enclave] is described as:

in the middle of Liguasan Marsh which sprawls some thousands of hectares along the boundary of Maguindanao and North Cotabato provinces. The marsh has some hundreds of islets formed from the sediments due to erosion some centuries.

49 (http://www.emindanao.org/) This site is about assistance for and activities in conflict-affected areas in the region.

50 MTF is a mechanism through which development partners, pools and coordinates official development assistance to conflict-affected communities in Mindanao. The World Banks is its main donour to the MTF and it is carried out through the ASFP (www.emindanao.org).
ago. Frequent flooding in the area contaminates their shallow wells and puts most of them at risk of catching water-borne diseases.

(emindanao.org)

Many of the residents have reported malnutrition and upper respiratory tract infection, among other health issues. However, the story goes on to explain that they had a “thirst for development assistance” and they were in “disbelief that such (health facility) is possible…over the isolated sitio in the marsh and made of semi-concrete materials”. The Community Health Center (CHC) that was built through the MTF is made out of half concrete that is 48 square meters with a floor elevated from the ground that protects the building from frequent flooding in the area. This ‘modernized’ building is compared to the materials used by most of the sitio residents who “can only afford to build houses made of round wood, bamboo, nipa and other shrubs”. This report indicates that, with technical assistance, ‘they’ too can change their community to be more developed. The story also argues that armed clashes between the military and ‘Moro mujahedeens’ have disrupted and prevented the extension of development projects and social services to the area. Thus internal conflict, a source of underdevelopment, forbids security and development to be achieved. Such stories legitimize the existence of the ASFP because its response appears to address both insecurity and poverty in the ARMM.

Before the proposed stage of the ASFP, a Social Assessment of Mindanao was conducted to list the needs in the ARMM. As mentioned earlier, the CDD referenced the Assessment with the needs pertaining to “peace and order, water supply, livelihood, health services and medicine, school buildings, power supply, roads, and housing for internally displaced persons”. However, there were crucial issues written in the
Assessment that were ignored and omitted in the CDD. The Social Assessment was conducted between the latter half of 2001 and early 2002 by a team led by Dr. Fermin Adriano. They integrate both quantitative (poverty statistics) and qualitative data (interviews and case studies) into the assessment report. It discusses infrastructure needs in the region; however a large portion of the assessment also reports on the necessity of development practitioners to understand Moro views on land and clan groupings within villages.

The needs of the poor in Mindanao may be very basic...however the delivery of development assistance is mediated by communities that have their own unwritten yet binding rules. The datus, war lords, rebel commanders, religious leaders, clan and village elders and the local nobility are the anchors of stability for communities in the many lawless frontiers of Mindanao. The relationships between leaders and followers would sometimes tend to be benign and fatherly, especially at the level of clan groupings within villages.


Traditional leaders of a community play an important role in regulating the relationship of the members of the community with the outside world; this is an important factor to consider in project implementation. Unfortunately, this crucial cultural and religious sanction is mentioned nowhere in the Country Assistance Strategy

51 Dr. Fermin Adriano served as a consultant for the World Bank for the past 10 years in Mindanao peace and development issues, the Community-Driven Development (CDD) employed in the government’s poverty reduction project and rural development issues (http://incitegov.org/about-us/board-of-trustees/dr-fermin-adriano/).
or the Project Paper on Proposed Additional Loan of the ASFP. The Assessment illustrates that the Moro view on land is that, land is inherited and governed in trust by the datu or chief. It should not be sold or rented, as well as “purchas[ing] of land is the least recognized among the modes of owning or using land” (Social Assessment 2003: 20). Furthermore, Moro groups use burial grounds and family genealogies as proof to ownership (even though these conceptions are seen to vary among different Muslim ethnic groups). Thus state policy that facilitated the encroachment of communal lands during colonialism displaced them from their homelands.

Because private ownership has no meaning and land use may differ according to the social hierarchy (datu, village elder, sultan), there may be contentions with the notions of what the World Bank deems ‘good governance’. According to the World Bank’s ‘good governance’ practices, providing aid and resources according to social status in a barangay may be interpreted as ‘corruption’ and fraud. The ASFP emphasizes on ‘monitoring’ and ‘accountability’ in disbursing aid; the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems keeps track of how the aid is being used and whether beneficiaries are ‘satisfied’. In the Proposal for Additional Loans report, the ASFP necessitates a strong monitoring system to include thematic reviews and evaluation of the procurement and management performance due to the fact that ‘the ASFP has a poor reputation where governance in concerned’\(^5\). The ASFP fails to acknowledge the tension that monitoring

\(^5\) In the Additional Loans, they report that “Governance risks are related to weak governance…[and] the ASFP region has…a prevalence of mismanagement and malpractice leading to the misuse of funds” (World Bank Proposed Additional Loan 2010: 15)
schemes may cause within a community because oftentimes aid is received from their local chief (datu). In the Social Assessment, some respondents offered the information “that they were afraid to give less than a perfect satisfaction rating for the government services provided because their local chief executive is also their datu” (Social Assessment 2003: 24). Given that their local government is the service provider of the community, they were concerned that a poor satisfaction rating would be misinterpreted as disrespecting or disliking their datu.

Thus, the ‘good governance’ model generated by the World Bank does not have the capacity to really address local issues. ‘Good governance’ as a universal concept is more a tool that is used to legitimate control over underdeveloped countries. It is ironic that while the World Bank promotes the value of good governance, it has failed to practice them themselves. One example is the case mentioned earlier where the Bank facilitated the corrupt use of loans during President Marcos’ dictatorship. Marcos and his generals misused the loans, but it was considered ‘worthwhile’ in exchange for an accelerated neoliberal reform.

In recent years, the ASFP was accused of supporting a regional government of three years in the ARMM whose family masterminded the Maguindanao massacre in November 2009.

The risk of the additional financing to the Bank’s reputation is considered substantial…However, the current, acting governor, in a donor meeting in Manila in March 2010, reaffirmed the importance of the ASF additional financing and similar programs for improving the welfare of the population in ASFP.

(WORLD BANK ADDITIONAL LOANS 2010:16)
Thus, it is evident that the ASFP is concerned with saving the World Bank’s reputation to regain trust and legitimacy. However, the organization’s ability to offer monetary aid and build infrastructure allows their presence to persist in many parts of the world. Furthermore, the World Bank’s ability to finance development projects enables them to continue enforcing ‘good governance’ practices to aid receivers when in reality their own practices are undeniably questionable.

While the World Bank dictates how poverty should be reduced, it also enforces individual responsibility. As part of ‘good governance’, individual responsibility is emphasized so that individuals may take charge of their own well-being and poverty. Ilcan and Lacey argue that the shift towards emphasizing the well being of the individual often implies that certain kinds of citizenship responsibilities are expected (2011:213). Some examples of how the World Bank contributes to the idea of resposibilizing their own poverty comes from another ‘story from the field’.53 In *Community Folk Visualize their Community Needs*, local residents of Barangay Kurintem, Datu Odin Sinsuat in the province of Maguindanao participated in the set-up of their *barangay*. Barangay officials and community volunteers who are Moro, gathered from all sitios for two days at a madrasah in Sitio (territorial enclave) Penuling. Their task was to create a visual representation of their respective sitios featuring key structures in the community. The twenty participants, four of them were women, looked at a sample map of Sitio Budzal on the board. Based on the sample map, and having familiarized the symbols for possible structures in the community, participants worked in twos or threes and they

53 (http://www.emindanao.org/) This site is about assistance for and activities in conflict-affected areas in the region.
drew landmarks of their own sitio. Seated on chairs tagged with numbers in Arabic, each group indicated houses, irrigation dams, and water sources. When the maps of all six sitios were completed, each team toured its assigned sitio to ensure that maps mirror the landscape of the area. With maps on hand, the teams, for example, checked the number of houses and verified the sitio boundaries.

The story argues that this mapping exercise made them ‘see the place in a new perspective’. Once all sitio maps were validated, they were pieced together to form the whole barangay map. In producing this map, they ‘realized’ that it was necessary to indicate information pertaining to crops, livelihood, gender, education, and social services. It is evident that through this mapping exercise, development projects, under the auspices of the World Bank, suggest that communities must indicate their needs and generate ways to effectively counter them.

A similar story, *Yakkan folk eye an end to community's plight*, also illustrates the ways in which community members of another barangay are ‘helping themselves’. This particular story talks about a few Moro community members who were involved in conducting a community assessment in their Barangay of Upper Bato-Bato of Akbar town in the province of Basilan. The local Moro community members involved in the assessment discussed among one another about the harsh conditions of each sitio, using maps as a tool to visualize the problems among them. Each map represents a theme such as income source, education, and population. They concluded that their barangay lacked potable water and toilet facilities, medical services, and insufficiency of income. The local Moros explained that having no potable water facility led to water-borne diseases

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54 [http://www.emindanao.org/#!/stories/vstc7=page10](http://www.emindanao.org/#!/stories/vstc7=page10)
such as diarrhea among some residents, particularly the children. Based on their
prioritization, water facility ranked first. They were then advised by ‘expert’
development practitioners to prepare project-specific thematic maps in order to come up
with responsive water facility design.

Such a process of preparing and designing their own water facility as the one above
implies that local communities must assume responsibility for their own problems,
however under the supervision of western development projects. Development agencies
may argue that the strategy of responsibilization is an effective way of undertaking
participatory development. However, this is merely a cost-effective way for
development agencies in ‘assessing the needs’ of the poor. CDD encourages community
participation such as these because it reduces the administrative burden of data collection
for project staff (World Bank CDD 200631). This particular story, Yakkan folk eye an
end to community’s plight also included the positive outcome from this mapping exercise.
A volunteer resident, Bash, expressed the value of the mapping exercise in which “aside
from knowing the problems of the community, [he] likewise recognized his newly
learned mapping skill as something valuable”. Such a statement helps to legitimize
development work by showing that subjects are ‘changing’ from their backward ways. It
implies that Bash has now gained knowledge in becoming more ‘modern’ and
‘developed’.

Similarly, in the previous story of In Community Folk Visualize their Community
Needs, a volunteer’s narrative was also incorporated, “I have learned some information
about my sitio which I did not care about before…Now [I am] aware of the picture of my
community”. Stories such as these are effective strategies for development practitioners
because it allows the public to see the ‘transformation’ in the Moro mind. It reinforces the process of linear of human ‘progress’ and ‘modernization’. These stories are examples of biopolitical governance in spaces of ‘underdevelopment’ such as the ARMM in that “they” are transforming in becoming less “backward”.

The ASFP attempts to secure the ‘species life’ of the Moro population through development activities in the ARMM region. The physical setting of the borderland, or the ARMM act as post-colonial spaces of containment in the Philippines, controlling ‘order’ through development practices that ‘protect’ the welfare of the individual. For example, Moro populations subject to development activities were directed by development practitioners to prepare thematic maps in the process of preparing and designing their own water facility. By encouraging responsibility and ‘self-reliance’ of their own impoverishment means that there is reduced work for development agencies but simultaneously controlling through monitoring systems.

The complex ways in which the ASFP attempts to govern the ARMM illustrates how good governance benefits the interests of the World Bank. It is evident that the ‘stories from the field’ and the ASFP Additional Loan have failed to consider the interests and concerns of local Moros. Furthermore, the stories do not acknowledge colonial, economic, political, and cultural marginalization, factors that have contributed to their impoverishment. Thus, ‘development’ by the World Bank may not be compatible to the interests of Moro resistance groups or community leaders of a barangay. This is elaborated in the next section below.
Chapter 4: Contentions in Governing the ARMM

Throughout this research, I have argued that the legitimacy of the ASFP is founded upon ensuring that the ARMM restores its livelihood from conflict and poverty. The ‘solution’ is to target the Moros and to develop them through providing infrastructure, encouraging good governance practices and engaging them in community participation. Such a strategy is believed to enhance peace and security through sustainable development by reducing poverty. The World Bank suggests that restoring the livelihoods of those in the ARMM is not possible with some calculations and ‘expert’ advice on the models of ‘development’. However, it is evident that the ARMM is still the poorest region in the Philippines, and purely economic development is not the solution. I have argued that the historical, cultural, and political tensions in the Philippines have affected the ARMM of today. Furthermore, there are multiple interests in governing the ARMM; the US and Filipino state, the ARMM government, the World Bank’s ASFP, liberation groups, and chiefs or datus have different ideas as to governing the ARMM.

Through the Social Assessment conducted by Dr. Adriano, it was clear that traditional leaders of a community play an important role in regulating the relationship of the members of the community with the outside world; they are crucial to the distribution of land, and resources. Because private ownership is not paramount and land use may differ according to the social hierarchy (datu, village elder, sultan), there may be contentions with the way the World Bank would like to govern the ARMM. The ARMM uses the ideas of ‘good governance’ and targets the poor in order to transform ‘them’ into
‘modern’ beings. The ARMM government partners with the ASFP to bring in investment for the region but simultaneously keeps the Moro traditions alive. However as Tuminez (2008) has argued, because the ARMM lacks fiscal independence and is almost completely dependent on block grants and subsidies from the national government, these handouts only reinforce dependence on the central government. As a result of Moro fiscal weakness, the ARMM government has failed to deliver public goods and services to its constituents. Internal Moro problems have also hampered governance in ARMM.

We have seen that various liberation movements in the region have different ideas of how they want the ARMM to be governed. The MILF was split to create the MNLF who followed a secular track towards self-determination within existing Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity. However the MILF also pursued a more uncompromising stance on Moro independence, identity, religion, and the political legacy of the sultanates. Furthermore, disgruntled former members of the MNLF and the MILF also formed the ASG. Because the ASG is more provocative in demonstrating their hopes on wanting a fully independent ARMM, they became listed as a ‘foreign terrorist organization’ by the United States.

The fact that the Filipino government was willing to partner with US military on the ‘war on terror’ in Mindanao raises the possibility that the rationalities and discourse used for intervention are rooted in historical arguments regarding the backwardness of race, language, and religion in the Philippines. As Naber (2002) argues, “Philippine defense…with their American counterparts are simply playing up the ASG “monster”…to justify bigger U.S. military assistance to their modernization program” (2002: 220). Thus, the colonial discourse of the Moro as ‘dangerous’ is still used today.
by the Filipino and US government. It is evident that in the discourse of “new wars”, sociocultural racism is used as a tool to protect the ‘species’ life of the United States and the Philippines. The Moros, the non-insured or “wastable” species life, is justified as exclusions of a particular “other”. This distinction has then, legitimized intervention of the US military in the sense that, security will contain potential ‘terrorists’, while development will introduce modernity and promote Western practices and ideologies, as well as the generation of a self-reliant species life.

Global Movements? Social Networking and Solidarity

In this section, I focus upon a new way in which Moro populations are building potential solidarity in their fight for a full independent state. During the past few years, social networking sites have been increasing as a new popular form of communication throughout the world. Social networking sites have become available for individuals to communicate beyond e-mail and the mobile phone. Many of these sites are free such as “Myspace and Facebook…[which] claim over 250 million registered users” (Kim, Jeong, Lee 2010: 215). These social networking sites have been utilized in political campaigns such as for Obama’s presidency as well as the recent overthrow of the Mubarak regime in Egypt. The overthrow of the Mubarak regime can be accounted in this particular historical moment in which social networking sites are available to Egyptian youth who have been suffering from neoliberal restructuring. Shahine (2011) argues that because the heavy usage of Facebook users in Egypt were children in the 1990s when neo-liberal economic policies were implemented, this enabled the successful mobilization to occur now. Unlike the previous generation, this particular generation came of age during a
time of detrimental consequences of privatization and economic deregulation (2011: 2), which sparked resistance. He uses Karl Mannheim’s work to make sense of the political awakening in which he emphasizes “the importance of the nexus between the individual life cycle and rapidly changing historical conditions to understanding generational shifts in the formation of political consciousness (Shahin 2011:2). These particular historical conditions of economic disparity coupled with social networking sites allowed people to experience “a new sense of connectedness along the lines of age and generation” (Shahine 2011:2). He concludes that a national and Arab solidarity has emerged out of their common struggle against oppression.

Like social networking websites such as Facebook, Youtube was also utilized by Arabs to rise against absolutism in Egypt and Libya. Videos of police brutality such as the death of Khaled Said in Alexandria were posted for millions of viewers to see; events which would have not been “aired” otherwise. Youtube has also encouraged increasing connections between individuals beyond national borders and it is currently the third most visited website (Kim et al 2010: 218). This site has allowed for a new venue in self-expression, which is available for anybody who has access to the Internet. Social networking through Facebook and Youtube are also used by the Moros of Mindanao. The Facebook page, ‘We support Constitutional Amendment for Bangsamoro State’ (Bangsamoro means Moro Nation) is an online campaign to raise awareness on the Moro issue. In the description box it states:

We call for the amendment of the Constitution for the purpose of creating, in lieu of the existing ARMM, a new Bangsamoro self-governing region, to meet the aspiration for a system of life and governance suitable and acceptable to the
Bangsamoro people, so as to decisively solve the Bangsamoro problem. For a truly just, lasting and comprehensive solution to our problem in Mindanao, it will not do to have just socio-economic reforms without also political and constitutional reforms to effectively address comprehensively the various interrelated root causes of the conflict.

(www.facebook.com/.../We-Support-Constitutional-Amendment.../)

In attempting to facilitate a wide information campaign to let people understand their stance and issue, they are in the process of launching a 1 million online signature campaign. The creators of this group have designed a campaign logo, ‘fb’\(^{55}\) (free bangsamoro) to create attention and visibility to their struggles. They also recently created a Youtube channel on October 2, 2011 to branch out in their efforts to gather international support. This may be an effective way of challenging any popular misconceptions about the issues in the Mindanao. It allows the chance for possible alliance and solidarity with other groups in other parts of the world.

Solidarity among various minority groups has proven to be effective in the United States where Filipino immigrants have been deported for being convicted as a ‘terrorist’. Some Filipinos have been deported to the Philippines as a security measure because of their risky status as possibly affiliated with al-Qaeda. For example “in San Francisco, a group of Filipinos were handcuffed and chained to one another on their sixteen-hour flight to the Philippines… A group of South Asians from New York City was deported in similar fashion (Naber 2002: 225). Some Filipino activists argue that U.S advisors seek to suppress the dissent of those speaking out against the war and “the deployment of

\(^{55}\) This is a clever strategy in that ‘fb’ is written in same font as ‘fb’ for facebook.
U.S. advisors in the Philippines who are committing human rights violations against local people” (220). The Bush administration used the attacks of 9/11 to heighten the President’s unconditional authority to mark as a criminal any individual or group with ties to organizations that the President deems “terrorist” or criminal. Outraged by this, some Asian American activists are developing programs for educating their constituencies as to the similarities between the methods the U.S. government has used in recent involuntary deportation cases targeting Filipinos/as and South Asians. The Asian Pacific Islanders for Community Empowerment’s (API ForCE) Fall 2002 newsletter is one example of alliance building since 9/11. This newsletter brings together articles on Southeast Asian deportation and attacks against Filipino/a immigrant workers and Arab and Muslim immigrant communities, highlighting the violation of human rights in all of these cases.

Naber goes on to show that activists from various communities have come together to forge anti-war mobilizations. In the San Francisco Bay Area, twelve Filipino organizations, including women’s groups, student groups, environmentalists, and labor organizers, forged the coalition, “Filipinos for Global Justice Not War” (2002:228). This coalition organizes, educates, and mobilizes the Filipino community to participate in building the anti-war movement, speaking particularly to issues such as attacks against airport screeners and U.S. militarization in the Philippines (ibid: 228). It was also evident that as the movement against increased militarization in the Philippines expanded, Filipino activists increasingly made links with Arab activists who are also organizing against similar resistance to U.S led imperialistic policies. Similar forms of
solidarity among the Moros seem possible, given their usage of social networking sites to gain support for their struggle.
Conclusion

Shortly after September 11, 2001, the United States declared the Southeast Asian country of the Philippines as the ‘second front’ in the war on terror. As a result, the Moro population in Mindanao has been subject to heavy surveillance due to their possible affiliation with al-Qaeda. Today, the ARMM ‘borderland’ is still perceived to be a threat to global security because of possible ‘terrorist’ activities that may be breeding in the region. The chase for capturing ‘terrorists’ has not only allowed the United States, but also development agencies to intervene and manage the Moro population in the name of peace and global stability. In the process of managing the ARMM, the World Bank’s ASFP has targeted the racialized Moros in activities that are deemed to be helpful to human development. This includes ‘good governance’ practices of individual responsibility and fiscal discipline.

Furthermore, the ASFP monitors the ARMM in reducing unwanted migratory flows abroad. While the World Bank claims that they wish to provide economic development to the Moro population, they also fear migration to ‘developing nations’. Duffield (2006) argues that biopolitics deals specifically with a highly racialized “new wars” discourse, in the sense that individual species-life needs to be contained, through projects of development, in order to lessen their chance of migration. It not only protects the surrounding regions and their sovereignty, but also protects sovereign power by promoting self-sufficiency, which limits the odds of uprising against sovereign power, as well as implementing their imperialistic agendas of liberalism, democracy, and capitalism.
Such an imperialistic agenda, motivated by powerful nations such as the United States as well as the World Bank, suggest that the ‘solutions’ to security and poverty and reduction in the ARMM are found through monitoring and calculative measurements. Furthermore, activities such as the mapping exercises in ‘stories from the field’ are assumed to convert the Moro ‘other’ into ‘modern beings’. Unfortunately, in the ‘solutions’ to security and poverty reduction, the World Bank’s expertise has completely disregarded vital cultural aspects of the Moros. The Social Assessment illustrated the importance of how traditional leaders play a role in their community and the outside world. However, the ASFP has intentionally omitted this knowledge as irrelevant. Instead, the ASFP governs this area of ‘conflict’ with the rationale that monetary funding, technical assistance, and building infrastructure will bring ‘order’ and ‘civility’.

With various interests and contentions in governing the ARMM, the ‘conflict’ in the Mindanao has become increasingly complex. I have illustrated the multiple roles such as the American and Filipino states, the ARMM government, the ASFP, resistance groups that are continuously pushing to play in governing the Mindanao region. In the midst of the struggle in attempting to control Mindanao, the local voices of the Moros that hope for an effective self-government and ancestral domain, have been ultimately silenced. Moro demands constitutes for a territory, a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity, larger than the current ARMM to reclaim control over economic resources in that territory. Moreover, a system of governance informed by Islamic culture and free from the dependency of Manila is at the root of long-term sustainability.

Tuminez (2008) argues that one of the lessons in Mindanao is that ‘autonomy’ is useless without dispute resolution and committed assistance from the international
community. The negotiating teams in peace talks in Mindanao have also shown great interest in evolving international legal norms such as the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Such norms could strengthen Moro autonomy, but their application and enforcement are unclear (Tuminez 2008:125). Unfortunately, none of these are considered to be on the World Bank’s security agenda as evident in the ASFP. The ASFP continues to play an important role in shaping the ARMM’s future through economic assistantship. It is evident that they fail to acknowledge some of the key issues that tug at the poverty and security issues of the ARMM.

However with multiple social networking sites that have become increasingly available, it is evident that the Moros are not passive to their circumstances in Mindanao. With the usage of Facebook and Youtube, I anticipate that the Moros will continue to raise awareness by expressing their struggles through these media outlets. The Facebook page, ‘We support Constitutional Amendment for Bangsamoro State’ allows for virtually anyone in the world who has access to the Internet to view their activities in Mindanao. Furthermore, social networking has prospects for a possible alliance with other activists in the world to gain mutual support for their struggles. It would be intriguing to conduct future research and analyses on the ways in which social networking can or cannot influence the politics of the ARMM.
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APPENDIX I: 2-storey school building with facilities at Barangay Imam Sapi, Proper Sitangkai, Tawi-Tawi.

APPENDIX II: ‘Free Bangsamoro’ logo for Facebook

VITA AUCTORIS

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