The international relations of Quebec.

Mark S. Kelly
*University of Windsor*

Follow this and additional works at: [https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd](https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd)

Recommended Citation
[https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/6685](https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/6685)

This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters' theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email ([scholarship@uwindsor.ca](mailto:scholarship@uwindsor.ca)) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208.
THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF QUEBEC

Submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Windsor in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

by

Mark S. Kelly

Faculty of Graduate Studies University of Windsor 1971
INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI Microform EC53083
Copyright 2009 by ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC
789 E. Eisenhower Parkway
PO Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346
Approved by:

W.L. White (chairman)

E.D. Briggs

G.A. Lemieux
ABSTRACT

La survivance has traditionally played a central role in Quebec politics, and while the international relations of Quebec can be viewed as part of this general historical pattern, it is also a particular response to modern technological conditions. Indeed, it is primarily because of these latter conditions that international relations has become somewhat of a cultural imperative for Quebec. Moreover, given the changes in its political and governmental processes, it was logically inevitable that Quebec should seek to establish such transnational relations. In attempting to conduct these relations, however, Quebec has posed several serious problems for the federal government.

One purpose of this thesis is to examine, in the light of cultural theory, the historical and present attempts by Quebec to ensure the integrity of the French Canadian cultural-national community. This examination reveals important changes over time: firstly, prime responsibility for cultural-national preservation has shifted from the Church to the State; secondly, there has occurred, in the post-war period, a redefinition of the means and ends of la survivance; thirdly, both previous changes were prompted by modern technological developments.

The second purpose of this thesis is to examine the international relations of Quebec. Quebec's governmental process has reflected the post-war redefinition which favoured
policies of extroversion. The international relations of Quebec is part of that reflection. In terms of federal-provincial relations, it is also part of Quebec's attempt to ensure maximum autonomy in areas of provincial jurisdiction. However, the constitutional and political problems which arise from Quebec's international relations are so grave, and so fundamental to the Canadian federal system, that solutions to them have not yet been found.

By demonstrating an essential and logical relationship between Quebec's international relations and the preservation and development of its cultural-national community, this thesis endeavours to explain why, in spite of the politico-constitutional stalemate, Quebec continues to conduct transnational relations.
PREFACE

The patriotic enthusiasm which marked Canada's centenary was tempered by a serious reassessment of national values and goals. Providing a dramatic impetus for that reassessment was the warning of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, that,

...Canada, without being fully conscious of the fact, is passing through the greatest crisis in its history... ...a time when decisions must be taken and developments must occur leading either to its break-up, or to a new set of conditions for its future existence... (Preliminary Report, p. 13 and 133).

The solution to problems of majority-minority rights, of deux nations, of associate-state and special-status concepts, and of constitutional review, necessitated an examination and understanding of the aspirations and politics of Québécois. Thus, since the mid-1960's, much has been written on the politics of Quebec. The reassessment in both English- and French-speaking Canada continues.

This particular study was undertaken in light of that continuing national reassessment. Hopefully, it will contribute to the growing body of literature on the politics of Quebec, and thereby further the understanding by English Canadians of their French-speaking confrères. Only by such repeated and reciprocal attempts at understanding will the chances for Canada's future and harmonious existence prevail.

In the preparation of this work, much valuable
assistance and encouragement were given by Dr. Walter L. White, my thesis director. His time and efforts are greatly appreciated. As well, I wish to express my indebtedness to Dr. E. Donald Briggs whose advice on matters of content and presentation were both pertinent and helpful. Gerard A. Lemieux, Assistant Professor of French Language and Literature, was the third member of my thesis committee. His familiarity with the French Canadian psyche was an essential contribution for which I am most grateful. Separately, each member of my committee donated an important element; together, they provided a stimulating intellectual environment wherein my ideas could grow and this thesis proceed.

In addition, I wish to express my appreciation to Mrs. S.L. Kelly for her typing assistance.

Lastly, I would be sorely remiss were I not to mention Karen. When completion of the thesis seemed so distant, my wife's unceasing reassurance was my source of determination. With that in mind, I dedicate this work to her.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I    CULTURE AND POLITICS</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture, Nation and State:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Theoretical Considerations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture, Nation and State:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Quebec Experience</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II   THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF QUEBEC</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III  LEGAL, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL ARGUMENTS</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Preservation of the French Canadian cultural-national community has always played a predominant role in the politics of Quebec. It lies near the heart of every issue. University grants, fiscal autonomy, linguistic rights can all be traced, in the final analysis, to a cultural root. Particularly in federal-provincial, Ottawa-Quebec relations, issues are more often than not cast in English-French, majority-minority terms.

The international relations of Quebec, while a relatively recent and controversial phenomenon, is part of this long-standing pattern. Indeed, not only is it part of that pattern but, given the circumstances within and outside contemporary Quebec, it is an essential element. Furthermore, in light of this essential relationship between cultural-national preservation and the international relations of Quebec, the latter's emergence as a problem-issue was logical, if not inevitable.

Within Quebec, the state has gradually assumed a more active and positive role. Its assumption of cultural responsibilities, formerly vested exclusively in the Church, was accompanied by the post-war redefinition of the means and ends of cultural-national survival (la survivance), a redefinition whereby the Church's traditional, defensive
policies involving isolation were rejected in favour of a
decisively extroverted and secular approach. Moreover,
within the present atmosphere favouring intervention, the
state is determined to exercise fully its legislative and
administrative responsibilities as defined by the British
North America Act.

However, changes within Quebec have occurred simulta-
necessarily with those of its global environment. Penetrative
communications, a result of modern technology, have opened
Quebec to the numerically overwhelming, English-speaking
North American community. Assimilative pressures are there-
fore brought to bear. Yet these networks of communication
have, in turn, facilitated Quebec contacts with other
francophone societies.

Technology has also effected a change in both the
conduct and the content of international relations: the
presence of informal international actors has markedly in-
creased; likewise, the treatment of issues of general
social welfare - which in Canada fall largely within pro-
vincial jurisdiction - is much more frequent.

From the standpoint of cultural theory, the combination
and interaction of these internal and external circumstances
seem to make international relations a necessity for
Quebec's cultural-national survival. Theories of culture
suggest that the maintenance and healthy development of any
cultural-national community necessitate an equilibrium
between the forces of stability and the forces of non-
assimilative change. The endogenous temporal, and the dif-
fusive spacial, transmissions of culture are therefore
equally imperative. By the mid-1960's, Quebec had effective-
ly institutionalized the temporal transmission of culture
when it created the Department of Education, but this was
only partial insurance against cultural assimilation.
Assimilative forces exerted by the anglophone culture's
size and ease of penetration cannot be forestalled by
Quebec alone. Extra-societal, francophone (ie. non-assimi-
lative) reinforcement is needed.

Therefore, given the external pressures upon Quebec's
cultural-national survival, and thus the internal pressures
upon the state to intervene, it was inevitable that the
Quebec government should seek to institutionalize the spa-
cial transmission of culture, by establishing relations
with francophone societies abroad. It was all the more in-
evitable given Quebec's non-acceptance of Ottawa as a
faithful representative of the French Canadian culture.

In pursuing this hypothesis - that there exists a
logical and essential relationship between Quebec's cul-
tural-national survival and its international relations -
the aforementioned areas will be studied in depth. To place
the entire question within a proper perspective, the work
will proceed with some theoretical considerations of the
components and processes of culture, how these are related
to the socio-political concepts of nation and of state,
and how technology affects each one. Against this theoretical background the practical, political experience of Quebec will be examined. The Church's ideology of survival, the re-orientation of the political process, and the emergence of new policies for cultural preservation are included.

The second chapter of this study provides a detailed review of Quebec's international activities, focusing on the 1960's. It is both an historical account of Quebec's emergence upon the external plane and a measure of its present involvement there. While it does not encompass entirely all phases of Quebec's transnational relations, it is an attempt to record, as comprehensively as possible, the major domestic and international confrontations and developments in which both Ottawa and Quebec are key actors. The chapter concludes by relating changes in the governmental process which effectively established an international role for Quebec, to the previously mentioned changes in the political process.

The third chapter consists of three parts each of which is an expansion of the salient and sometimes diverse points of view advanced by the major disputants, Ottawa and Quebec. The first section briefly covers the legal, constitutional arguments in which Ottawa appears, to this author at least, to enjoy a decisive advantage. The second and third parts centre on Quebec's political and cultural arguments respectively. They express Quebec's need and
desire to conduct international relations and thus form the
basis for understanding that government's actions.

The conclusion reviews and draws together the various
elements discussed in an attempt not only to confirm the
hypothesis, but also to treat the subject, the international
relations of Quebec, as a contemporary political problem.

In so far as the international relations of Quebec
remains a political problem, it threatens, in Atkey's words,
"not only the internal maintenance of the Canadian federa-
tion, but the position of the federation in the interna-
153). Any study of that problem is therefore of consider-
able relevance. It is hoped that by placing this contem-
porary, controversial subject within a cultural, rather
than the all too often legal-constitutional, context, a
much needed dimension may be added. This dimension, the
author hopes, will provide a broader understanding of the
problem.
CHAPTER I

CULTURE AND POLITICS

Culture, Nation and State:
Some Theoretical Considerations

Since "culture" occupies a fundamental position within the hypothesis, the bounds of that term must be made clear. The author therefore will attempt to establish a concept of culture which is at once relevant, and applicable to a particular situation.

Whatever else might distinguish Man from other animals, culture is certainly the most crucial aspect. Moreover, because Man, unlike other animals, has few if any instinctive skills and no instinctive knowledge which might enable him to sustain himself, either singly or in groups, culture is essential:

...it provides the knowledge and the techniques that enable Man to survive, both physically and socially, and to master and control, insofar as it is possible, the world around him... (Chinoy, p. 47).

1 The use of "concept" over "definition" expresses the author's bias toward the grasping rather than the pinpointing of an idea or term. Where little consensus exists despite a myriad of definitions, as in the case of "culture", this approach proves useful. Kroeber agrees:

...What culture is can be better understood from knowledge of what forms it takes and how it works than by a definition. Culture is in this respect like life or matter: it is the total of their varied phenomena that is more significant than a concentrated phrase about them... (p. 60).
Culture is thus the special and exclusive product of Man, embodying at once those characteristics of a "rational" and of a "social" animal. For Man lives in two worlds: he is part of nature, and part of the man-made world within which he himself is socialized. Through his capacity to reason, Man creates out of the natural conditions of his existence, a social world—a social network of activities (be they political, economic, religious or otherwise) which "constitute Man's most sophisticated attempts to realize the potentialities of his own nature" (Verene, p. 2). It is culture which epitomizes Man's creative interaction with his natural and social environments; it is culture which enables Man to structure these relationships, to order his own existence.

Culture therefore integrates Man's total environment, and thus, according to Quebec's Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, the purpose or object of culture can be stated as:

...the systematic, balanced, hierarchic "valorization" of (Man's) complex potentialities with a view to his completest fulfilment and the fullest fruition of his existence...(vol. 2, p. 7).

Yet the essence of culture is its social nature. Indeed, it has been stated that culture is to the group what personality is to the individual (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism; Report, vol. 1, p. xxxi-xxxii). While this may be a fine and somewhat contentious

---

Hereafter cited as the Tremblay Report.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
point, it nevertheless underscores the close relationship between society and culture.

Man, as previously mentioned, substitutes knowledge and technique for his lack of animal instinct, and uses his faculties of oral and literal communication to survive. Man is thus a "time-binding" animal, in the sense that "he binds time by transcending it, through influencing other generations by his actions" (Kroeber, p. 8). Therefore culture (the totality of technique for environmental mastery), being both learned and shared, necessitates men to continue the learning and sharing process; otherwise, culture will be neither created nor maintained. This is Man's distinction. Human beings are designated as such precisely because they are animals with the ability to create for themselves a culture:

...so far as Man is concerned, culture always has society as a counterpart; it rests on, and is carried by, society. Beyond the range of Man there are societies but no cultures. Cultural phenomena thus characterize Man more specifically than his social manifestations characterize him, for these latter he shares with vertebrate and invertebrate animals...(Kroeber, p. 61).

Thus we have come full-circle: culture, embodying both the rational and social natures of Man, allows him to master and structure his total environment - not only in order to survive, but to realize his individual and group potentials as well.

From the perspective of content, culture is composed of, or encompasses, three basic elements: knowledge,
values, and means of expression. The first of these components, knowledge, embraces the whole vast body of ideas by which men account for their observation and experience, and which they take into account or rely upon in choosing alternative lines of action. It encompasses all forms of cognition and is thus an essential cultural component:

...In its principle as in its process of development, culture is primarily knowledge, the acquisition and mastery of learning, and the shaping, for that purpose, of the intelligence and other faculties of the mind... (Tremblay Report, vol. 2, p. 8).

Values, on the other hand, are the standards and ideals by which men define their goals, regulate their interaction with society, and judge themselves and others. They are general precepts to which men give their allegiance; they are learned and they are shared. Attitudes of approval and disapproval, judgments of good or bad, desirable or undesirable - toward specific persons, things,

3 There is as much consensus regarding the components of culture, as there is regarding its definition. Frequently quoted is Tylor's 1871 enumeration:

...Culture...is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities acquired by Man as a member of society... (as quoted in Chinoy, p. 46; Merkl, p. 40; and Kroeber, p. 60).

Each writer submits his own list reflecting, as is natural, his personal prejudices or interests. Leslie White's division, for example, includes four sectors of culture - ideological, sociological, sentimental or attitudinal, and technological (Hammond, p. 48). Each sector is strongly dependent upon Man's symbolic faculty. While this is surely an acceptable social science orientation, it tends toward proliferation, whereas simplification is more desirable.

This particular tri-component description which is borrowed from the Tremblay Report (vol. 2, p. 8), represents the essence of most other attempts. All this only serves to emphasize the "basic" nature of these three elements.
situations, and events - all have as their common root, values. In this connection, values and knowledge are interdependent, as the former shares with the latter a strong bearing on the concept of culture:

...Values are the criteria of appreciation, the norms according to which Man judges, not knowledge itself... but the use to be made of knowledge. In terms of values, branches of knowledge are chosen and classified according to their respective purposes and ordered for life. The sense of values is the integrating principle, the very soul of culture... *(Tremblay Report*, vol. 2, p. 9).

The acquisition, progress, and mere existence of culture depends upon the third element, means of expression. In all its parts and aspects, culture relies upon Man's symbolic faculty, or, more specifically, upon articulate speech. Thus language comes to hold a principal position within the cultural concept. Language is the necessary instrument of culture, just as communication generally is a fundamental aspect of social life and processes. It is the vital link by which all is learned and shared.

From the foregoing it is evident that culture is made up of a collection of organic components. While each constituting element has its own special purpose, together they are mutually dependent. Knowledge, values and means of

---

4 While "means of expression" is here treated in relation to Man's ability to communicate in a symbolic manner, primarily through the use of language, it may also refer to material things (instruments, machinery, works of art, books, etc.). There exists a fine line, however, between the means of expression and the expression itself, and such cultural artifacts may be considered as either. But since material objects usually appear as products of a culture, they are not treated here as "means of expression".
expression are essential to each other, but even more to
the whole; and that whole, culture, while itself a syn­
thesis, provides for Man (individually and collectively)
both order and synthesis. In short, it defines his exis­
tence.

In its processes, culture is basically social. Commu­
nication and society are the *sine qua non*. For culture to
exist, to grow, to attempt to fulfil its purposes, the
transmission of culture is therefore essential.

This transmission of culture may be either temporal or
spacial, or even - and it is today more the rule than the
exception - a combination of both. Temporal transmission
reflects the "social heritage" aspects of culture (Linton,
p. 69-79). It flows from tradition, from an accumulation
of ancestral or generational cognitive, evaluative and ex­
pressive ideas, adapted over time for reasons of survival
in its varied forms. It is a handing-down, a sharing of
experience from the old to the young; it is a process of
regeneration and of socialization. In this sense, temporal
transmission tends toward the persistence, strengthening
and stability of a culture, and the mother-tongue serves as
its most effective instrument.

While temporal transmission resists so far as it is
possible (and/or desirable) extra-cultural influences,
spacial transmission, because it is primarily a process of
cultural diffusion, promotes change. Here, the acceptance
of foreign elements and systems constitutes a geographical spread; and the cultural content of foreign origin which gradually accumulates, is normally quite high within any given culture. Furthermore, once the new cultural element is smoothly integrated within a culture, its source becomes forgotten and irrelevant. Spacial transmission is thus an inter-societal, integrative process, emphasizing the more passive or receptive faculties of culture.

This is not to say, however, that there are no resistances, strains, and dislocations against the importing of cultural elements. Since most societies are dynamic, a redistribution of cultural elements affects the total cultural structure within a society and may result in social upheavals, usually attributed to an accumulation of internal strains. Often, however, the source of the cultural dislocation stems from external influences. Only the final climax of conversion is internal. Put another way, spacial transmissions of culture may be subtle and covert, with the consequences slowly evolving to a point of frustrating complexity which might underpin revolutionary change.

On the other hand, there are the obvious manifestations of cultural diffusion: the continuous first-hand, face-to-face contacts which contribute to acculturation, and which border, at times, on assimilation. Such cultural confrontations often provoke an acute self-awareness:

...the group becomes conscious of the fact that it
constitutes a community of patterns of feelings - or rather, has a common unconscious psyche - and possesses its own unity and individuality, its own will to endure in existence... (Maritain, p. 5).

This realization is all the more acute where contacts tend to be pervasive. Self-awareness is thus reaffirmed or, perhaps, a newly awakened consciousness of collective personality gives birth to the idea, "nation". Henceforth, the lines of cultural demarcation are drawn; the "we"-group and a "they"-group are established. This internalization of culture induces nationalism.

However, if, in the process of transmission (be it temporal or spacial), this national culture is subjected to a chronic imbalance between the two goals of preservation and progress, the nation must look to that authority entrusted with the pursuit of its common good, the state.

So as to distinguish between "nation" and "state" - two terms which are often (and mistakenly) used interchangably - the following is suggested: by "nation" we mean, "...a community of people who feel that they belong together in the...sense that they share deeply significant elements of a common heritage..." (Emerson, p. 95); "...a multitude of humans characterized by common and unique cultural factors...(sharing) in a common historical past and...linked by an awareness of its uniqueness..." (Heiman in Russell, p. 329).

While "state" will soon be defined, suffice it to say now that, whereas "nation" is a subjective term, "state" is wholly objective (Catlin, p. 333). This subjective quality of "nation" is for Emerson the essence:

...The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation; and it may be that when all the fine-spun analysis is concluded this will be the ultimate statement as well... (p. 102).

In addition to the objective-subjective distinction
If, on the one hand, diffusion is denied, then there is a risk of cultural isolation resulting in sterility or stagnation. On the other hand, if

...the functions of collective life proceed from an inspiration foreign to the culture or is, in fact, dominated by foreign elements, the relations of cultural exchange between Man and his social environment are mixed up; the homogeneity of the ethnic environment is weakened and the nation's renewal organism and then, sooner or later, its survival are threatened


In either case, the state intervenes. It alone possesses both the power and the authority necessary to confer juridical existence upon the institutions of common life, to effect the institutionalization of the processes of culture where those processes, if allowed free play, might thwart the expressed common will. Indeed, the institutionalization and regulation of the temporal and spacial transmissions of culture are already evident, particularly through education and media control.

Contributing to this development in no small way, is technology. Its effects are ubiquitous; neither culture,

previously drawn between the state and nation respectively, the state is a politico-legal entity and the nation, a socio-cultural one. The two, however, may be coincident and, in that case, there exists a nation-state. Moreover, where the organizing principle or dominant ideology of the state becomes that of nationality, we have a nationalist-state. But state and nation are often not concordant terms. The state, the political society, usually encompasses heterogeneous national elements.

Technology is employed here in the same sense that Grant (Technology and Empire) uses the term; it is Ellul's "technique": "...the totality of methods rationally
nor nation, nor even state go untouched. And as culture, nation and state are interrelated, so too are the effects on them which technology brings to bear.

Technology moulds the actions, thoughts and imaginings of men (Grant, p. 15). It becomes, in an attempt to overcome chance, the unlimited master of men by men; and this technological mastery of all things has become, in itself, an end. Furthermore, to the degree that values are not independent of the will to technology (as Grant would argue), culture is diminished. Its "soul", its "integrating principle", is itself mastered, mechanically submerged in the stream of technique.

Ferkiss disagrees with this Ellul-based argument, but not, however, with its conclusions for culture. Certainly, cultural order in the technological age is rapidly disintegrating; but this is largely due to "...the subordination of technology to the values of earlier historical eras and its exploitation by those who do not understand its implications and consequences..." (Ferkiss, p. 36). For Ferkiss, arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity..." (Ellul, p. xxv).

8 ...As moderns we have no standards by which to judge particular techniques, except standards welling up with our faith in technical expansion... (Grant, p. 34). In the pursuit of technological efficiency, any values which are not part and parcel of, or which do not stem from, technique, are skepticism into oblivion and illegitimacy (p. 129). This is the reason, according to Grant, why educational content is becoming increasingly "value-free".

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
therefore, the central danger facing mankind in the latter part of the twentieth century lies neither in the autonomy of technology, nor in the triumph of technological non-values. Rather, it is the danger of an extreme alienation, an alienation between Man and his milieu:

...what emerges as the pattern of the future is not technological man so much as neoprimitive man trapped in a technological environment... (p. 173).

Bourgeois man and the world of technique combine for the fragmentation, disintegration, and general destruction of the cultural order (p. 201).

However one wishes to approach the process, and whatever conclusions one might draw therefrom, the impact of technology on culture is both inevitable and considerable. It is no less substantial on the collective personality, the nation. Here, high rates of industrialization, urbanization, and socio-occupational mobility (all equally stimulated by technology), create, in Wheatcroft's words, "loss of roots", "psychological homelessness", "existential insecurity", "lack of firm consensus on basic values and norms", "atomization", "impersonality", and a "disintegration of group continuity" (in Mann, vol. 1, p. 327-329).

The sense of community, the consciousness of collective

---

9 To whomever one turns, ceteris paribus, the results are the same: Marcuse already mourns the passing, the desublimation of Man's second dimension, his "higher culture"; Ellul speaks of the explosion of local and national cultures, for they are unable to coexist with technique (p. 130); and Wheatcroft, like Ferkiss, focuses on the cultural consequences of "extensive reality negotiation" (in Mann, vol. 1, p. 338) in this technological age.
personality, the subjective psychology of "we"-ness - essential ingredients of the nation concept - are all, in the extreme, abolished. On this point, Ellul is frank:

...(technical development) dissociates the sociological forms, destroys the moral framework, desacralizes men and things, explodes social and religious taboos, and reduces the body social to a collection of individuals. The most recent sociological studies (even those made by optimists) hold that technique is the destroyer of social groups, of communities (whatever their kind), and of human relations. Technical progress causes the disappearance...of that 'amalgam of attitudes, customs and social institutions which constitute a community'. Communities break up into their component parts. But no new communities form. The individual in contact with technique loses his social and community sense as the frameworks in which he operated disintegrate under the influence of techniques...(p. 126).

Quite different are the effects of technique on the state. Whereas, under the impact of technology, culture and nation are subjected to forces of disintegration, the state is compelled to centralize. In terms both of causation and of replacement, organizational complexity serves sociological disunity. Similarly, concentrations of power supplant civic efficacy. Possessing the power and legitimacy, the state is called upon increasingly, by circumstance or citizenry, to support, to plan and/or to conduct the affairs

---

10 Franz L. Neumann, in writing (1950) about the relationship of technology to power, hypothesized that:

...the higher the state of technological development, the greater the concentration of political power...(p. 170).

Theobald agrees, but decries not so much the concentration of power per se, as our lack of contingency plans for this development:

...our present institutional structures are designed to increase our power rather than to control our power...(in Mann, vol. 1, p. 7).

This, for him, is our central dilemma.
of society. Moreover, in an age of rapid change—which is the age of technique—that necessitates planning precision (Grant's "overcoming of chance"); in turn, there evolves, again by necessity, a decision-making process of unprecedented intricacy. In the face of technology, therefore, the state becomes, in short, ever more powerful, ever more centralized.

Yet technology cuts with a double blade: one is domestic, the other, external. It reinforces, on the one hand, state structures and strength. It facilitates, on the other hand, primarily through vast networks of communication and intelligence services, penetration:

...as technology advanced, the opportunities for penetration increased...
...(state) boundaries have become porous. Techniques have been fashioned to provide agents of one (state) with direct access to the population and processes of another...(Scott, 1965, p. 12 and v).

From this inevitable permeation of previously isolating barriers against effective culture contact, there arises a threat to the balanced, essential processes of culture (and therefore of nation). This evokes a reaction from the state when the state's role as protector is itself partially diminished. Out of these conditions of a technological age, culture, nation and state merge. From the perceived assimilation there is an apprehensive feed-back and from this, in turn, the nationalist-state arises. Innovative reinforcement of culture and of nation occurs, for, paradoxically, where technology renders traditional...
structures and institutions obsolete, only change preserves.

Quebec can be studied from this point of view. Traditional ideologies and institutions which, in the past, had interpreted and preserved French Canadian culture, have today been found unsuitable. In the temporal transmission of culture, Church gave way to state. Now, increasingly, out of the modern conditions of Quebec's existence in Canada and in North America, even a state-reinforced temporal transmission is, for survival purposes, insufficient. Extra-cultural, extra-national, support is required.

That Quebec has indeed undergone this development - from cultural preservation through isolation, to a determined state involvement in the temporal and spacial transmissions of culture - and, that such a development has posed certain problems for the state of Quebec, as for the Canadian state, are the subject-matters dealt with below.

Culture, Nation and State: The Quebec Experience

...The Quebecker is no longer a metropolitan Frenchman, but neither has he become a North American - Yankee or Canadian. Over the centuries he has forged a different collective personality...(Rioux, p. 9).

Through the forceful interplay of historical and environmental factors there has emerged, in the Province of Quebec, a unique culture, or, at least, a subjective cultural distinction the issue of which has become the Québécois nation. Since the Conquest, policies to ensure the
survival of that nation have been propounded, and the politics of Quebec has been, historically, the politics of survival.

The Conquest as a starting point is quite significant for,

...the French Canadian clergy found itself, in 1763, the only representative of the national conscience and the national culture, the only elite...(Rioux, p. 35).

Having thus a near monopoly over the definition of the purposes and policies for cultural-national preservation, it was natural that the Church should proceed with such formulations within its own frame of reference. Yet not until

11...nearly every French Canadian, viewing the place of his community in Canada, almost invariably begins with an interpretation of the meaning of the British Conquest...(Cook, 1971, p. 100).


12 That frame of reference is well described by the Tremblay Report, vol. 2, p. 35-39. It embodies three basic concepts: (1) the sense of order (which is "the very essence of...the social doctrine of the Catholic Church"); (2) the sense of liberty ("...it means living according to the requirements of order as established by the natural law, which is itself illuminated by Revelation..."); and (3) the sense of progress (ie. 'real' progress: "...an improvement of the man himself by a constant raising of his intellectual and moral level..."). This religious concept of life is reflected, organizationally, in the society of Quebec which they favoured: (a) it was personalist (that is to say, it espoused systems of work and property which ensured maximum autonomy - agriculture and crafts, or more recently, small businesses, co-operatives, Catholic trade unions, etc.); (b) it was communal (ie. there existed an organic unity amongst family, profession and parish - the latter being, "the mother institution of public institutions", "the veritable centre of social life"). See also Falardeau in Rioux and Martin, p. 342-357; in addition, Cook's anthology (1969) contains the best known formulations which were derived from this frame of reference.
after the 1837-38 Rebellion and after the assimilative implications of Lord Durham's Report, did these nationalistic formulations have their fullest impact. Bonenfant and Falardeau point this out:

...Group consciousness and patriotic feeling...developed...after the British Conquest, as a result of isolation, contrast and struggle with the culturally-alien conquering group...

but,

...Quebec nationalism as a political expression...actually came to life against the assimilation attempt of the Union Act...(in Cook, 1969, p. 19-20 and 22).

For the greater part of the next century, then, the political and socio-economic thinking of Québécois - with a view to survival - was strongly coloured by the traditional teachings and influence (the social doctrine) of the French Canadian Catholic Church. It began with Garneau and continued with Groulx; it was characterized by the promotion of the three myths, l'agriculturalisme, l'anti-étatisme and le messianisme (Brunet, p. 113-166); it was a nationalism wholly "defensive", "apostolic and formalistic".

The Church certainly dominated the ideology of survival, but that ideology was by no means monolithic. Others - Lafontaine, Cartier, Tache - advocated survival through political participation (double majority theory); Papineau, an anti-cleric, desired annexation to the United States; Laurier, Bourassa and Laurendeau - each to varying degrees - sought cultural preservation in a pan-Canadian, rather than an English-dominated or British-oriented, state. However, even those who subscribed to the larger pan-Canadian nationalism advocated the absolute maintenance of a French Canadian culture and retreated to (more or less) defensive positions in moments of crisis. Indeed, in such moments of crisis - economic, political or military - that defensive nationalism was rooted more strongly in definitions of race, religion, language and history.

13 The Church certainly dominated the ideology of survival, but that ideology was by no means monolithic. Others - Lafontaine, Cartier, Tache - advocated survival through political participation (double majority theory); Papineau, an anti-cleric, desired annexation to the United States; Laurier, Bourassa and Laurendeau - each to varying degrees - sought cultural preservation in a pan-Canadian, rather than an English-dominated or British-oriented, state. However, even those who subscribed to the larger pan-Canadian nationalism advocated the absolute maintenance of a French Canadian culture and retreated to (more or less) defensive positions in moments of crisis. Indeed, in such moments of crisis - economic, political or military - that defensive nationalism was rooted more strongly in definitions of race, religion, language and history.
"traditionalist", "conservative and bourgeois" (Leger in Cook, 1969, p. 306); it wove into a close and mutually interdependent association, cultural and religious values; but most importantly, on the political plane, that traditional nationalism was reactionary. When the state was used as an instrument for cultural-national survival (most notably under Mercier and Duplessis), it was cast in a somewhat negative role - as a protector, a barrier against external threats, and thus, in withdrawal, fostering further isolation.

All this is in contrast to contemporary purposes and policies. Certainly, some traditional strains remain and form the foundations for the present. However, the nationalist spectrum has widened considerably, and the mainstream has at its source, indigenous, secular and progressive elements. At the heart of this development is the growing acceptance of, and emphasis upon, the positive role of the state.

Cut off from their cultural fountainheads, France and Rome, during World War II, an increasing number of French

---

14 The most outspoken and politically active Churchmen have been, until recently, ultramontane. (The basic principles of French Canadian nationalistic ultramontanism, as laid down by Mgr. Laflèche, are found in Wade, 1968, vol. 1, p. 346.) With a deep suspicion of democracy and of the state, and strongly authoritarian in political matters, the Church was the object of much criticism particularly after WW II. See especially: Trudeau, 1968, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec"; Trudeau, 1970; and, in Cook, 1969, "Quebec on the Eve of the Asbestos Strike"; see also Corbett, p. 127-132.
Canadians attended English Canadian and American universities, and received there applied, pure, and social science training (Wade in Park, p. 375). Thus, the post-war intellectual elite of Quebec was, unlike previous generations of classically-educated leaders, both more aware and more optimistic regarding the potentials of democracy and of the state. With the doctrine of popular sovereignty, the state would advance and direct, rather than isolate and protect, the socio-economic and cultural developments of Québécois. The School of Social Sciences at Laval, l'Institut Canadien des Affaires publiques, and Cité Libre were symbols of this new thought.

Yet, while this "quiet revolution" of political, economic and sociological thought was not, originally, 'other-directed', the consequences which it occasioned, were. From this there arose Quebec's neo-nationalism.

Guindon traces the development of this modern nationalism to the breakdown in the 1950's of "mutually satisfying institutional self-segregation" (in Kruhlak, p. 88-93). The post-war bureaucratization of Quebec had created a large, white-collared middle class which, because it had been educated in modern technology, business and industry, rejected the old nationalist tenets and myths, as embodied by the policies of Duplessis: "to resist assimilation from without, to resist emancipation from within" (Cook, 1966, p. 99). These were incompatible with the modernization ethic; they
hampered rationalization; they ignored the singularly important criterion of objective competence. Thus the efforts of this new middle class were directed towards reform at home, towards the modernization and rationalization of Quebec's society and institutions, towards the removal of those elements which impeded their own progress, towards the defeat, therefore, of Duplessis. It was not anti-English or anti-American. It was not conservative:

...Modernization, bureaucratic rationality, and personal qualification became the tools for the new middle class to assess the worth of not only the institutions but also the ideologies of the past. Ethnically homogenous, the new middle class was not initially ethnically conscious...

...The values of the middle class were those of modern liberalism with emphasis on progress and social change articulated partly in class interests but not in terms of ethnic conflict...(Guindon in Kruhlak, p. 84-86).

The progress of this class was defined by occupational mobility. However, since the Quebec bureaucracy was more or less specialized and of a smaller scale and size (these were due to Duplessis' autonomist policies which duplicated the federal bureaucracy but, of course, on a much smaller scale), middle class growth was restricted by the channels of mobility on the one hand, and by the levels of mobility on the other. These were structural constraints of an occupational and geographical nature. While the former could be and was partially overcome by a bureaucratic transformation of the traditional institutions, the latter constraint involved ethnic contact, and the breakdown of self-segregated institutions. The ethnic competition thus engendered gave
rise to a new nationalism.

This neo-nationalism was completely compatible with the new middle class ethic. Indeed, its driving force was modernization and development: the modernization and development of the state of Quebec - for it and it alone was perceived as capable of providing for French-speaking Québécois, not only opportunities on a non-discriminatory basis, but also, at last, the "possession of their rightful heritage":

...The advent of liberal democracy to the province bore promise of power for all classes henceforth. But in practice the newly self-conscious classes have found most roads to a better life blocked: the clergy clings to its grip on education, the English continue to dominate our finances, and the Americans intrude upon our culture. Only Quebec as a state would appear to belong unquestionably to French Canadians; and the fullest power for that state is therefore highly desirable...


That Quebec began to see itself as a twentieth-century industrial society, and that it began to look to the future (rather than past) for its Golden Age, were, for Rioux, "the two most significant changes of the early 1960's" (p. 78). A new reckoning - with itself, with Canada, and with the world - was taking shape. The Liberals, to be sure, expressed both in form and in substance the prevalent desire of Québécois to be "maîtres chez nous". This first had the stamp of equality: an equality of opportunity, an equality of economic, political, and socio-cultural conditions. Even "associate state" and "special status" advocates, because their proposals all pivot on the two-nation thesis, desire, implicitly - if not explicitly - equality:
...they (all such proponents) exhibit one predominant motive: they want their community to have in the structure of Canada an accepted equality with the English speaking people... (Brady in Fox, p. 29).

To this end, the Lesage government undertook a series of confrontations, - in Canada (demands for a larger share of the direct tax field, for the elimination of joint-cost programmes, for the end, in short, of 'creeping centralization', the greatest impediment to effective economic planning), and in Quebec (the establishment of hospital and welfare services, of regional and general economic corporations, the restructuring of the provincial civil service, the public ownership of hydro power, and "the institutionalization of the temporal transmission of culture" - i.e. the creation of a public school system). The passage of government in 1966 from the Liberals to the Union Nationals did not, fundamentally, alter this trend. The "State of Quebec" in its positive role had come to stay.

Furthermore, the die of that positive state had been cast: there was no possible retreat from the realization

15 It is of interest to point out one separatist's view of these confrontations. In so far as the reform measures were equality-directed, and in so far as they expressed the "ideology of catching up", they were "essentially a negation of Quebec as a nation":

...Only the ideology of catching up is by definition federalist, for it envisages the pure and simple integration of the Quebec people in a greater American world, through the intermediary of Canada... (Rioux, p. 79).

For the separatists, the assertion of the state ought to proceed hand in hand with an assertion of the nation, until finally, these two attain a coincident maturity as manifested in an independent and sovereign nation-state.
(born prior to, but given full expression in, the "quiet revolution") that cultural-national survival and economic development were two sides of the same coin, that they were inextricably bound up, one with the other. It is a vital fact today. It is recognized by capitalists and socialists, by federalists and separatists alike:

...sans prosperité économique, nous ne pourrons jamais atteindre les objectifs culturels et sociaux que nous rechercherons tous...(Bourassa / Québec!, p. 11).

...to return to the example of the language, it is obvious that its salvation, that is, its existence as the deep-rooted expression of the milieux, will remain an impossibility until there are powerful economic and social motives for speaking French, until French is the language of labour and activity in all spheres, the language of economic success and social progress... (Léger in Cook, 1969, p. 310).

Therefore, through the exercise of autonomy (i.e. whatever autonomy it may possess and may, in its confrontations, gain), the Quebec government is able to institute economic programmes which accord with the provincial cultural milieu. Projects wherein French is the language of both employer and employee, programmes which, in structure and in organization, are inspired by the French genius, are most likely to safeguard and reinforce cultural-national values. They tend least towards assimilation. At the same time, working within his own cultural milieu, the French Canadian employee is more

---

16 For a discussion of the general, national genius and of the specific, French genius, see Tremblay Report, vol. 2, p. 16-17 and p. 33 respectively.
economically efficient and, consequently, more likely to succeed and to advance. Otherwise - the working environment not being culturally hospitable - a sense of diminishment, irritation and dissatisfaction, and loss of efficiency result (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism; Report, vol. 1, p. xxix - xxx).

Economic development promotes cultural progress; and, a culturally harmonious workplace produces, in turn, a more economically competent workforce.

The question of 'how to survive' is thus answered in contemporary Quebec terms. Cultural and economic development programmes, attuned to the indigenous environment, are mutually reinforcing.

'Why to survive' is something else again. As it is no longer a question answerable by Mgrs. Lafleche and Paquet, neither is it a case of survival-for-survival's-sake. Behind the policies there lies a purpose. It is a new purpose, a re-orientation which arose simultaneously with the thought and policies of the "quiet revolution":


18 Part and parcel of the re-interpretation of the state's role, was a re-thinking of the form and content of 'la survivance'. Paul Gerin-Lajoie expressed it well:

...We have survived enough...The time has come to give this survival a positive sense, to fix a goal for it, and to justify it...(Cook, 1966, p. 23).
...Leaving behind them the 1950's, when a vengeful self-criticism was the order of the day, Quebeckers recovered their self-confidence and began to ask themselves what else they could accomplish as a community. For a century they had striven to preserve their heritage; more recently, they had tried to catch up with the other North Americans; now they ask themselves if they did not have some original contribution to make to the world of human societies. They were reasserting their vocation as a nation... (Rioux, p. 76).

That Québécois seek to preserve their linguistic and cultural particularisms in the face of an assimilative technological era, is no reaction, no defensive preservation of the status quo. It is a direct result of the end of isolation. It is the first step in "l'épanouissement des Québécois" (Sabourin in Le Devoir, p. 169). It is, above all else, a proud extroversion which stems from their uniqueness as an economically-developed French speaking society: for, with France, they stand on the brink of post-technological development; yet, unlike France, their culture is distinctly northern. In both capacities, Quebec serves as an example to the predominantly underdeveloped Francophonie, and perceives its contribution to the human race in these terms. To falter economically, or to succumb culturally, is to lose their raison d'être. Thus, enters once more "l'État du Québec".

Cultural-national preservation and progress is the primary means to the longer-term goal. For this reason, greater fiscal autonomy is pursued; education (the temporal transmission of culture) is structured and supported (institutionalized) by the state; spacial transmission is all that
remains.

If Quebec as a cultural nation is to survive, external cultural reinforcement is essential. Quebec sits as a French-speaking island of six million in an English-speaking sea forty times its size. Its economy is anglo-oriented and, in its daily life, it is subjected to a culturally-alien bombardment:

...Quebeckers have witnessed the disintegration of the way of life which traditionally protected them... Almost overnight they found themselves in an industrial society requiring massive intervention by the state, open to the whole of North America, and exposed to the influence of foreign, especially American, culture backed by such powerful means of communication as speedy transport, highways, cinema, radio, and television...(Preliminary Statement: Confederation of Tomorrow Conference, p. 4).

Beyond this sea, however, the French language and genius thrives (Morrison, p. 11-15). While by no means a replica of Québécois culture, it is nevertheless a non-assimilative source of strength and reinforcement. Moreover, in cultural terms, diffusion - short of assimilation - is both normal and healthy.

To this, then, the Québécois turn, their principal instrument of communication being the state.
CHAPTER II

THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF QUEBEC

The history of Quebec's relations with sovereign states is, for the most part, not unique. Indeed, until the 1960's, its development was very much in step with that of other Canadian provinces. The quickening pace of activities abroad during the 1960's was merely a cultural, political and economic manifestation of the previously-mentioned reorientations from within.

Canadian provinces have always demonstrated a concern over their particular interests abroad, and, in so far as they were empowered by the constitution, a desire to protect them personally. This was evident from the moment Canada opened its first overseas offices. Provincial legislative rights in matters of immigration, agriculture and commerce seemed to provide justification, if not authority, for the establishment of their own provincial agencies in

---

1 The following historical account is based upon Andre Patry's 1964 submission to the Comité Parlementaire de la Constitution (established in 1963 by the Assemblée législative du Québec). Revised in 1965, the account appears in book form with other submissions which deal with Les Pouvoirs Extérieurs du Québec (Brossard et al.). This work also formed the basis for Daniel Johnson's speech in favour of Bill 33, a bill to establish the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs. (See Débats de l'Assemblée Législative, 13 avril 1967, p. 2167-2171.)
Great Britain and elsewhere. On October 31, 1868, delegations of the governments of Canada, New Brunswick, Ontario and Quebec met in conference. They agreed there that:

...Outre les agences européennes du Canada, chaque province pourra nommer tels agents en Europe ou ailleurs qu'elle jugera à propos de choisir et ces agents seront dûment accrédités par le gouvernement général ...(Brossard, p. 67).

It was by virtue of this agreement that Canadian provinces were to open offices in Great Britain, and later, in other countries of Europe and of America.

In London, however, the simultaneous presence of both federal and provincial representatives proved administratively and financially burdensome. It was therefore decided in 1874 to group the provincial offices and to place them all in the same building, under the authority of the Canadian Agent-General. But, when in 1880 the federal government named a High-Commissioner (Alexander Galt) to London, the provinces soon re-established their own representation in the British capital.

These provincial delegations were not formally recognized by the Imperial Government. Unlike the Australian state representatives, the Canadian counterparts received no official status because they came from British territories wherein the (lieutenant-) governors were not named by an imperial act (Keith, vol. 2, p. 651). This absence of status, which forced the provincial agents to communicate with the Colonial Office via the Canadian High-Commissioner, was the source of much friction between the federal
government (who fully supported the British attitude) and certain provincial governments (Keith, vol. 1, p. 343).

Following the first world war, the Canadian High-Commissioner in Great Britain attempted to boost the prestige of provincial representatives by conferring upon them certain official functions. Nevertheless, on the eve of WW II, when all but British Columbia withdrew their London agents, no provincial delegation had yet been recognized by the British government.

Quebec's agents in Great Britain and in France date from the nineteenth century. While the post at London was abolished shortly after its creation and placed under the Agent-General of Canada, the Paris office functioned from 1882 to 1911. During this period, Hector Fabre represented both the Dominion and the Quebec governments. He held at once the positions of Commissariat général du Canada, and Agent commercial et financier du Québec. His successor, Phillippe Roy, ceased to perform this dual role and became,

2 The Canadian Annual Review (1923) speaks of this attempt:
   ...adopting the Australian practice, Hon. Mr. Larkin (Canadian High-Commissioner) announced his intention of associating the Agents-General of the Provinces with him in the discharge of some of his duties...The Agents-General welcomed the innovation, hoping that it might prove a stepping stone to the restoration of their constitutional right to direct access to the Crown in relation to Provincial affairs which the Dominion had refused to acknowledge since Lord Strathcona's time... (p. 109).

3 In 1943, Ontario re-established its London Agent-General; other provinces soon followed suit.
simply, the Commissioner-General of Canada.

A law adopted in 1909 and promulgated in 1911 authorized the government of Quebec to name an Agent-General to Britain and another to Belgium. Such a delegate was proposed - in 1911 for London, and in the course of world war one, for Brussels. Each agent was thereby placed under the provincial premier’s authority. In 1936 this law was repealed to be replaced by a 1940 statute giving the Department of Municipal Affairs, Commerce and Industry authority over the nomination and control of Agents-General. Abrogated in turn, this legislation was superceded by a new law in 1961 "qui parle aussi bien de délégués généraux que d’agents généraux et qui place ces fonctionnaires sous l’autorité du ministre de l’Industrie et du Commerce" (Brossard, p. 68).

The official status of Quebec's Délégations-Générales (there are presently three: London, New York and Paris) has changed very little over time. In the United Kingdom, provincial agents may enjoy the same privileges and immunities as foreign consuls; in the United States, provincial

---

4 The Revised Statutes of the Province of Quebec (1909, vol. 1) reads:

...He (the Agent-General) shall be under the control of the First Minister, and shall follow the instructions which may be given him, from time to time, by the latter...(p. 272).

5 See: Loi relative à l'Agent-général de la province dans le royaume de Belgique, Statut du Québec, 1936, ch. 18; Loi concernant les agents généraux de la province, Statut du Québec, 1940, ch. 10; Loi concernant les agents ou délégués généraux de la province, Statut du Québec, 1960-61, ch. 85.
delegates have been accorded (by the State Department) those certain diplomatic privileges which non-official members of Canadian consulates also enjoy; and in France, by virtue of an agreement between Canada and France, the Quebec Délégation-Générale partakes of similar immunities and privileges.

Nevertheless, provincial agents abroad can not be officially accredited to the governments of sovereign states, nor can they officially negotiate with them. In principle, they enjoy no privilege and no immunity. Even in practice, it is only by courtesy that, in London, New York and Paris, they are accorded privileges of a diplomatic character. This is not to be confused with a true consular or diplomatic status; nor are such courtesies granted elsewhere; nor do they extend to other staff members, beyond the Délégué Général. In short, Quebec, like all Canadian provinces, possesses no jus legationis.

This absence of jus legationis stems from the fact that "the provinces have no status in international law".

---

6 Ces avantages...consistent principalement dans l'exemption du service militaire, de l'impôt sur le revenu et des droits de douane lors du premier établissement ...(Brossard, p. 69).

In Paris and in London, the privileges and immunities consist of the following:

...l'inviolabilité des locaux et l'immunité de juridiction quant aux actes accomplis par le délégué général dans l'exercice de ses fonctions, ainsi que l'exemption d'impôt sur le revenu et de droits de douane sur les importations pour fins officielles ou strictement personnelles...(Brossard, p. 237).

7 Re The Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertaking Act, The
Despite their lengthy involvement on the international plane, the provinces have acquired no legal external rights, nor have they particularly aspired to such (Débats, 13 avril 1967, p. 2176). The federal government for over forty years has exercised an exclusive competence in this field and, until recently, has done so unchallenged.

Quebec now challenges that position. The reorientation of politics at home, and the re-definition of the means and ends of cultural-national survival, gave birth to and nourished that challenge - a challenge which, having begun with Lesage and continued by Johnson and Bertrand, knows no party lines; a challenge which, throughout the 1960's, has been executed by thought, by word, and especially by deed.

...les premisses de notre action dans le domaine international remontent...à ma première entrevue avec le président de Gaulle, à l'automne '61, lors de l'ouverture de la Maison du Québec à Paris...(Jean Lesage; Débats, 13 avril 1967, p. 2172-2173).

As with previous openings of Agences-Générales, there had been created no constitutional commotion when, in 1940, the New York office was established. Similarly, the subsequent October 1961 opening of the Délégation-Générale du Québec à Paris did not per se create a problem. (Ontario, as one province, operated several European agencies at that Minimum Wages Act and The Limitation of Hours of Work Act, 1936 S.C.R. 461, p. 510. The intention here is not to enter upon the legal argument at this stage. That will follow. The author wishes merely to relate the long-established thought regarding provincial rights on the international plane, and thus to convey the unconventional nature of Quebec's activities in the 1960's.
time.) Even the enthusiastic welcome given by France to Lesage provoked no suspicion in Ottawa or elsewhere that de Gaulle was recognizing Quebec as an international personality. Nonetheless, a somewhat low-key debate was aroused when Quebec wished to obtain for its representatives those rights and privileges ordinarily given to consular officers. (The question was, as we have seen, resolved to Quebec's advantage.) Quebec, for its part, issued a ministerial decree granting all foreign consular officers within Quebec several fiscal privileges, "tels que l'exemption de l'impôt sur le revenu et des droits sur les successions" (Brossard, p. 239).

Again, in 1962, Lesage officiated at the opening of the new Délégation-Générale in London, naming Lapointe (the present Lieutenant-Governor) its representative.

Such activities abroad by the government of Quebec were neither novel nor startling; they elicited little federal concern. No pattern of exceptional behaviour was (or perhaps could have been) deduced from what appeared to be, superficially at least, matters of a routine nature. However, the next few years of continued and accelerated involvement by Quebec with foreign states and international bodies were to shed new light upon these first few acts. Today, by virtue of hindsight, they are interpreted as Quebec's initial forays into the external world. They mark the serious quest for an international competence, a quest which, throughout that decade, never ceased to arouse grave
constitutional concerns.

Early in 1964, a Direction des délégations à l'étranger was established within the Department of Industry and Commerce. This section was to co-ordinate the activities of all Quebec delegations abroad, and, because within those delegations several departments were represented, it was to regulate administrative problems as well. More important perhaps than this administrative housekeeping of external involvement was the Quebec-ASTEF agreement in February of that same year. This instituted a programme of Franco-Québécois exchanges of young civil servants and technicians. Yet, while Quebec was to administer that programme, it was the federal Department of External Affairs which approved and concluded the final arrangements with the Quai d'Orsay, and which, in so doing, altered the original content: instead of Quebec choosing by itself all ten exchange trainees, the Department of External Affairs authorized the federal government to nominate two. One can only speculate about the impact of the 1964 alteration. It may well have been an experience influential upon the following year's conduct.

From 1965 to the end of the decade, Quebec moved decidedly into the international arena. In Paris, on February 27, 1965, the French and Quebec Ministers of Education
and the French Director-General of Cultural and Technical Affairs negotiated and signed an entente whereby programmes of exchanges (teachers, students and researchers) and co-operation in the field of education would proceed. The agreement also established a Commission permanente de co-opération franco-québécois, charged with the administration and operation of such programmes. It would meet regularly and alternately in Paris and in Quebec. This was followed soon after by the establishment of a Service de co-opération avec l'extérieur, within Quebec's Education Department.

By being a party to the education entente, Quebec seemed to pose a serious precedent in terms of provincial relations with another sovereign state. The federal government did not modify the terms of that agreement because, according to Ottawa, the entente's significance had already been minimized on the date of signing by a pre-arranged exchange of letters between the French Ambassador and the Secretary of State for External Affairs. The exchanged letters merely requested and granted the Canadian government's consent in the proposed educational programme (Federalism and International Relations, p. 27).

on the one hand, and by the École nationale d'administration de France, on the other. In matters of external relations, the French school falls within the jurisdiction of the Quai d'Orsay.

9 Such meetings began immediately: Quebec (May, 1965), Paris (November, 1965), Quebec (June, 1966), Paris (April, 1967). As of January 1, 1971, ten conferences have been held, the last being in Paris, November-December, 1970.
Quebec, in contrast to the federal view, presented a different interpretation of these events. Attaching great symbolic importance to this entente, it portrayed Ottawa in a defensive, reactionary role:

...Lorsque le Québec a signé la première entente France-Québec à Paris le 27 février 1965, c'était la première fois qu'un gouvernement d'une province du Canada prenait une semblable initiative en négociant lui-même et en signant, dans les formes d'usage, une entente internationale de même qu'en participant à une commission permanente de coopération pour en assurer la mise en œuvre. Cet événement a provoqué à l'époque de multiples réactions et a incité le gouvernement fédéral à déclarer que le Canada n'avait qu'une seule personnalité internationale et qu'à ce titre, seul l'exécutif fédéral avait le pouvoir de conclure des traités. Et, marquant bien sa détermination, le ministre des Affaires extérieures du Canada procédait à une échange de lettres avec l'ambassade de France à Ottawa le jour même de la signature de l'entente France-Québec pour déclarer que l'entente "recontre l'assentiment du gouvernement canadien"...(Paul Gerin-Lajoie; Débats, 13 avril 1967, p. 2174).

It matters little, for the purposes of this work, which side of the federal-provincial argument is correct. It is natural - and must be assumed in the absence of extensive interviews - that Quebec would proceed to further action on the basis of its own perceptions of the actors' roles, and of the significance of the entente, and not upon those perceptions of Ottawa. Indeed, its attitudes and deeds shortly thereafter seem to confirm this.

The following month, in April 1965, Minister of Education Gerin-Lajoie spoke to the consular corps of Montreal. His speech of government policy outlined yet another area wherein Quebec wished to assert its international competence and personality:
Sans doute exercez-vous ici vos fonctions en vertu d'une autorisation du gouvernement fédéral; mais vous êtes, à certains égards, plus près des autorités québécoises que de celles qui vous ont habilités à agir en qualité officielle. En effet, d'une part, la juridiction de la plupart d'entre vous se borne à des circonscriptions entièrement comprises dans les limites territoriales du Québec; d'autre part, cette même juridiction intéresse, dans une large mesure, des domaines relevant strictement de la compétence de notre État fédéré. D'après la dernière convention de Vienne (art. 5, para. b), les fonctions consulaires consistent à favoriser le développement de relations commerciales, économiques, culturelles et scientifiques entre l'État d'envoi et l'État de résidence. Encore une fois, pour vous qui exercez votre juridiction ici, l'État de résidence est facile à identifier, c'est le Québec... (Allôcation du Ministre de l'Éducation, 12 avril 1965, Service d'Information du Ministère; p. 1-3).

One may note here that this position did not change under the Union Nationale. On May 7, 1967, Daniel Johnson affirmed that the granting of privileges to consulates within Quebec fell within his government's jurisdiction, and that, furthermore, his government was fully prepared to take the initiative in this matter (Le Devoir, 8 mai 1967, p. 1).

But Quebec pressed forward in 1965. In order to coordinate the various departmental relations with foreign governments and organizations, the government announced in August that the Deputy Minister of Federal-Provincial Affairs would chair a new Commission interministérielle des relations extérieures. This committee was composed of deputy ministers of departments "likely to have close knowledge of relations with foreign countries and groups" (Sabourin in Clarkson, p. 104); thus, the Departments of Federal-Provincial Affairs, Education, Cultural Affairs,
Industry and Commerce, and Health were all involved. For many observers, this move appeared as a first step towards the creation of a Department of External Affairs, even though Mr. Lesage, in an attempt to allay these fears, said that the committee would stick to matters of provincial jurisdiction (Sabourin in Clarkson, p. 104).

The October 1965 opening of a Bureau économique in Milan was rather uneventful, particularly when compared to events of the following month. On November 17, Canada and France concluded a cultural agreement:

...This agreement established a general framework (accord cadre) designed to facilitate arrangements between provincial governments and the French Government, and provided that such arrangements could be entered into by the provinces either by reference to the accord cadre and exchange of notes or by specific authorization on the part of the Federal Government through a further exchange of letters...(Federalism and International Relations, p. 28).

The next week, the French Ambassador and the Quebec Minister of Cultural Affairs signed a cultural entente for co-operation in cultural and artistic fields. The entente, however, made no reference either to the accord cadre or to an exchange of letters. Instead, the French Ambassador merely informed the federal government of this agreement and requested Ottawa's assent. This was granted by Mr. Martin in an exchange of letters that very day, November 24. The terms of the "umbrella agreement" were thereby met.

10 Similar to that procedure employed in February, following the educational entente, a Service de co-opération avec l'extérieur was established soon after within the Department of Cultural Affairs.
Controversy was, nevertheless, generated by this entente. Some regarded the exchange of letters as quite "hasty" (Atkey in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 162; and Brossard, p. 195), indicating that the Department of External Affairs was less than prepared for Quebec's actions. Others continued the February argument, contending that Quebec had reaffirmed the significance of that month's precedent-setting education entente. It was not until July 7, 1970 that Pierre Laporte (the 1965 Minister of Cultural Affairs) made clear the thinking which lay behind the Lesage government's conduct:

...J'ai signé la première entente culturelle avec Paris. L'on m'a fréquémment demandé : 'Est-ce que Ottawa a été consulté?' J'aurais fait la manchette de tous les journaux, le lendemain, si j'avais dit : Jamais! Nous avons l'intention...et blablabla...J'ai répondu aux journalistes : J'ai le choix entre deux choses : commencer ici au Canada une querelle sensationelle ou signer une entente culturelle avec Paris. Qu'est-ce que le plus valable pour le Québec? Alors, la veille, l'avant-veille, ou deux semaines avant, le gouvernement du Canada a signé des ententes culturelles avec Paris. Quel mal cela nous a-t-il fait? J'ai signé avec Paris une entente qui a fait la joie de tout le monde et qui, cette fois-là, n'a pas été signé à l'occasion d'une querelle. Nous avons eu depuis, sous le gouvernement qui nous a précédé et sous celui dont j'ai fait partie avant, les fruits de cette entente... (Débats, 7 juillet 1970, p. 792).

Despite conflicting interpretations of roles and actual events, 1965 was certainly a watershed. Quebec, both as a province and as a cultural-national community, had

...In the House of Commons...Opposition members charged that Quebec had started the negotiations without informing the Federal Department of External Affairs, and that Canadian assent had been given only after the agreement had already been signed...(Morrison, p. 20).
accomplished much on the international scene. Precedents had been set, seeds of controversy planted. Equally important was the creation of administrative machinery, a reflection of Quebec's resolve and permanence of action in international affairs. Funds had been allocated and manpower employed for a vast range of cultural, technical and educational programmes, and these projects, all initially with France, were designed to enrich and thus to strengthen the culture of Quebec. It was the manifestation of a much needed, much desired, cultural diffusion.

In terms of Quebec's international relations, little occurred the following year. The June 1966 provincial elections had transferred power unexpectedly from the Parti Libéral to the Union Nationale. Quebec's lack of initiative in external affairs was therefore due not so much to a period of cooling-off, as to the pre-occupations with internal governmental consolidation. Indeed, in retrospect, this lull was much more the calm before a storm, for early 1967 witnessed the first of several moves to entrench those rights which, in the eyes of the new Quebec government, had already been gained.

In January 1967, jurisdiction over the Délégations-Générales and over other foreign offices of Quebec was transferred from the Department of Industry and Commerce, to the Office of the Premier. Not only did this provide an indication that the government was undergoing a re-organization of administration, but it furnished an index of
priority as well: the international relations of Quebec were to assume a prominent position in the politics of Daniel Johnson. The March budget confirmed this latter point. Education and cultural affairs formed two of the three priorities of the Johnson government, and cultural affairs alone received a substantial increase in funds of thirty-eight percent. Furthermore, within this area, the most favoured item was "la diffusion de la culture". Monies directed towards international relations were enlarged by twenty percent, to a total of three million dollars. Divided amongst four major ministries, this last sum was allotted for two purposes only: (a) different co-operative efforts, but particularly to the application of Franco-Quebec educational and cultural accords; and (b) délégations-générales and agences du Québec abroad (Le Devoir, 18 mars 1967, p. 4).

In April 1967, the salience of Quebec's international role was reaffirmed. Regarded by Sabourin as "the most important initiative that Quebec has taken" (in Clarkson, p. 105), the National Assembly debated and adopted Bill 33. This bill established the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs, a central co-ordinating authority under whose jurisdiction would fall the Délégations-Générales, the Agences du Québec, and all of the province's "external" activities. According to Johnson, several factors contributed towards the necessity of that bill; of these, four were quite dominant:
...Premièrement, le désir du Québec d'occuper pleinement tous les domaines de sa compétence et, à cette fin, de se donner les moyens d'action les plus efficaces possibles, tant sur le plan de l'élaboration des politiques que sur celui de la co-ordination de ses positions.

...Deuxièmement, l'objectif de hâter la solution du problème constitutionnel canadien et en même temps d'élargir les horizons du Québec dans les domaines de sa compétence.

...Troisièmement, la nécessité de mettre un terme à la dispersion actuelle, dispersion entre divers ministères, des responsabilités administratives, notamment en ce qui concerne l'action extra-territoriale du Québec, particulièrement dans le cas des délégations générales du Québec à l'étranger et des ententes avec la France dans les domaines de l'éducation et de la culture.

...Quatrièmement, l'évolution normale du ministère des Affaires fédérales-provinciales dont les responsabilités actuelles comprennent non seulement les relations de Québec avec le gouvernement central et les gouvernements des autres provinces mais, aussi, par la force des choses, les relations du Québec avec tous les autres gouvernements... (Débats, 13 avril 1967, p. 2167).

While in its operation, the new department would direct its efforts toward two major sectors, that of federal-provincial relations and that of international relations, the latter field was by far the most contentious. Assurances that "cette initiative ne vise pas à donner au Québec des droits qu'il n'aurait pas" were given both by Johnson and by the new Department's Deputy Minister, Claude Morin (in Débats, 13 avril 1967, p. 2170 and in Le Devoir, p. 178 respectively). Nonetheless, many believed this to be a new manifestation of Quebec's international ambitions. To be sure, arguments in favour of the bill and duties assigned to the Department, did nothing to mitigate those concerns. Gerin-Lajoie, particularly, in expressing the Opposition's
support for the bill, provoked, rather than allayed, federal fears:

...On l'a assez souligné, ce projet de loi ne confère au Québec aucun pouvoir nouveau dans les affaires internationales. Il constitue cependant une nouvelle étape, un pas de plus dans l'affirmation de rôle et d'une personnalité de nature internationale pour le Québec. En créant un organisme administratif chargé de coordonner toutes ses activités à l'extérieur du Québec, le gouvernement pose un geste qui indique clairement sa détermination à poursuivre et à développer les réalisations que le Québec a déjà à son crédit depuis cinq ou six ans...(Débats, 13 avril 1967, p. 2173).

Administratively, the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs was assigned several functions apart from those which dealt with federal-provincial matters (Morin in Le Devoir, p. 181). The Minister would take charge of all Quebec delegations and agencies abroad; he would be responsible for the administration of all Franco-Quebec ententes and, to this end, would collaborate closely with the Departments of Education and Cultural Affairs; he would conduct whatever negotiations might be necessary "lorsque le Québec jugera opportun d'établir, dans les domaines de sa compétence, des relations plus étendues avec l'étranger" (Morin, in Le Devoir, p. 181); he would cooperate with federal foreign aid officials, for the purpose of sending Quebec educators and specialists to developing countries; he would actively concern himself with those certain international organizations and bodies with which Quebec desired to participate; and finally, he would coordinate the interest and research of the various Quebec departments in so far as

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
these pertained to the numerous international conventions which Canada could not implement without provincial assent. In addition to these duties, the Minister would preside over a cabinet committee of intergovernmental affairs.

However controversial Bill 33 appeared to English-speaking Canada, and especially to Ottawa, it was regarded as a natural, logical step in Quebec. It merely harmonized various executive and legislative efforts. Indeed, for Peyton Lyon, other provinces would be wise to follow suit (Le Devoir, 20 mars 1967, p. 4).

The advent of May only exacerbated the Ottawa-Quebec dispute. In the provincial legislature on May 2, Premier Johnson spoke of Quebec's right to represent French Canada outside the country. Later that week, he spoke in Montreal to the St. Jean Baptiste societies. Here he warned the federal government not to conclude international agreements covering subjects under provincial jurisdiction, without first consulting the provinces; Ottawa could not expect the province to delegate any of its powers. Continuing, he reprimanded the federal government for its attempts to undermine Quebec relations with francophone countries:

...en instituant un ministère des Affaires intergouvernementales, le gouvernement du Québec veut assurer l'unité de sa politique en ce qui a trait à ses relations et à celles de ces ministères et organismes, avec les gouvernements, ministères et organismes de l'extérieur du Québec... (Johnson; Débats, 13 avril 1967, p. 2170).
...depuis quatorze mois, le fédéral semble pris de
la bougeotte dans le domaine des accords, ententes
ou traités, non pas avec l'Allemagne ou l'Australie,
mais avec les pays francophones... Dès que le Québec
s'intéresse à un pays, Ottawa accourt et s'empresse
de le faire dans le giron... (Le Devoir, 8 mai 1967,
p. 1).

When, less than twenty-four hours later, the federal govern-
ment announced the signing of a Canadian-Belgian cultural
agreement which dealt with cultural, academic, scientific
and technical affairs, Johnson admonished Ottawa once again
(Le Devoir, 9 mai 1967, p. 1).

During the period of May 18 to 22, 1967, Daniel Johnson
paid an official visit to Paris and opened there a new Déle-
gation-Générale. He was well-received by General de Gaulle.

As a result of several private interviews with the French
President and with senior members of the French Cabinet,
the two governments laid the basis for extending projects
of co-operation. They included a further exchange of tech-
icians and civil servants, the training in France of Quebec
technicians in nuclear research, a study for investment,
and, most controversially, an exchange of radio and tele-
vision programme through the use of a satellite in whose

--- 13 ---

66), the signing of this cultural agreement "...prompted Mr.
Johnson to say that Prince Albert (of Belgium) had been used
by Ottawa as a dupe to help crush Quebec. There were reports
that the provincial protocol department had told Ottawa that
Paul Tremblay, Canadian Ambassador to Belgium, was persona
non grata in the province and should not accompany the
Prince. Jean Lesage subsequently criticized the Premier
for involving the royal couple in an internal dispute...".

Such unofficial reportings of behind-the-scene movements
were common throughout this period. Tactics of one-up-
manship and the pre-occupation with symbolic gains were soon
to be dubbed "La Guerre des Boutons" by Edward McWhinney
operations Quebec would participate (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 6, p. 68). At home, in Quebec, the significance of this visit and the value which these programmes held for Québécois, did not go unnoticed. Jean-Marc Leger, writing in Le Devoir, explained:

...Le Québec est aux prises avec des problèmes très concrets et, à plusieurs égards, aigus, de développement, d'équipement, de formation des cadres, etc. et plus généralement d'affirmation de sa personnalité; la France est redevenue une puissance économique, scientifique et technique de premier ordre, conduite naturellement à s'intéresser de façon particulière - mais sans exclusive - à l'avancement des pays partageant sa langue et sa culture, surtout lorsque, de sur croit, ils sont issus d'elle-même...(18 mai 1967, p. 4).

Above all else, 1967 was a year in which Canada generally, and Quebec specifically, gained international attention. Because Canada was celebrating its centenary, Ottawa received a steady flow of congratulatory heads of state, diplomatic functionaries and government officials. Few failed to visit Montreal, host to the international exposition, and, while in the province, many met with Johnson as well. The July visit by Charles de Gaulle was least typical, most provocative, almost historical. (The General's visit is well documented in several sources. See particularly, Tanturier; Wade, 1968, vol. 2; C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 6). Nevertheless, despite his visit and speeches, and the notice which they attracted, they did not, as a result, 14 accelerate the international activities of Quebec. In

14 Aside from giving international publicity to the "aspirations" of Québécois and to the close Franco-Quebec
relationship, de Gaulle's "Québec libre" speech neither dampened nor expedited, in any direct or noticeable fashion, the international relations of Quebec. Laurent Chevalier disagrees:

...le choc psychologique provoqué par le voyage du général et la volonté des deux gouvernements ont fait progresser à pas de géants la coopération franco-québécoise...(in Bernard, p. 98).

To this visit Chevalier attributes the marked increase of Franco-Quebec projects. Yet the necessary cause-effect relationship is nowhere evident and is more or less assumed, rather than established, by that author. The direct encouragement and publicity given to separatist and autonomist groups within Quebec is the more conspicuous impact, but an impact upon Quebec's (and Canada's) domestic politics.

If anything, the French President's July visit curtailed, in the short run, further international initiatives by Quebec. It was Ottawa who, increasingly, took advantage of the situation and especially after the departures of Johnson and de Gaulle from the political scene. Indeed, one can notice a general shift of focus from "Franco-Quebec relations", to a triangular "Ottawa-Quebec-Paris" relationship, to the present "Franco-Canadian" term. (Admittedly, the first expression is still common usage, but Quebec no longer dominates relations with France, as it once did. This latter development stems from a proliferation of Quebec's external efforts to other francophone countries, and not from a concession to Ottawa's exclusivity in international affairs.)

The position that de Gaulle's visit and speech had little direct bearing upon Quebec's international relations, seems to be confirmed by the President's later remarks (July 31 and November 27) which dealt exclusively with Canadian-Quebec internal politics. In addition, the position of the Johnson government was quite vague:

...Premier Johnson at first seemed mildly critical of the de Gaulle performance and appeared to be disassociating himself from it. Later he denied this and supported the General, declaring that he was only saluting the freedom of choice of Quebec to select its own political and economic destiny...(C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 6, p. 91);

and later,

...While attending the Confederation of Tomorrow conference in Toronto Premier Johnson of Quebec was questioned about the de Gaulle and Pearson statements. He described the exchange as a private fight between de Gaulle and the Prime Minister in which he should not get involved...(C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 6, p. 131).

Marcel Rioux paints a similar picture.
fact, only one further entry is recorded: on August 23, France announced an increase in technical and economic aid to Quebec, intended, in the words of de Gaulle, "to help the French of Canada to maintain and develop their personality" (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 6, p. 92).

Quebec's attendance at the 1968 Conference of African and Malagasy Ministers of National Education provided the new pivot around which the on-going debate would revolve. Pearson, perhaps in anticipation, had written to the Quebec Premier as early as December 1, 1967. His letter suggested that arrangements be agreed upon between the two governments with respect to la Francophonie generally, which would allow for full Quebec participation in Canadian representation.

...Daniel Johnson seemed to have trouble keeping up with what was going on, and appeared embarrassed by de Gaulle's friendliness towards Quebec. Right up to his death, Johnson continued to give reassurances to both parties of the conflict... (p. 82).

De Gaulle's speeches, if they had blatantly recognized the international personality and competence of Quebec, would have afforded an opportunity upon which Johnson might have capitalized. However, these speeches made no such mention, nor was the Premier in a firm policy position to take full advantage. Therefore, we can conclude from this, and from Quebec's lack of external activities for the rest of 1967, that the visit of de Gaulle played no substantial and influential role in the international relations of Quebec.

15 This letter is reproduced in Federalism and International Conferences on Education (p. 62-65), and reads in part:

...The composition of the Canadian delegation will, of course, be dependent on the subject matter of the meeting. If such a meeting, for instance, should deal with questions of a general character, or with external aid, it would then seem desirable for the Secretary of State for External Affairs to lead the Canadian delegation, which I would hope would also include strong
The Quebec-Ottawa discussions subsequently arranged, came to no agreement.

In January 1968, the government of Gabon invited Quebec's Minister of Education, Jean-Guy Cardinal, to an educational conference to be held in Libreville, February 5-10. France, Quebec and fifteen independent francophone African states attended. All delegations were represented at the ministerial level. The federal government, having failed in its attempts to procure a "Canadian" invitation for a "Canadian" delegation, suspended diplomatic relations with the Republic of Gabon. This move was based on the fact that the Gabonese government had sent the invitation directly to the government of Quebec, and not via the intermediary of Ottawa. For the federal government, this was "an exercise in diplomatic brinkmanship" (McWhinney in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 127).

representation from Quebec. If, on the other hand, the purpose of the conference was, for example, to deal exclusively with education, it would then be appropriate for the Minister of Education of Quebec to be a member of the Canadian delegation, if such was your wish. Needless to say, he should occupy within this delegation a place appropriate to his position, taking into account the nature of the conference. In certain cases, the Quebec Minister might well be the head of the Canadian delegation...

This so-called "Gabon crisis" had all the elements of the Theatre of the Absurd, according to McWhinney: the Gabonese, in a note dated January 20, had insisted that the invitation was purely personal; Paul Martin, in his reply to the Gabonese Ambassador, declared that in attempting to interpret the Canadian constitution Gabon had acted in a way "which is neither in conformity with international law, nor with the maintenance of close and friendly relations between our two countries" (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 7, p. 32);
Following the Libreville conference, the federal government again communicated with Quebec authorities in the hope of establishing some formula for the composition of future delegations. In a letter of March 8, Pearson re-emphasized his dual purpose: to allow Quebec full participation, but "in a manner which would be compatible with the continued existence of a sovereign and independent Canada" ([Federalism and International Conferences on Education, p. 66]. Otherwise, if the Gabon affair were repeated in some form or fashion, the unified structure of Canada and/or Canada's presence abroad would be seriously threatened:

"...That structure and that presence would certainly be weakened - and ultimately destroyed - if other countries invited Canadian provinces to international conferences of states, if those provinces accepted the invitation, and if the provincial delegates were treated formally as representatives of states while the Government of Canada was ignored..." ([Federalism and International Conferences on Education, p. 68].

In April 1968, the Conference of African and Malagasy Ministers of National Education re-convened in Paris. It came and went without an open diplomatic clash between Canada and

Pearson criticized Quebec, while Trudeau, at a March press conference, expressed his conviction that France was behind the move by Gabon; Gabon suggested that Canada had suspended relations to divert Canadian public opinion from the reality of the Quebec problem, and furthermore, that Canada had reneged on its offer of aid; lastly, Quebec officials were denying the Pearson statement that Quebec had been invited to head a Canadian delegation. It was not until June 1969, that Canada re-established relations with Gabon. At that time, a Gabon delegation visited both Ottawa and Quebec, and the immediate subject of the Ottawa-Gabon-Quebec quarrels "was revealed to have been no more than the exchange of some half dozen teachers and students and the provision of technical assistance in staffing a new public health centre in Libreville" ([McWhirney in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 128].

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
France, even though Pearson and his successor Trudeau, had both indicated in March that "if France by-passed Ottawa and invited Quebec to Paris, she could expect the same treatment as that given the Gabonese" (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 7, p. 43). Early in the month, the Canadian Prime Minister had sent a third personal letter to Daniel Johnson still urging arrangements for a mutually-acceptable delegation. Johnson's only response to the three letters preceded by twenty-four hours his government's announcement that Cardinal would attend the Paris conference. But the circumstances surrounding this conference differed from those which resulted in the suspension of Canadian-Gabonese relations. In the first place, the meeting was scheduled as "a second stage" of the Libreville conference. Secondly, France attempted to emphasize this natural continuity. Hoping to avoid a dispute with Canada, the French government sent "reminders" to previous delegates, rather than invitations. Finally, as reported in

17 Partially startled and somewhat angered by the federal government's publication (in Federalism and International Conferences on Education) of Mr. Pearson's "personal and confidential" letters to him, Daniel Johnson tabled his own letter in the National Assembly on May 9, 1968 (Débats, p. 1450). In it, the Quebec Premier regretted Pearson's departure from political life and praised his "openness to dialogue". Concerning the matter at hand, however, Johnson was frank:

...There is nowhere in the Canadian constitution a disposition so fundamental and over which jurisdiction of the provinces has been so firmly established as education...(Globe and Mail, May 10 1968, p. 11).

He went on to say that the federal government was using its exclusive jurisdiction over international affairs as a counter-argument. This would have to be settled by negotiation. In the meantime, Quebec could only assume all its responsibilities.
the speeches and statements of Johnson, Cardinal, Pearson and Trudeau, the atmosphere in Quebec and in Ottawa seemed more optimistic (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 7, p. 43-44).

Nevertheless, Ottawa was not completely at ease. Jules Leger, Canada's Ambassador to France, had been summoned home; it was not until four days after arriving that his presence in Ottawa was known. Following several discussions with Messrs. Pearson and Trudeau, and after the Cabinet met to study the situation further, the Canadian Ambassador returned. With him, Mr. Leger took a note which, on the instructions of the Canadian government, was to be delivered personally to French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville. While Mitchell Sharp in Ottawa refused to divulge the contents of that note, his comments indicated three elements: (a) a re-statement of federal claims of supremacy in international relations; (b) regrets that France had not communicated through Ottawa to Quebec; and (c) a desire for good relations with France (Globe and Mail, May 4, 1968, p. 1). This "low-key" note, according to Sharp, would close the entire incident.

The federal government was particularly dismayed by the formalities accorded Cardinal:

... The Canadian Government was never officially informed of the status of the Quebec delegation at the Paris meeting... it appears from the proceedings of the conference that he (Jean-Guy Cardinal) participated on the same basis as other delegates. In the case of the Paris session, the Quebec Minister stated after the conference that Quebec had participated on the same basis as other delegations... (Federalism and International Conferences on Education, p. 38).
In Canada, however, the issue was far from dead. To the Montreal Chamber of Commerce, Premier Johnson declared that Quebec would continue to set precedents in international relations until Canada had a new constitution respecting the provinces' exclusive rights and Canada's general interests. The recent international diplomacy moves by his government were regarded, assured the Premier, as "necessary, legitimate and reasonable" by all provincial legislators and a vast majority of citizens. Indeed, Quebec, like the other provinces, had possessed exclusive (and therefore sovereign) powers in education since 1867, and while these powers were originally exercised only internally, in the modern world, this was no longer possible:

...Quebec can no longer fulfil its constitutional tasks without extending its internal spheres to the international level...We can no longer act in a vacuum...If we want to progress, we must start exchanges and establish bonds of cooperation with other provinces and countries... (Globe and Mail, May 7, 1968, p. 31).

Johnson did concede that Ottawa had the responsibility for directing Canada's foreign policy in certain traditional areas (such as war and peace, monetary policies, tariffs, commercial treaties) but, "when it involves education problems, what can the federal government truly do or say...It has absolutely no power in the matter...".

The reply to Johnson was not long in coming. The next two days, on May 8 and 9, the federal government had much to say and much to do. A 58-page study, Federalism and International Conferences on Education, was released by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and, at a press
conference in Ottawa, Trudeau made it plain that he would consider a Liberal victory at the polls on June 25 as a mandate to challenge Quebec's international ambitions (Globe and Mail, May 9 1968, p. 1 and 8). Later in the month, Trudeau's campaign statement on foreign policy stressed the development of closer relationships between the federal government and francophone countries. New missions, increased aid, more cultural programmes were promised (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 7, p. 54).

Quebec, momentarily put on the defensive, found no source of strength for its position in the conflict with Ottawa when Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba paid a May state visit to Ottawa and Montreal. The Tunisian President was asked by reporters whether his country would develop closer ties with Quebec. His response was brief: until proved to the contrary, Quebec belonged to Canada (Globe and Mail, May 11 1968, p. 11). Later, in Montreal, he was quoted as expressing confidence that Quebec could preserve its identity and come into closer contact with French-speaking nations without breaking from Canada (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 7, p. 54).

During July and August 1968, there were no confrontations on a ministerial level between Quebec and Ottawa. Daniel Johnson's July visit to Paris had been cancelled because of illness. When the Department of External Affairs was forming a Canadian delegation for the UNESCO conference on educational planning (Paris, August 6-14), Quebec declined to
participate. Later in August, Quebec did send two observers with the Canadian delegation to the UN conference on exploration and peaceful uses of outer space. The agenda included discussions of the use of satellites for communications resource surveys and the impact of space activities on education.

There was one additional non-incident. Reportedly (Globe and Mail, August 9 1968, p. 3), Quebec had sent a four-man mission to certain francophone African states (Gabon, Chad, Niger and Senegal) to investigate their needs in education and health services. On this, Claude Morin refused comment.

The absence of a firm federal response seems to imply that, at least in the area of foreign aid, Quebec and Ottawa had reached some modus vivendi. Both in Federalism and International Relations (p. 37-39), and in its supplement, Federalism and International Conferences on Education (p. 42-46 and 52-54), an active provincial role in foreign aid was recognized:

...an effective aid programme depends for its realization upon full co-operation from the provinces...

...the Federal Government welcomes provincial contributions...

When questioned on the absence of a Quebec representative on the delegation, Mr. Morin explained. Because there had been no agreement yet on the status of Quebec in participating in international conferences, the province, although having been invited, refused to join the Canadian delegation. Negotiations on the rights of the province were still in progress and if Quebec had accepted Ottawa's invitation it could be interpreted to mean that the province agreed to Ottawa's viewpoint that Quebec cannot act independently in attending international meetings (Le Devoir, 24 juillet 1968, p. 1).
...the Federal Government is anxious to (act) in as flexible a manner as possible...

clear recognition should be given to the provincial role...

Cardinal had given an indication of his government's position in April, when Quebec educational aid to Gabon was rumoured. At a press conference, the Minister of Education said that Quebec did not consider its plans for educational co-operation as competing with Ottawa, but as supplementary (Globe and Mail, April 29 1968, p. 2). When compared to statements on other issues concerning external relations, these remarks appear quite moderate. In any case, the reported August mission brought no public rebuke from federal government circles.

In late November 1968, questions of the conference in Niger first arose. The new Quebec Premier, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, announced on November 26 that his government had received an invitation to participate in the conference, and that this invitation had not been obtained through Ottawa (Le Devoir, 27 novembre 1968, p. 1). Mr. Trudeau, in the House, announced that his government had received their invitation as early as November 17, and that, since it was a conference of French-speaking countries in general, the Canadian delegation would represent "all Canadians and particularly French-speaking Canadians who, as you know, do not live only in the province of Quebec but also in other provinces..." (Commons Debates, November 27 1968, p.
Until the following February, the question would remain open.

January 1969 began yet another year in which Quebec actively pursued an international role. A provincial delegation led by Cardinal and Beaudry paid a five-day visit to Paris, January 22-27, in order to strengthen Franco-Quebec relations. Upon arrival, the delegation was greeted with "full diplomatic and political honours" (Globe and Mail, January 23 1969, p. 1), while the Canadian Ambassador, also at the airport, received no special recognition, and moreover, in what appeared to be a diplomatic snub, was not invited to that night's dinner at the Elysee Palace. Having attracted much initial attention, the Quebec delegation was soon meeting privately with French government leaders. Their talks resulted in three letters of agreement: (a) work on a possible Franco-Quebec telecommunications satellite; (b) help from Paris for the new University of Quebec; and (c) increased promotion of French involvement in the provincial economy (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 8, p. 10). For Mr. Cardinal, these agreements did not constitute "accords." Mitchell Sharp, for whom the satellite agreement

---

On the same day, it was reported in the Globe and Mail (November 27, p. 3) that Paul Martin might interrupt his tour of African countries to visit Niger and discuss plans for the conference. Three days later, President Diori of Niger held a press conference following his talks with Senator Martin. There he expressed Canada's intentions of sending a "Canadian" delegation composed of representatives from all French-speaking provinces. He announced at the same time that Canada had offered "special aid" to Niger (Globe and Mail, November 30 1968, p. 4).
was of primary concern, expressed similar views:

...The Canadian Government wishes to reserve its position with regard to these documents (agreements). It intends to study them carefully to determine whether they come within the framework of agreements concluded by Canada and France. In any event, these documents in themselves would not constitute international agreements. Moreover, constitutional responsibility in the field of telecommunications devolves upon the Government of Canada which would mean that every project carried out in this field will involve action on the part of the Canadian Government. It is, therefore, clear that all international co-operation concerning satellite communications requires the concurrence and full co-operation of the Canadian Government...(Globe and Mail, January 25 1969, p. 3).

Later, in the House of Commons, after he had received and studied the letters in question, Mr. Sharp reaffirmed his previous opinion:

...these documents could not of themselves constitute international agreements, and in this connection I have since noted the statements of representatives of the Quebec government that the documents were not intended by Quebec to constitute intergovernmental agreements...

(Commons Debates, January 31 1969, p. 4981).

The "satellite" letter of agreement was an issue over which Quebec apparently wished no confrontation. At his Quebec press conference on January 30, Mr. Cardiand was quite conciliatory. Co-operation between France and Quebec could lead to a joint launching of a communications satellite, he said, "but not before studies and discussions involving the federal government" (Globe and Mail, January 31 1969, p. 1). However, he added that, because the other matters were exclusively in Quebec's jurisdiction, only the satellite proposal would be discussed.

There occurred another event during January which
brought the federal and Quebec governments close to full agreement. This was the Kinshasa conference of education ministers, January 13-18. Prior to that conference, a series of telegrams exchanged between Messrs. Trudeau and Bertrand produced a tentative agreement whereby the Quebec delegation, duly identified, would join with other representatives of the Canadian delegation. Of special importance were those proposals set forth by Trudeau in his telegram of January 8. They suggested means by which Quebec might properly assert its own particular identity within the larger Canadian delegation. These included suggestions...
regarding documentation, the display of flags, voting procedures, chairmanship, and matters of general diplomatic import. Reporting from Kinshasa, the Globe and Mail (January 15, 1969, p. 27) confirmed that the actual arrangements at the conference followed generally the suggestions made by Prime Minister Trudeau, but that the details had been worked out only after the federal and Quebec representatives, travelling separately, had arrived in the city.

If the Kinshasa formula for representation implied a modicum of harmony between the positions of Ottawa and of Quebec, the federal-provincial constitutional conference confirmed it. On February 12, Quebec Premier Bertrand tabled his government's Document de travail sur les relations avec l'étranger. Quebec was clearly not retreating from its demand for an international role. Yet the proposed ground rules for international conferences (p. 26-28) embodied much of the Kinshasa agreement. In addition, where matters of provincial jurisdiction were concerned, the paper recognized the federal government's right to veto agreements between provinces and foreign governments, but only if such agreements were proven incompatible with Canada's general foreign policy (p. 23). Quebec, in return, asked for prior consultation when Ottawa embarked upon international agreements in the fields of concurrent or full provincial jurisdiction. It was evident, then, that bargaining had begun and, as Quebec wished, on a constitutional level.

The question of appropriate representation at the Niamey
The conference, February 17-20, was the subject of much discussion at this same time. (The conference was to discuss the possibility of establishing an international agency to coordinate aid and exchange amongst French-speaking nations; as previously mentioned, both the Quebec and Canadian governments had received invitations to participate.) Marc Lalonde and Claude Morin met early in the month to discuss arrangements, but Prime Minister Trudeau in reply to a Commons question, assured the House that the delegation's composition would not be similar to that of Kinshasa:

...In Niamey, the conference will deal with several subjects over which the federal government has jurisdiction. Therefore, we intend to send federal ministers as delegates, as opposed to Kinshasa where the conference was on education, a subject which concerns only indirectly the federal government. That is why we sent officials there while all the provinces sent ministers ... (Commons Debates, February 3 1969, p. 5175).

Within a week, Bertrand announced that "the Quebec delegation will go to Niger and join the Canadian delegation and there it will represent Quebec on matters of education and culture" (Globe and Mail, February 11 1969, p. 3). Agreement on participation at the conference had been reached. While Marcel Masse would head the Quebec delegation, the federal Secretary of State, Gerard Pelletier, would be sole leader of the "all-Canadian" delegation. In this capacity, Mr. Pelletier would exercise the single Canadian vote; but, in event of disagreement among the delegates, he would abstain. The federal announcement stressed, however, that "the arrangements between Quebec and Ottawa would not bind either
government in the search for a permanent solution to the dispute over dealings on matters of foreign affairs within provincial jurisdiction" (C.I.A.A., Monthly Report, vol. 8, p. 48).

At Niamey, the conference agreed to establish an Agence de coopération culturelle et technique des pays francophones, and Jean-Marc Léger (an able advocate of Quebec's international role) was appointed provisional executive secretary to draft a charter. The Canadian federal government, for its part, threw strong financial support behind the embryonic agency. Not only did it pledge up to thirty per cent of the budget, but Mr. Pelletier also announced that the volume of Canadian aid to francophone countries would be vastly expanded in the next few years (External Affairs, vol. XXI, no. 5, p. 217).

Nevertheless, during the conference, even as before, disagreement arose over federal and Quebec representations. On the official list of governments represented at the conference, Canada and Quebec were given separate listings.

22 From the statements of Trudeau and Bertrand, firm agreement had been reached. However, according to the C.I.A.A.'s Monthly Report, Mr. Marcel Masse held a somewhat different opinion:

...(on February 13)...Mr. Masse was reported by the Canadian Press as saying that there would be no link between the Quebec and the federal delegations and that not having co-chairmen meant Quebec would not have to consult "Ottawa" on matters involving culture and education. Spokesmen for the federal government denied the assertion by Mr. Masse, saying that the agreement made by Prime Minister Trudeau and Premier Bertrand was specific on this point...(vol. 8, p. 48).
thus producing a series of procedural disputes concerning the identification and status of Canadian and Quebec delegates. Not until the following year, when the founding conference met, were these problems solved.

The summer of 1969 came on an optimistic note. A new policy of détente between Quebec and Ottawa on the one hand, and France and Ottawa on the other, seemed to be taking shape. Premier Bertrand revealed that, in July, Claude Morin had delivered to French President Pompidou a personal message in which the Quebec Premier expressed his desire to maintain close relations with France without neglecting the relations with Canada. *Le Devoir* interpreted this as a break with the politics and strategy of the late Daniel Johnson (19 août 1969, p. 1); with similar thoughts, the federal government warmly welcomed the Bertrand statement (*Le Devoir*, 20 août 1969, p. 1). Pragmatism, reasonableness and the elements of commonsense and mutual co-operation were being emphasized by Sharp federally, by Bertrand provincially. The de Lipkowskí affair brought this to an end.

From the moment Mr. Jean de Lipkowskí arrived in Quebec on October 9, 1969, Ottawa, Quebec and Paris plunged once again into the throes of controversy. The French Minister of State for Foreign Affairs was in Quebec on the invitation of Marcel Masse, then Quebec Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, and was heading a five-man delegation of top French government officials. Although he had been formally invited to visit Ottawa (the invitation having been renewed
on three separate occasions), Mr. de Lipkowski declined. His non-acceptance, he insisted (Le Devoir, 11 octobre 1969, p. 3), did not constitute an affront to Ottawa since his visit was made within the framework of the existing Ottawa-Paris-Quebec arrangements (i.e. the accord cadre of 1965). For many, this was a deliberate snub to the Canadian government. The controversy began.

On October 14, de Lipkowski spoke of plans for the Franco-Quebec telecommunications satellite:

...he...declared that such a project was authorized by the Canada-France "umbrella agreement", by reason of the fact that the Canadian constitution of 1867 was silent on telecommunications and the fact also that the France-Quebec project had a cultural and educational bent - matters within provincial competence... (McWhinney in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 144) 23

This prompted Prime Minister Trudeau to characterize the French official as "impertinent", "impolite", and "grossly misinformed" (this latter in particular reference to his comments on the Canadian constitution), and to threaten a

23 When contrasted with other statements he is reported to have made, this seems quite conservative. Compare, for example, the following:

...he said France must help Quebeckers in their "lonely battle" for national identity and could no longer remain indifferent to Quebeckers' struggle for survival...

...de Lipkowski told a press conference that "There's been no change" in the French foreign policy with respect to Ottawa and Quebec since the departure of President de Gaulle. He said that the decision to bypass Ottawa had been made by the French government, that a decision to visit Ottawa after the election of President Pompidou might have indicated that France now recognized the federal government's "monopoly" over Franco-Quebec relations... (C.I.I.A., Monthly Report, vol. 8, p. 255).
change, or if necessary, a denunciation of the Franco-Canad-
dian "umbrella agreement". Mr. Masse defended his guest,
accusing the federal government of creating unnecessary pro-
blems through its lack of flexibility. French Foreign Mini-
ster Maurice Schumann also supported his official.

Accusations, counter-accusations and rumours, either
directly or indirectly related to the affair, continued
throughout October and November. In December, the de Lip-
kowski affair ended as suddenly as it had begun:

...The French government apparently decided quietly to
ignore the Ottawa protest note over the de Lipkowski
affair, and Ottawa, in turn, apparently decided
quietly to ignore the French government's ignoring of
its protest note; and the Quebec government, for its
part, chose not to involve itself further, publicly,
in this latest Ottawa-Paris conflict... (McWhinney in

24 By far the best account of this affair occurs in Mc-
Whinney's article (Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 142-
150). His observations and conclusions are worthy of note:
...The de Lipkowski affair itself seems to have
stemmed from political events beyong the immediate
control either of the professional Foreign Ministers
in Ottawa or in Paris, or of the Quebec Premier...
(p. 118)
...it was hardly possible to avoid the conclusion that
an undue amount of time and energy had been invested
by all three capitals - Ottawa, Quebec, and Paris - in
an affair of disproportionately slight social value;
and that, whatever issues of constitutional principle
may have been involved at the beginning, the war had
now become trivial and farcical...no one of the parties
could now emerge with much political profit or advan-
tage...(p. 149).

In substance, the de Lipkowski affair played an insignificant
part in the international relations of Quebec. In form,
however, it typified the politics through which Quebec
struggled to assure itself of an international role. Often
third or even fourth parties were drawn into what was es-
sentially a domestic, an Ottawa-Quebec, or federal-provin-
cial, dispute. The trivial, farcical, ill-mannered extremes
to which all parties resorted in the pursuit of symbolic

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The trend towards reasonableness which had begun in the summer resumed in December 1969. Schumann and Sharp met at the Brussels NATO Council meeting and, after a long private discussion, apparently agreed to avoid similar incidents in the future (Le Devoir, 6 décembre 1969, p.2).

Bertrand and Sharp had previously agreed on arrangements for Quebec-Canadian representation at the up-coming Paris conference of francophone education ministers (Le Devoir, 26 novembre 1969, p. 16).

...Everything thus pointed finally to a polite and essentially pragmatic accommodation among the three parties - Ottawa, Quebec, and Paris - reflecting at once the commonsense and moderation of their principal spokesmen in recent weeks, federal External Affairs Minister Sharp, Quebec Premier Bertrand, and French Foreign Minister Schumann... (McWhinney in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 150).

By 1970, at least the question of Quebec's attendance at educational conferences seemed to be closed. Following the conclusion of arrangements for the conference at Mauritania, February 23-26, Mr. Sharp declared to the House that "the principles that were followed in the past for attendance at educational ministers' conferences are well established and will be followed" (International Canada, 1970, p. 31). Quebec led the Canadian delegation.

Despite the apparent solution to this problem, there remained considerable disagreement over several issues surrounding the constitutional conference (for the Agence de gains, fortunately gave way to a "new recognition of the merits of co-operative federalism" (p. 118). If the de Lipkowski affair produced anything of benefit, it was certainly this.
coopération), to be held in Niamey, March 16-20. Particular
negotiations which had begun in January, continued through
February and into March. (One will recall that general dis-
cussions began at the first Niamey conference one year be-
fore.) Proposals and counter-proposals were exchanged be-
tween federal and provincial officials, and finally, between
Trudeau and Bertrand. That such lengthy and laborious bar-
gaining should precede this Niamey conference, did not sur-
prise one observer, Jean-Charles Bonenfant. For him, it
was very much a "rapprochement historique":

...La conférence...a été pour le Québec l'occasion de
duire valoir ses désirs d'activité extérieure car elle
posait les trois problèmes classiques d'une telle
activité, celui de la représentation, celui de la sig-
nature d'un accord et celui de la participation à une
organisme international... (Études Internationales,

On March 13, final arrangements had been concluded:
Quebec delegates would be part of the Canadian delegation
which Gerard Pelletier would again head; the leader of the
Quebec delegation would act as vice-chairman; Canada would
vote with one voice, or abstain; but, in matters of provin-
cial jurisdiction, the Quebec delegate would speak in the
name of his government; Quebec would be allowed to display
its flag in company with that of Canada, with the latter
taking precedence; a similar procedure applied with respect
to name plaques; Mr. Pelletier would sign the charter first,
in the name of Canada, followed by the signatures of pro-
vincial representatives; Quebec, like the other interested
provinces, would be adequately represented on the commissions
and committees of the Agency, according to the subject-matters discussed; and lastly, Canada and Quebec would share equally the Canadian delegation's financial contribution to the budget (Études Internationales, juin 1970, p. 88-89).

At the conference, however, one hurdle remained:

...La France...avait demandé que ce soit non seulement les États souverains qui fussent partie de l'organisation mais aussi les gouvernements, les institutions et les associations dont la compétence serait compatible avec la vocation de l'Agence...(Études Internationales, juin 1970, p. 89).

This proposal, which would have allowed Quebec full membership, was opposed by the Canadian federal government, as the latter "reserved the right to deal with foreign countries" (International Canada, 1970, p. 61). Following a prolonged debate, whereby the Agency's existence was at times placed in jeopardy, an agreement was reached. But neither Quebec nor Ottawa spoke in terms of victory or defeat at the conclusion of the conference. The compromise

25 This agreement constitutes article 3, subsection 3 of the Agency's Charter:

...Dans le plein respect de la souveraineté et de la compétence internationale des États membres, tout gouvernement peut être admis comme gouvernement participant aux institutions, aux activités et aux programmes de l'Agence, sous réserve de l'approbation de l'État membre dont relève le territoire sur lequel le gouvernement participant concerné exerce son autorité et selon les modalités convenues entre ce gouvernement et celui de l'État membre...

Both documents, la Convention relative à l'Agence de coopération culturelle et technique and la Charte de l'Agence de coopération culturelle et technique, are reproduced in Études Internationales, juin 1970, p. 91-101.

26 Michel Roy, who was at Niamey, explained the reasons for this restraint:
had been semi-satisfactory for both parties: Ottawa ensured that Canadian representation as an international entity would not be split; Quebec succeeded, nevertheless, in joining for the first time, an international organization.

For McWhinney, this second Niamey conference "may... have been in the nature of the last storm, preceding a final calm" (Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 152). Events to date, having been devoid of those verbal diplomatic/constitutional battles of the past, seem to verify that statement.

Particularly since the April 1970 election in Quebec, the principles of federal comity have formed the basis for relations between Quebec and la francophonie, and Canada and la francophonie.

The new Quebec Premier, Robert Bourassa, has given the external relations of his province a new direction. While not minimizing cultural relations - "les relations culturelles avec la France sont fondamentales" (Bourassa/Québec!, p. 31) - Bourassa has given economic issues first priority:

...il faut "asseoir la coopération culturelle sur la coopération économique"... (Bourassa/Québec!, p. 31).

The previous pre-occupation with symbols has therefore suffered, having been replaced by more pragmatic goals and issues.

...ce n'est pas seulement par prudence, parce qu'ils se trouvaient à l'étranger, ou par diplomatie pour éviter de heurter les autres pays participants, que le secrétaire d'État et le secrétaire-général du Conseil exécutif du Québec se sont abstenus soigneusement d'employer ce vocabulaire. C'est surtout que la réalité de l'entente, les conditions dans lesquelles elle a été réalisée et, enfin, la portée véritable de l'accord ne le justifiaient pas... (Le Devoir, 23 mars 1970, p. 1).
In conclusion, Quebec's presence internationally has not been changed, but rather "normalized":

...on peut donc conclure que rien d'essentiel n'est changé dans les relations extérieures du Québec, mais que par suite de la présence à Québec d'un nouveau gouvernement qui coïncide avec une transformation de l'attitude de la France elles semblent devoir prendre une orientation différente qui sera moins politique et plus économique et qui se précisera sans coup d'œil à l'intérieur des structures actuelles du fédéralisme canadien...(Études Internationales, septembre 1970, p. 76).

The normalization of Quebec's external relations has not, however, been accompanied by recognition, or full acceptance, on the part of the federal government. The open diplomatic clashes and covert backstage manoeuverings (which so often characterized and accompanied the international relations of Quebec from 1965-1970) might have been halted, but the underlying issues which gave rise to those battles continue. The essential aspirations of Quebec have not changed, nor has the character of Canadian federalism.

This chapter, it must be pointed out, has dealt largely with the governmental process; that is, the international relations of Quebec were viewed from the governmental, the administrative-legislative point of view. To say, therefore, that 1965 was a watershed is to indicate only a change in the governmental process, a change whereby the spacial transmission of culture was, relatively speaking, institutionalized. Administrative and legislative structures were created, manpower employed, and monies allocated for the
establishment and orderly functioning of Quebec relations with other francophone societies.

The much broader political process of Quebec was not mentioned. In terms of 1965, this process, being composed of different constituencies, is less easily characterized as having undergone any profound transformation. While the views of some political constituencies outpaced those of the government, others invoked restraint. But since it is in the nature of democratically-elected parties, particularly those of Canada, to tread as wide a path between extremes as is politically possible, then one must assume that the governmental process is a rough reflection of its environment. The views of such popular but divergent Quebec constituencies - such as those represented by Rene Levesque and Jean Drapeau - are not so much reconciled as inevitably encompassed by the governmental process. This is only to say that in a pluralist society - and Quebec is one - overlapping occurs.

With respect to the international relations of Quebec, the similar orientation of the Liberal and Union Nationale governments of the period seems to imply a fairly broad consensus within the political process. Tactics, strategies, means to short-term goals, are always in dispute. This is the realm of day-to-day politics. For a society to progress and develop, however, there must exist general agreement as to "ends" before meaningful action can be had. It is from such premises that governments proceed. The premises upon
which the governments of Quebec have acted are those of the Quiet Revolution: firstly, that cultural-national survival is of value; secondly, that, being endangered by technology and the force of numbers, cultural-national survival is better ensured by extroversion and cultural reinforcement rather than by the introversion and isolation of the past; thirdly, since the economy and culture are interdependent, that a French-speaking economy is equally necessary; fourthly, that such economic and cultural particularism demands decentralization, or maximum autonomy for Quebec; and lastly, that the state is best equipped to act as agent in these tasks, that is, that the state has a singularly positive role to play.

27 That is why, in reference to the discussion above, 1965 is described as a watershed for Quebec's governmental process and not the political process. It is more likely, and it is generally accepted, that the transformation of the latter was gradual and preceded that of the former.

28 This is according to the given general political structure, federalism. For some, particularly separatists, this is no problem. But, while separatists may dominate certain occupational and/or age groups, they do not comprise the majority to date. The argument advanced here is that the governmental process is operating with a rough approximation of the political mean in mind.

29 These ideational inputs from the political process occurred with the rise of Quebec's new middle class. As the politico-cultural pressures of the 1960's forced a growing number of this self-assertive and informed group into the provincial bureaucracy, the governmental organization changed. The Department of Public Instruction is a case in point. The increasing secularization of society and of the political process in particular prompted the creation of a Department of Education. Moreover, the infusion of lay officials brought ideas which inclined to extend rather than to restrict, outside contacts and co-operation.

This example only serves to emphasize the close
All these have, of course, been mentioned. They are a subtle blend of short- and long-term goals, and thus constitute both means and ends. The actions of Quebec to effect those means, to achieve those ends, have also been recounted: the drive for an international role - an expression of extroversion; the conclusion of cultural, technical and economic co-operative programmes - a manifestation of cultural-economic reinforcement. But where external affairs are concerned, attempts at legitimate decentralization have so far been in vain. The federal government maintains a firm position that it possesses exclusive jurisdiction over all matters which transcend Canadian boundaries, that Canada's international personality and foreign policy are indivisible. The federal and Quebec governments thus confront one another with cultural and political arguments, in the hope of settling the dispute once and for all on a constitutional level.

relationship existing between the political and governmental processes, whereby the inputs from the former directly affect the outputs of the latter.
CHAPTER III

LEGAL, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL ARGUMENTS

The federal government, particularly under Pearson and under his successor Trudeau, had not sat idle during the 1960's when the governmental and political processes of Quebec were commanding great concern. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was established in 1963; a policy of "co-operative federalism" was pursued until 1968. Both were designed to correct the inequities of Canada's majority-minority (English-French) relations; each attempted, in its own way, to find solutions to the problems and accusations raised in the Quiet Revolution's aftermath. Yet while these, and other similar measures, sought to establish between Ottawa and Quebec more just modi vivendi et operandi domestically, the question of external involvement was quite another matter. Indeed, the international implications which flowed from Quebec's desire to use fully its legislative prerogatives, had no small impact upon the federal government.

Martin and Pearson, especially after 1965, were more emphatic on the bilingual and bicultural qualities of Canadian foreign policy:

...the government of Canada represents all of Canada on the international plane and...we are anxious to use our powers in the foreign affairs field to promote and further the interests of all Canadians, including, of course, those relating to our unique French-speaking heritage...(Martin in Morrison, p.4).
Francophone Africa was suddenly in the spotlight of Canadian foreign aid. Furthermore, in the face of accusations that the Department of External Affairs did not represent the interests of French Canadians, either at home or abroad, the government moved to recruit more Québécois, and to transform the Department into a more truly bilingual unit. (On this development, see Gilles Lalande; The Department of External Affairs and Biculturalism: Diplomatic Personnel and Language Use; and Federalism and International Relations, p. 41-42.)

During this whole period, and particularly from 1965 on, there existed a continuing see-saw effect between Ottawa and Quebec over the latter's jurisdiction regarding treaty-making and treaty-implementation. That Quebec's actions were legally valid was denied by Ottawa as strongly as it

In the first half of the 1960's, $17 million was allocated to Commonwealth Africa, compared to Francophone Africa's $1.5 million (CIDA Annual Review, 1969). Today, 1969-70, the balance is sharply reversed with allocations to Francophone Africa exceeding by $10 million those to Commonwealth Africa ($34 and $24 millions respectively). In fact, bilateral aid allocations to this French-speaking area far exceed that to any other region (except Asia as a whole) and easily surpass the amounts given to any other two regions combined - excluding, again, Asia (International Canada, 1970, p. 173-174).

That such federal attention is directly attributable to events in Quebec is the view of several authors - Atkey, Matthews, McWhinney and Morrison. Of these, Matthews is most blunt:

...the extension of Canada's aid programme to French speaking Africa was not motivated by a moral concern for balancing the scales of justice. Rather, this decision was the by-product of a Canadian domestic crisis. Building bridges with la Francophonie was seen as one way of dealing with the French Canadian problem...(in International Journal, p. 125).
was supported by Quebec. Indeed, it was (and continues to be) a debate of great importance, for, as Atkey points out, "...at stake is not only the internal maintenance of the Canadian federation, but the role of Canada in the international community..." (in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 153).

It may be useful therefore to put forward the main arguments on each side, not because the basic issue is capable of a purely legal solution, but rather for consideration as to their contemporary relevance, legal authority and political viability.

One of the primary complications in this matter is the virtual silence of the British North America (BNA) Act as to the separation of treaty-making and treaty-implementation.

2 The politico-legal arguments (dealing with provincial treaty-making and treaty-implementation) have been well documented in the past few years, and it would serve little purpose in outlining them all here. However, I refer the reader to several of the better discussions, most of which are incorporated by the following section: Atkey in International Journal; Lyon and Atkey in Canadian Constitutional Law in a Modern Perspective; Laskin, Delisle, McWhinney (vol. 1) and McWhinney, Atkey (vol. 2) in The Confederation Challenge. For the positions of the federal and Quebec governments, see Jean-Pierre Goyer in Commons Debates, (30 October 1969, p. 284-289); Federalism and International Relations, and its supplement, Federalism and International Conferences on Education (federal position); and Paul Gerin-Lajoie in Débats (13 avril 1967, p. 2173-2178), Document de Travail sur les Relations avec l'Étranger, as well as Les Pouvoirs Extérieurs du Québec.

3 The importance of the BNA Act in the determination of this question is underlined by the fact that international law cannot by itself decide whether or not a member of a federal union can make a treaty. International law looks,
Firstly, while section 132 does relate to federal obligations arising from treaties between the British Empire and other foreign countries, it is contended that the Statute of Westminster (1931) negated those necessary powers of federal performance. Nowhere else does the BNA Act speak of the making or implementation of treaties. Thus, the governing rule has become the principle laid down by the Labour Conventions Case in 1937:

...for the purposes of...the distribution of legislative powers between the Dominion and the Provinces, there is no such thing as treaty legislation as such. The distribution is based on classes of subjects; and as a treaty deals with a particular class of subjects so will the legislative power of performing it be ascertained...(Laskin in Confederation Challenge, vol. 1, p. 109).

The exclusive right to implement treaties within its own constitutionally-defined jurisdiction, has implied, to Quebec

in the first instance, to the constitution of the state in question to determine the treaty-making capacity" (Federalism and International Relations, p. 12). Both Quebec and Ottawa recognize this. In fact, argues Brossard, nothing prevents the federal government from granting wide powers to Canadian provinces; international law could do nothing but accept any change in the Canadian constitution (p. 227).

4 ...The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all Powers necessary or proper for performing the Obligations of Canada or of any other Province thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties between the Empire and such Foreign Countries...

5 ...No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the commencement of this Act shall extend or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of that Dominion...(Statute of Westminster, 1931, section 4).
at least, the equally legal right to negotiate and sign treaties on provincial subjects. This would seem to have some validity, being as it is an extension of what Justice Laskin calls "a long-established constitutional doctrine": namely, that the distribution of legislative power between Parliament and the provincial legislatures involves a correlative distribution of the accompanying executive or prerogative power (in *Confederation Challenge*, vol. 1, p.103).

This contention regarding the inseparability of executive and legislative powers (i.e. of treaty-making and -implementation) is further reinforced by the *Liquidators* and *Bonanza Creek* cases of 1892 and 1916 respectively. Whereas the former held that "the provinces were independent and autonomous with the Lieutenant Governors having all the powers of the royal prerogative necessary for provincial purposes", the latter supplemented this by asserting that "the distribution of powers under the grant of executive authority follows the distribution under the grant of legislative powers in the BNA Act" (Atkey in *International Journal*, p. 262). Using such weapons, the Quebec government argues:

...qu'en matière d'exercice de la prérogative royale, le texte des lettres patentes (...émises au Gouverneur-général en 1947...) ne peut prévaloir à l'encontre de la constitution et que celle-ci implique un partage de la prérogative qui correspond au partage de la compétence législative.

...D'autre part, l'application à cette question des principes généraux gouvernant l'exercice de la prérogative royale entraîne la conclusion inévitable que les provinces jouissent, en vertu de la constitution actuelle, du droit de conclure des traités avec les autres pays dans les matières qui sont de leur ressort législatif...(*Document de Travail*, 1969, p. 18, p. 20-21).
There are, in addition to these constitutional arguments, the recent precedents set by Quebec to which some would point as suggesting that a de facto provincial competence in the international sphere is being created by evolution, or to which others would refer as establishing provincial competence to make international agreements through constitutional custom and practice. This applies not only to matters of competence, but to Quebec's international personality as well. Paul Gerin-Lajoie, having reviewed Quebec's international initiatives, held such an opinion:

...Cette action internationale du Québec, déjà importante, implique en quelque sorte que le Québec possède une personnalité internationale. Or, on a contesté, non seulement que le Québec ait cette personnalité, mais aussi qu'il puisse même en être doté un jour... (Débats, 13 avril 1967, p. 2174).

The federal legal argument, on the other hand, appears to be substantially better founded. It too is based on the devolution of foreign affairs power from Britain to Canada, as the result of a series of Canadian external participations:

6 The recognition of one’s international personality is dependent upon the recognition of one’s external sovereignty. Brossard argues that Quebec participates in Canada’s international sovereignty:

...ce n'est pas l'État fédéral qui détient la souveraineté extérieure mais la fédération, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble constitué par l'État fédéral et les États provinciaux...(p. 231).

Although he does not treat Quebec’s international personality specifically, his argument leads logically to the conclusion that if Quebec participates in Canada’s international sovereignty, then it surely also shares Canada’s international personality. This conclusion is implicit.
Washington Treaty (1871), Treaty of Versailles (1919), Halibut Fisheries Treaty (1923), Imperial Conference (1926), Statute of Westminster (1931), and the declaration of war (1939). As well, foreign affairs generally (by definition) cannot be considered seriously among "matters of a merely local or private nature" (BNA Act, section 92); furthermore, since it is not "assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the provinces", international relations, as a residual power, falls to the federal government. Section 3 of the Statute of Westminster gives "the Parliament of a Dominion...full power to make laws having extraterritorial operation"; and the Letters Patent of 1947 would seem to include, among other powers, the transfer of the treaty-making prerogative (formerly vested exclusively in the Queen by section 9 of the BNA Act) to the Governor-General (in Council).

The federal government also countered that argument of Quebec which employed the Labour Conventions Case. The judgment dealt not with treaty-making, but rather with the implementation of treaties. (The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council clearly stated that it wished to express no opinion on the treaty-making issue. See Atkey in International Journal, p. 266). Federal advocates point to the decision as handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada (before it was appealed to the J.C.P.C.), to the belated dissent of Lord Wright (who, as a member of the Privy Council, sat on the case), and to Chief Justice Kerwin's statement (in the course of his judgment in Francis v. The Queen, 1956) that "it may
be necessary...to consider in the future the judgment of the Judicial Committee in the Labour Conventions Case" (Laskin in Confederation Challenge, vol. 1, p. 111).

However firm the federal position may be when drawing upon internal strengths, it is buttressed further by references to international law. Here, "recognition" plays a large role; and it was the federal government, not provincial governments, that was recognized by other sovereign states as having power to conduct foreign affairs - first by Britain, then by the United States, by others, by the United Nations. It is a position which has gone, until recently, unchallenged at home and unchallenged abroad. There is, as well, the unwritten legal rule which regards the central government of a federation as responsible for any default on an international agreement, whether that tort is committed by the central government, or by a component unit. According to federal proponents, this places Ottawa in a potentially unfair position, particularly if Ottawa is to be required to remedy provincial breaches of international agreements over which it has no control. Moreover, were such a provincial default to occur, it would seriously detract from Canada's international integrity. The federal government, they conclude, by shouldering the responsibility, must also control the relations (Atkey in International Journal, p. 267).

Quebec proponents use this same argument. If the provinces possessed the necessary executive (treaty-making) power to coincide with the present legislative (treaty-implementation) powers, then not only would Canada be
Yet despite the federal government's stronger legal argumentation, there is no rigidity about its conclusions. Indeed, they are quite flexible, game for negotiation, open for revision. Their proposals for co-operation present a stark reminder that the issue's solution lies not in legalities, but rather in the politics of federal-provincial (or specifically Ottawa-Quebec) relations:

...neither centralization to the exclusion of other priorities nor decentralization to the point of dissolution is desirable or necessary. What is of particular importance is to improve and extend the present framework, on the basis of the very broad range of options which is available...

...Within these limits, it is not the intention of the Government to fix upon or crystallize any one formula for improvement or adjustment in existing arrangements. Those which are referred to above (in the text) are open to consideration and it is the Government's hope that they will receive close attention and examination in all interested quarters. For its part, the Government will be prepared to consider the further development of any such procedures which are found to be of general interest, as well as alternatives which may be proposed, with a view to achieving a fully effective design for future co-operation... (Federalism and International Relations, p. 48).

Indeed, both federal and provincial legal arguments lead away from rather than toward the judicial system, placing the solution within the political arena.

Indeed, both federal and provincial legal arguments lead away from rather than toward the judicial system, placing the solution within the political arena.

indemnified against such provincial torts, but it would also participate more fully in international affairs (Brossard et al., p. 85).

8 This is not surprising when one considers the suspicion with which provincial governments view the constitutional arbiter, the Supreme Court of Canada. At the same time, however, the federal government has no assurance that, if the question were put before the Court, a decision (or opinion) favourable to Ottawa would be made. The decision, according to Peyton Lyon, could easily go either way (Le Devoir, 20 mars 1967, p. 4).
Quebec's political objectives are shaped fundamentally by its cultural-national particularisms, by the value placed upon those particularisms, and therefore upon their survival.

...We believe that there is in Canada, in a sociological sense, a nation of French speech, whose home is in Quebec. This nation has every intention of continuing its self-assertion by obtaining...all the instruments required for its development.

Specifically...as the mainstay of a nation, (Quebec) wants free rein to make its own decisions affecting the growth of its citizens as human beings...their economic development...their cultural fulfilment...and the presence abroad of the Quebec community.

To this end, the new Quebec government is committed to the fundamental task of obtaining legal and political recognition of the French Canadian nation... (Statement: Tax Structure Committee, 1966, p. 2-3).

...As French speaking Canadians, we have the unshakable conviction that we form a viable community sharing one of the greatest cultures in the western world, speaking an international language and endowed with vast human potentialities. That is why, despite all difficulties, we are resolved to preserve our identity... (Preliminary Statement: Confederation of Tomorrow Conference, 1967, p. 5).

La survivance thus lies behind one of Quebec's prime political objectives, decentralization. Each successive Quebec government since 1867 has remained "consistently attached to a strict federalism as a protector of its own culture and the cultural dualism of Canada. (Each) has been the chief citadel of resistance to centralizing conceptions and homogenizing tendencies" (Brady, in Meekison, p. 338).

While, historically, Quebec has always sought to guard its domestic provincial autonomy against federal encroachments, external affairs is presently in the foreground of that vigil. The age of technique has altered the content and conduct of international relations and these changes, in turn,
affect not only Canadian federal-provincial relations, but threaten as well la survivance.

Increasingly, since the second world war, international relations has shifted its focus in terms of subject matter. More and more it deals with topics which, in Canada's case, are assigned to provincial jurisdiction - education, culture, labour, health, etc. - and if the federal government were to ignore this large and growing sector of international activities, Canada would be harnessed with an ever-narrowing external role. Those benefits which co-operation and mutual development bring, would no doubt be lost. Yet, if the federal government were to treat all international activities, including these, as matters of its own exclusive jurisdiction, it could not help but reshape, if only by influence, the domestic distribution of powers and thus the federal structure. From a constitutional point of view, and within the context of Quebec's devotion to decentralization (or the minimum objective of strict federalism), this is totally unacceptable:

...Le fait...que les relations extérieures aient été généralement confiées au gouvernement central à l'époque où ces relations ne se rapportaient qu'à la paix et à la guerre ou aux échanges commerciaux ne veut pas dire grand'chose aujourd'hui, alors que ces relations concernent de plus en plus l'éducation, la culture et les affaires sociales...(Document de Travail, 1969, p. 34).

...Now most of these sectors are a provincial responsibility, and Quebec obviously cannot allow them to be dealt with internationally by the federal government alone. The content of agreements in these fields has such a close bearing on the implementation of day-to-day policies that, if the federal government were to have a monopoly on international affairs, it would gradually take over de facto - if not de jure - internal jurisdiction over matters which constitutionally, do
not fall within its competence... *(Brief on the Constitution, 1968, p. 14).

It is all the more unacceptable when consideration is given to the inefficient and artificial nature of boundaries within the modern world. If technology, through the creation of vast new networks of communications, has webbed more intricately the relations among governments and peoples, it has also, by the same means, facilitated informal penetration. Technology has fostered the proliferation of international actors and agents, and has provided all with some degree of informal access. Thus, in a period of increasing informal access, as the traditional lines between states become more blurred and as the controls of movement across and within boundaries become more difficult,

...a situation sometimes develops in which the critical boundary may not be the geographical one but one defined by the circumstances of the market, the location of the adherents of an opposing ideology, the location of a given race or religious group, (etc.)... *(Scott, 1965, p. 168).

This, precisely, is Quebec's argument; that the geographical boundary is now irrelevant. Instead, the critical line of demarcation follows closely the subject-matters of jurisdictional competence, for, in the modern world, external-internal dichotomies are inapplicable.

9 The inextricable relationship between external and domestic affairs is often used to support Quebec's international ambitions. Since both jurisdictions share one and the same boundary (however tenuous that line may be), to affect one is necessarily to affect the other. Jean-Marc Leger repeatedly points this out.
The salience of such arguments for Quebec is reinforced by their dual nature: the boundary of exclusive jurisdiction for the government of Quebec coincides with the equally critical boundary of the cultural-national community. Strict federalism is one means to survival. Not only must the federal government cease to encompass provincial areas on the international plane, but it must also cease to represent, or to speak on behalf of, French Canada abroad. As so many Quebec governments have stated, Quebec - not Ottawa - is the mainstay of the French Canadian community.

This latter assertion stems from both historical and current developments whereby French Canadians ended their "long search for a fatherland" (Brunet in Russell, p. 47-60). During the Quiet Revolution Québécois particularly identified...
themselves increasingly with the state of Quebec as the sole provider of French Canadian opportunities on a non-discriminatory basis. Ottawa was left as the capital of English Canada. Quebec’s nationalist historians point to the representation of French Canadians in federal employment statistics and percentages, and to the historical pro-English performance of the central government (especially in times of crisis) as having rendered Ottawa ineligible for that leadership role. Indeed, the Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism confirmed this lack of identification by French Canadians with Ottawa:

...Our first contacts with French-speaking Canada did not reveal anything we had not anticipated, unless it was the extreme suspicion with which a large part of Quebec looks on anything that is initiated by Ottawa, and its considerable scepticism as to English Canada's ability and desire to understand French Canada. Some said irritably: "We have been submitting our claims for thirty, fifty and even a hundred years, and there have never been any results - why should we begin again now?" (p. 28).

The force of such popular historical interpretations - interpretations which successive Quebec leaders have not been reluctant to accept - thus granted to the government of Quebec, the duty of ensuring and providing for the growth and fulfilment of the French Canadian collectivity.

In this light, the denial of a federal role is at once an assertion that Quebec, in the exercise of its full legislative competence, be the single, direct and legitimate spokesman for that cultural-national community. Demands for a "special status" at home have thereby become claims for a
"special status" abroad:

...if Quebec is the prime political structure for French Canada's destiny, there is no reason by this province's government should not assume international responsibilities to the extent that external factors may affect its destiny...(Painchaud in Clarkson, p. 86).

And, as it is argued, if this should be the case generally, it should most certainly be the rule where cultural-national life-lines are concerned:

...jamais nous ne lâcherons quand il s'agit de relations dans le domaine de l'éducation et, particulièrement, avec la francophonie, car nous ne voulons pas laisser à Ottawa...le contrôle de l'oxygène francophone dont nous avons besoin pour vivre...(Daniel Johnson; Le Devoir, 26 septembre 1968, p. 2) 12

11 Claude Ryan, in an editorial (Le Devoir, 14 septembre 1968), puts forth this exact case:

...le gouvernement du Québec, en raison de la composition de sa population et de l'histoire même du dernier siècle, a une responsabilité toute spéciale à l'endroit de l'épanouissement de la vie française en Amérique du Nord. Chargé de responsabilités exclusives dans des domaines aussi vitaux que l'éducation, le bien-être, les relations de travail, la justice, le développement économique et social, il éprouve spontanément, dès qu'il veut respirer, le besoin d'être en rapport avec le pays qui incarne par excellence la vie française. Il veut pouvoir communiquer directement avec ce pays. Il lui répugne de devoir se prêter, dans le développement de ces rapports, à la surveillance jalouse d'une belle-mère, même si celle-ci est très bien disposée...(p. 4).

12 Bertrand has made a similar assertion. In the Document de Travail (p. 10), the Quebec government submits that, particularly in the field of education (and education plays a large part in Quebec's external relations), only the provincial government can effect competent international agreements:

...le gouvernement du Québec doit y être directement partie et...il ne peut accepter d'y participer par l'intermédiaire du gouvernement fédéral. Tous ces échanges exigent une connaissance intime de l'appareil gouvernemental et des institutions d'enseignement. Il s'agit d'abord d'évaluer les besoins, puis de fixer des priorités et, pour cela, d'engager des discussions avec les ministères et les institutions d'enseignement; il faut ensuite négocier le tout, annuellement, avec les
While Quebec was demanding the recognition of its right as sole spokesman for the French Canadian community, and while it argued for various forms of "special status" at home and abroad, it became increasingly important for that government to exercise more fully that right. In the post-war years - when the evolution of political thought was firmly establishing the Quebec state as a point of political reference for French Canadians, when the Quiet Revolution was re-defining la survivance, when demands for full legislative competence were making "special status" more attractive, when the content of international relations was touching more closely upon the nerves of provincial jurisdiction - in the midst of all these activities, the relationship between la survivance and Quebec's need to engage in external relations became increasingly apparent. The same technology which had opened the world to Quebec had simultaneously opened Quebec to the world, and specifically to its North American English-speaking environment.

Immediately, a variety of implications became evident to Québécois: sociologically, their traditional protective way of life was disintegrating; demographically, they comprised a tiny group in comparison with the North American English-speaking community; economically, their industrial society, created by aliens, reflected none of their own particular
cultural values; and politically, the 1867 constitution did not grant the protection they had long anticipated. Premier Johnson, in reviewing these "obstacles to full self-achievement", was, perhaps correctly, pessimistic:

...our nation no longer has a choice. If it passively accepts the present situation, it will inevitably take the road to slow but sure assimilation into the great North American mass...(Preliminary Statement: Confederation of Tomorrow Conference, 1967, p. 4-5).

Given its numerical size and the relative strength of its economy, the French Canadian community could never hope to maintain its position within, let alone dominate, the patterns of North American cultural communications. La survivance demanded cultural reinforcement. External relations thus became politically an objective, culturally an imperative. Several papers presented at the Montreal conference of Les États-Généraux make this quite clear:

...French Canadians are and will be more and more submitted to massive influence from the United States in every respect of their life, their work, their thought. From this it follows that prompt and rapid development of close relationships with other French-speaking countries is an urgent necessity...

...it is no exaggeration to affirm that the entry of French Canada into the Francophone world has become a fundamental condition, a sine qua non, of survival. Yesterday, this could have been regarded simply as desirable or useful; today, it is necessary, it is vitally desirable...

...it is necessary also to revive our cultural heritage and to restore our language, and to open ourselves in French to the modern world...(in Morrison, p. 22-23).

This cultural imperative has strongly conditioned the behaviour of Quebec governments in the 1960's, particularly
their determination to assume full legislative and administrative responsibilities, whether those responsibilities lay in the domestic or in the external domain. The international relations of Quebec can certainly be seen in this light. It is an attempt to institutionalize and, in the federal-provincial arena, to regularize Quebec's spacial transmission of French Canadian culture; it is an attempt to secure a much needed, much desired cultural reinforcement by co-operation and in association not only with the cultural motherland France, but also with other less-developed francophone societies. To Quebec, it is a question of breaking out of its previously self-imposed isolation wherein stagnation and assimilation are inevitably perceived; it is a question of extroversion, modernization and societal self-development (l'épanouissement) while preserving and developing all that is culturally valuable.

In defence of Quebec's international role, French Canadian advocates have employed Canadian political, technological and cultural arguments. Those used by Daniel Johnson, the most ardent and flamboyant advocate, combine all three:

...Il n'y a pas d'égalité possible pour la communauté française au Canada si le Québec ne peut pas négocier librement les accords nécessaires à la préservation de

13 The speeches of Liberal Paul Gerin-Lajoie and of the Union Nationale's Marcel Masse express strikingly similar sentiments:

...De plus, dans un monde où les frontières existent de moins en moins, il est évident que notre épanouissement social et culturel exige que nous exprimions nous-mêmes sur le plan international, que nous développions des contacts et des échanges, que nous nous donnions des
son heritage particulier. Il n'y a pas d'égalité possible pour une communauté nationale qui se trouve placée sous la dépendance d'une autre dans les domaines qui mettent en jeu son existence même...Dans le passé le Québec a pu préserver son heritage culturel grâce à isolement relatif. Cet isolement n'est plus possible aujourd'hui. Le temps est venu pour nous de nouer des contacts beaucoup plus étroits avec la France et les autres pays francophones du monde. Ce n'est pas un caprice juridique, c'est un nécessaire vitale...La nation n'est pas un cercle fermé...C'est une communauté de langue et de culture qui est ouverte par conséquent à tous ceux qui ont part à cette langue et à cette culture, quelle soit leur origine ethnique...(Le Devoir, 26 juin 1967, p. 1-2).

In addition, Louis Sabourin, keeping in mind the close relationship between Quebec's culture and its economy, adds the following economically-oriented reasoning:

dimensions nouvelles, des possibilités d'action plus étendues tant sur le plan individuel que collectif. Pour protéger notre identité québécoise et canadienne-francaise, nous nous sommes autrefois repliés sur nous-mêmes. Pour l'épanouir, il nous faut aujourd'hui nous ouvrir sur le monde...(Gerin-Lajoie; Débats, 13 avril 1967, p. 2176).

...Mais dans ce monde qui marche irrémédiablement vers l'unité d'action, il demeure quand même indispensable de sauvegarder les particularismes, principalement d'ordre culturel et sociologique, qui forment l'une des grandes richesses de l'humanité. Voilà pourquoi aucun peuple et, c'est le cas du peuple québécois, ne peut s'en remettre entièrement pour l'image qu'on projette de lui à l'extérieur à une autorité qui n'a jamais su le refléter fidèlement dans son essence et dans ses caractéristiques propres. Les États fédératifs sont souvent créés dans le but de protéger la diversité culturelle de leurs habitants. Mais l'expérience du passé, en ce qui nous concerne, nous indique clairement que la communauté québécoise doit avoir certaines fenêtres sur le monde extérieur pour s'acquitter de toutes ses obligations internes et pour assurer son épanouissement, même si elle ne jouit pas de la souveraineté complète ...(Le Devoir, 23 juin 1967, p. 5).

This latter statement by Masse is part of a speech, the text of which may be found in Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, p. 40-45.
...the government (of Quebec) must make sure that the million and a half young people who will look for jobs in the next fifteen years will be able to work in their language. Most private corporations are not yet able to create a French-speaking milieu de travail for they import most of their scientific know-how from the United States and English Canada. It is then up to the government of Quebec to try to counter-balance such a trend. The only way to do so is to establish more exchanges with French-speaking countries which can provide such scientific and technical knowledge ...(in Clarkson, p. 100).

Nevertheless, whatever arguments are brought to bear - whether cultural, political, legal, technological, or economic - the issue itself has evolved from one of "institutionalization" to one of "legitimization". The external activities of Quebec, particularly from 1965 onward, have placed that government firmly on the international scene. The Department of Intergovernmental Affairs, numerous cultural, economic, educational and technical programmes of co-operation, and Quebec's participation on several international or intergovernmental bodies and commissions, have virtually assured Quebec an international role in practice, if not in theory.

What remains to be settled is a question of degree, both in the quantity and in the quality of Quebec's international relations. Given the fluid nature of Quebec provincial and Canadian federal politics, it is a question which may conceivably never be answered, but for which in the continuing constitutional conference, and in day-to-day federal-provincial relations, a solution is constantly being sought.
Preservation of the French Canadian culture and nation has been, historically, a prime concern. Since the Conquest and for almost two centuries thereafter, the French Canadian Catholic Church has been, by virtue of its dominant position in Quebec's society, the receptacle of this culture and thus the guarantor of national survival. Language, culture, laws, general customs and ecclesiastical principles were freely interwoven by the Church to form the ideology of survival. Defensive isolation was the keystone. The state was an insignificant actor, for, with the Church ("the mother-institution of public institutions") serving as cultural repository, there was no necessity for interventional assistance; nor was the political climate appropriate, given Quebec's general conservative nature, for the state to assume a positive role.

The urbanization and accompanying secularization of Quebec altered this pattern. It was particularly under the accelerated technological advances of post-war Quebec that the power and relevance of the Church rapidly dissipated, and, in part by its own acquiescence, in part by public pressure, the Church gradually withdrew from many

1 Mason Wade wrote in the mid-1950's of this growing public pressure:

...All French Canadians are conscious of the great debt they owe to their clergy for ensuring cultural survival in the post-conquest period, though there is a growing

- 98 -
nonecclesiastical, societal functions.

In the critical area of cultural-national preservation, the state assumed the leading role. But the methods by which the state government attempted to sustain cultural-national integrity were not those of the Church. A twentieth century approach to the twentieth century technologically-inspired assimilative threats was needed. Defensive tactics of cultural isolation were now inapplicable, and the financial, administrative and moral supports of the state were given to an extroverted development encompassing all areas of provincial jurisdiction:

...group today who feel that this debt has been abundantly repaid and that the clergy should abandon many of their traditional activities now that there are plenty of trained laymen available to fulfil these nonclerical functions... (in Park, p. 369).

2 The Church's withdrawal was certainly not total, nor did the state seek to exclude it completely. Left-right and secular-sacral debates throughout the hierarchical structure of the Church (although more noticeable amongst the lower ranks of young clerics) contributed to its "hesitant and divided" nature (Corbett, p. 4), and thus to its relegation to one aspect of the larger politico-socio-economic complex. At the same time, and for the first time, a great and growing number of the lay middle class is concerned about cultural issues and are pursuing solutions beyond the aegis of that Church. This is no more than the natural functioning of a pluralist society.

The Church, however, is still a societal participant, directing its present attentions more towards the field of social action. For a current examination of the Church today and of its "thorough-going metamorphosis", see Norbert Lacoste, "A Mobile Church for a Mobile People" in Mann, vol. 1, p. 295-301.

3 The means of course changed with the ends; as la survivance was re-defined, so were government policies. The Premiership of Jean Lesage was the first where government policies issued in large part from the Quiet Revolution. He wrote of the attitudinal change toward cultural-national
...nous devons non seulement sauvegarder notre identité ethnique, mais nous devons trouver les moyens qui permettront à notre langue et à notre culture de s'épanouir...nous croyons que la cause de l'avancement de notre minorité nationale dans tous les domaines ne sera bien servie que si le gouvernement du Québec - la seule province à prédominance canadienne-française - adopte ce que j'appellerais une politique globale, en ne négligeant de cette façon aucun des domaines d'activité capables de favoriser l'épanouissement économique, social et culturel de notre groupe ethnique...(Un Québec Fort, p. 15-16).

The placing of education under state control was only an initial step towards l'épanouissement des Québécois. It did not per se ensure cultural development and enrichment, for the sources of French cultural strength lay beyond the borders of Quebec and beyond the borders of Canada and English-speaking North America. By the same technological means which permitted the anglophone culture to converge on Quebec, Quebec in turn, could reach cultural allies. Inter-societal cultural transmission was a sine qua non for l'épanouissement, and Quebec thus sought to establish relations (particularly and initially in the cultural-educational fields) with francophone societies abroad.

survival, that attitudinal change which formed the basis of his government's approach :  
...il n'est pas question de survivre, mais de VIVRE! Et vivre, c'est lutter...
...La population québécoise vivait jadis dans l'isolement, dans son petit monde à elle et dans le sentiment que "le Canada" s'arrêtait aux frontières de sa province; aujourd'hui, la province est ouverte sur le reste du pays et le reste du monde...Plus que jamais, elle tient à ses caractères propres, à sa culture, sa langue et sa religion. D'une manière, elle s'est engagée dans un processus d'affirmation de soi pour laquelle elle entend vivre désormais comme un peuple adulte dans un monde de nations souveraines...la population du Québec ne veut plus se contenter d'être la gardienne de cette culture ; elle veut en devenir le symbole vivant ...

(Un Québec Fort, p. 10-11).
Naturally, France held a fundamental position within this framework. It was the cultural fountainhead; its schools, its economy, its literati were all well established; they enjoyed a considerable reputation. Consequently, France provided the much-needed initial francophone reinforcement.

Nevertheless, as early as 1961, Francophone Africa was viewed as an important factor in the self-definition of Québécois. Relations with these newly independent states would offer cultural stimulation and strength, and would provide "la chance de faire connaître notre culture par les autres" (Un Québec Fort, p. 13). Most important, however, was that opportunity which Francophone Africa afforded Quebec:

...l'élément français du Canada peut, s'il le veut, devenir un important trait d'union entre les pays occidentaux et ceux qui appartiennent à ce que nous appelons le tiers-monde. Un grand nombre de ces pays sont d'expression française - je pense ici aux nouveaux États d'Afrique - et ils ont besoin de l'appui culturel et technique du Canada français. Tous ces nouveaux États ne partagent pas le même degré d'industrialisation et le même niveau de vie, mais tous, à cause de leur situation nouvelle et à cause de leur indépendance récente, sentent la nécessité de frôler les coudes des nations qui peuvent les comprendre. Il est indéniable que le Canada français appartient à ce groupe... (Un Québec Fort, p. 13).

Francophone Africa provided Quebec with the opportunity to make an original contribution to the human race. In so doing, Francophone Africa provided a raison d'être.

Given the new and acute assimilative threats of the technological age, given the redefinition of the means and
ends of cultural-national survival, and given the government's determination to pursue on its own, in all ways, the achievement of those means and ends, it was inevitable that Quebec should seek to institutionalize not only the temporal transmission, but the spacial transmission of culture as well. The attempt to effect an international role was the logical next-step in the government's drive to develop Quebec society, culturally and economically, by exercising fully its legislative and administrative prerogatives. Changes in the content and conduct of international relations, and the virtual silence of the British North America Act specifically on external affairs, facilitated this step and provided Quebec with some basis for argumentation.

Throughout the 1960's, but particularly from 1965-1970, the government of Quebec made increasingly frequent forays into the external arena and there sought to establish programmes of co-operation and exchange with other French-speaking states. To date, thousands of Québécois have participated in such programmes; several hundred others have served on the administrative commissions and bodies. Quebec

Jean Lesage, in his speeches, often spoke of the necessity for Quebec to count only on itself:

...il y a un accord complet quant à la nécessité pour la population du Québec de compter sur elle-même si elle veut voir ses espoirs et ses aspirations réalisés pleinement et convenablement...Dans la découverte et dans l'application de ces moyens (de nous épanouir), nous faisons face à des problèmes qui nous sont propres et nous savons qu'en dernière analyse, c'est presque toujours par nos propres énergies que nous les résoudrons. Dans ce domaine, nous voulons surtout nous aider nous-mêmes...(Un Québec Fort, p. 12 and p. 15).
operates three Délégations-Générales (New York, London and Paris), six Bureaux Économiques (Milan, Chicago, Boston, Dallas, Los Angeles, Dusseldorf), and a Mission permanent pour le Québec en Louisiane. The creation in 1967 of the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs signaled, for all provincial purposes, the institutionalization of the international relations of Quebec. Thereafter, Quebec's external activities were co-ordinated and controlled by one central, administrative agency.

The quantity and scope of Quebec's international activities seem to have assured that province of an international role. Indeed, its degree of involvement on the international plane presents a considerable barrier to the path of retreat. Furthermore, the continued allocation of monies, the employment of manpower and the creation of administrative bodies speak themselves of a certain determination in policy whereby Quebec is resolved to maintain transnational relations.

Such factors lead one to the conclusion that the international relations of Quebec is a permanent feature on the Canadian scene. In this sense, it is institutionalized. Moreover, because those relations deal largely with cultural, educational, and socio-economic affairs, and because they are

5 Chapter II of the Document de Travail (p. 6-13) gives an overall picture of Quebec’s international involvement up to February 1969. Études Internationales, a quarterly publication of the Centre Québécois de Relations Internationales, provides current documentation of the international relations of Quebec.
conducted within a francophone framework, one can also speak of Quebec's institutionalization of the spacial transmission of culture.

In terms of federal-provincial relations, what was originally a bitter and controversial issue has become more long-term and thus low-key. The international relations of Quebec is presently a political reality; its existence is no longer at stake. Instead, the debate has shifted increasingly to one of a mutually-acceptable legitimization, and its forum has become the constitutional conference.

Here, both the standardization (or institutionalization) of Quebec's relations and the intervention of short-term political phenomena account for the issue's less-than-urgent priority. In fact, at the most recent constitutional conference in Victoria, June 1971, the focus was on social welfare. Neither in the final communiqué, nor in the constitutional charter, was external affairs discussed (Le Devoir, 18 juin 1971, p. 5; and 19 juin 1971, p. 9 respectively).

---

6 Marcel Cadieux, a prominent federal figure (formerly Under Secretary of State for External Affairs and now Canadian Ambassador to the United States), holds this very opinion:

...Quebec's presence on the world scene is, I believe, not merely a fact; it is an obvious fact. That Quebec must be more active on that scene also appears obvious to me. The real problem is how Quebec is to play its role in the world...(in Meekison, p. 379).

7 The polarized Quebec election of April 1970, the FLQ crisis in the fall, and the general unhealthy state of the Canadian economy all made great demands on both federal and provincial governments.

8 According to Claude Lemelin, however, there were rumours
Perhaps a more important factor has been "de-symbolization". The election of Robert Bourassa effected a change in emphasis and style. Economic and fiscal questions were given top priority, and federal advantages stressed. The quest for governmental symbols as ends in themselves - a quest which seemed to characterize the Ottawa-Quebec dispute in the 1960's - was "consciously downplayed" (McWhinney in Confederation Challenge, vol. 2, p. 141).

All these factors have combined to defuse what was once an explosive issue. Together, they account for the relatively more pragmatic approach being taken by both Ottawa and Quebec. But, while the issue of Quebec's international relations may have been relegated to a longer-term, lower-key concern, it remains nevertheless without a solution. It is unlikely that the federal government will concede to Quebec the rights to represent itself and to negotiate and sign agreements on its own initiative, in all matters of provincial jurisdiction. It is equally unlikely that Quebec will concede to the federal government an exclusive jurisdiction in international affairs. There is, of course, a myriad of compromise positions and the attainment of the most suitable may involve a much lengthier process of negotiation than is presently envisaged.

that the federal government would submit a text calling for the recognition of its exclusive competence in international affairs (Le Devoir, 11 juin 1971, p. 4). Such a text did not appear.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Park, Julian, ed. The Culture of Contemporary Canada. Ryerson (Toronto : 1957).


Rioux, Marcel and Martin, Yves, eds. French Canadian Society. McClelland and Stewart (Toronto : 1964).


**Articles**


Gagne, Raymond. "Cultures in Conflict : The Imperative of Language" in *Canadian Dimension*, vol. 6, nos. 3-4. p. 16-19.


McWhinney, Edward. "Federalism, Biculturalism and International Law" in *Canadian Yearbook of International Law*, vol. 3. p. 100-120.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.


Government Publications


Canada. House of Commons Debates. Queen's Printer (Ottawa).


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.


Québec. Débats de l'Assemblée législative du Québec. (Québec).


CIIA Publications


Canadian Institute of International Affairs. International Canada. (Toronto).

Institut Canadien des Affaires Internationales (Québec section). Études Internationales. (Québec).
Newspapers

*Le Devoir*. Montreal (daily).

VITA

Born : MARK STEWART KELLY; January 16, 1948, in Windsor, Ontario; son of Mr. and Mrs. S.L. Kelly of Windsor.

Married : Karen Anne Bird; May 2, 1970.

Education : Hon. W.C. Kennedy Collegiate Institute, Windsor, Ontario; Senior matriculation, 1966.

University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario; Bachelor of Arts (economics major), 1969.

University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario; Master of Arts in Political Science, 1971.


University of Windsor Entrance Scholarship, 1966.


Ontario-Quebec Exchange Fellowship, 1971 (declined).

Experience : Teaching Assistant, 1969-1971, Department of Political Science, University of Windsor.