Genetic Discrimination, Life Insurance, and Justice as Fairness

In this paper, I use justice as fairness (JAF) to inquire whether any issues of liberal justice are raised by the practice of genetic discrimination in society, in particular from the standpoint of life insurance pricing in Canada. I present three ways in which JAF may apply. First and foremost, Rawls’ negative thesis can be interpreted to say that one’s genetic characteristics are morally arbitrary and therefore persons do not deserve to be advantaged or disadvantaged by the basic structure of society based on these characteristics. Second, as James W. Nickel observes, Rawls’ principle of equal basic liberties can be interpreted to include a right to privacy which is necessary, among other things, in order to protect other basic rights and liberties. Third, as Martin O’Neill maintains, life insurance is a gateway social good that allows individuals to access primary goods and to live a full human life. Therefore, securing this important good on non-discriminatory grounds is of fundamental importance for a society committed to social justice.