Date of Award

2011

Publication Type

Master Thesis

Degree Name

M.A.Sc.

Department

Industrial and Manufacturing Systems Engineering

First Advisor

Zhang, Guoqing (Industrial and Manufacturing Systems Engineering)

Keywords

Engineering, Industrial.

Rights

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License.

Abstract

Common social issues are usually criticized considering the potential interrelationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and supply chain management. Companies and manufacturers in supply chain networks have been pressured by a growing concern for CSR from governments, organizations, and consumer, and have to bear at least some CSR under policies and regulations. However, naturally, members in a decentralized supply chain network make decisions to maximize their individual net profits. This thesis aims to allocate CSR to members in a non-integrated supply chain over time. Specifically, we formulate a model that crosses through multi-periods by a dynamic discreet Stackelberg game. We then apply control theory and calculus variations to obtain an equilibrium point at where both the profits of members and the level of CSR taken by Supply Chains are maximized. The findings of this thesis serve three subjects: supply chain management, social science, and game theory application.

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