Date of Award


Publication Type

Master Thesis

Degree Name









The following thesis is an attempt to find a role for the faculty of memory in Kant's account of the structures of consciousness in the Critique of Pure Reason. The very core of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is the importance of an unchanging structure of consciousness to which thoughts and experiences can be attributed across time: the transcendental unity of apperception. If it is true, as I maintain, that Kant's project is fundamentally an epistemological, rather than metaphysical one, it follows that the anchor of this project shall be the subject, as one who can know his world in a coherent fashion. Our knowledge of the world, and of ourselves as meaningfully involved therein, depends entirely upon our ability to self-ascribe events and experiences. This ability cannot be gleaned from a theoretically 'raw' experiential base, for there would be no anchor or reference point from which to begin such an epistemological project. It is the productive imagination which provides laws of affinity according to which it is structurally possible to order representations or images which are subject to the form of time (even a past time) in intuition, such that they can be known by the same consciousness as belonging to it, even as that empirical consciousness changes across time. This thesis attempts to demonstrate the transcendental productive memory is in fact a transcendental structure of memory, and that this reading of Kant is bourn out through a subsequent analysis of the Schematism chapter, and the chapter on the Principles of Understanding.Dept. of Philosophy. Paper copy at Leddy Library: Theses & Major Papers - Basement, West Bldg. / Call Number: Thesis2005 .B78. Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 44-03, page: 1162. Thesis (M.A.)--University of Windsor (Canada), 2005.