Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Keywords
argumentation, argumentative virtues, dialectical, incompleteness, pragmatic-utilitarian
Start Date
22-5-2013 9:00 AM
End Date
25-5-2013 5:00 PM
Abstract
The incompleteness problem for virtue ethics is inherited by a virtue-based theory of argumentation as developed by Daniel Cohen (2007). A complete normative theory of argumentation should be able to provide reasons for why argumentative virtues such as open-mindedness are worthwhile, along with being able to resolve conflicts of such virtues. Adumbrating virtue-based argumentation theory with a pragmatic utilitarian approach constitutes a more complete theory that can account for why argumentative virtues are worthwhile.
Creative Commons License
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Response to Submission
Sheldon Wein, Commentary on: Brian MacPherson's "The incompleteness problem for a virtue-based theory of argumentation"
Reader's Reactions
Sheldon Wein, Commentary on: Brian MacPherson's "The incompleteness problem for a virtue-based theory of argumentation" (May 2013)
Included in
The incompleteness problem for a virtue-based theory of argumentation
University of Windsor
The incompleteness problem for virtue ethics is inherited by a virtue-based theory of argumentation as developed by Daniel Cohen (2007). A complete normative theory of argumentation should be able to provide reasons for why argumentative virtues such as open-mindedness are worthwhile, along with being able to resolve conflicts of such virtues. Adumbrating virtue-based argumentation theory with a pragmatic utilitarian approach constitutes a more complete theory that can account for why argumentative virtues are worthwhile.
