Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Keywords
ad hominem, argumentational vice, argumentational virtue, fallacy, virtue argumentation
Start Date
22-5-2013 9:00 AM
End Date
25-5-2013 5:00 PM
Abstract
If good argument is virtuous, then fallacies are vicious. Yet fallacies cannot just be identified with vices, since vices are dispositional properties of agents whereas fallacies are types of argument. Rather, if the normativity of good argumentation is explicable in terms of virtues, we should expect the wrongness of fallacies to be explicable in terms of vices. This approach is defended through case studies of several fallacies, with particular emphasis on the ad hominem.
Creative Commons License
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Response to Submission
Maurice A. Finocchiaro, Commentary on: Andrew Aberdein's "Fallacy and argumentational vice"
Reader's Reactions
Maurice A. Finocchiaro, Commentary on: Andrew Aberdein's "Fallacy and argumentational vice" (May 2013)
Included in
Fallacy and argumentational vice
University of Windsor
If good argument is virtuous, then fallacies are vicious. Yet fallacies cannot just be identified with vices, since vices are dispositional properties of agents whereas fallacies are types of argument. Rather, if the normativity of good argumentation is explicable in terms of virtues, we should expect the wrongness of fallacies to be explicable in terms of vices. This approach is defended through case studies of several fallacies, with particular emphasis on the ad hominem.
