Author ORCID Identifier

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1416-241X : Matthew McKeon

Location

Room 2

Document Type

Paper

Keywords

argument, inference, persuasion

Start Date

5-6-2020 2:00 PM

End Date

5-6-2020 3:00 PM

Abstract

I move beyond Pinto’s (2001) discussion of arguments as invitations to inference by highlighting how arguments can guide the performance of inferences that they do not express. This motivates a distinction between two types of persuasive force arguments can have in terms of two different connections between arguments and inferences. I use this distinction to explain how an epistemically bad argument can rationally persuade addressees of its conclusion.

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Philosophy Commons

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Jun 5th, 2:00 PM Jun 5th, 3:00 PM

Argument, Inference, and Persuasion

Room 2

I move beyond Pinto’s (2001) discussion of arguments as invitations to inference by highlighting how arguments can guide the performance of inferences that they do not express. This motivates a distinction between two types of persuasive force arguments can have in terms of two different connections between arguments and inferences. I use this distinction to explain how an epistemically bad argument can rationally persuade addressees of its conclusion.