Author ORCID Identifier

http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8430-2599

Location

Room 3

Document Type

Paper

Keywords

burden of arguing, burden of explanation, burden of proof, burden of reasoning, cognitive presumption, deontic function, practical presumption

Start Date

6-6-2020 11:00 AM

End Date

6-6-2020 12:00 PM

Abstract

On the standard view, all types of presumptions share the same deontic function: they asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. In this paper, I take into account the differences between cognitive and practical presumptions and explore the deontic function in some detail. What, exactly, does the deontic function of presumption amount to? Once presumptions are rejected, do they always place the burden of proof on the opponents? If they do, what does the burden of proof amount to; and, if they do not, what other obligations might be relevant? Do presumptions place the burden of arguing, the burden of explanation, or the more general burden of reasoning on their opponents? Minimally, the paper shows that the standard account of the deontic function is ambiguous. However, the standard account is not only ambiguous but also implausible: since “burden of proof” is best understood as a burden of arguing (rather than a more general burden of reasoning), cognitive presumptions, strictly taken, do not asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. As a result, the standard accounts require revisions.

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Jun 6th, 11:00 AM Jun 6th, 12:00 PM

Presumptions, burdens of proof, and explanations

Room 3

On the standard view, all types of presumptions share the same deontic function: they asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. In this paper, I take into account the differences between cognitive and practical presumptions and explore the deontic function in some detail. What, exactly, does the deontic function of presumption amount to? Once presumptions are rejected, do they always place the burden of proof on the opponents? If they do, what does the burden of proof amount to; and, if they do not, what other obligations might be relevant? Do presumptions place the burden of arguing, the burden of explanation, or the more general burden of reasoning on their opponents? Minimally, the paper shows that the standard account of the deontic function is ambiguous. However, the standard account is not only ambiguous but also implausible: since “burden of proof” is best understood as a burden of arguing (rather than a more general burden of reasoning), cognitive presumptions, strictly taken, do not asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. As a result, the standard accounts require revisions.