Location
Brock University
Document Type
Paper
Start Date
15-5-1997 9:00 AM
End Date
17-5-1997 5:00 PM
Abstract
In the methodology of theory construction, the concept of "intuitions" is commonly assigned a central role. This is especially true of philosophical and social scientific theories or rational human agency. An equally important trait of such accounts is the theorist's employment of "ideal models" or rational agency. It is frequently supposed that the concept of intuitions and the concept of ideal models link in such a way as to give rise to a coherent and load-bearing notion of "objective normativity." This paper shows, with reference to a wide range of contemporary theories, (a) that the employment of ideal models is otiose, and (b) that the supposedly related concept of objective normativity is groundless.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Response to Submission
Robert C. Pinto, Commentary on Woods
Reader's Reactions
Robert C. Pinto, Commentary on Woods (May 1997)
Included in
The Normative Impotence of Ideal Models
Brock University
In the methodology of theory construction, the concept of "intuitions" is commonly assigned a central role. This is especially true of philosophical and social scientific theories or rational human agency. An equally important trait of such accounts is the theorist's employment of "ideal models" or rational agency. It is frequently supposed that the concept of intuitions and the concept of ideal models link in such a way as to give rise to a coherent and load-bearing notion of "objective normativity." This paper shows, with reference to a wide range of contemporary theories, (a) that the employment of ideal models is otiose, and (b) that the supposedly related concept of objective normativity is groundless.
