Document Type
Paper
Start Date
15-5-1999 9:00 AM
End Date
17-5-1999 5:00 PM
Abstract
If we think of fallacies as violations of the preconditions governing the products, processes, and procedures of argumentation, we see that fallacies do not merely weaken arguments, but rather undermine the possibility of argument itself. This approac h recommends itself on several counts. First, it accounts for diversity in fallacy analysis (investigations have to be formal, rhetorical and pragmatic). Second, it makes possible investigations into new kinds of fallacies (which might focus on context more than conduct). Third, it provides new applications for ongoing developments in fallacy theory (we might further clarify preconditions of argument as required by discourse ethics).
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Response to Submission
John Hoaglund, Commentary on Campolo
Reader's Reactions
James Lawler, Commentary on Brown (May 1999)
Included in
Fallacies and the preconditions of argumentation
If we think of fallacies as violations of the preconditions governing the products, processes, and procedures of argumentation, we see that fallacies do not merely weaken arguments, but rather undermine the possibility of argument itself. This approac h recommends itself on several counts. First, it accounts for diversity in fallacy analysis (investigations have to be formal, rhetorical and pragmatic). Second, it makes possible investigations into new kinds of fallacies (which might focus on context more than conduct). Third, it provides new applications for ongoing developments in fallacy theory (we might further clarify preconditions of argument as required by discourse ethics).
