Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Start Date
6-6-2007 9:00 AM
End Date
9-6-2007 5:00 PM
Abstract
Numerous informal logicians and argumentation theorists restrict their theorizing to what they call “real” arguments. But is there a clear distinction to be made between “real” and “non-real” arguments? Here I explore four possible accounts of the alleged distinction and argue that none can serve the theoretical uses to which the distinction is most often put.
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Response to Submission
Patrick Francken, Commentary on Goddu
Reader's Reactions
Patrick Francken, Commentary on Goddu (June 2007)
Included in
What is a “Real” Argument?
University of Windsor
Numerous informal logicians and argumentation theorists restrict their theorizing to what they call “real” arguments. But is there a clear distinction to be made between “real” and “non-real” arguments? Here I explore four possible accounts of the alleged distinction and argue that none can serve the theoretical uses to which the distinction is most often put.
