Author Information

Lilian Bermejo-LuqueFollow

Location

University of Windsor

Document Type

Paper

Keywords

criteriological conception, justification LNMA, rationality, reasonableness, reasons, transcendental conception, wrong kind of reasons problem

Start Date

18-5-2016 9:00 AM

End Date

21-5-2016 5:00 PM

Abstract

Within the epistemological approach to Argumentation Theory, there are two opposing views on what a theory of argumentation should look like. On the one hand, there are those interested in providing epistemological criteria for good argumentation. For these theorists, the main question is "should we accept this claim on the basis of those reasons?". On the other hand, there are those interested in “characterizing” what is good argumentation. For them, the main question is: "does this piece of argumentation count as good argumentation, taking into account the conception of good argumentation that underlies the practice of arguing?". Both accounts assimilate the goals of a normative theory of argumentation to the goals of a theory of justification, but the former focuses on the conditions for considering that a target-claim is justified, whereas the latter tries to characterize the very concept of justification from the point of view of the practice of arguing. In this paper, I analyze the rewards and shortcomings of both epistemological conceptions of Argumentation Theory and their corresponding criteriological and transcendental accounts of the sort of objectivity that good argumentation is able to provide.

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Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

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David Zarefsky, Commentary on "What should a normative theory of argument look like?" (May 2016)

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May 18th, 9:00 AM May 21st, 5:00 PM

What should a normative theory of argumentation look like?

University of Windsor

Within the epistemological approach to Argumentation Theory, there are two opposing views on what a theory of argumentation should look like. On the one hand, there are those interested in providing epistemological criteria for good argumentation. For these theorists, the main question is "should we accept this claim on the basis of those reasons?". On the other hand, there are those interested in “characterizing” what is good argumentation. For them, the main question is: "does this piece of argumentation count as good argumentation, taking into account the conception of good argumentation that underlies the practice of arguing?". Both accounts assimilate the goals of a normative theory of argumentation to the goals of a theory of justification, but the former focuses on the conditions for considering that a target-claim is justified, whereas the latter tries to characterize the very concept of justification from the point of view of the practice of arguing. In this paper, I analyze the rewards and shortcomings of both epistemological conceptions of Argumentation Theory and their corresponding criteriological and transcendental accounts of the sort of objectivity that good argumentation is able to provide.