Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Keywords
argumentative cell, data, evidentiality, layout of arguments, linguistics, objectivity, rhetoric, Toulmin
Start Date
18-5-2016 9:00 AM
End Date
21-5-2016 5:00 PM
Abstract
This paper presents what we call with Plantin (1900, 2005) an argumentative cell as an unit which is inspired by Toulmin’s layout of arguments (and refined with linguistic insights), in order to analyse two major effects of pseudo-objectivity in argumentation. Four problems of Toulmin's layout will be tackled: (1) Data are only described as facts, (2) the definition of Backing is blurred, but it may be linked with sources of information (linguistic evidentiality) and extended to Data, (3) the dialectical component of the Rebuttal needs to be extended to concessions, and (4) dealing with complex argumentation (linked and convergent argument) within such a model is quite difficult. Treating these problems will highlight the rhetorical possibility of a "bias of objectivity": numerous arguments that use starting points (not only factual Data) which may appear to be objective or shared in order to impose a standpoint to the addressee. This bias can be seen in at least two rhetorical strategies: the first one is using facts as arguments without signs of evidentiality (or sources) in grounds for the argument. The second one is delivering opinions as apparently collectively shared.
Creative Commons License
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Reader's Reactions
S. W. Patterson, Commentary on T. Herman’s “Revising Toulmin’s Model: Argumentative Cell and the Bias of Objectivity” (May 2016)
Included in
Modern Languages Commons, Philosophy Commons, Rhetoric Commons
Revising Toulmin’s Model: Argumentative Cell and the Bias of Objectivity
University of Windsor
This paper presents what we call with Plantin (1900, 2005) an argumentative cell as an unit which is inspired by Toulmin’s layout of arguments (and refined with linguistic insights), in order to analyse two major effects of pseudo-objectivity in argumentation. Four problems of Toulmin's layout will be tackled: (1) Data are only described as facts, (2) the definition of Backing is blurred, but it may be linked with sources of information (linguistic evidentiality) and extended to Data, (3) the dialectical component of the Rebuttal needs to be extended to concessions, and (4) dealing with complex argumentation (linked and convergent argument) within such a model is quite difficult. Treating these problems will highlight the rhetorical possibility of a "bias of objectivity": numerous arguments that use starting points (not only factual Data) which may appear to be objective or shared in order to impose a standpoint to the addressee. This bias can be seen in at least two rhetorical strategies: the first one is using facts as arguments without signs of evidentiality (or sources) in grounds for the argument. The second one is delivering opinions as apparently collectively shared.
