Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Start Date
6-6-2007 9:00 AM
End Date
9-6-2007 5:00 PM
Abstract
In this paper, the author presents a theory of testimony intended to provide normative clarity in nonspecialized communication contexts where participants are searching for common ground. Drawn in part from the work of a number of contemporary philosophers, the theory presented is essentially non-reductionist, but contains qualifications and safeguards sufficient to distinguish it from many so-called default acceptance theories of testimony.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Response to Submission
Trudy Govier, Commentary on Fields
Reader's Reactions
Trudy Govier, Commentary on Fields (June 2007)
Included in
Acceptable Addressee Expectations Regarding Testimony
University of Windsor
In this paper, the author presents a theory of testimony intended to provide normative clarity in nonspecialized communication contexts where participants are searching for common ground. Drawn in part from the work of a number of contemporary philosophers, the theory presented is essentially non-reductionist, but contains qualifications and safeguards sufficient to distinguish it from many so-called default acceptance theories of testimony.
