Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Start Date
3-6-2009 9:00 AM
End Date
6-6-2009 5:00 PM
Abstract
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein argues both that certain propositions belong to our “frame of reference” and are “exempt from doubt,” and that this “river-bed of thoughts” can change. Exploring this seeming contradiction, I argue that such changes can take place as the result of rational argumentation, although of a highly indirect nature, and suggest that something like this can hold for argumentation between cultures.
Creative Commons License
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Response to Submission
Menashe Schwed, Commentary on Bohlin
Reader's Reactions
Menashe Schwed, Commentary on Bohlin (June 2009)
Included in
The Dynamics of Belief Systems: A Wittgensteinian view
University of Windsor
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein argues both that certain propositions belong to our “frame of reference” and are “exempt from doubt,” and that this “river-bed of thoughts” can change. Exploring this seeming contradiction, I argue that such changes can take place as the result of rational argumentation, although of a highly indirect nature, and suggest that something like this can hold for argumentation between cultures.
