Event Title
Section and Paper
Section 1: Paper 3
Description
Irony appears to be deeply rooted in the practice of ethics. Attempts to prescribe morally obligatory duties, and to will morally justified actions, often bring about the opposite of their intended result. Imposing imperatives, e.g., justice, in efforts to produce fair, equitable, caring societies, inadvertently plants seeds of failure. The imposition of moral imperatives increasingly appears to generate polarities rather than unities, as cases of abortion, euthanasia, reactions to liberal immigration, and environmental protection policies have illustrated. Imposed imperatives generate counter imperatives and counterclaims of having justice on “our” side. I attempt here to explain this phenomenon and, in the process, argue that attempts to resolve such conflicts by defending one’s position against its opposition is, in a certain way, destructive of moral life. I conclude with a sketch of how an ethic of attunement can help rectify this problem.
First Page
41
Last Page
59
Included in
Opposites
Irony appears to be deeply rooted in the practice of ethics. Attempts to prescribe morally obligatory duties, and to will morally justified actions, often bring about the opposite of their intended result. Imposing imperatives, e.g., justice, in efforts to produce fair, equitable, caring societies, inadvertently plants seeds of failure. The imposition of moral imperatives increasingly appears to generate polarities rather than unities, as cases of abortion, euthanasia, reactions to liberal immigration, and environmental protection policies have illustrated. Imposed imperatives generate counter imperatives and counterclaims of having justice on “our” side. I attempt here to explain this phenomenon and, in the process, argue that attempts to resolve such conflicts by defending one’s position against its opposition is, in a certain way, destructive of moral life. I conclude with a sketch of how an ethic of attunement can help rectify this problem.
Comments
Bruce Morito is Professor of Philosophy at Athabasca University, Athabasca, Alberta, Canada. His main areas of research and writing can generally be described as practical ethics with emphasis on environmental philosophy and issues pertaining to Indigenous people/Crown relations. He is especially interested in how matters of worldview (metaphysics), value theory, personhood, and mind bear on these topics.