Title
The Stages on Neo-Aristotelian Moral Taxonomy - What Virtue Ethics Can Learn from Kierkegaard
Conference Level
Undergraduate
Location
University of Windsor
Start Date
March 2015
End Date
March 2015
Abstract
That Kierkegaard goes into great detail about the motivations and affectations of agents who pursue different ways of going about life renders it a plausible candidate for informing the project of virtue ethics in some way. Especially if ethics is taken to be the study of how one ought live their life, then, ostensibly, what Kierkegaard’s descriptions can be interpreted as an agent-based ethic. What is different, however, is that in contrast to Aristotle’s reliance on empirical observations and rational objective argumentation, Kierkegaard writes from the perspective of the agents themselves and provides detailed and visceral descriptions of the internalized affectations and motivations of agents. Given that these are two different approaches that are essentially directed towards a common task of describing a good way of life, I suggest that Kierkegaard’s texts can be justifiably interpreted as descriptive works of moral psychology that can supplement Aristotle’s hierarchy of moral agents. Towards this end, the first half of the presentation will briefly explain the sort of constructivist virtue ethic that will be ameliorated by my reading of Kierkegaard; and highlight some key points of convergence to justify such a reading. Building upon this interpretation as a foundation, the second portion of the presentation will be more precisely dedicated to the actual constructive task itself and foreground some facets of moral theory that are made more clear by this reading of Kierkegaard.
In the first section, I will highlight links between Kierkegaard and Neo-Aristotelian emphasis on an aretaic and teleological aim of the agent (eudaimonia for the latter, and eternal happiness for the former). Both of these aims are further contextualized and qualified by both authors in their consideration of the necessary and embodied context of the agent: that is, there exists an unalienable lacuna that cannot be rationally overcome in the agent’s movement towards the teleological end. Addressing the greatest linguistic shortcoming to this project, I will clarify the hallmarks of Kierkegaard’s ethical stage on life’s way and suggest that this is in essence what is implicitly included in an interpretation of virtue ethics that includes telic hierarchies. Taking these convergences into consideration, I advance the views that: 1) the proper attitude of the temperate or virtuous agent towards eudaimonia is one of hope, and 2) the difference between continence and temperance is the affectation of hope. Taken together, both these claims have great implications on the way in which we ought conceive the move towards aretaic excellence.
It should be emphasized that the presentation is more properly a work in ethical theory rather than proper Kierkegaard scholarship – the lessons gleaned from Kierkegaard are primarily drawn from a decontextualized reading of Either/Or and Fear and Trembling, rather than Kierkegaard’s broader corpus. While it is plausible from the results of the arguments presented that the rest of Kierkegaard’s work can likewise be interpreted and that their inclusion would likely benefit the arguments (specifically, Sickness Unto Death), due to the scope of the completed project, these works will not be discussed.
The Stages on Neo-Aristotelian Moral Taxonomy - What Virtue Ethics Can Learn from Kierkegaard
University of Windsor
That Kierkegaard goes into great detail about the motivations and affectations of agents who pursue different ways of going about life renders it a plausible candidate for informing the project of virtue ethics in some way. Especially if ethics is taken to be the study of how one ought live their life, then, ostensibly, what Kierkegaard’s descriptions can be interpreted as an agent-based ethic. What is different, however, is that in contrast to Aristotle’s reliance on empirical observations and rational objective argumentation, Kierkegaard writes from the perspective of the agents themselves and provides detailed and visceral descriptions of the internalized affectations and motivations of agents. Given that these are two different approaches that are essentially directed towards a common task of describing a good way of life, I suggest that Kierkegaard’s texts can be justifiably interpreted as descriptive works of moral psychology that can supplement Aristotle’s hierarchy of moral agents. Towards this end, the first half of the presentation will briefly explain the sort of constructivist virtue ethic that will be ameliorated by my reading of Kierkegaard; and highlight some key points of convergence to justify such a reading. Building upon this interpretation as a foundation, the second portion of the presentation will be more precisely dedicated to the actual constructive task itself and foreground some facets of moral theory that are made more clear by this reading of Kierkegaard.
In the first section, I will highlight links between Kierkegaard and Neo-Aristotelian emphasis on an aretaic and teleological aim of the agent (eudaimonia for the latter, and eternal happiness for the former). Both of these aims are further contextualized and qualified by both authors in their consideration of the necessary and embodied context of the agent: that is, there exists an unalienable lacuna that cannot be rationally overcome in the agent’s movement towards the teleological end. Addressing the greatest linguistic shortcoming to this project, I will clarify the hallmarks of Kierkegaard’s ethical stage on life’s way and suggest that this is in essence what is implicitly included in an interpretation of virtue ethics that includes telic hierarchies. Taking these convergences into consideration, I advance the views that: 1) the proper attitude of the temperate or virtuous agent towards eudaimonia is one of hope, and 2) the difference between continence and temperance is the affectation of hope. Taken together, both these claims have great implications on the way in which we ought conceive the move towards aretaic excellence.
It should be emphasized that the presentation is more properly a work in ethical theory rather than proper Kierkegaard scholarship – the lessons gleaned from Kierkegaard are primarily drawn from a decontextualized reading of Either/Or and Fear and Trembling, rather than Kierkegaard’s broader corpus. While it is plausible from the results of the arguments presented that the rest of Kierkegaard’s work can likewise be interpreted and that their inclusion would likely benefit the arguments (specifically, Sickness Unto Death), due to the scope of the completed project, these works will not be discussed.