Author ORCID Identifier

http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0821-8787 : Guoqing Zhang

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

5-2018

Publication Title

Computers and Industrial Engineering

Volume

119

First Page

63

Keywords

Dual channel, Resalable returns, Reverse supply chains, Pricing, Stackelberg game, Nash game

Last Page

75

Abstract

Many retailers are adopting a dual-channel retailing strategy (DCRS) in which products are offered through two channels: physical stores and online stores. Due to regulations or competitive measures, such a strategy allows customers who find a purchase unsatisfactory to obtain a full refund through a same-channel return or a cross-channel return. No papers have collectively studied the aforementioned types of customer returns in a dual-channel context. This paper studies optimal pricing policies for a centralized and decentralized dual-channel retailer (DCR) with same- and cross-channel returns. How dual-channel pricing behavior is impacted by customer preference and rates of customer returns is discussed. It is found, through sensitivity analysis, that when a channel with significant customer preference faces a high rate of returns, decentralized channels generate a greater system profit for retailers than coordinated channels that have a unified pricing strategy. A DCR with a Stackelberg scheme has the proclivity to be more profitable when under the leadership of a channel with a high rate of returns and significant customer preference.

DOI

10.1016/j.cie.2018.03.020

Funding Reference Number

RGPIN-2014-03594

Comments

Recommend citation:

Radhi, M., & Zhang, G. (2018). Pricing policies for a dual-channel retailer with cross-channel returns. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 119, 63-75.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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