Location

University of Windsor

Document Type

Paper

Keywords

Argumentation, reasoning, objectivity, emotion, tribunal

Start Date

2016 9:00 AM

End Date

2016 5:00 PM

Abstract

We intend to examine ways that emotions may be intertwined within argumentative legal discourses. From the transcript of a brief trial in a Court of Appeal in Brazil we have the opportunity to observe how the emotional and rational reasoning live together in a deliberation among magistrates. “The leg broken case” allow us to examine how judges define the value of compensation to be paid in cases of moral damage. We show that not only technical arguments are the compounds of one decision; subjectivity is also important in that legal context. We would yet confirm what jurists and philosophers of the argumentation fields, such as G. Cornu (2005), E. Feteris (1999), A. Garapon (2001, 2008), J. J. Robrieux (2010), C. Perelman (1999), C. M. Stamakis (1995), among others, had already emphasized: judges are not cold machines in the moments of a judging. The analysis may show that a sentence is a mix of legal rules and magistrates’ personal experience, in some extent.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

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Linda Carozza, Commentary on Emotional Legal Arguments and a Broken Leg (May 2016)

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May 18th, 9:00 AM May 21st, 5:00 PM

Emotional legal arguments and a broken leg

University of Windsor

We intend to examine ways that emotions may be intertwined within argumentative legal discourses. From the transcript of a brief trial in a Court of Appeal in Brazil we have the opportunity to observe how the emotional and rational reasoning live together in a deliberation among magistrates. “The leg broken case” allow us to examine how judges define the value of compensation to be paid in cases of moral damage. We show that not only technical arguments are the compounds of one decision; subjectivity is also important in that legal context. We would yet confirm what jurists and philosophers of the argumentation fields, such as G. Cornu (2005), E. Feteris (1999), A. Garapon (2001, 2008), J. J. Robrieux (2010), C. Perelman (1999), C. M. Stamakis (1995), among others, had already emphasized: judges are not cold machines in the moments of a judging. The analysis may show that a sentence is a mix of legal rules and magistrates’ personal experience, in some extent.