Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Keywords
Argumentation, reasoning, objectivity, emotion, tribunal
Start Date
2016 9:00 AM
End Date
2016 5:00 PM
Abstract
We intend to examine ways that emotions may be intertwined within argumentative legal discourses. From the transcript of a brief trial in a Court of Appeal in Brazil we have the opportunity to observe how the emotional and rational reasoning live together in a deliberation among magistrates. “The leg broken case” allow us to examine how judges define the value of compensation to be paid in cases of moral damage. We show that not only technical arguments are the compounds of one decision; subjectivity is also important in that legal context. We would yet confirm what jurists and philosophers of the argumentation fields, such as G. Cornu (2005), E. Feteris (1999), A. Garapon (2001, 2008), J. J. Robrieux (2010), C. Perelman (1999), C. M. Stamakis (1995), among others, had already emphasized: judges are not cold machines in the moments of a judging. The analysis may show that a sentence is a mix of legal rules and magistrates’ personal experience, in some extent.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Reader's Reactions
Linda Carozza, Commentary on Emotional Legal Arguments and a Broken Leg (May 2016)
Emotional legal arguments and a broken leg
University of Windsor
We intend to examine ways that emotions may be intertwined within argumentative legal discourses. From the transcript of a brief trial in a Court of Appeal in Brazil we have the opportunity to observe how the emotional and rational reasoning live together in a deliberation among magistrates. “The leg broken case” allow us to examine how judges define the value of compensation to be paid in cases of moral damage. We show that not only technical arguments are the compounds of one decision; subjectivity is also important in that legal context. We would yet confirm what jurists and philosophers of the argumentation fields, such as G. Cornu (2005), E. Feteris (1999), A. Garapon (2001, 2008), J. J. Robrieux (2010), C. Perelman (1999), C. M. Stamakis (1995), among others, had already emphasized: judges are not cold machines in the moments of a judging. The analysis may show that a sentence is a mix of legal rules and magistrates’ personal experience, in some extent.
