Document Type

Paper

Start Date

15-5-1999 9:00 AM

End Date

17-5-1999 5:00 PM

Abstract

If we think of fallacies as violations of the preconditions governing the products, processes, and procedures of argumentation, we see that fallacies do not merely weaken arguments, but rather undermine the possibility of argument itself. This approac h recommends itself on several counts. First, it accounts for diversity in fallacy analysis (investigations have to be formal, rhetorical and pragmatic). Second, it makes possible investigations into new kinds of fallacies (which might focus on context more than conduct). Third, it provides new applications for ongoing developments in fallacy theory (we might further clarify preconditions of argument as required by discourse ethics).

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

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John Hoaglund, Commentary on Campolo

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James Lawler, Commentary on Brown (May 1999)

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May 15th, 9:00 AM May 17th, 5:00 PM

Fallacies and the preconditions of argumentation

If we think of fallacies as violations of the preconditions governing the products, processes, and procedures of argumentation, we see that fallacies do not merely weaken arguments, but rather undermine the possibility of argument itself. This approac h recommends itself on several counts. First, it accounts for diversity in fallacy analysis (investigations have to be formal, rhetorical and pragmatic). Second, it makes possible investigations into new kinds of fallacies (which might focus on context more than conduct). Third, it provides new applications for ongoing developments in fallacy theory (we might further clarify preconditions of argument as required by discourse ethics).