Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Keywords
argumentation theory, criticism, idealizations, normativity, pragma-dialectics
Start Date
18-5-2016 9:00 AM
End Date
21-5-2016 5:00 PM
Abstract
In this paper I develop and defend a form of argumentative normativity that is not based on fundamental principles. I first argue that research agendas that aim to discover (or claimed to have discovered) fundamental principles of ‘good’ argumentative discourse share one crucial weak spot, viz. circularity. I then argue that this weak spot can be avoided in a pancritical (Bartley, 1984) view of normativity.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Reader's Reactions
S. W. Patterson, Commentary on E. Popa’s “Normative Argumentation Theory Without Fundamental Principles” (May 2016)
Included in
Normative Argumentation Theory Without Fundamental Principles
University of Windsor
In this paper I develop and defend a form of argumentative normativity that is not based on fundamental principles. I first argue that research agendas that aim to discover (or claimed to have discovered) fundamental principles of ‘good’ argumentative discourse share one crucial weak spot, viz. circularity. I then argue that this weak spot can be avoided in a pancritical (Bartley, 1984) view of normativity.
