Author ORCID Identifier
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1416-241X : Matthew McKeon
Location
Room 2
Document Type
Paper
Keywords
argument, inference, persuasion
Start Date
5-6-2020 2:00 PM
End Date
5-6-2020 3:00 PM
Abstract
I move beyond Pinto’s (2001) discussion of arguments as invitations to inference by highlighting how arguments can guide the performance of inferences that they do not express. This motivates a distinction between two types of persuasive force arguments can have in terms of two different connections between arguments and inferences. I use this distinction to explain how an epistemically bad argument can rationally persuade addressees of its conclusion.
Reader's Reactions
Daniel H. Cohen, Commentary on McKeon on argument, inference, and persuasion (June 2020)
Included in
Argument, Inference, and Persuasion
Room 2
I move beyond Pinto’s (2001) discussion of arguments as invitations to inference by highlighting how arguments can guide the performance of inferences that they do not express. This motivates a distinction between two types of persuasive force arguments can have in terms of two different connections between arguments and inferences. I use this distinction to explain how an epistemically bad argument can rationally persuade addressees of its conclusion.
