Location
Room 1
Document Type
Paper
Keywords
adversariality, argumentation, default skeptical stance, epistemic injustice
Start Date
3-6-2020 3:00 PM
End Date
3-6-2020 4:00 PM
Abstract
The Default Skeptical Stance (DSS) delineates dialectical partners behavior toward one another given the adversariality thesis. Phyllis Rooney holds that the DSS, as a bridge between the formal and pragmatic elements of adversariality, leads to epistemic dysfunction. This connection commits the Adversarialist to defending the DSS. My modest version of this defense will be to show that the dysfunction in Rooney’s going case, the Penaluna – Leiter exchange, is not attributable to argument’s skeptical norms.
Reader's Reactions
Daniel H. Cohen, Commentary on Vollbrecht's "Epistemic success and skeptical norms in argumentation" (June 2020)
Included in
Epistemic Success and Skeptical Norms in Argument
Room 1
The Default Skeptical Stance (DSS) delineates dialectical partners behavior toward one another given the adversariality thesis. Phyllis Rooney holds that the DSS, as a bridge between the formal and pragmatic elements of adversariality, leads to epistemic dysfunction. This connection commits the Adversarialist to defending the DSS. My modest version of this defense will be to show that the dysfunction in Rooney’s going case, the Penaluna – Leiter exchange, is not attributable to argument’s skeptical norms.
