Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Start Date
6-6-2007 9:00 AM
End Date
9-6-2007 5:00 PM
Abstract
Following Rescher’s (1977) conception of dialectics, I argue for the view that the dialectical aspect of argumentation enables a “second order intersubjectivity”, to be understood in terms of the recursive nature of the activity of giving and asking for reasons. This feature underlies that most argumentative discourses represent the explicit part of a dynamic activity, “a mechanism of rational validation” (Rescher, 1977: xiii) which presupposes the possibility of attaining objectivity.
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Response to Submission
James B. Freeman, Commentary on Bermejo-Luque
Reader's Reactions
James B. Freeman, Commentary on Bermejo-Luque (June 2007)
Included in
Second Order Intersubjectivity: The Dialectical Aspect of Argumentation
University of Windsor
Following Rescher’s (1977) conception of dialectics, I argue for the view that the dialectical aspect of argumentation enables a “second order intersubjectivity”, to be understood in terms of the recursive nature of the activity of giving and asking for reasons. This feature underlies that most argumentative discourses represent the explicit part of a dynamic activity, “a mechanism of rational validation” (Rescher, 1977: xiii) which presupposes the possibility of attaining objectivity.
