Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Start Date
6-6-2007 9:00 AM
End Date
9-6-2007 5:00 PM
Abstract
Contrary to current individualistic epistemology, classical rhetoric provides us with a pragmatical conception of ‘testimony’ as a source provided to the orator by the particular community in which he acts. In order to count as usable ‘testimony’, any linguistic instance must comply with specific rules of social sanction. A deliberate attention to the social practices in which ‘testimony’ is given and assessed may provide us with a more accurate view of its epistemological role.
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Response to Submission
John E. Fields, Commentary on Olmos
Reader's Reactions
John E. Fields, Commentary on Olmos (June 2007)
Included in
Making it Public: Testimony and Socially Sanctioned Common Grounds
University of Windsor
Contrary to current individualistic epistemology, classical rhetoric provides us with a pragmatical conception of ‘testimony’ as a source provided to the orator by the particular community in which he acts. In order to count as usable ‘testimony’, any linguistic instance must comply with specific rules of social sanction. A deliberate attention to the social practices in which ‘testimony’ is given and assessed may provide us with a more accurate view of its epistemological role.