Location

University of Windsor

Document Type

Paper

Start Date

3-6-2009 9:00 AM

End Date

6-6-2009 5:00 PM

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to extend Miranda Fricker’s conception of testimonial injustice to what I call “argumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer’s social identity brings listeners to place too little or too much credibility in an argument. My recommendation is to put in place a type of indirect “affirmative action” plan for argument evaluation. I also situate my proposal in Johnson (2000)’s framework of argumentation as an exercise in manifest rationality.

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Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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John E. Fields, Commentary on Bondy

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John E. Fields, Commentary on Bondy (June 2009)

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Jun 3rd, 9:00 AM Jun 6th, 5:00 PM

When Reasons Don’t Work

University of Windsor

The aim of this paper is to extend Miranda Fricker’s conception of testimonial injustice to what I call “argumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer’s social identity brings listeners to place too little or too much credibility in an argument. My recommendation is to put in place a type of indirect “affirmative action” plan for argument evaluation. I also situate my proposal in Johnson (2000)’s framework of argumentation as an exercise in manifest rationality.