Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Keywords
deep disagreement, Feldman, Fogelin, peer disagreement, reasonable disagreement, Wittgenstein
Start Date
22-5-2013 9:00 AM
End Date
25-5-2013 5:00 PM
Abstract
When epistemic peers disagree, what should a virtuous arguer do? Several options have been defended in the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement, which connects interestingly to the controversy launched by Fogelin’s famous paper on ‘deep disagreement.’ I will argue that Fogelin’s case is transformed by the new work on disagreement, and that when seen in that broader epistemological context ‘deep’ disagreement is much less problematic for argumentation theory than it once seemed.
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Response to Submission
Robert C. Pinto, Commentary on: Harvey Siegal's "Argumentation and epistemology of disagreement"
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Robert C. Pinto, Commentary on: Harvey Siegal's "Argumentation and epistemology of disagreement" (May 2013)
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Argumentation and the epistemology of disagreement
University of Windsor
When epistemic peers disagree, what should a virtuous arguer do? Several options have been defended in the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement, which connects interestingly to the controversy launched by Fogelin’s famous paper on ‘deep disagreement.’ I will argue that Fogelin’s case is transformed by the new work on disagreement, and that when seen in that broader epistemological context ‘deep’ disagreement is much less problematic for argumentation theory than it once seemed.
