Location

University of Windsor

Document Type

Paper

Keywords

ad hominem, argumentational vice, argumentational virtue, fallacy, virtue argumentation

Start Date

22-5-2013 9:00 AM

End Date

25-5-2013 5:00 PM

Abstract

If good argument is virtuous, then fallacies are vicious. Yet fallacies cannot just be identified with vices, since vices are dispositional properties of agents whereas fallacies are types of argument. Rather, if the normativity of good argumentation is explicable in terms of virtues, we should expect the wrongness of fallacies to be explicable in terms of vices. This approach is defended through case studies of several fallacies, with particular emphasis on the ad hominem.

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Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

Response to Submission

Maurice A. Finocchiaro, Commentary on: Andrew Aberdein's "Fallacy and argumentational vice"

Reader's Reactions

Maurice A. Finocchiaro, Commentary on: Andrew Aberdein's "Fallacy and argumentational vice" (May 2013)

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May 22nd, 9:00 AM May 25th, 5:00 PM

Fallacy and argumentational vice

University of Windsor

If good argument is virtuous, then fallacies are vicious. Yet fallacies cannot just be identified with vices, since vices are dispositional properties of agents whereas fallacies are types of argument. Rather, if the normativity of good argumentation is explicable in terms of virtues, we should expect the wrongness of fallacies to be explicable in terms of vices. This approach is defended through case studies of several fallacies, with particular emphasis on the ad hominem.