Document Type
Paper
Start Date
15-5-1999 9:00 AM
End Date
17-5-1999 5:00 PM
Abstract
This presentation traces an historical root of the reductio ad absurdum mode of argumentation in Greek philosophy. I propose a new understanding of the liar paradox as an instance of this mode of argumentation. I show that the paradox was crea ted as part of a refutational argument in the controversy over the justification of realism and the realists concepts of truth and certainty. The paradox was part of the dialectical style of Greek scepticism, which was characterized, inter alia, by the u se of the reductio ad absurdum. The paradox turns out to be a metaphysical and epistemological argument.
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Response to Submission
Lawrence Powers, Commentary on Schwed
Reader's Reactions
Lawrence Powers, Commentary on Schwed (May 1999)
Included in
The Liar Paradox as a reductio ad absurdum argument
This presentation traces an historical root of the reductio ad absurdum mode of argumentation in Greek philosophy. I propose a new understanding of the liar paradox as an instance of this mode of argumentation. I show that the paradox was crea ted as part of a refutational argument in the controversy over the justification of realism and the realists concepts of truth and certainty. The paradox was part of the dialectical style of Greek scepticism, which was characterized, inter alia, by the u se of the reductio ad absurdum. The paradox turns out to be a metaphysical and epistemological argument.
