Document Type
Paper
Start Date
15-5-1999 9:00 AM
End Date
17-5-1999 5:00 PM
Abstract
Since the dialectical turn in logic, truth has been replaced by acceptability. The latter notion, however, does not provide for a strong enough constraint. It is thought that only truth can overrule acceptability, and for that reason we need to reass ess the notion. Still, truth is a confusing philosophical concept, and we should be clear as to which understanding of the notion can do the job. I shall argue that a correspondence theory of truth in particular will not do. Rather we should adopt a de flationary account: all we need is a suitable understanding of the truth-predicate.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Response to Submission
Wayne Grennan, Commentary on Slob
Reader's Reactions
Wayne Grennan, Commentary on Slob (May 1999)
Included in
But that simply isn't true; rethinking truth in argumentation
Since the dialectical turn in logic, truth has been replaced by acceptability. The latter notion, however, does not provide for a strong enough constraint. It is thought that only truth can overrule acceptability, and for that reason we need to reass ess the notion. Still, truth is a confusing philosophical concept, and we should be clear as to which understanding of the notion can do the job. I shall argue that a correspondence theory of truth in particular will not do. Rather we should adopt a de flationary account: all we need is a suitable understanding of the truth-predicate.
