Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Keywords
epistemic foundationalism, epistemic coherentism, dialectical egalitarianism, disagreement, epistemic merits, rapprochement
Start Date
18-5-2011 9:00 AM
End Date
21-5-2011 5:00 PM
Abstract
According to Michael Rescorla’s recent defense of dialectical egalitarianism (The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 59, No. 234: 2009) reasoned discourse lacks a foundational structure, but saves the foundational intuition that some propositions are basic. On this view, I may select the reasons forwarded in support of a claim according to their being accepted by particular communities/audiences. I discuss the epistemic risk of doing so, and clarify if Rescorla’s is an epistemic approach in disguise.
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Included in
Foundations for nothing and facts for free?
University of Windsor
According to Michael Rescorla’s recent defense of dialectical egalitarianism (The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 59, No. 234: 2009) reasoned discourse lacks a foundational structure, but saves the foundational intuition that some propositions are basic. On this view, I may select the reasons forwarded in support of a claim according to their being accepted by particular communities/audiences. I discuss the epistemic risk of doing so, and clarify if Rescorla’s is an epistemic approach in disguise.
