Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Keywords
credibility, epistemic privilege, experience, Hume, Nagel, standpoint theory, testimony, qualia, victims, Wittgenstein
Start Date
22-5-2013 9:00 AM
End Date
25-5-2013 5:00 PM
Abstract
The authority of first person claims may be understood from an epistemic perspective or as a matter of social practice. Building on accounts of Hume, Nagel, and several more recent authors, it is argued that this authority should be understood as limited. To extend it beyond notions of what it is like to experience something, we shift from what should be a narrow subjective edge to a territory of objective claims, thereby reasoning incorrectly. A relevant application is the supposed authority of victims.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Response to Submission
Maureen Linker, Commentary on: Trudy Govier's "Reflections on the authority of personal experience"
Reader's Reactions
Maureen Linker, Commentary on: Trudy Govier's "Reflections on the authority of personal experience" (May 2013)
Included in
Reflections on the authority of personal experience
University of Windsor
The authority of first person claims may be understood from an epistemic perspective or as a matter of social practice. Building on accounts of Hume, Nagel, and several more recent authors, it is argued that this authority should be understood as limited. To extend it beyond notions of what it is like to experience something, we shift from what should be a narrow subjective edge to a territory of objective claims, thereby reasoning incorrectly. A relevant application is the supposed authority of victims.
